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South Asia’s minorities - religious and linguistic groups, especially 
women and those from Dalit backgrounds amongst them, and the many 
indigenous/adivasi communities, besides sexual minorities - make up 
disproportionate numbers of the poor and excluded in each country, 
suffering discrimination in the socio-economic sphere and denial of the 
most basic human rights.
South Asia State of Minorities Report 2018: Exploring the Roots seeks 
to examine the reasons for the poor outcomes for minorities in South 
Asia, shining a light specifically on their socio-economic situation and 
their access to rights and opportunities. South Asia demonstrates amply 
how failures to prevent exclusion and discrimination against specific 
minorities have opened the way for graver abuse of human rights and 
violence against those groups.
The South Asia State of Minorities Report is planned as a tool for 
advocacy. It is hoped that the periodic reports on outcomes for minorities 
and the quality of state provisioning for them, will spur public debate on 
the subject in the region and create the conditions for state parties and 
the SAARC to agree to give serious consideration to issues of minorities 
and how to deliver for them. The purpose of the project is about promoting 
citizenship, a central challenge of the ‘deepening democracy’ agenda 
in the region. This publication is the second in the series following the 
publication of South Asia State of Minorities Report 2016: Mapping the 
Terrain.
The South Asia Collective is a group of human rights activists and 
organisations that dream of a just, caring and peaceful South Asia, that 
came together in December 2015 to document the condition of the 
region’s minorities – religious, linguistic, ethnic, caste and gender, among 
others – hoping this would help in better outcomes for South Asia’s many 
marginalised groups.
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vThe multiple religious, linguistic and ethnically diverse communities that 
make up South Asia are our richest source of culture and heritage. The man-
ner in which various influences impacted, intermixed and developed each 
other to higher standards of decency and humanity have, over centuries, 
led to significant progress, and the emergence of common values deemed 
South Asian, even though they are bifurcated by national boundaries drawn 
to protect hegemonies. 
Our history books tell us that this trajectory of interchange has never 
been linear, and has often been disrupted by violent contestation. There 
have always been influences that seek to divide and conquer us, highlighting 
differences and sowing distrust in undisguised quests for power, influence 
and fiefdom. One historical feature of the cultures in the region, fuelled by 
beliefs in the value of spirituality, is to treat even these disruptive influences 
with kindness and sophistication, retaining the residual goodness in them, 
while rejecting and fighting against their destructive influences. 
It is this spirit that is needed once again as identity and belief - the 
source of so much pride accumulated over centuries, are parodied and por-
trayed by those set with a narrow compass on history, as sources of division 
and hate. The South Asia State of Minorities Report 2018, written drawing 
on meticulous research, and underscored by immense humanity, highlights 
the vast distance we need to travel once again. It has often been said that a 
society should be judged on how well it treats its most vulnerable populati-
ons. The violations of the rights of marginalized and excluded populations 
highlighted in this report emphasize the need for urgent and collective acti-
on to fight against those who would divide and conquer us.
Hate is a self-fulfilling prophecy that can only propagate greater hate. 
Emerging from this deathly cauldron requires committed leaders and 
value-driven communities who can see past trickery and vested interest, 
to draw clear lines that respect every individual’s dignity and worth, and 
celebrate every culture that has contributed to the incredible mosaic of 
populations that survive, endure and thrive in these lands. The report is 
compulsory reading for all who are concerned about the future of our body 
politic. If read closely it will make you ashamed and angry, but neither of 
these sentiments are likely to result in a better 2019. To do that requires 
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collective will, generosity of resource and spirit, dreams about a better 
world and the imagination for how to get there. To kick-start that, it needs 
a determination not to be fooled into believing that the person besides you, 
irrespective of her religion, in fact shares common values for peace and 
prosperity. There is much at stake here for our common future. Yet this can 
only be realized if we defeat the dark period we are in. A period characteri-
zed by selfishness and avarice we thought had been eased by the progress 
of our civilizations, but which has resurfaced.  Our history tells us that if we 
unite for progress, brighter days will come. We have done this before, a few 
generations ago, and can do it again, by realizing that sharing our space in 
peace and prosperity is only possible if we all realize that we have a collec-
tive stake in it.  And if we do that successfully, the report for 2019 will begin 
to look significantly different. 
Professor Joshua Castellino
Executive Director & Professor of Law
Minority Rights Group International, London, UK
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Executive Summary
1. South Asia’s minorities - religious and linguistic groups, especially 
women and those from Dalit backgrounds amongst them, and the many 
indigenous / Adivasi communities, besides sexual minorities - make up 
disproportionate numbers of the poor and excluded in each country in 
the region, suffering discrimination in the socio-economic sphere, be-
sides denial of the most basic human rights. They form the bulk of the 
marginalised in a region that houses over half the world’s multi-dimen-
sionally poor, and where country Human Development Index (HDI) 
rankings are among the worst. Yet, there is very little systematic docu-
mentation of the condition of minorities, and of discrimination in deliv-
ery of basic rights. Poor access of South Asia’s minorities to socio-eco-
nomic rights makes them vulnerable to violations of other critical rights 
too – life and security, freedom of religion, and to participation - a cycle 
we see playing out repeatedly in the entrenched exclusions and frequent 
targeted violence against minorities across South Asia.
2. South Asia State of Minorities Report (SASoM 2018): Exploring the 
Roots - the second in the series after South Asia State of Minorities 
Report 2016: Mapping the Terrain - is on the theme of socio-econom-
ic rights, aimed both to document evidence of denials as well as to act 
as a tool to galvanise action. SASoM 2018 reports on the performance 
of each county in the region on equal and non-discriminatory access to 
socio-economic rights, specifically as it relates to their minorities. Us-
ing international treaties of direct relevance to socio-economic rights 
as basis for the assessment, SASoM 2018 focuses on states promoting 
equality and non-discrimination in the provision of key rights - health, 
education, work, adequate standard of living and social security. The 
analysis here uses UN’s Human Rights Indicators framework to report 
state performance, shedding light on commitments and efforts by state 
parties to deliver rights equally to their minorities, and the outcome of 
those measures. SASoM 2018 uses official and non-official data, both 
qualitative and quantitative, and acknowledges the significant limitation 
of data, across the region, on socio-economic rights disaggregated by 
minority groups.   
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3. Among South Asia’s minorities are four major recurrent categories:  
 3.1. Religion has been a major axis of contestation in South Asia. This 
has been aided by the multiplicity of religious identities in the re-
gion, and their politicisation. This results on the one hand, in fuel-
ling majoritarianism – much of it competitive across borders – and 
on the other, severely impacting minority outcomes. Discrimina-
tion based on religion has been the most enduring, marginalising 
religious minorities. 
 3.2. Caste discrimination adversely affects more than 260 million peo-
ple globally, the overwhelming majority of victims being Dalits 
living in South Asia. Caste discrimination is not only a serious vio-
lation of human rights but also a major obstacle to achieving devel-
opment goals. 
 3.3. Women and girls in South Asia suffer doubly, both on account of 
their being religious, caste, ethnic or linguistic minorities, and as 
women. Despite constitutional guarantees in several countries, 
gender-based violence and discrimination exists in its worst forms 
in the region, manifested as economic exploitation and trafficking, 
besides sexual violence and that at birth.  
 3.4. Refugees and the stateless in South Asia - estimated at some 50 
million - suffer some of the worst vulnerabilities - denied the right 
to fully enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms and to have 
access to remedy for human rights violations. A large section of 
the stateless in the region are drawn from the ranks of the minori-
ties, being victims of conflicts, targeted violence, forced population 
movements and migrations.
4. Country Status
  4.1 South Asian states’ performance on minority rights is poor overall. 
Most states have ratified the more important conventions geared 
to socio-economic rights, but ratification of optional protocols ac-
companying these treaties is sparse. This has prevented states from 
having to improve their enforcement of the commitments. Demon-
strating the poor commitment in the region to ending discrimina-
tion is also the fact that no country – throughout the region – has 
legislations against discrimination in access to socio-economic 
rights. Efforts - to translate the poor commitment into results are 
also mostly wanting. Below a snapshot of country findings:
ix
4.1.1 Minorities in Afghanistan – Hindus, Sikhs, Shias and 
Hazaras, as well as small ethnic groups – are particularly 
deprived. Afghanistan’s commitment to protecting and pro-
moting minority rights is newfound and still forming. The 
2004 Constitution lays the foundation for equal rights to all 
citizens. Afghanistan has also ratified all key international 
covenants.  But religious and ethnic minorities continue 
to be discriminated against, both in law and in effect, due 
mostly to poor effort to translate commitments into domes-
tic laws and actionable programmes. Lack of socio-economic 
data disaggregated by minority groups is a serious barrier.   
4.1.2 Bangladesh continues to refrain from endorsing the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), 
jeopardising safeguards for indigenous peoples. There seems 
little resolve to enforce pro-minority laws and programmes, 
e.g. The East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 
1950 and The Chittagong Hills Tribes Peace Accord (1997), 
among others. And whilst the Vested Properties Act, 1974 
may have been replaced with Vested Properties Return Act, 
2001, it is to be seen whether this new legislation has rolled 
back the mass dispossession that Hindus faced. Similarly, 
whilst Urdu-speaking population has gained citizenship sta-
tus recently, it is excluded from welfare programmes, and 
only recently were token measures introduced for the coun-
try’s Dalits. 
4.1.3 Rights of minorities in Bhutan must be seen against the 
backdrop of the stripping away of the citizenship of a sixth 
of the population, of Nepali-speaking Lhotsampas and their 
eventual expulsion in early 1990s. The 2008 constitution 
introduced nominal democracy – ‘democratic constitu-
tional monarchy’ - restoring the rights of Lhotsampa. But 
minorities continue to be marginalised, with minority-con-
centrated districts being significantly deprived. Ultimately 
it is ironic that the country that devised the Gross National 
Happiness index continues not to ratify either CERD (1965) 
or CESCR (1966), demonstrating its poor commitment to 
minority rights and against discrimination.  
Executive Summary
xSouth Asia State of Minorities Report 2018 
Exploring the Roots
4.1.4 India’s commitment to protecting and promoting rights of 
minorities, including socio-economic rights, is strong, but 
this excludes religious minorities. Muslim and Christian 
Dalits are excluded by law from the Scheduled Caste catego-
ry, depriving them of preferential benefits in education, jobs, 
welfare programmes, and protection against violence that 
Dalits are entitled to. Other laws, such as provincial ones for 
cow protection and against beef, discriminate against reli-
gious minorities. There is also no anti-discrimination law in 
the country, despite the Constitution guaranteeing equality 
and India having ratified most key international treaties. 
The laws that do exist are poorly enforced, and there is little 
targeting of minorities for improved access to services and 
benefits. There is also only a poor regime of monitoring, ev-
idence gathering and assessment of the impact of efforts on 
minorities, and data disaggregated by religious groups, is 
poorly available, resulting in the poor showing on socio-eco-
nomic outcomes, especially for poorer Muslims.
4.1.5 Tarai Dalits, Muslims and janjatis (indigenous peoples), are 
among the most deprived sections in Nepal. The poor out-
comes for them and other deprived minority groups, can be 
traced to both inadequate commitments, especially for spe-
cific minority groups and the poor implementation of laws 
and policies, representing weak and flawed effort. Nepal has 
taken various steps to ensure equality and non-discrimina-
tion, including constitutional provisions, and ratifying sever-
al international conventions to ensure non-discrimination. 
Yet the 2015 Constitution’s flawed definition of secularism 
privileges Hinduism, creating openings for discrimination 
against religious minorities. And despite putting in place 
strong measures to translate good intentions into outcomes 
for minorities, weak provisioning, poor minority representa-
tion in government and the deep-seated bias against minori-
ties, comes in the way of rooting out discrimination. 
4.1.6 There is significant poverty in Pakistan, and large re-
gional variations, with minorities suffering most. Minori-
ties particularly targeted are religious - Christians and 
Hindus, and Ahmadis besides Shia. Baloch and Pashtun 
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ethnic minorities too are targeted. When exclusions in-
tersect: Hindu brick kiln workers in Sindh, and Chris-
tian sanitation workers, including women among them, 
in Punjab, Karachi and elsewhere. Pakistan has ratified 
most key treaties, and the constitution guarantees equal-
ity, but there is a significant gap between ratification, leg-
islation and implementation. An example is bonded labour 
and minimum wages acts that are not implemented for 
many reasons, including poor effort. Dearth of relevant 
data – disaggregated by social groups - is a barrier to analy-
sis and planning.
4.1.7 Despite development outcomes being positive for Sri Lan-
ka as a whole, they are poor for districts with high minority 
concentration, especially tea estates districts. Eastern dis-
tricts are the worst affected, with food security and malnu-
trition being particularly problematic, as is land alienation. 
Poor commitment is a problem. The Constitution guaran-
tees equality, and Sri Lanka has ratified most international 
treaties, but their translation into domestic law is poor. And 
there is only poor effort. For example. allocation of health 
personnel to minority concentrated districts is poor, as is 
that for education. And since data on socio-economic rights 
disaggregated by minority groups or by region is not avail-
able, it is difficult to make deductions on efforts and out-
comes for minority groups.
5 Conclusion:  South Asia and its minorities 
 Behind poor national commitment and effort for minority outcomes is 
the play of majoritarian nationalism in South Asia, much of it compet-
itive across borders, that disincentivises action perceived as favouring 
minorities. Economic policies followed by South Asian states – neo-lib-
eral, privileging private capital and outsourcing of services to private 
providers, besides heavy military spending, in place of redistributive 
policies and effective universal services for all – too have a role to play. 
As a consequence, minorities suffer in silence, unable to challenge the 
systematic patterns of discrimination and disadvantage due to the lack 
of power. 
Executive Summary
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   5.1 Below some preliminary thoughts on recommendations for action: 
5.1.1 For state parties 
Commitment: 
- South Asian states need to strengthen their commitment to 
minority rights protection and promotion, in the first instance 
by ratifying all relevant international treaties, specifically the 
ones that bind state parties to ensuring equality and non-dis-
crimination provisions, viz CERD (1965), CESCR (1966), CE-
DAW (1979), CRC (1989), CMW (1990) and CPRD (2006), 
including signing relevant optional protocols. 
- This must be followed by writing these commitments into 
domestic laws, including amending national laws that dis-
criminate against specific minorities, and addressing the key 
lacunae across the region of the absence of equality and an-
ti-discrimination legislations, including mechanisms for their 
effective enforcement.  
Effort
- Shore up policies and programmes, to operationalise the 
equality and non-discrimination commitments – through 
schemes and projects that meet the specific needs of minority 
groups; greater investment in those efforts; and appropriate 
institutional mechanisms. This must include greater minority 
representation in public services, and measures to change at-
titudes and behaviour of duty bearers, through training, expo-
sure and appropriate incentives.  
- Improved outcomes also require better observation and 
measurement, creating data disaggregated by individual 
groups and monitoring and measuring efforts using those 
data to provide an accurate picture of performance and 
outcomes. 
5.1.2 Regional actors  
But South Asian states only have poor incentives for improving 
their minority outcomes – due primarily to the rise of majoritarian 
nationalism across the region, mostly competitive, that sees deep-
ening democracy and strengthening minority safeguards as unwel-
come concession. Regional actors, especially civil society – given 
formal networks like SAARC have little interest – can play a role 
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in disrupting this stalemate and engendering debate and dialogue 
across borders:  
- Debates and discussions, based on new data, findings, analy-
sis and insights, to educate the public and policy community, 
pushing the envelope on minority rights 
- Sharing of experiences and good practices in providing for mi-
norities, through South Asia-wide networks 
- Regional networks and alliances, debate and discussions, de-
veloping common ground, voicing demands, creating collec-
tive pressure on duty bearers, and reaching out to internation-
al entities on the condition of minorities in the region
5.1.3 International community 
 International community must support this enterprise, through 
creating right incentives for state parties in the region and encour-
aging regional civil society efforts. 
- a UN led effort to get members states in the region to agree on 
a charter of minority rights, and a mechanism and process for 
enforcing those. 
- UN handholding the process, providing technical and legiti-
macy support, and other multilateral bodies as well as the rest 
of the international development community, supporting the 
process.
- This to include supporting minority-focused regional and na-
tional civil society networks, capacity building and shoring up 
their strengths  
5.2. Minority communities and civil society
Ultimately minority communities and individuals and groups 
representing them need to take charge    
- improve their capacity to act as effective CBOs, documenting 
evidence, mobilising support, networking with stakeholders, 
and raising demands. 
- Rights-minded NGOs and civil society platforms supporting 
community-led effort, through handholding, signposting, in-
vestment and networking.
Executive Summary
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1Exploring the Roots of the 
Vulnerabilities of Minorities 
in South Asia
M. Sajjad Hassan
Introduction
1. MPI involves counting the different types of deprivation that individuals experience at 
the same time, such as a lack of education or employment, or poor health or living stan-
dards. These deprivation profiles are analysed to identify who is poor, and then used to 
construct a multidimensional index of poverty (MPI). See: https://ophi.org.uk/research/
multidimensional-poverty/alkire-foster-method/
South Asia, home to 23% of the world’s population, is among its poorest 
parts. Although there are intra-regional variations, much of South Asia is 
mired in poverty and marginalisation. According to the recently released 
Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) 2018, 546 million people 
are multidimensionally poor in South Asia (global total is 1.3 billion). More 
than 364 million of these were in India (in 2015/16). Nutrition deprivation 
alone contributes more than a fourth of the overall MPI.1 In both Afghani-
stan and Pakistan, 1 in 4 persons lives in severe poverty (Oxford Poverty 
and Human Development Initiative, 2018). A look at some other indicators 
is also instructive (Table 1). Infant and Under-5 mortality in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan are shockingly high, but not much better in India, Nepal or 
Bangladesh. Child malnutrition figures are particularly alarming for Afgha-
nistan, India and Pakistan. Mean years of schooling is poor for all except Sri 
Lanka, and GNI per capita low overall. Unemployment is also high. Taken 
together, barring Sri Lanka, the HDI ranks of all the countries are in three 
figures (Human Development Report 2015).
It is well established now that the most excluded groups everywhere are 
in fact minorities and indigenous peoples, with poverty rates amongst them 
typically double the national (Minority Rights Group 2013: 3). This applies 
to South Asia too. South Asia’s minorities – religious and linguistic groups, 
especially women and those from Dalit backgrounds amongst them, and 
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the many indigenous/adivasi communities, as well as sexual minorities – 
make up disproportionate numbers of the poor and excluded in each coun-
try, suffering both discrimination in the socio-economic sphere and denial 
of the most basic human rights. As the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom 
of Religion or Belief noted in the foreword to the South Asia Collective’s 
South Asia State of Minority Report, 2016, ‘across the region, many of the 
religious, ethnic, linguistic and indigenous minorities, particularly women 
and the poor, face marginalization and suffer the worst forms of exclusion’. 
(South Asia Collective, 2016: v) 
What are the roots of the particular marginalisation of the region’s mi-
norities? The insights above point to widespread discrimination against 
minority groups in South Asian societies, and the concentrated forms of 
exclusions that perpetuate [ibid: x]. A key explanatory factor is minority 
groups’ inability to challenge systemic patterns of discrimination and dis-
advantage that keep people in poverty, because being minorities they ‘....
often lack the power, social or legal standing, or access to decision-making 
required to challenge their disadvantaged status....’ (Mepham 2014). The 
current (2018) volume seeks to explore the roots of the poor outcomes for 
minorities in South Asia, shining a light specifically on their socio-economic 
situation and their access to rights and opportunities. The purpose is both 
to document and report, and also to contribute to ushering change for the 
region’s multifarious minorities.       
HDI 
rank 
Life 
Exp. at 
birth 
Mortality rate 
(UNDP 2013)
Child 
mal-
nutri-
tion
Mean 
years 
of 
schoo-
ling
Gross 
National 
Income 
per K 
(PPP, $ 
2011)
Unem-
ploy-
ment 
(ILO 
2013)
IMR U-5 M
Afghanistan 171 60.4 70.2 97.3 59.3 3.2 1,895 9.1
Bangladesh 142 71.6 33.2 41.1 41.4 5.1 3,191 4.3
Bhutan 132 69.5 29.7 36.2 33.6 3.0 7,176 2.8
India 130 68.0 41.4 52.7 47.9 5.4 5,497 3.6
Maldives 104 76.8 8.4 9.9 20.3 5.8 12,238 11.6
Nepal 145 69.6 32.2 39.7 40.5 3.3 2,311 2.7
Pakistan 147 66.2 69.0 85.5 45.5 4.7 4,806 5.2
Sri Lanka 73 74.9 8.2 9.6 14.7 10.8 9,779 4.6
Table 1. South Asia development indicators
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report – 2015
3South Asia, as we know, also sees much violence against its minorities. 
South Asian states are unable to provide security and protection of life and 
freedoms to their minorities. They rank high on perpetrating or tolerating 
abuse of religious freedom. According to the US Commission for Interna-
tional Religious Freedom (USCIRF),2 Pakistan continues to be character-
ised as Tier 1 (one of 16 worldwide); Afghanistan and India are both Tier 
2 (among the 12 worldwide); and Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are character-
ised as countries of interest, amongst a small number of similar countries 
studied (USCIRF 2018). Many countries in the region figure high on glob-
al ranking of countries with a high risk of genocide and mass killings of 
minority groups – notably Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka (People 
Under Threat 2018). With safeguards against violence weakening in other 
countries too – India notably – the threats for minorities there are also ris-
ing significantly.       
Experience shows that exclusion, discrimination and inequality make 
minorities vulnerable, and that ‘patterns of discrimination against partic-
ular minorities in the political, social economic and cultural spheres can 
translate into abuse and systematic violation of basic human rights and can 
escalate into atrocity crimes’ (United Nations 2014: 7). South Asia demon-
strates amply how failures to prevent exclusion and discrimination against 
specific minorities opened the way for graver abuse of human rights and vi-
olence against those groups. This failure of states and societies in the region 
to address deep-seated and longstanding discrimination against minority 
groups – in the sphere of socio-economic rights – in other words society’s 
willingness to tolerate severe inequality and exclusion, also means that vi-
olence and atrocity crimes against those groups have been very difficult to 
prevent. 
Structure of the Report and its Limitations   
In the following sections of this introductory chapter of the report, we pro-
2. USCIRF studies and ranks countries worldwide on their violations of religious freedom 
and progress. Tier 1 countries (or Countries of Particular Concern, CPC) are those ‘whose 
government engages in or tolerates particularly severe religious freedom violations, 
meaning those that are systematic, ongoing, and egregious.’ Tier 2 are ‘nations in which 
the violations engaged in or tolerated by the government during 2017 are serious and 
characterized by at least one of the elements of the “systematic, ongoing, and egregious” 
CPC standard’. Recently a new category was created, a Special Watch List, ‘for govern-
ments that engaged in or tolerated severe violations but are deemed to not meet all the 
criteria of the CPC test’. (USCIRF 2018: 3)
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vide a summary of the objective, scope and justification for this explora-
tion, foregrounding the focus of the report – equal access to socio-economic 
rights – and defining key concepts used, as well as articulating the broader 
public-action-for-minority-rights purpose of the effort; unpacking the con-
cept of socio-economic rights, exploring its grounding in international hu-
man rights law, to be able to grasp its potential for informing initiatives and 
monitoring and tracking minority outcomes; and engaging with the practi-
cal issues of measuring performance on minority rights, and the choice and 
availability of sources of evidence. In Section 1.3 we summarise the findings 
of the report, drawing on individual country chapters to catalogue, first-
ly, the broad minority categories in South Asia, prioritising those that are 
cross-cutting across the region. This is followed (section 1.4) by individual 
snapshots of country reports on performance for their minorities in the so-
cio-economic realm, after which we conclude (Section 1.5) with drawing, 
from the material presented, lessons for why minority rights protection and 
promotion efforts have seen poor traction in South Asia, concluding (Sec-
tion 1.6) by presenting preliminary but pointed recommendations for the 
way forward.  
The rest of the volume reports the condition of South Asia’s minorities by 
country. But before we present country reports, we present, in Chapter 2, a 
summary of the recent developments affecting minorities in each country in 
the region, to provide a background to the more pointed audit of the perfor-
mance of south Asian states to protect the interests of their minorities – the 
country chapters. This summary of the developments (we call it ‘Looking 
Back: 2017–18 in the Lives of Minorities in South Asia’) seeks to survey for 
each country threats, attacks and violence against minorities; majoritarian 
mobilisation against minority groups; and any changes in law and in policy 
and programmes that affect minorities either adversely or positively.  This 
events chapter is expected to set the tone for the country reports to follow, 
contextualising each country’s performance on socio-economic rights, with 
the aim to help us make sense of the curtailment – or advancement – of the 
rights of minorities in specific countries, within the wider dynamic playing 
out in the country. Limiting this survey to 2017–18 was a practical step. 
We, the South Asia Collective – the regional civil society network working 
to document, track and report minority outcomes at South Asia level – 
brought out our first report in late 2016, providing a broad-brush picture 
of the condition of minorities in the region. The 2018 report is our second. 
Surveying ‘events’ since the last report is meant to help maintain continuity 
in the reporting process. 
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The country reports (Chapter 3 onwards) themselves are quite straight-
forward. Missing from the volume is the Maldives, a South Asian coun-
try and member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC), but where we were unable to find local resources to partner with 
for the production of the report – likely a reflection of the hostile climate for 
human rights-minded civil society in the country. We faced similar prob-
lems in Afghanistan, with a local partner agency unable to continue work, 
reportedly due to heightened surveillance of human rights work, especially 
that focusing on minorities. We have a short account of the situation of 
minorities in Afghanistan, as a substitute for a full chapter, annexed to the 
report. Due to operational constraints we could not put together a full chap-
ter on Nepal, and we have had to make do with a short account annexed to 
the report. Our 2016 report did not include Bhutan. The current volume 
does have a chapter on the country. Again, in the interest of continuity, 
the current Bhutan chapter has a broader frame: a broad-brush picture of 
minorities there and state efforts for them, similar to the scope of the 2016 
report, rather than the limited socio-economic rights focus of the 2018 re-
port. Lastly, we have always wanted to include Burma within the scope of 
our work. Though Burma is not part of the SAARC grouping, it has histori-
cally been seen as part of the South Asian region, and much of the dynamic 
around minority rights in the country has also affected one or the other 
of its South Asian neighbours. We hope to include Burma, along with the 
Maldives and Afghanistan, in our subsequent reports, which we hope now 
to bring out annually. 
Reporting the Socio-economic Condition of South 
Asia’s minorities 
Scope and Justification  
The South Asia State of Minorities Report 2016 provided a survey of the 
condition of minorities in the region. It used the UN Declaration on Mi-
norities (UNDM) 1992 framework of the four-fold classification of minority 
rights (life and security, identify and culture, participation and equal access 
to socio-economic rights) to report the status of South Asia’s minorities. We 
in the South Asia Collective decided that having established a benchmark, 
subsequent reports ought to be qualitatively different – they should have a 
thematic focus, for in-depth analysis and presentation of results for minori-
ties in specific domains. 
Accordingly, South Asia State of Minorities Report 2018 is focused on 
the theme of the socio-economic rights of the region’s minorities – the first 
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of our thematic reports. According to the UNDM (1992), ‘persons belonging 
to minorities may exercise their rights individually as well as in a communi-
ty with other members of their group without any discrimination.’ Non-dis-
crimination and equality before the law are the basic principles guiding 
human rights. For minorities to enjoy non-discrimination, UNDM propos-
es: ‘there should be formal freedoms and equality (such as equal access to 
social services and employment in the public and private sectors) and pro-
grammes for empowerment of those who in the past have been the subject 
of discrimination or who suffer persistent discrimination’. (United Nations 
1992: 10-11). We seek to report the performance of each county in the region 
on equal and non-discriminatory access to socio-economic rights, specifi-
cally as it relates to their minorities. 
As with our benchmark report, we understand minorities as ‘a group nu-
merically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant 
position, whose members… possess ethnic, religious or linguistic charac-
teristics differing from those of the rest of the population and maintain, if 
only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their cul-
ture, traditions, religion or language’ (Capotorti 1991: 98). Given our use of 
a rights-based perspective, our assessment seeks to compare performance 
to obligations placed on state parties, both by national laws as well as by 
international commitments, and their meeting those.  
What do we seek to achieve by focusing on socio-economic rights?
i. Socio-economic rights are not as well studied as for instance life and 
security, and there is generally only a poor evidence base available;
ii. Within the catch-all phrase socio-economic rights are a range of rights 
of great importance to minorities’ ability to live fulfilling lives. There is 
very little systematic documentation of the condition of minorities on 
these counts. Unpacking this meta-right, so to speak, then, will help us 
identify specific sectoral rights, for further exploration down the line; 
iii. This is also the arena for a great deal of discrimination against minori-
ties in the region, that largely goes unnoticed and unreported. Shining a 
light on these discriminations will be of great help to the advancement 
of minority rights;
iv. It has been established that poor access to socio-economic rights makes 
minorities vulnerable to violations of other critical rights – life and secu-
rity, freedom of religion, and participation. Hence focusing on this right 
will help shore up the defences, so to speak, against other violations; and
7v. There is wide variation in availability of evidence on socio-econom-
ic rights across countries, especially data disaggregated by minority 
groups, with some quite advanced with a mix of headcount and sample 
data, and others barely counting and documenting.
Focusing on the theme of socio-economic rights, then, has the potential to 
help build a body of evidence on violations as well as protection and pro-
motion, on the range of specific rights that concern South Asia’s minorities, 
covering new ground, and contributing to expanding the minority rights re-
gime in the region. 
Socio-economic Rights: What to Measure?  
By using the UN Declaration on Minorities (1992) definition of minority 
rights, our assessment directly benchmarks international norms and stan-
dards. This helps us to (i) use universally accepted and up-to-date norms on 
the rights in question, socio-economic in this case, and (ii) use a framework 
that works for all countries in the region, regardless of the state of devel-
opment of the particular country’s regime for provisioning of the specific 
right (and we know that there is great variance here). Tethering the report 
to international norms also ensures the report is aligned to state parties’ 
reporting requirements on specific rights (Universal Periodic Review and 
specific UN treaty bodies, such as the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights – CESCR 1966), thus directly aiding in civil soci-
ety advocacy on the subject.
So, what are the international norms and standards on socio-economic 
rights?
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and particularly CE-
SCR, 1966, along with the following conventions, make up the international 
normative framework on socio-economic rights:3   
- International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination (CERD), 1965
- Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDW), 1979
2. Other potential candidates include: The International Convention on the Protection of 
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 1990; ILO 111 Discrim-
ination Convention, 1958; and ILO 169 Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples, 1989. 
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-  Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 1989
- Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), 2006
Table 2 maps the main rights created by the above five (binding) treaties.3 
Between the five treaties, the socio-economic rights that are marked most 
commonly are:
i. Right to health
ii. Right to education
iii. Right to work
iv. Right to adequate standard of living 
3. Bhutan and Myanmar have not ratified CESCR and CERD, and only Bangladesh and Ne-
pal, of all in the region, have signed CRPD. (Minority Rights Group International, 2014: 
226-227)  
CESCR, 1966 CERD, 1965 
(Art 5)
CEDW, 1979 CRC, 1989 CRPD, 2006
Non-discrimination (2) Non- 
discrimination 
Non- 
discrimination 
(1)
Non- 
discrimination 
(2)
Equality and 
Non-discrimina-
tion (5)
-Right to work (6)
-Favourable condi-
tions of work (7)
work Employment 
(11)
Work and employ-
ment (27)
Right to Social 
security, and social 
insurance (9) 
social security 
and social 
services 
Economic and 
social benefits 
(13)
Social security 
(26)
Against child 
labour (32)
social protection 
(28)
Right to Physical and 
mental health (12)
Public health, 
medical care,
Health (12) Health and 
health services 
(24) 
Health (25) 
Right to adequate 
standard of living – 
food and freedom 
from hunger (11)
Economic and 
social benefits 
Adequate 
standard of 
living (27)
Adequate Stan-
dard of living (28)
Housing Habitation/
rehabilitation (26)
Right to Education 
(13)
Education and 
training
Education (10) Education 
(28-29)
Education (24)
Table 2. UN Human rights treaties and their rights 
(figures in brackets are article numbers)
9v. Right to social security
These five rights are the focus of our survey of minority outcomes in the 
sphere of socio-economic rights.  Given that the focus of our exploration is 
performance (on protection and promotion of rights) for minority groups, 
the question of equality and non-discrimination, assumes primacy – anoth-
er common feature of all the main international treaty bodies. 
‘Non-discrimination is at the heart of all work on human rights. It is 
a cross-cutting human rights norm… (and) prohibits discrimination 
on the basis of a list of non-exhaustive grounds such as race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status’ (United Nations 2012: 8). 
Action on promoting equality and non-discrimination requires evidence 
gathering on the identified rights for specific minority/vulnerable groups. 
This presumes the presence of evidence disaggregated by social group – re-
ligion, caste, ethnicity, gender, age, etc – both quantitative and qualitative. 
Our 2016 report pointed us to the absence of much of this – especially sta-
tistical – information across the region. As it turned out, resolving the issue 
of evidence disaggregated by social groups continued to be our main mea-
surement challenge. 
Research Framework and Methodology: How to Measure? 
Human Rights Indicators 
We began our enterprise trying to identify for each of the five socio-econom-
ic rights a set of indicators to use for reporting state parties’ performance. To 
study performance we relied on the human rights indicators (HRI) frame-
work, developed by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) ‘to promote and monitor the implementation of 
human rights and to make information about the progress that states are 
making in fulfilling the obligations that flow from human rights available 
to human rights monitoring bodies and civil society’ (Equality and Human 
Rights Commission 2015: 4). According to the UN, ‘[H]uman rights indica-
tors are specific information on the state of an event, activity or an outcome 
that can be related to human rights norms and standards; that address and 
reflect the human rights concerns and principles; and that are used to assess 
and monitor promotion and protection of human rights’ (United Nations 
2012: 2).
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The HRI framework required us to identity, for each of the 5 rights domains 
above, three types of indicators, measuring ‘commitment’ and ‘effort’ by 
state parties, and the ‘results’ of those for individuals and groups. The three 
types of indicators are:  
i. Structural indicators:  These are formal commitments to human rights  
in principle, eg domestic human rights law/ratification of international 
treaties, and precedents in legal judgements;4  
ii. Process indicators: focusing on efforts made, or not, by duty bearers to 
meet the above  obligations.
These are primary laws, policies, targets, guidelines, inspection and regula-
tory frameworks or resource allocation (budgets and borrowings), as well as 
information about key regulators, inspectorates, ombudsman and related 
mechanisms; and
iii. Outcome indicators: Results achieved in terms of the position/experi-
ences of individuals and groups, specifically minority groups. 
Reporting these three types of indicators, and evidence on those, also meant 
we were able to mitigate for over-reliance on ‘outcome indicators’ to report 
performance, where availability of disaggregated data is mostly wanting. 
This also links to the broader objective of the use of human rights indicators 
to monitor human/minority rights: there is no claim, indeed attempt, to 
provide a complete evidence base on results of rights realisation; rather the 
objective is to shine a light on rights realisation – broken down by commit-
ment, effort and results – in each country context, aiding in the progressive 
realisation of the rights (Equality and Human Rights Commission 2015: 9). 
This is particularly relevant to economic, social and cultural rights, which 
are ‘positive’ in nature (compared to civil and political rights, which are 
mostly ‘negative’) (United Nations 2012: 23). The use of the Human Rights 
Indicators framework aids, alongside, in the creation of evidence and disag-
gregation, feeding into the progressive realisation. 
Evidence Base 
Drawing on OHCHR’s work and that of the UK’s Equality and Human 
Rights Commission (EHRC), the evidence base we hoped at start to 
4. This combination of domestic law and international treaties also ensures the measure-
ment is explicitly grounded in the legal framework (case law approach), whilst formulat-
ing some indicators and measures in terms of human rights values. This ensures a good 
mix of indicators of ‘minimal compliance’ (case law) and those that are proactive and 
encourage development of a ‘culture’ of human rights (EHRC 2015).  
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develop was aimed to bring together different types of information for mi-
nority rights analysis and assessments (Equality and Human Rights Com-
mission 2015: 9-10). These included:     
- information about domestic human/minority rights laws and interna-
tional treaty ratifications;
- information about human/minority rights case law outcomes (i.e. viola-
tions/ breaches);
- information about the public policy framework for protecting human/
minority rights;
- concerns highlighted by domestic and international human/minority 
rights monitoring bodies (eg. UN treaty monitoring committees);
- findings of investigations, inquiries and reviews;
- issues raised by regulators, commissions, and ombudsmen;
- allegations and concerns raised by NGOs and other civil society mecha-
nisms such
as media reports;
- statistical information drawing on a wide range of administrative and 
social survey sources; and
- administrative data, such as plans, budgets, spending, and programme 
reports.   
The choice of indicators and evidence would themselves be a combination 
of:  
- Qualitative and quantitative data/evidence. Case law, findings of human 
rights bodies; the findings of inquiries, investigations and reviews; the 
findings of regulators, commission and ombudsmen; and so forth;
- Official and non-official data (press and media, advocacy and NGO 
data); and
- A combination of objective and subjective measures, eg perceptions and 
self-reporting of discrimination. 
Very soon into our research, we came up against major barriers of data and 
information, especially those disaggregated by minority groups. Our focus 
on socio-economic rights revealed how data on these rights was even more 
scarce. This remains the most significant shortcoming of the report.
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Box 1: Measuring discrimination
OHCHR proposes the following tools for measuring the prevalence specifi-
cally of discriminatory practices:
i. Socioeconomic statistics disaggregated by prohibited grounds of dis-
crimination (eg life expectancy, age-specific sex ratios and unemploy-
ment rates broken down by ethnic origin);
ii. Econometric models based on multiple regression analysis, which help 
in estimating the portion of differences in outcomes attributable to dis-
crimination, as opposed to observable variables (eg percentage of the 
wage differential between women and men that cannot be explained by 
‘observable’ criteria, such as the number of working hours or socio-pro-
fessional characteristics, etc.);
iii. Population surveys measuring experiences, perceptions and attitudes 
regarding discrimination (eg percentage of members of ethnic minori-
ties reporting racially motivated victimisation and discrimination by 
public/private personnel); and
iv. Discrimination or situation-testing surveys to directly measure discrim-
ination in specific instances, such as those related to access to work, 
housing, health care, private educational institutions or other public 
services.
Source: United Nations (2012: 82) 
Who are South Asia’s Minorities?
Minorities in South Asia – suffering the worst forms of discrimination – 
are typically religious and sexual minorities, Dalits, refugees and IDPs 
and stateless people, with women being particularly vulnerable across 
categories. As a report on Dalits notes, ‘the exclusion of Dalits and similarly 
affected communities by other groups in society lead to high levels of pov-
erty among affected populations and exclusion, or reduced benefits, from 
development processes, and generally precludes their involvement in de-
cision making and meaningful participation in public and civil life.’ (IDSN 
2009: 1) 
Religious Minorities 
Underlying poor outcomes for minorities in the region is South Asia’s strong 
majoritarian atmosphere, fuelled in part by competing nationalism across 
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borders, which is also antagonistic, harking back to the region’s recent 
conflictual history. This is rooted in the politicising of ethnic and religious 
identities in South Asia by its colonial encounters (including anti-colonial 
struggles). The creation of post-colonial states through partition of much of 
the subcontinent, splitting up religious and ethnic groups across new and 
arbitrary borders, and the fears of the political elites of further disintegra-
tion of successor states reinforced the majoritarian trend. This has had an 
adverse impact on outcomes for minorities, particularly religious (South 
Asia Collective 2016: 40). 
But nation-states in the region are not homogenous – there are majorities 
and minorities, and the majority in one country could be a minority in an-
other. This undergirds the issue of ‘reciprocity’, where the treatment of a 
minority in one country is contingent on how minorities are treated in an-
other, or subject to bilateral relations between two countries. The regional 
dynamics of minorities in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (given their com-
mon experience of the Partition in 1947 and the creation of Bangladesh in 
1972) and how it affects respective minorities – Muslims in India, Hindus 
and Sikhs in Pakistan and Hindus and ‘Urdu speakers’ in Bangladesh – is 
well-known. There are other examples too.5  All these have implications for 
the condition of South Asia’s minorities and the rights available to them. 
Given the multiplicity of religious identities, their politicisation, and their 
Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka
Muslim 89.5 Hindu 80.67 Hindu 81.3 Muslim 96.3 Buddhist 76.7
Hindu 9.6 Muslim 14.23 Buddhist 9.0 Hindu 1.6 Muslim 8.5
Christian 2.30 Muslim 4.4 Christian 1.6 Hindu 7.8
Sikh 1.72 Kirat 3.1 SC 0.3 Catholic 6.1
Buddhist 0.70 Christian 1.4 Ahmadi 0.2 Other Christian 0.9
Jain 0.37 Pakriti 0.5
Table 3. Religious Plurality in South Asia 
(figures represent percentage of total population)
Source: Adeney 2015 
5. A similar dynamic, although not on religious lines, exists between India and Sri Lanka 
too, impacting largely the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka; between India and Nepal, 
affecting Madhesis in Nepal and Nepalis in India; between Nepal and Bhutan, affecting 
Bhutan’s largest minority, Lhotsampas; and finally, between Pakistan and Afghanistan, 
the Pashtun minority in Pakistan being the main one affected. Clearly, minority rights in 
South Asia is also a trans-border issue.  
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repeated use to mobilise opinion, religion is a major axis of contestation 
in the region, on one hand fuelling majoritarianism and on the other se-
verely impacting minority outcomes – life and security as well as access to 
socio-economic rights and equal participation. Discrimination based on re-
ligion has been the most enduring.
Caste-based Minorities  
Caste discrimination adversely affects more than 260 million people global-
ly, the overwhelming majority of victims being Dalits (or ‘outcastes’) living 
in South Asia. Caste, in the way we understand it, is practised widely in 
all south Asian countries, barring Afghanistan and Bhutan – although both 
these countries have their own and deep-seated forms of racial discrimina-
tion. Caste discrimination is not only a serious violation of human rights but 
also a major obstacle to achieving development goals. Victims of caste dis-
crimination are routinely denied access to water, schools, health services, 
land, markets and employment. Among the most serious impediments to 
addressing caste discrimination is either a lack of law or a de facto denial 
of equality before the law, resulting in a lack of protection of caste-affect-
ed people against violent attacks and other crimes, and impunity for the 
perpetrators of such crimes. Below is a snapshot of the caste situation in 
each country, summarising a report by the International Dalit Solidarity 
Network (IDSN 2009).
Refugees and the Stateless
Artificial boundaries, longstanding intra- and inter-state conflicts, disas-
ters, and persecution of minority groups, among others, have created in 
South Asia a constant stream of refugees, including many that are stateless. 
A very large section of the stateless in South Asia are drawn from the ranks 
of minorities, who are often victims of conflicts, targeted violence, forced 
population movements and migrations. It is estimated that there are some 
50 million such people in South Asia. Refugees and the stateless represent 
the plight of the minorities in its most vulnerable form – denied the right to 
fully enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms and to have access to 
remedy for human rights violations.
Women and Girls as Minorities 
Women and girls suffer doubly, both on account of their being religious, 
caste, ethnic or linguistic minorities, and as women. Gender-based vio-
lence and discrimination exists perhaps in its most concentrated form in 
South Asia. This is despite constitutional guarantees in several countries 
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Box 2. Caste Discrimination – National Snapshots  
Bangladesh: The estimates of the number of Dalits in Bangladesh vary from 
3.5 to 5.5 million. Although most are Hindus, there are a sizeable number of 
Muslims too. The Dalits of Bangladesh have been much overlooked in the 
development and rights discourse and have only recently been able to raise 
their voices and mobilise for their rights, including the right to development. 
India: According to the official census, India’s Scheduled Castes (SC) num-
ber 167 million, making up the bulk of South Asia’s Dalit population. This 
figure does not include Dalits who have converted or are born and raised 
within a non-Hindu religious community, especially Muslim and Christian 
Dalits (estimated to be over 30 million). These the constitution bars from 
inclusion within the SC label, and they are thus excluded from the elaborate 
programme for affirmative action available to Dalits identifying as Hindu, 
Sikh and Buddhist. At the same time, constitutional guarantees for Dalits 
have not been able to prevent violations of the fundamental human rights of 
the community that go on on a massive scale. Impunity is widespread. 
Nepal: Although the official Dalit population is set at 13 % of the total 
(2001 census), activists claim it is closer to between 20 and 25%. The Dalit 
movement has over the past decades challenged the exclusion of Dalits in 
decision making and development processes in Nepal. The interim constitu-
tion indicates a degree of success for the Dalit movement in securing some 
constitutional provisions for non-discrimination, equality and protection – 
guaranteed representation (of only 8% though), as well as a national Dalit 
commission and other institutional mechanisms for securing rights.  
Pakistan: Dalits in Pakistan are mostly part of the Hindu minority and fall 
victim to double discrimination on the basis of their religion and caste. The 
official figure for SC is approximately 330,000. Researchers claim, however, 
that the numbers could be as high as 2 million. The data does not include 
‘lower castes’ within the Muslim community, who live under similarly 
depressed conditions. Dalits are exploited grossly as a work force in rural 
and urban areas – as bonded and forced labour in Sindh and Punjab.
Sri Lanka: Although in Sri Lanka there is no common identity as Dalits 
among the ‘lower castes’, an estimated 4–5 million persons (20–30% of the 
population) experience some form of caste discrimination. Caste discrimi-
nation continues to be entrenched in society among Sinhalese and partic-
ularly Sri Lankan and Indian Tamil populations, a result also of the caste-
blind policies of both state and non-state actors. ‘Lower castes’ constitute a 
large number of IDPs in Sri Lanka, who are also the most vulnerable group, 
subjected to dual discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and caste in camps.
Source: Summarised from International Dalit Solidarity Network (2016: 1–2).
Introduction
Exploring the Roots of Vulnerability of Minorities in South Asia
16
South Asia State of Minorities Report 2018 
Exploring the Roots
Box 3. Refugees, Migrants and the Stateless  
The heightened global attention paid to migrants has largely bypassed South 
Asia, yet the problem in the region is as longstanding and severe as anywhere 
else. Research estimates that there are 50 million migrants, refugees, and 
stateless people in the region, among them populations transferred during 
wartime among Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan; caste and religious groups 
fleeing persecution; and Afghans, Chinese, Nepali-speakers, Rohingyas, Sri 
Lankan Tamils, Tibetans, and others who have fled violence or repression 
during the past seven decades. These population movements have added 
to the already daunting complexity of societies in the region, intensifying 
political volatility and sharpening security issues. With the exception of 
Afghanistan, no South Asian states are party to the UN Refugee Convention. 
Still, compared with other regions, South Asia has treated its refugees rela-
tively well, partly through assistance programmes and partly through benign 
neglect. Most migrants have got jobs, and many have even become citizens of 
their countries of refuge. But South Asia also provides examples of some of 
the most enduring kinds of vulnerabilities faced by refugees: Biharis or Urdu 
Speakers in Bangladesh; Lhotsampas, in Bhutan; up-country Tamils in Sri 
Lanka; Bengali speakers and Chakmas in India’s Assam and other northeast-
ern states; and Hazaras and Pashtos in Pakistan. 
Source: Summarised from Nathan (2017).
and gender-friendly social movements – the patriarchal mindset oppress-
es all that are not male (South Asia Alliance for Poverty Eradication 2016: 
60). Violence is manifested in various forms: rape and sexual harassment; 
dowry-related violence; sexual harassment at the workplace; forced or ear-
ly marriages; acid attacks; psychological violence in a custodial setting; 
domestic violence by family members; and economic exploitation and 
cross-border trafficking. Honour killings are also common in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan and parts of India; and violence, including sexual, targeting mi-
nority women everywhere. Violence against women and girls takes place at 
the family, community, workplace, and public levels (ibid). 
A telling example of discrimination against girls is the violence against 
them at birth. Male to female sex ratio at birth and throughout life reveals 
that in nearly all countries except Sri Lanka and Nepal, the number of girls 
remain lower than normal (Table 4). ‘Not addressing this fundamental 
question of disappearance before birth that has led millions of girls “miss-
ing at birth”, it is impossible to establish a gender-just society’ (ibid). In 
any case, there is low investment in education and health, thwarting the life 
chances available to girls. The results are some of lowest standing of south 
Asian nations in gender indexes (Table 4).
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Country
Sex ratio (male: female) at birth 
(2010–2015)
GII ranking
(lower is better)  
World Bank, 2015 UNDP, 2015
Afghanistan 1.06 171
Bangladesh 1.05 111
Bhutan 1.04 97
India  1.11 130
Maldives 1.10 49
Nepal 1.06 108
Pakistan 1.09 121
Sri Lanka 1.04 72
Table 4. Gender Deprivation in South Asia  
(figures represent percentage of total population)
Source: South Asia Alliance for Poverty Eradication (2016: 39)
Another harsh manifestation of the violence against women in the re-
gion is human trafficking, estimated to affect over 150,000 persons a year 
in South Asia, most of whom are women and children, who are exploited 
for labour and sexual slavery, often sold to human traffickers. Trafficked 
women are divided from their families and exposed to rape, sexual assault, 
mental trauma and physical abuse. Neither anti-trafficking laws or proce-
dures, at least in some countries in the region, nor the existence of SAARC 
Convention on Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution (2002) 
seems to have resulted in any effective progress against human trafficking 
in the region.6
How do South Asian Nations Check 
Out on Minority Rights?
Afghanistan
Minorities in Afghanistan are predominantly Hindus and Sikhs, and Shias 
among Muslims.  
6. A similar dynamic, although not on religious lines, exists between India and Sri Lanka 
too, impacting largely the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka; between India and Nepal, 
affecting Madhesis in Nepal and Nepalis in India; between Nepal and Bhutan, affecting 
Bhutan’s largest minority, Lhotsampas; and finally, between Pakistan and Afghanistan, 
the Pashtun minority in Pakistan being the main one affected. Clearly, minority rights in 
South Asia is also a trans-border issue.  
Introduction
Exploring the Roots of Vulnerability of Minorities in South Asia
18
South Asia State of Minorities Report 2018 
Exploring the Roots
Tr
ea
ty
Af
gh
an
is
ta
n
Ba
ng
la
de
sh
Bh
ut
an
 
In
di
a 
M
al
di
ve
s 
Ne
pa
l 
Pa
ki
st
an
 
Sr
i L
an
ka
 
IL
O 
No
. 1
11
 D
is
cr
im
in
at
io
n 
(E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t a
nd
 O
cc
up
at
io
n 
Co
nv
en
tio
n)
 1
95
8
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
on
 
El
im
in
at
io
n 
of
 a
ll 
fo
rm
s 
of
 R
ac
ia
l 
Di
sc
rim
in
at
io
n 
– 
CE
RD
, 1
96
5
3
(a
)
3
3
3
(a
)
3
(a
)
3
3
(a
)
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ov
en
an
t o
n 
Ec
o-
no
m
ic
, S
oc
ia
l a
nd
 C
ul
tu
ra
l R
ig
ht
s 
– 
CE
SC
R,
 1
96
6
3
(a
)
3
3
(a
)
3
(a
)
3
(a
)
3
3
(a
)
Co
nv
en
tio
n 
on
 E
lim
in
at
io
n 
of
 a
ll 
fo
rm
s 
of
 D
is
cr
im
in
at
io
n 
ag
ai
ns
t 
W
om
en
 -
 C
ED
AW
, 1
97
9 
3
3
3
3
3
(a
)
3
3
(a
)
3
Co
nv
en
tio
n 
on
 th
e 
rig
ht
s 
of
 th
e 
Ch
ild
 –
 C
RC
, 1
98
9
3
3
3
3
(a
)
3
3
3
IL
O 
16
9 
Co
nv
en
tio
n 
Co
nc
er
ni
ng
 
In
di
ge
no
us
 a
nd
 T
rib
al
 P
eo
pl
es
 a
nd
 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t C
ou
nt
rie
s,
 1
98
9
–
–
–
–
–
3
–
–
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
on
 th
e 
Pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
Ri
gh
ts
 o
f a
ll 
M
ig
ra
nt
 w
or
ke
rs
 a
nd
 m
em
be
rs
 o
f 
th
ei
r f
am
ilie
s 
– 
CM
W
, 1
99
0
–
3
–
–
–
–
–
3
(a
)
Co
nv
en
tio
n 
on
 th
e 
Ri
gh
ts
 o
f 
Pe
rs
on
s 
w
ith
 D
is
ab
ilit
ie
s 
– 
CR
PD
, 
20
06
 
3
(a
)
3
–
3
3
3
3
3
CR
PD
, 2
00
6
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
T
a
bl
e 
5.
 S
ta
tu
s 
o
f 
R
a
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 o
n
 I
n
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
T
re
a
ti
es
 o
n
 S
o
ci
o
-e
co
n
o
m
ic
 R
ig
h
ts
 
So
ur
ce
: S
ou
th
 A
si
a 
A
lli
an
ce
 fo
r 
Po
ve
rt
y 
Er
ad
ic
at
io
n 
(2
01
6:
 3
9)
19
Hazaras, as the intersectional case – suffering both religious and eth-
nic exclusions – are particularly deprived. Afghanistan’s commitment to 
protecting and promoting minority rights is newfound and still forming. 
Minority rights have been better since the Bonn Agreement, 2001, which 
installed a national unity government, replacing Taliban.  In the 2004 Con-
stitution that followed, Hazaras – the traditionally persecuted and margin-
alised – were given some of the same rights as others. But religious minori-
ties continue to be discriminated against, both in law and in effect. This is 
despite Afghanistan having ratified all key international covenants.
Efforts to convert the weak commitment are also poor. The first bar-
rier that one comes across is the absence of appropriate data disaggregat-
ed by religious groups, in the absence of which it is difficult to say in any 
precise manner whether minorities are provided socio-economic rights or 
not. Overall, minorities have poor access. Nomadic and tribal communities, 
eg Kuchis, have poor access to education. Poverty is highest in northern 
areas, areas inhabited by minorities such as Aimaq, Turkmanis, Uzbeks, 
Nuristanis; and central parts, amongst Hazaras. Areas occupied by Shias – 
Hazaras and Ismailis – are among the most deprived in Afghanistan.  
Bangladesh
Religious minorities make up close to 14% of Bangladesh’s population, Hin-
dus and Buddhist making up the bulk. Minorities experiencing intersection-
ality of exclusion suffer the most. These are the indigenous peoples, Dalits 
and tea garden workers that are religious minorities as well as class and 
caste minorities. Poorer sections among stranded Pakistanis or ‘Biharis’, 
who are both linguistic and class minorities, also figure here. Of all the 
minority groups, Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) indigenous groups are the 
most deprived.7 Stripped of their land and forest resources, thus deprived 
of livelihoods, these indigenous tribes suffer extreme poverty, hunger and 
malnutrition. They also suffer poor service provisioning – water and sani-
tation, health services and nutrition. There is high incidence of morbidity, 
especially among women, and high dropout levels from schools. Dalits in 
Bangladesh too suffer acute marginalisation. Poverty levels are high, living 
conditions dismal, and education and health access marginal. Similarly, Bi-
haris suffer severe deprivation. Only some 5% are in formal employment, 
7.  According to a 2011 census, there are about 1.5 million indigenous persons in Bangla-
desh. Indigenous persons themselves claim their population is closer to 5 million. The 
CHT groups make up some 20% of this total population. See: https://www.iwgia.org/en/
bangladesh.  
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with the rest entirely in the informal sector. Living conditions in refugee 
camps are harsh, and there are high dropout levels from schools. 
Despite the severity of marginalisation of these groups, there seems to 
be little resolve to address the problem. Bangladesh is a signatory to many 
international conventions relevant to minorities. But it has refrained from 
endorsing United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP), that could potentially have provided safeguards for individu-
al and collective rights of indigenous peoples. And although it has ratified 
ILO Convention 107 concerning the protection of indigenous and tribal/
semi-tribal populations, domestic laws have not been harmonised, and land 
grabbing and loss of livelihoods of indigenous persons are rampant. Even 
national laws to protect rights, such as The East Bengal State Acquisition 
and Tenancy Act, 1950, are not enforced fully.  The deprivations were also 
the driving force behind the long-drawn armed conflict between Shanti 
Bahni, representing CHT tribes and the Government of Bangladesh. The 
Chittagong Hills Tribes Peace Accord (1997) was signed between the two 
parties to end the violence, guaranteeing safeguards against land alien-
ation; devolution of power to local bodies; rehabilitation of refugees, IDPs 
and returnees; and investment in services and opportunities for the people. 
Rights groups claim the accord is only poorly implemented, resulting in 
deprivation persisting. 
Similarly, despite the poor condition of dalits, there is very little com-
mitment and effort for them. Only recently, nominal measures have been 
introduced for reservation of jobs as sweepers, and for enrolment and 
retention of children in schools. A nominal special allocation for pension 
and scholarship for Dalits was initiated only in FY 2011–12. Recently, the 
seventh national 5-year plan (2016–2020) recognised Dalits as the missing 
poor, and as the most marginalised. The result of this is yet to be felt.  Bihari 
linguistic minorities continue to be excluded from welfare programmes (the 
national social security strategy), and services, due both to the poor provi-
sioning for them – their stateless status was only overturned in 2008 when 
they were recognised as citizens – and the stigma attached to the refugee 
camps where most are housed. 
Bhutan
Bhutan’s is a case of a minority elite (the Ngalongs making up 15% of 
the population) being the dominant power in what is essentially a three-
way ethnic make-up (Buddhist Ngalongs in the north-west; Buddhist 
Sharchopkas in the north-east; and Nepali-speaking, mainly Hindu, Lhot-
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sampas in the south). Sharchopkas (who speak a minority language) are 
demographically the dominant group making up 50% of the population. 
They are the principal minority. But it is the Lhotsampas (the southern-
ers, professing Hinduism and speaking Nepali), making up 22–25 % of the 
population at last count, who are minorities in the true sense. Christians are 
also excluded.  
Language and Buddhism form the bedrocks of the Ngalong state, which 
seeks a homogenised society around the Dzongkha language, dress code 
and Buddhist religion. The homogenising trend was strong enough that in 
the late 1980s a sixth of the population of the Nepali-speaking Lhotsam-
pas were stripped of their citizenship, paving the way for their expulsion 
in 1991–92. The backdrop to this was discrimination against Lhotsampas 
increasing from the late 1980s in the context of the Bhutanese elite’s fears of 
Lhotsampa domination and of political/armed movements in the region, re-
sulting in the government’s rolling out of a ‘One Nation, One People’ policy. 
This resulted in land and jobs being taken away and the Lhotsampas being 
disenfranchised. More than 100,000 Lhotsampas became stateless as a re-
sult of the disenfranchisement and were forced to take refuge in UN refugee 
camps in Nepal. This was one of largest forced migrations in history. Not 
one refugee has been allowed to return since. Some 113,160 have relocated 
to western countries, including the US and Canada.8 Other minorities also 
suffer disadvantages, particularly religious minorities.
The 2008 constitution, which introduced nominal democracy – in the 
form of ‘democratic constitutional monarchy’ – in Bhutan, restored the rights 
of the Lhotsampas, but is still a far cry from providing a level playing field 
for minorities. Lhotsampa-concentrated districts (southern, with some 80% 
concentration) have higher poverty incidence and unemployment, and poor-
er health and education attainment figures. Commitment to international 
best practices is less than adequate; indeed, Bhutan has not ratified either 
the CERD (International Convention on Elimination of all forms of Racial 
Discrimination, 1965) nor the (CESCR) International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (1966). And although the 2008 constitution guar-
antees equality to all, and aims to reduce inequalities, these aspirations are not 
fully translated into laws, nor operationalised in policies and programmes. A 
key drawback here is the absence of data disaggregated by minority group, 
preventing the tracking and reporting of outcomes, even media and civil soci-
ety based reports and analysis on the condition of minority groups.     
8. Source: My Republica
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 India 
Minorities, understood here as religious, make up some 19% of India’s pop-
ulation. The poorest Muslims, also characterised as Arzal or Dalit Muslims 
and Dalit Christians, and women among them, suffer the worst forms of 
exclusion. Education and health outcomes and income and employment 
among these sections are some of the poorest among all social groups, as 
is access to services and benefits. Indeed, a recent report claims that inter-
generational mobility (a proxy for equality of opportunity) has been steadily 
declining among Muslims, even though it has been rising for India’s tradi-
tionally excluded – the Dalits (Asher et al 2018).
Underlying the vulnerability of religious minorities in India is poor com-
mitment and effort towards improving minority outcomes. Commitment to 
international standards is poor. India has ratified most international cove-
nants, including CESCR (1966) and CERD (1965),  but these have not been 
fully written into the law. An example is anti-discrimination and equality 
provisions; the core of most international covenants on socio-economic 
rights, but on which there is no specific legislation in India. Indeed, dis-
criminatory provisions exist in the law itself, disadvantaging minorities, 
a glaring example being the exclusion of Muslim and Christians from the 
Scheduled Caste category, keeping the poorest sections among these reli-
gious groups away from benefits that affirmative action programmes pro-
vide SC populations. Overall, only recently have Muslims – who, recent 
research is confirming, are the poorest of the poor – been recognised as a 
subject of development. 
Efforts to operationalise the weak commitments there are are even poor-
er. This takes various forms. Minorities are ill-defined and not included in 
official categories, and are thus deprived of benefits. Data on minorities is 
available only partially; as a result there is poor preparation for targeting 
efforts, monitoring progress and measuring impact. 
There is also poor targeting of minorities in terms of public policies, 
programmes and schemes. The poorest Muslims (and Christians) are ex-
cluded from affirmative action programmes that have, over time, helped 
SCs (or Dalits) enhance their inter-generational mobility. These sections 
– defined mostly as Other Backward Classes (OBC) – are forced to com-
pete with groups that are quite advanced educationally and economically. 
The minority programmes that do exist are modest; not targeted, but ge-
neric; and use an area approach rather than focusing on deprivations faced 
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by specific groups. The budget is size is also poor; data disaggregated by re-
ligious groups is absent; and attempts to monitor performance, evaluate re-
sults and communicate outcomes are weak. There is poor awareness about 
the minority programme, even amongst those tasked to implement them. 
The authors demonstrate that these lacunae are further pronounced at the 
state level – with even poorer funding, utilisation, and reporting even more 
pronounced. 
Since the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party took power in 2014 in a landslide 
victory riding a majoritarian Hindu nationalist vote, religious minorities 
have suffered increasing violence and marginalisation. This has facilitated 
the gradual dismantling of the minority programme there was, thus further 
imperilling efforts. Plans for improving results on equality and non-dis-
crimination, such as those for establishing an Equal Opportunity Commis-
sion (EOC) and Diversity Index (DI), have been shelved, as have plans for 
better data gathering and management, aiding planning and delivery, such 
as the Assessment and Monitoring Authority (AMA) and National Data 
Bank (NDB). There have also been calls for key institutions for minority 
development – the central Ministry of Minority Affairs, and National Com-
mission of Minorities – to be disbanded. These years have also seen a grad-
ual diminution in budgetary provisioning for minority programmes, and in 
some states, a complete reversal of minority schemes (eg Uttar Pradesh’s 
erstwhile 20% budgetary allocation for minorities). India is a good example 
of how majoritarian nationalism can set the clock back significantly on mi-
nority rights protection and promotion. 
Nepal 
Nepal has been described as a land of minorities, considering the many iden-
tity groups in the country, defined along religious, caste and ethnic lines. 
Madhesis and Janjatis (indigenous groups), defined along ethnic lines; Dal-
it caste groups; and Muslim and Christian religious groups are the main mi-
norities in the country. Of these, Dalits and religious minorities, especially 
women among them, suffer the worst disadvantages. Research is showing a 
wide disparity in socio-economic attainment among Nepal’s social groups, 
the gap being especially large between Hindu caste communities and other 
dominant groups on the one side and minorities on the other. Tarai Dalits 
and Muslims, as well as Tarai Janjatis, demonstrate poor outcomes – child 
survival and other health access indicators; poverty, economic access and 
standard of living; and educational attainments. 
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The poor outcomes can be traced to inadequate commitment, especially 
for specific minority groups, and the poor implementation of laws and pol-
icies, representing a weak and flawed effort. Nepal has taken various steps 
to ensure equality and non-discrimination. Along with constitutional pro-
visions, Nepal is also a party to several international conventions to ensure 
non-discrimination. How these otherwise robust measures might not be 
adequate when it comes to minorities is demonstrated by the example of 
the 2015 Constitution, which in effect discriminates against religious mi-
norities. Building on the 2007 Interim Constitution, the 2015 constitution 
guarantees equality of all citizens and prohibits discrimination in any man-
ner; sets aside specific quotas for women, Dalits and religious minorities; 
and affirms proportional representation, along with a plural voting system, 
to enable a share in power for smaller groups. All these provisions go to 
equalise access to power and resources for minority groups. Yet, the con-
stitution’s flawed definition of secularism privileges Hinduism over other 
faiths and undermines its otherwise equalising ethos, creating openings for 
discrimination against religious minorities. 
Nepal has also travelled great lengths to translate the overall good com-
mitments into efforts. Constitutional aspirations and international prom-
ises have been written into domestic laws and policies, examples being the 
5th Human Rights National Action Plan 2015–2020, National Employment 
Policy (2015), and the School Sector Development Plan 2016–2023. Insti-
tutional changes are also being effected. National commissions for women, 
Dalits and other minorities (with the exception of Christians) have been 
set up, as have Gender Equality and Social Inclusion units in key minis-
tries. Yet bias is deep-seated, and minorities are only poorly represented 
in government, making the rooting out of discrimination much more dif-
ficult. This, along with poor provisioning and a lack of clarity in roles and 
responsibilities for key inclusionary institutions, means minorities still face 
an uphill task in accessing rights and opportunities. However, Nepal’s is 
also a case that shows the way forward for inclusion of minority groups, not 
least the significant progress made in creating and reporting data on a range 
of counts, disaggregated by social groups. 
Pakistan 
Pakistan has ratified ICESCR (1966), but there is poor implementation in 
terms of incorporating the laws into domestic legislation and operational-
ising those laws. There is a significant gap between ratification, legislation 
and implementation. This applies to the right to work, the right to stan-
dard of living, the right to health, and the right to education. An example 
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is the bonded labour and minimum wage acts, which are not implemented 
for many reasons, including simply poor effort.  A dearth of relevant data 
disaggregated by social groups is a barrier to analysis and planning.
As a result, there is significant poverty, and large regional variations, with 
minorities suffering most. The situation for religious minorities is worsen-
ing. Minorities particularly targeted are Ahmadis (considered by extremist 
elements, but now also codified in law, to be    un-Muslim), Christians (who 
are seen to be linked to the west) and Hindus (who are linked with India 
and partition). Baloch and Pashtun are also targeted, hence the nature of 
minority marginalisation has an ethnic and regional dimension too. 
There are various threads in the Pakistan story that deserve attention: 
The worst forms of exclusion happen when exclusions intersect – Hin-
du brick kiln workers in Sindh, and Christian sanitation workers (women 
among them) in Punjab, Karachi and elsewhere. Minority women in Paki-
stan are some of the worst sufferers. The conjuncture of economic margin-
alisation, gender discrimination and religious exclusion results in extreme 
abuse. But the Ahmadi community is a unique case, where persecution is 
purely on religious grounds – through both violence and marginalisation.  
Everywhere we see state and non-state actors conspiring together – 
mostly with the state being captive of majoritarian elements – to target mi-
norities. Exclusionary majoritarian nationalism provides the context to this 
take-over of the state, enabling the marginalisation of minority groups. This 
also might provide us a clue to the puzzle we noticed in Pakistan of poor 
resolve to address minority concerns. 
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka’s minorities make up a combination of ethnic groups (Tam-
ils, making up 15% of the population and Moors 9%) and religious groups 
(Hindus at 12% of the population, Muslims at 10% and Christians at 6.7%). 
Intersectionality is crucial, as is caste, as an important factor enabling dis-
crimination. Whilst development outcomes, such as those for education and 
health, are positive on the whole for Sri Lanka, they are poor for districts 
with high minority concentrations, especially tea estate districts. Food se-
curity and malnutrition are particularly problematic, as is land alienation. 
Eastern districts are the worst affected. The recent spike in violence against 
Muslims is seen to have economic drivers, with Sinhalese nationalists using 
violence instrumentally to cripple Muslims economically.      
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Here too commitment and effort to realise minority outcomes and check 
discrimination are poor, even though Sri Lanka leads the region in sound 
social policies – a good example being making education free and compul-
sory for all in 1954, just after independence. Although Sri Lanka again has 
ratified most international treaties against discrimination and for economic 
and social rights, the translation into domestic law is poor. Furthermore, 
as in other countries in the region, data on socio-economic rights disaggre-
gated by minority group is not available. There is none available by region 
either, at the district level, hence it is difficult to make deductions on efforts 
and outcomes for minority groups concentrated regionally. 
The lack of effort is also reflected in the provision of services. For exam-
ple, the allocation of health personnel (medical officers and nursing staff, 
and the preventive system of midwives) to minority concentrated districts 
is particularly poor. Another example of how effort is wanting is education. 
The district quota system was introduced in 1971 to equalise university plac-
es across the country. Only 30% of the places are now left to be determined 
by merit. This disadvantaged Tamils (from Jaffna), where the demand was 
large and quota places provided small. A challenge to the policy in the Su-
preme Court was thrown out, on grounds of discrimination. This ruling had 
the effect of entrenching the systemic discrimination initiated by the ‘Sinha-
la Only’ policy. Recent policy initiatives, such as the National Human Rights 
Action Plan, 2017, and National Plan for Action, 2016, for up country Tam-
ils, to provide housing, basic services and health, are a fresh start. It remains 
to be seen to what extent they facilitate equal access to all.  
Conclusion 
The results across the region on the socio-economic rights of minorities are 
evidently poor, on account of poor commitment and poorer effort by state 
parties. At the national level, minorities suffer in silence. At the regional lev-
el there is no movement on minority rights. Only very occasionally are there 
any efforts at the international level. Further demand by minority groups 
themselves is too weak, too fragmented, and too occasional. 
Minorities are unable to challenge the systematic patterns of discrimi-
nation and disadvantage due to their lack of power. Effective public policy 
can make that difference. Effective and universal public services, such as 
health care, education and social care, can counter inequality in health and 
education. Redistributive policies and schemes, such as social safety net 
and universal programmes can moderate inequality in wealth, and policies 
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enabling mobility can get entrenched minorities out of poverty. But as a 
report by a regional initiative for inclusive development explains, the con-
tribution public policies might make to positive changes in South Asia, es-
pecially for minorities, is seen under a negative light. (SAAPE 2016). Opin-
ion polls support this claim. The Gallup World Poll asks respondents about 
their satisfaction with basic services, their assessment of future well-being, 
and their views on government efforts to help the poor. Findings from India 
show that Muslims, who are more likely to suffer, have less confidence than 
other groups in public institutions to make change in their lives.9  
At the core of this poor perception of public policy and institutions, es-
pecially among the region’s poor and minorities, is poor commitment and 
effort to bridge gaps between the rich and poor, between minorities and 
the rest. The Commitment to Reducing Inequality Index (CRI) measures 
how countries fare in terms of their policies targeting inequalities, including 
social spending, taxation and labour rights. Reduction of inequalities has 
a disproportionate effect on poverty reduction. A recent report by CRI re-
searchers shows that South Asian countries figure somewhere at the bottom 
of the pile on their CRI score. Six of the eight South Asian countries are in 
the bottom 20 of the 152 countries studied.  India ranks 132, Afghanistan, 
146. Nepal, South Asia’s best performer on the count, is at 81 (Oxfam 2017).
Behind this lacklustre commitment by most South Asian states is the 
adoption of economic models that are neo-liberal, privileging private capital 
and outsourcing of services to private providers at the expense of public. 
This ‘perpetuates pauperisation of larger masses by allowing greater chunks 
of GDP to accumulate in the wallets of the top few’ (SAAPE 2016: 11). This 
harsh form of neo-liberal agenda privileges, among other things, ‘….priva-
tisation, the dismantling of welfare state and social security programmes 
as well as fortification of market driven agricultural policies and increasing 
military expenditure’ (ibid).10  As a result, all across South Asia, the nature 
of growth is under question, with increasing GDP on one hand and increas-
ing unemployment on the other (ibid: 4). This impacts minorities – and the 
poorest among them – the most.   
9. https://news.gallup.com/poll/157079/muslims-india-confident-democracy-despite-eco-
nomic-educational-challenges.aspx
10. The region houses 22% of the world’s population, but accounts for only 1.3% of the 
world’s income. Yet military expenditure is one of the highest (India: 2.3 % of GDP, Sri 
Lanka, 2.3 %, Pakistan 3.4 % – SIPRI 2015).   India is the largest importer of military 
equipment. Pakistan is not too far behind.  Militarisation is a major roadblock to eradi-
cating poverty (SAAPE, 2016: 50).
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Recommendations  
Below, we attempt to provide some helpful recommendations for the 
advancement of minority rights protection and promotion regimes in South 
Asia, especially on socio-economic rights. These are provided in general 
terms for countries to follow, as well as at regional and international levels. 
Recommendations are also provided for civil society and community groups 
to implement. Specific recommendations for individual countries are pro-
vided in their respective country chapters. 
For state parties 
Commitment
- South Asian states demonstrate weak commitment to minority rights 
protection and promotion. This must be changed. There is a need to rat-
ify all international treaties that are relevant to minorities, specifically 
the ones that bind state parties to ensuring equality and non-discrim-
ination provisions, viz CERD (1965), CESCR (1966), CEDAW (1979), 
CRC (1989), CMW (1990) and CPRD (2006). South Asian states must 
also raise the bar and sign optional protocols relating to these treaties, 
to allow individual complaints mechanisms to be moved, thus stepping 
up of their own accord to improve minority outcomes and put account-
ability mechanisms in place;
- These international commitments must be written into domestic law, 
and measures for the operationalisation of these commitments must be 
put in place. This will include resolving contradictions and lacunae in 
national laws, to meet the higher standards that international treaties 
demand; and
- This will require amending national laws that discriminate against spe-
cific minorities. Equally, this will require working on a key lacuna in 
domestic law across the region – namely the absence of equality and 
anti-discrimination legislations that could be effectively enforced. 
Whilst most national constitutions guarantee equality of all citizens and 
non-discrimination, that aspiration has not been translated into specific 
laws and programmes of action. Nepal’s is perhaps the strongest regime 
of equality and inclusion for minority groups as a whole, but its chal-
lenge has been poor implementation. India’s experience with a similar 
instrument, though limited to the country’s Dalits, has been similar. 
Exclusion and violence against Dalits continue. There is nothing like 
such an instrument for religious minorities. 
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Effort
- Policies and programmes to operationalise the commitments are poor. 
There is only limited provisioning for the socio-economic uplift of mi-
norities and for ensuring their equal access to services and entitlements. 
This is about a lack of resources invested and limited institutional 
mechanisms to address minority deprivations. India’s case is instruc-
tive. It has an expansive programme of affirmative action for SCs, STs 
and OBCs, with quotas in educational institutions and public sector em-
ployment. It also has a vast social service regime with safety net pro-
grammes for the poorest population. Only some of these are universal. 
Religious minorities are excluded from much of these impressive equal-
ising programmes, all of which are caste or means tested, and there is 
little to provide religious minorities the chance to overcome barriers to 
accessing universal services. Most of the other countries in the region 
have even less to offer their minorities to provide equal access to rights 
and opportunities. What is required is newer programmes that meet 
the specific needs of minority groups, and greater investment in those 
efforts, including special institutional mechanisms. Nepal has led the 
effort, with the creation of constitutional bodies to advance the interests 
of women, Dalits and minorities. Other countries should follow suit, and 
better the example through providing these statutory bodies with effec-
tive authority, resources and personnel capacity;
- This last would also include greater minority representation in public 
services, so that minorities have a stake in government functioning, and 
their concerns also come through in how state institutions function and 
deliver services. Equally important here is changing the attitudes and 
behaviour of key duty bearers, as it is bias that is the biggest barrier 
to equal provision for minorities and socially disadvantaged groups. 
Despite the best of laws and programmes, outcomes continue to let 
minorities down, because discriminatory behaviour is so deep-seated. 
Training, exposure and appropriate incentives are required to change 
behaviour; and  
- Effective effort for improved outcomes also requires investment of re-
sources and energy in observation and measurement, creating data dis-
aggregated by individual groups and monitoring and measuring efforts 
using those data to provide an accurate picture of performance and out-
comes. The region as a whole is weak on data and analytics, but without 
statistical data specifically disaggregated by groups as well as qualitative 
data on experiences and impact, measuring and tracking performance is 
an impossible task. All states need to progress in that direction.  
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For regional actors 
Behind poor national commitment and effort for minority outcomes in 
the region is majoritarian nationalism, much of it competitive across bor-
ders (examples being Hindu nationalism in India, in opposition to Islamic 
in Pakistan; and Sinhala-Buddhist in Sri Lanka against Tamil), which disin-
centivises action perceived as favouring minorities by deepening democracy 
and strengthening minority safeguards. In this kind of stalemate, hope for 
a breakthrough lies only in engendering cross-border dialogue and under-
standing. There are various forms this could take:    
- Debates and discussions based on new data, findings, analysis and in-
sights, to educate citizens and the policy community on the condition 
of minorities, to show how provision for them works or not, and how 
drivers of minorities’ deprivations and their struggles for dignity every-
where, regardless of their affiliations, are similar;   
- South Asia-wide cross learnings: sharing of experiences, good practices, 
and challenges in providing for minorities across borders, to showcase 
how challenges could be overcome and progress advanced;  
- Regional networks and alliances for advancing minority rights, working 
across national borders and engaging with each other to share experi-
ences, develop common ground on minority demands, voice demands, 
and bring to bear collective pressure on duty bearers and civil society 
actors to act for minorities; and 
- Regional platforms drawing the attention of international entities to the 
condition of minorities in the region, leveraging their strengths and en-
gaging with UN and other multilateral mechanisms to push the envelope 
for minority rights in the South Asia region. 
Given the poor legitimacy, interest and capacity of formal regional entities 
– SAARC in particular – regional civil society must take the lead in this 
Track II type work, paving the way for greater regional movement on 
dialogue and exchange on minority and human rights.
For international community 
The international community needs to pay greater attention to the condi-
tion of minorities in South Asia. 
- The problem is vast, both in terms of the scale (the largest number of 
those deprived and discriminated against) and nature of the problem 
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(deep-seated caste and gender discriminations, and religious extrem-
ism, making progress that much more difficult). 
- Progress with outcomes for minorities in South Asia will have a signif-
icant impact on meeting SDG targets, hence the additional attention is 
practical too.
- South Asia has seen many long-standing armed conflicts and identi-
ty-based movement, and some conventional intra-regional wars too. All 
have as their drivers grievances of minorities that remained unmet.
- Majoritarian nationalism has been on the rise in the region, including 
in countries as yet robustly democratic. Their capturing state power has 
been making life for minorities even more difficult, and progress on mi-
nority rights that much more contingent.  
Yet South Asia is the only region without a regional mechanism or pro-
cess for minority rights, and without traction amongst state parties on it. 
What is needed is a UN-led effort to get member states in the region to agree 
on a charter of minority rights, and a mechanism and process for enforcing 
those. This will require the UN’s close handholding throughout the process, 
providing technical and legitimacy support, and for other multilateral bod-
ies as well as the rest of the international development community to sup-
port the process.  
For minority communities and civil society 
Finally, no effort at advancing minority rights will bear fruit without the 
effective involvement of targeted communities themselves. Minorities are 
deprived and discriminated against ultimately because they are excluded 
from decision-making processes. Greater participation of minority commu-
nities will require: 
- Their improving their capacity to organise themselves, mobilise sup-
port, network with other interest groups, document and track violations 
of rights and progress made, and make demands on duty bearers and 
laws and structures. This will require significant and organised invest-
ment of resources and energy in minority activists, community-based 
organisations and platforms; and
- Rights-minded civil society supporting this community-led effort, 
through handholding, signposting, investment and networking, at the 
local and national level, making demands on state institutions and influ-
encing the policy community.
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Introduction 
Minorities in South Asia are a mix of religious, ethnic, linguistic and caste 
groups, with women being particularly vulnerable. Recent years have con-
tinued to be detrimental to minorities in the region. They have faced target-
ed attacks on individuals, groups and places of worship; and government 
suppression and prohibition of cultural practices. These include killings by 
armed Islamist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan and by vigilante groups 
and lynch mobs associated with Hindutva groups in India; the targeting 
of bloggers by Islamists in Bangladesh; and communal flare ups involving 
Buddhist extremists in Sri Lanka. South Asia continues to be a difficult place 
for its minorities. The Peoples Under Threat rankings, which list countries 
where communities face the greatest risk of genocide, mass killing, or sys-
tematic violent repression, include every single country in South Asia, with 
varying degrees of threat (Minority Rights Group International 2018). The 
only one missing is Bhutan, about which there is little knowledge. 
This chapter, looking back over the events of 2017 and 2018 (up to the 
month of August), especially targeted violence against minorities by both 
state and non-state actors in the region, catalogues the human tragedy play-
ing out in the region in an attempt to demonstrate the implications of the 
more long term and institutionalised discrimination and marginalisation of 
minorities in the socioeconomic realm – the focus of this year’s report. In 
the literature on minority rights violations, one can see strong links between 
the two – the long term marginalisation of minorities and physical attacks 
against them. The causality works both ways. Long term and institution-
alised marginalisation paves the way for overt physical violence and the tar-
geting of minorities’ cultural rights and practices, because society becomes 
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used to the discrimination, and impunity is already established, giving the 
perpetrators free rein. At the same time, violence towards minorities and 
the resultant polarisation of society reinforces discrimination, especially by 
state actors that then lend weight to communal considerations in the deliv-
ery of citizenship rights and the rule of law. A vicious circle sets in, which is 
exactly what seems to be happening in South Asia. 
Below is a summary of developments during 2017 and 2018, covering 
the period since the last State of Minorities Report was published, present-
ed by country (listed alphabetically). This account is limited to the infor-
mation available. In Bhutan’s case in particular, we have struggled to find 
any information on minorities there. For the rest, most of what is available 
is work by international networks on human and minority rights as well as 
by local civil society and minority groups and networks. Official data on the 
condition of minorities is severely limited.    
Bangladesh
Bangladesh has been teeming with attacks on its minorities, including in-
digenous people; atheist and secular writers and activists; and members of 
the LGTBQI+ community. Members of the Ahmadi, Sufi and Baul commu-
nities have also been targeted. There have been inter-group clashes too with 
entire villages attacked and burnt. While the government has attempted to 
clamp down on these attacks, minorities still fear for their lives, security 
and property. 
The Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council compiled 
959 reports of violations of minority rights between January and October 
2017, based on media reports. These included murder, attempted murder, 
death threats, assault, rape, kidnapping, and attacks on homes, businesses, 
and places of worship (United States Department of State 2017a). These 
followed some 907 incidents of political violence in Bangladesh in 2016, 
many against minority groups, which resulted in 177 deaths and 11,462 in-
juries. Reports on these were compiled by the Bangladesh legal aid and hu-
man rights organisation Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK) (2016: 13). A bi-annual 
report by the Kapaeeng Foundation reported that in the first 6 months of 
2018, there were attacks on at least 209 indigenous persons and 125 fam-
ilies. Victims included 12 children and 23 women.1 This section aims to 
1. https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2018/07/02/report-209-indigenous-peo-
ple-victimized-in-six-months
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2. https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/bangladesh-imam-of-ahmadiyya-attacked-mosque 
-976174-2017-05-09
3. https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2017/06/11/langadu-attack- 
manufactured-rage/
4. https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2017/08/06/rangamati-court-sends-16-to-jail-over- 
langadu-violence
5. https://www.thedailystar.net/city/rohingya-refugee-crisis-stop-atrocities-bangladesh- 
buddhists-urge-myanmar-1459282
provide a snapshot of events in the country affecting minorities from Janu-
ary 2016 to August 2018, especially attacks by non-state actors on individu-
als from minority communities.
On 2 January 2017, a Hindu named Narayan Chandra Das was killed in 
Naokhali over extortion (ASK 2018). On 8 May 2017, Mustafijur Rahman, 
an imam of the Ahmadiyya community, was brutally hacked to death in My-
mensingh district.2 On 24 May 2017 the Bangladesh Christian Association 
reported a Christian family being attacked by Muslim real estate investors 
and local government officials, who wanted to seize their land (United States 
Department of State 2017a).
On 2 June 2017 at least 224 houses, offices and shops were razed to the 
ground in an attack on indigenous people in Langadu in Rangamati. Ten-
sions began with the brutal killing of the local leader of the Awami League’s 
youth front, Juba League: Nurul Islam Nayan. Two indigenous Chakma 
persons were accused. During the funeral procession, a crowd of thousands 
gathered. Some were holding banners demanding the punishment of ‘in-
digenous criminals’. As the procession moved, someone threw bricks at 
Chakma houses and shops. Soon, houses began to be torched. A 70-year-old 
Chakma woman died during the attacks. The survivors managed to escape 
while their homes and livelihoods, including granaries and cattle, were de-
stroyed.3 As of August 2017, 46 people had been arrested for the arson.4 
On 8 September 2017, the Buddhist community, under the banner of 
the Bangladesh United Buddhists’ Forum, formed a human chain in Dhaka, 
calling upon the Myanmar government to stop ongoing atrocities against 
Rohingya Muslims. They also expressed concerns for their safety in the light 
of rumours circulating against them on social media, and a fear of reprisal 
from Bangladeshi Muslims.5 On 29 October 2017 six persons were detained 
for looting and vandalising a Hindu Durga temple in Manikganj district 
(United States Department of State 2017a).
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According to ASK Bangladesh’s annual observation on the human rights 
situation in Bangladesh, violence against Hindus in the country in 2017 in-
cluded the attack, looting or destruction of 212 idols, 45 houses and 21 busi-
ness organisations (ASK 2017: 14). On 10 November 2017, more than 30 
Hindu homes were ransacked, looted and set on fire by a mob in Thakarpur 
village in Rangpur Sadar upazila of Rangpur. The mob that carried out the 
attack had emerged from a crowd of about 20,000 people from neighbour-
ing villages, which had gathered based on a rumor that a Hindu had put 
up a Facebook post defaming Islam. In the police action that followed, one 
person was killed and at least 5 more severely injured. An angry mob later 
blocked a highway, protesting the police attack.6 Two Union Parishad mem-
bers were also arrested for suspected involvement,7 and 53 further arrests 
were made.8 In January 2018 a government engineer confessed in court that 
he had incited people to attack Hindu homes, leading to the aforementioned 
Rangpur violence. In the two cases registered in connection to the attack, 
the police have referred to 159 named and 2000 unidentified perpetrators.9 
On 20 January 2018, three pastors were assaulted at a gathering in Go-
palganj, over disputed property.10 The National Coordination Committee 
for Different Religious and Indigenous Organisations – an umbrella group 
for ethnic and religious minorities – held a rally on 10 March protesting 
communal attacks and demanding safety and security.11 
On 30 March 2018, a large group of people attacked an Ahmadiyya 
mosque at Jamalpur’s Madarganj Upazila. The attack took place after Fri-
day prayers, and left over 20 worshippers injured.12 On 12 June 2018, five 
Hindu houses were attacked in Nasirnagar, Brahmanbaria, leaving nine 
6. https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/nation/2017/11/10/one-killed-angry-go-ber-
serk-rangpur-hindu-village-facebook-status/
7. https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/crime/2017/11/17/attack-rangpur-hin-
dus-two-members-arrested
8. https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/nation/2017/11/11/53-arrested-attack-hin-
du-houses/
9. https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/world/engineer-admits-to-inciting-people-to-at-
tack-hindus-in-bangladesh/531043.html
10. https://www.ucanews.com/news/thugs-beat-up-bangladeshi-pastors-over-disputed-
pond/81314
11. https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/dhaka/2018/03/10/minority-communi-
ties-protest-communal-attack-demand-safety
12. https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/nation/2018/04/11/jamalpurs-ahmadi-
yya-community-living-fear-mosque-attack/
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injured.13 On 22 July 2018, a Hindu religious procession, Ulto Rath Yatra, 
was attacked by a group of locals in Kotalipara Upazila, Gopalganj. Six dev-
otees were injured. 
State actors and minorities
On 5 April 2017, Romel Chakma, an indigenous college student and leader 
of Pahari Chhatra Porishad, Rangamati, was picked up by the army. It was 
alleged that the army tortured him and he eventually died of the injuries in 
hospital. Following his death, a day long blockade was called by indigenous 
students’ political groups in Rangamati. The National Human Rights Com-
mission set up a committee to investigate his death.14 15 16   
In April 2017, the High Court confirmed the death penalty for two found 
guilty of killing individuals for allegedly offending Islam. These were part 
of the nine killings from February 2013 to April 2016 claimed by banned 
group Ansar Al Islam (United States Department of State 2017a). In 2017, 
it was also reported that the Ministry of Education had made changes to 
Bengali language textbooks. Poems and stories from non-Muslim authors 
were removed, and Islamic content was added to nonreligious subject mat-
ter (United States Department of State 2017a).
Bhutan
When it comes to the status of its minorities, Bhutan is opaque to the world. 
Religious groups can register with the Commission for Religious Organisa-
tion to organise, raise funds, conduct outreach or import literature, among 
other activities. However, since not all groups are registered, very little 
is known about events affecting minorities. Of the 108,000 Lhotsampas 
who had fled Bhutan in the 1990s, most have been resettled by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) under a third coun-
try resettlement process, with the US resettling 100,000.17 The remaining 
13. https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/nation/2018/06/12/five-hindu-households-at-
tacked-in-nasirnagar-9-injured
14.   https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2017/05/02/nhrc-investigating-hill-student-leader-ro-
mel-s-death
15. https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2017/04/21/romel-chakma-death-pcp-de-
clares-blockade-rangamati/
16. https://www.thedailystar.net/backpage/police-probing-romels-death-1395517
17. The country created situations where Lhotsampas, a Nepali-speaking minority, were 
forced out, in a bid to create a homogenous national identity. See: https://thediplomat.
com/2016/09/bhutans-dark-secret-the-lhotshampa-expulsion/
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refugees are to be resettled by the end of 2018.18 These may be resettled in 
Nepal itself, though some, who refused third country resettlement, wish to 
go back to Bhutan. Bhutan itself maintains that it will take back only those 
who can prove to be Bhutanese.
According to Open Door’s World Watch List 2018, Christians in Bhutan 
continue to face discrimination, with the NGO rating their persecution as 
‘very high’. Examples include a student who was not allowed to graduate 
from school due to her religion; a church building locked up and another 
demolished; a Christian man denied government identification; and Chris-
tian farmers who were excluded from the traditional communal harvesting 
process.19 It was reported that a make-shift church working in a private res-
idence had to close after receiving threats and warnings from the govern-
ment for not being registered. It was also reported that non-Buddhist civil 
servants were forced to resign if they did not participate in Buddhist rites 
and festivals (United States Department of State 2017b). Of the 96 regis-
tered religious groups in the country, only one is non-Buddhist, the Hindu 
Dharma Samudaya – an umbrella body representing the country’s Hindu 
population. 
India
Targeted violence against religious minorities is not new in India. Since the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) took power in the centre in 2014, anti-mi-
nority violence has steadily risen, both in number of incidents and in geo-
graphical spread. Newer forms of violence are also emerging. According to 
figures released by the Government of India, there was a rise in the number 
of communal violence incidents in 2017 compared to previous years. 111 
persons were killed and 2,384 injured in 822 communal incidents in 2017, 
compared to 86 persons killed and 2321 gravely injured in 703 incidents in 
2016, and 97 persons killed and 2264 injured in 751 incidents in 2015.20 The 
state that saw the highest number of incidents, claims the report, was Ut-
tar Pradesh, with 44 deaths and 542 persons injured in 195 violence cases. 
Other states with a high incidence of violence in 2017 included Karnataka (9 
killed and 229 injured); Rajasthan (12 killed and 175 injured); West Bengal 
18. http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2017-12-23/after-all-these-years.html
19. Available at: https://www.opendoorsusa.org/christian-persecution/world-watch-list/bhu-
tan/
20. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/nearly-300-killed-in-2-276-communal-vio-
lence-incidents-in-2015-17-govt-tells-rs/story-dQwLNGd1NtcvnKE5Ut1HhP.html
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21.   http://lynch.factchecker.in/
22. http://lynch.factchecker.in/
(9 killed and 230 injured); and Gujarat (8 killed and 125 injured); as well as 
Bihar and Madhya Pradesh (ibid).  
Muslims suffered the brunt of the violence in these ‘communal violence’ 
incidents, which are, in fact, targeted mass attacks by militant Hindutva 
groups themselves or networks established and nurtured by them. 2017 
ushered in, in public discourse at least, the age of lynchings, mostly against 
Muslims in cow-related attacks, mostly carried out by so-called ‘Gau Rak-
shak Dals’ (cow protection militias), many working in coordination with 
state forces. IndiaSpend, an online data site, recorded 24 incidents of cow 
related violence in 2016, with 58 victims, including 8 deaths. Of these, Mus-
lims accounted for 43%, Dalits for 34%, Hindus for 10%, Sikhs for 3%.21 
In 2017 it recorded 37 incidents of cow-related violence, with 152 victims 
including 11 deaths. Of these, Muslims accounted for 61%.22 Cow related 
lynchings appeared to ease off towards the end of 2017, but they have seen 
a revival in 2018. A civil society study counted 40 deaths by lynching and 
vigilantism in February 2018, in 30 incidents spread over several states – 
notably Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Jharkhand, as well as Rajasthan and 
West Bengal (Citizens Against Hate 2018a). Five persons have been report-
ed lynched to death in quick succession since May 2018, all in cow related 
attacks, one each in in Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, and three in 
Jharkhand. 
Interfaith couples also faced harassment, with lynchings carried out 
against so-called ‘love Jihad’ – a purported Muslim conspiracy to lure Hin-
du women into marriage. Rumours on social media led to killings commit-
ted on suspicion of kidnapping and cow slaughter. 
Other forms of targeted violence against Muslims have been reported 
from several states. In March 2018, in a string of targeted mass attacks 
against Muslims around Ram Navami festival, five persons were reported 
killed in West Bengal, and scores injured, besides largescale destruction of 
property and desecration of religious sites across several districts of Bihar, 
West Bengal and Telangana (Citizens Against Hate 2018b). Similar tar-
geting of Muslims by organised Hindu groups has been reported in Uttar 
Pradesh and Rajasthan. Small-scale incidence of provocations, threats and 
attacks by Hindu groups on Muslim communities and their religious sites 
and practices, as well as opportunistic violence against overtly Muslim peo-
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ple, such as madrassa students and maulvis, is increasingly being reported 
from the states of Jharkhand, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh, among others. 
State police also seem to be targeting Muslim youth in extrajudicial execu-
tions, with Muslims killed disproportionately in ‘fake encounter killings’ in 
Uttar Pradesh and Haryana (Citizens Against Hate 2018c). Both states are 
ruled by the BJP, with top political executives overtly espousing anti-Mus-
lim stances. 
Anti-minority violence is not limited to the targeting of Muslims, how-
ever. According to the Evangelical Fellowship of India (EFI), a Christian 
human rights documentation and advocacy group, there were over 300 in-
cidents of abuse targeting Christians in India in 2016, an increase from 177 
incidents in 2015 (United States Department of State 2017c). The Religious 
Liberty Commission of the EFI documented at least 351 cases of violence 
against Christians and churches in 2017 (ibid). The Union of Catholic Asian 
News, Persecution Relief recorded 736 attacks on Christians in 2017 com-
pared to 348 attacks in 2016 (ibid). This included four murders, 110 ‘physi-
cal violence/arrest’ cases, 70 cases of ‘threats and harassment’, 64 occasions 
when worship was forcibly stopped, and 49 cases of Christians being falsely 
accused and arrested. Most incidents were reported from southern Tam-
il Nadu, and from Uttar Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra and Madhya 
Pradesh, of which the latter four states are ruled by the BJP, and in which 
the report noted, ‘the Sangh [Hindu nationalist] cadres have free hand, with 
the police and administration either looking the other way, or complicit’.23 
EFI described 2017 as ‘one of the most traumatic’ years for Indian Chris-
tians in a decade, comparing 351 verified incidents of hate crime against 
Christians in 2017 to 147 in 2014, 177 in 2015, and 134 in the first six months 
of 2016.24 
Police records as well as the claims of the perpetrators trace these in-
stances of targeted violence and efforts at instigations to extremist Hindu 
groups, among them Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), Vishwa Hindu 
Parishad (VHP), Bajrang Dal, and Hindu Yuva Vahini, and their local vari-
ants, and notably senior members and foot soldiers of the ruling Bharatiya 
Janata Party (Citizens Against Hate 2018a and 2018b).
The period under report also saw restrictions on minority rights written 
into the law. In November 2017, Jharkhand became the 7th state to adopt 
23. https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/2018/02/2017-one-traumatic-years-indian-christians/
24. Ibid.
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25. The first of these laws were enacted in Odisha (1967), Madhya Pradesh (1968) and Chhat-
tisgarh (1968), to be followed later in Arunachal Pradesh (1978), Gujarat (2003), Rajasthan 
(2006), and Himachal Pradesh (2006). Tamil Nadu, under a BJP coalition government, 
adopted the law briefly in 2002, but public opposition forced the government to withdraw in 
2004. 
26. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/10-years-after-kandhamal-riots-both-sides-say-
they-await-justice-5322057/
what are euphemistically called Freedom of Religion Acts, provincial level 
legislations which prevent conversions, in effect restricting the freedom of 
conscience guaranteed by the Indian constitution.25 While in select states 
– Arunachal Pradesh and Rajasthan – these laws apply specifically to reli-
gious minorities, in practice the laws everywhere restrict minorities’ free-
dom to proselytise. Anti-conversion laws provide easy tools for anti-minori-
ty groups, such as VHP and RSS, to target Christians, especially on false 
charges of forcibly converting people. Recently, soon after taking power in 
the centre, the BJP was reported to have made an unsuccessful attempt at 
instigating a nation-wide anti-conversion law. The period also saw state 
cow protection laws being further beefed up, with punishments made more 
strict in some states. These laws have been known to create openings for 
Hindu extremist groups such as Bajrang Dal and VHP to target cattle trad-
ers and pastoralists, especially Muslims, resulting in the lynchings rife in 
the country today (Citizens Against Hate). Together, state anti-conversion 
and cow protection laws are the jurisprudential teeth of attempts to physi-
cally target minorities in India.   
The highest court in the land, the Supreme Court of India, and its sub-
sidiary high courts have in the period under report also passed some key 
orders affecting minorities. These deserve listing here. In August 2016 the 
Supreme Court declared the practice of unilateral triple talaq followed in 
the Muslim community as unconstitutional and unIslamic (United States 
Department of State 2017c). In the same month, the Supreme Court direct-
ed the Odisha state government to reinvestigate 315 pending cases from 
2008’s anti-Christian violence in Kandhamal, which saw some 90 killed 
and largescale destruction of property. By August 2018, of the 362 trials 
completed, only 78 had resulted in convictions.26 On 16 September 2016, 
Mumbai High Court upheld yoga and sun salutation being compulsory 
in Mumbai schools, not granting interim stay to a petitioner arguing that 
non-Hindu children were being made to follow Hindu practices (United 
States Department of State 2017c).
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The Supreme Court in April 2018 set aside a High Court order from 2017 
that had annulled the marriage of a Hindu girl to a Muslim man because 
the girl had converted to Islam. The Supreme Court held the right to choose 
one’s partner and one’s religion to be a fundamental right.27 On 17 July 2018 
the Supreme Court, in the light of cow vigilante cases, passed orders that 
included a slew of preventive, remedial and punitive measures to deal with 
mob violence and cow vigilantism, directing state authorities to provide re-
lief to victims and take action against perpetrators as well as complicit state 
actors.28 The Supreme Court is also supervising the process of updating the 
National Register of Citizens (NRC) in eastern Assam, to determine the 
nationality of residents. This exercise, which has involved processing the 
claims of some 32 million applicants, has already identified some 4 million 
as ineligible, causing fear and uncertainty in the minds of the excluded, even 
as an appeals process is underway.    
Pakistan
Through 2017–18 Pakistan continued to battle extremism and violence 
against minorities. Legal provisions such as the country’s blasphemy laws 
continue to be misused to target minorities. According to a recent report 
by the Centre for Social Justice, 74% of these blasphemy cases were re-
ported from Punjab.29 In 2017 at least 17 individuals were booked under 
the country’s blasphemy laws, compared to 18 new cases in 2016 (United 
States Department of State 2017d). Through 2016–2018 over 140 Pakistani 
Shias have ‘disappeared’, according to community activists.30 The coun-
try’s national elections in July 2018 elected Imran Khan, leader of the Teh-
reek-e-Insaf party, as Prime Minister. Imran Khan has defended blasphemy 
laws. How minorities fare under his watch is yet to be seen. 
A snapshot of events related to ethno-religious minorities from January 
2017 to August 2018 is provided below. The trends include the following: 
- Minorities were the target of violence by non-state groups and discrim-
inatory practices by state law enforcement agencies. Ahmadis, Shias, 
27. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/right-to-marry-supreme-court-hadiya-
case-5131055/
28. https://www.firstpost.com/india/supreme-court-tells-parliament-to-draft-new-law-on-
mob-lynching-condemns-mobocracy-highlights-from-judgment-4758471.html
29. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1657005/1-74-blasphemy-cases-pakistan-originate-pun-
jab-reveals-report/
30. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44280552
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31. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1310101/mob-violence-106-acquitted-joseph-colony-case/
32. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/suspect-lahore-blasphemy-case-fight-
ing-life-180303085358736.html
33. https://www.dw.com/en/pakistan-journalism-student-latest-victim-of-blasphemy-vigilan-
tes/a-38433834
34. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42970587
35. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/twin-blasts-kill-dozens-parachinar-mar-
ket-170623141126819.html
36. https://www.dawn.com/news/1341501
37. https://www.dawn.com/news/1378358
Hazaras and Christians suffered the brunt of this. 
- Positive legislative changes such as the promulgation of the Hindu Mar-
riage Act 2017 and the amendment to the Christian Divorce Act 1869 
sought to protect minorities, especially women, from discrimination 
and abuse. Other attempts such as the Sindh Criminal Law (Protection 
of Minorities) Bill failed to pass. 
Targeting of minorities by non-state actors 
In January 2017 an anti-terrorism court acquitted all 106 accused of being 
involved in the Joseph Colony attack of March 2013, during which an armed 
mob torched around 150 houses in a Christian neighbourhood following 
allegations of blasphemy against a Christian man,31 who himself remains on 
death row following conviction in 2014 (United States Department of State 
2017d). On 19 February 2017, a mob stormed into the Christian majority 
village of Baba Bandook Saeen, accusing one of its residents of committing 
blasphemy.32  
In April 2017 23-year-old journalism student Mashal Khan was killed 
by a vigilante mob over allegations of blasphemy.33 An investigation team 
ordered by the Supreme Court found the blasphemy accusations to be fab-
ricated (United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 
(USCIRF) 2018). In February 2018 a Pakistani court sentenced one man to 
death and handed life terms to five others for the murder. 25 others were 
convicted of lesser offences in the case and 26 people were acquitted.34   
On 23 June 2017 at least 85 Shia Muslims died from twin bombings 
in the northwestern city of Parachinar. A Sunni armed group, Lashkar-
e-Jhangvi, claimed responsibility.35 36 On 22 December 2017 assailants 
opened fire and killed two Shia Hazaras in Quetta. The victims were coal 
miners returning to the Mach coal field after a holiday.37 
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At least four persons from one Christian family were killed in an attack 
in Quetta on 3 April 2018.38 On 15 April at least two Christians were killed 
when leaving church after Sunday service in Essa Nagri in Quetta.39 Islamic 
State in Iraq and the Levant claimed to have carried out two gun attacks and 
bombed a church, all in April 2018.40 Such crimes against the community 
are driving Christians out of Quetta, according to reports.
April 2018 witnessed four targeted attacks on Hazaras. The month be-
gan with one killed and another injured when gunmen opened fire on their 
vehicle in Quetta’s Kandahari Bazaar.41 A shopkeeper was killed in a drive-
by shooting in Quetta on 18 April 2018.42 Two men from the community 
were killed and another injured in an attack in Quetta’s western bypass area 
on 22 April 2018.43 On 28 April 2018 unidentified assailants killed two Haz-
ara shopkeepers in Quetta.44 These killings led to protests by Hazara com-
munity members, led by the Hazara Democratic Party.45 
At least 20 were killed on 10 July 2018 in a suicide bombing at the Awami 
National Party’s Peshawar campaign event. The Pakistani Taliban claimed 
responsibility for the attack, which killed politician Haroon Bilour.46 On 14 
July 2018 a suicide bombing at an election campaign event in Mastung, 
Balochistan killed at least 149. Islamic State claimed responsibility for the 
attack.47 48 This was the second deadliest militant attack in the country since 
independence. In another attack claimed by Islamic State, a man blew him-
self up outside a polling station in Quetta, killing at least 31 people on 25 
38. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/killed-attack-christians-pakistan-quet-
ta-180402161157315.html
39. https://www.dawn.com/news/1401797
40. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/04/21/christians-claim-forced-pakistani-city-isil-
violence/
41. https://www.dawn.com/news/1398907
42. https://www.dawn.com/news/1402346
43. https://www.dawn.com/news/1403198/two-hazara-men-gunned-down-in-targeted-attack-
in-quetta-police
44. https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/30/pakistans-hazara-community-under-attack
45. https://www.dawn.com/news/1404857/govt-talks-with-hazara-protesters-inconclusive
46. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/suicide-bomber-kills-anp-candidate-support-
ers-election-rally-180710201101463.html
47. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/14/world/asia/pakistan-suicide-bombing-election.html
48. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44847295
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49. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44924384
50, https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/misuse-of-blasphemy-law-again-on-the-rise-in-pakistan/
51. https://www.dw.com/en/pakistans-missing-activists-whats-behind-the-disturbing-phenome-
non/a-41754825
52. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1654420/1-missing-activist-samar-abbas-returns-home/
53. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/hindus-balochs-condemn-arrest-of-hindu-man-in- 
pakistan-4643049/
54. https://www.dw.com/en/pakistan-christian-teen-detained-over-koran-burning/a-40166731
55. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/16/pakistan-man-sentenced-to-death-for- 
ridiculing-prophet-muhammad-on-whatsapp
56. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/ahmadis-sentenced-death-blasphe-
my-171012081709423.html
57. https://www.dw.com/en/police-arrest-dozens-of-christians-in-pakistan/a-43839440
58. https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/08/01/19-year-old-hindu-boy-arrested-for- 
allegedly-posting-blasphemous-content-online/
July 2018.49 On 17 July an artist employed at the National College of Arts in 
Lahore was killed by his landlord over fake blasphemy charges.50 
Targeting of minorities by state actors
In January 2017 there was public outcry after five secular social media activ-
ists who had criticised the government went missing. Four returned weeks 
later, with one publicly saying he had been tortured by a state intelligence 
agency.51 The fifth activist, Samar Abbas, returned over a year later in March 
2018.52  In May a Hindu man, Prakash Kumar, was arrested in Hub, Baloch-
istan for alleged blasphemy. A crowd gathered outside the police station to 
lynch him and was stopped only by police intervention.53 A Christian teen-
ager was arrested in August 2017 in central Punjab province, again over al-
legations of blasphemy, for burning the Quran.54 In September 2017 a court 
sentenced a man to death, arrested in July 2016 on allegations of sharing 
blasphemous material via messaging service WhatsApp.55 Three Ahmadis 
were sentenced to death for blasphemy on 12 October 2017 in Sheikhupu-
ra, following their arrest in May 2014 for allegedly tearing down religious 
posters in Bhoiwal, southwest of Lahore. The accused claimed the posters 
carried anti-Ahmadi slogans. The fourth accused was shot and killed in po-
lice custody days after the incident took place.56 On 16 May police brought 
20 Christians to court in Karachi and charged them for possessing arms 
and being involved in criminal activities. The families of those arrested said 
that security forces picked up more than two dozen Christians without any 
charges from Gulshan-e-Iqbal and other parts of the city.57 A 19-year-old 
Hindu boy was arrested in Tando Allah Yar’s Mirwah Gorchani area for 
allegedly posting blasphemous content on social media on 31 July 2018.58 
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Attempts at legislative or institutional change 
concerning minorities
The period under report saw some legislative advances affecting the rights 
of minorities in Pakistan, but it also saw pushback by majoritarian groups. 
Early 2017 witnessed the passing of The Hindu Marriage Act 2017 – which 
at long last enables the registration of Hindu marriage, separation and re-
marriage, with the minimum age of marriage set at 18 years for both boys 
and girls – in Punjab, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces.59 60 
Sindh had already formulated its own Hindu Marriage Law. The new law 
provides for mechanisms for the registration of Hindu marriages, proce-
dures for the dissolution of marriages and the grounds on which marriages 
can be dissolved. It also provides for judicial separation, where the marriage 
remains intact but parties are no longer under obligation to cohabit with 
each other. Moreover, the legitimacy of children born out of void and void-
able Hindu marriages has also been protected.61 
The Sindh Criminal Law (Protection of Minorities) Bill, passed by the 
Sindh Assembly in 2016, was returned by the Governor in January 2017 
following a string of protests.62 The bill recommended that change of re-
ligion not be recognised until a person was 18 years of age and was seen 
as a move to protect religious minorities from forced conversions.63 Many 
women’s and human rights groups have been demanding changes, pointing 
to certain antiquated sections such as marriages solemnised after sunset be-
ing illegal and marriage solemnised between person(s) below the age of 18 
being admissible under the Christian Marriage Act in force. Furthermore, 
the Divorce Act specifies six grounds for the dissolution of marriage by a 
husband, including conversion to another religion, adultery, bigamy and 
cruelty; whereas a wife may only initiate divorce proceedings if the husband 
has committed adultery coupled with cruelty.64 The process seems to have 
stalled at present. 
59. https://www.dawn.com/news/1315482
60. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/Pakistan-Senate-passes-landmark-Hin-
du-marriage-bill/article17324249.ece
61. https://indianexpress.com/article/world/pakistan-parliament-passes-landmark-hindu-mar-
riage-bill-4563476/
62. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1287146/sindh-governor-refuses-ratify-forced-conver-
sion-bill/
63, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/Sindh-Governor-returns-Minori-
ties-Bill-against-forced-conversion/article17004387.ece
64. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1242277/amendments-christian-marriage-laws/
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65. https://www.dawn.com/news/1313249
66. https://www.rferl.org/a/pakistan-clerics-fatwa-suicide-bombings-unislamic/28978125.html
67. https://www.dawn.com/news/1409710/national-assembly-votes-on-kp-fata-merger-bill
68. https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/world/the-full-speech-that-rm-of-bts-gave-at-the-
united-nations/2018/09/24/f2dfc13a-c01d-11e8-9f4f-a1b7af255aa5_video.html?utm_ter-
m=.213a91711ab4
69. https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/islamist-militancy-in-pa-
kistan
In February 2017 the National Assembly passed the Criminal Laws 
(Amendment) Act 2016. The punishment for the offence of ‘deliberately us-
ing words to hurt the religious feelings of any person’ has been enhanced 
from yearlong imprisonment and an unspecified fine to imprisonment 
extendable to three years and not less than one year, and/or a fine of Rs 
500,000. One of the amendments outlines the duties of a police officer 
to prevent sectarianism and hate, as well as enhanced punishments for 
officers guilty of violating this duty. A new clause has been inserted into the 
Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 defining ‘lynching’ and suggesting punishments 
for it.65 
In October 2017 the national discourse against Ahmadis was in the lime-
light due to amendments to the Election Reform Act of 2017 by a parliament 
committee. The wording of the oath on the candidates’ nomination form 
for Muslim candidates, affirming their belief in the finality of the prophet-
hood of Muhammad, was changed from ‘I solemnly swear’ to ‘I declare’, 
and separate voter lists for Ahmadis were abolished. There were protests 
from multiple religious and extremist groups who saw this as an attempt 
to empower the Ahmadi community. The government relented, returning 
the oath to its original. The crisis escalated, with various Islamist groups 
launching protests, only ceasing once the government agreed to several de-
mands, including firing the country’s Law Minister (United States Commis-
sion on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) 2018). 
In January 2018 more than 1800 Pakistani clerics issued a fatwa against 
suicide bombings, declaring them to be ‘haram’ or un-Islamic.66 The Nation-
al Assembly on 24th May 2018 passed a constitutional amendment merging 
the Federally Administered Tribal Area with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, a move 
that is considered to mainstream tribal areas.67 But violence continued 
apace. On 14 March 2018 a suicide bombing outside a police checkpoint in 
Lahore caused at least nine deaths.68 The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan claimed 
responsibility.69  
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Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka’s minorities continue to face attacks and threats to life and liveli-
hood. Even after the end of the civil war, ethnic minorities have continued 
to face discrimination and violence. Attacks against religious minorities 
have also remained unreduced. In 2017 alone the National Christian Evan-
gelical Alliance of Sri Lanka documented 97 attacks, and the Sri Lankan 
Muslim Council reported dozens of violent attacks on mosques and Mus-
lim prayer rooms, especially during Ramzan.70 These attacks were notably 
characterised by a lack of reportage, especially in local media. The police 
have also been reluctant to lodge complaints against the majority groups 
perpetrating the violence. Social media plays a significant role in perpetu-
ating rumours and fake news has encouraged the violence. Major incidents 
in which minority groups were targeted between January 2017 and August 
2018 are detailed below.
Violence against ethno-religious minorities
In February 2017 resettled Tamil women were continuously harassed by Sin-
halese soldiers stationed at the irrigation building whenever the women went 
to the tank for water and bathing needs in Vadamunai, Batticaloa.71  On 17 
September 2017 a Christian congregation was injured during an attack by a 
large Buddhist mob: stones were pelted at a church in an Eastern coastal town 
by a mob of approximately 150 members. Six members were injured during 
the onslaught, including two women. The perpetrators then locked the two 
injured women in the church, holding them hostage. The remaining four who 
were injured were taken to the hospital. Unable to reach the police on their 
emergency hotline, the pastor went to the police station and asked the Assis-
tant Superintendent of police to rescue the two women trapped in the church.
On 26 September 2017 extremist Buddhist monks stormed a UNHCR safe 
house and attacked Rohingya refugees, following the alleged rape of a refu-
gee girl by a policeman the previous month. Alleging that the refugees were 
Muslim terrorists who killed Buddhist monks in Myanmar, the violent monks 
urged their mob to smash the premises while the women refugees huddled 
with their children in fear.72 While this was an attack on Rohingya Muslims, it 
is characteristic of the increasing anti-Muslim violence in Sri Lanka.
70. https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/attacks-religious-minorities-contin-
ue-%E2%80%98unabated%E2%80%99-sri-lanka-says-us-state-department
71. https://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=79&artid=38761
72.  http://www.colombopage.com/archive_17B/Sep26_1506438646CH.php
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73. https://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=38116
74. http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2018/03/04/news/govt-mulls-special-police-team-probe-
ampara-unrest.
75. https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/video-anti-muslim-assaults-lump-of-flour-
has-snowballed-govt-balks-at-full-disclosure-on-situation/ 
76. http://www.ft.lk/news/Shops--mosque-damaged-in-Ampara/56-650304
77. http://www.ft.lk/news/PM-orders-another-inquiry-into-alleged-police-inaction-in-Ampa-
ra-incident/56-650570)
78. http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_ti-
tle=181012 
Since being resettled in 2015 in 60 different villages in Batticaloa, Tam-
il victims of war have been repeatedly harassed. Many of their homes and 
crops were destroyed by wild elephants but they are yet to receive the mea-
ger LKR 20,000 they were promised by government officials. Tamil Net re-
ports: ‘Tamil families that are dependent on freshwater fishing are unable to 
withstand Sinhala intruders exploiting their catch. Farmers are robbed off 
their cattle by Sinhala colonisers.’73 
2018 has so far been a dire year for minorities. A Christian funeral ser-
vice was disrupted by Buddhist villagers on 18 January 2018 in Vaharai, 
Batticaloa district (National Christian Evangelical Alliance of Sri Lanka 
(NCEASL) 2018). The mob was against the burial of the deceased in the 
village cemetery and attacked the police when they arrived at the scene. On 
26 February 2018, a Mosque and several Muslim-owned restaurants and 
vehicles were damaged in Ampara,74 as violence broke out when a Muslim 
youth working at his family’s restaurant was forced to say he had put ster-
ilisation pills in the food of a Sinhalese customer. He was video recorded 
saying this on a mobile phone and the video was circulated widely on social 
media.75 The establishment was swarmed by a mob, who burned it to the 
ground. Following this several other Muslim-owned restaurants in the area 
were attacked, along with a mosque.76 The police did not attempt to arrest 
the perpetrators, nor to stop the violence.77 78
Immediately after the incident the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
issued a statement strongly condemning the violence and clarifying that 
sterilisation pills do not exist. This information was not circulated by the 
media, however, even though the attacks received wide and lengthy media 
attention both locally and internationally. The perpetrators who later sur-
rendered to the police were granted bail when the court case was called. The 
matter that was said to be a sterilisation pill was examined by government 
analysts and found to be a cluster of flour. Almost a month later the doctors’ 
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union released a statement stating that sterilisation pills do not exist. This 
did not receive much publicity either. The video of the Muslim youth con-
tinues to be circulated on social media, causing alarm and dismay among 
Sinhala Buddhists.79
Violence against Muslims continued. On 4 March 2018, there were mass 
attacks on mosques, Muslim-owned businesses, and homes in the Kandy 
district by Sinhalese Buddhist mobs. They were encouraged by Buddhist 
monks both in the area and from afar – through social media. Both organ-
ised and spontaneous attacks on Muslims took place in the Kandy district 
when a Sinhalese man succumbed to his injuries after being assaulted by 
Muslim youths over a traffic dispute. The violence was wide spread, leav-
ing four dead and several injured. Muslim-owned shops and homes, and 
mosques were burnt to the ground, leaving several homeless and with live-
lihoods lost. It was reported that the police and Special Task Force (STF) 
participated in the attacks and that the violence was only brought to an end 
when the army arrived. The president called for three days of curfew and 
an island-wide State of Emergency (SoE). The president also imposed an 
island-wide social media blackout and ordered internet restrictions on all 
networks for seven days to prevent hate and violence being spread on so-
cial media by extremist Sinhalese groups. This large-scale violence received 
much local and international media attention, including in-depth analytical 
reports. Facebook agreed to meet with government officials and relevant 
ministers to discuss how hate groups can be shut down on the network, 
however Facebook officials could not provide any solutions. While sever-
al hundred perpetrators were eventually arrested by the police, many were 
released days later. Muslims in the area continue to be harassed by their 
Sinhalese neighbours and monks in the area. Victims of the violence are 
yet to receive the compensation for damages that was promised to them by 
the government. The situation remains tense and volatile for the Muslims 
across the island.
Some 300 Tamil Iranaitivu villagers continued their year-long campaign 
to have their land – currently occupied by the military forces – returned to 
them. On 25 April 2018 they sailed to their land despite the military occupa-
tion, however the navy showed no signs that their land would be returned. 
The Tamils continued with their demand. By August 2018, according to 
79. http://www.ft.lk/columns/-Wanda-Pethi----Digakalliya--and-the-violence-in-Ampa-
ra/4-651431
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80. http://www.ft.lk/columns/-Wanda-Pethi–Digakalliya--and-the-violence-in-Ampa-
ra/4-651431
81. https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/sri-lankan-train-attendant-harasses-tamil-wom-
an-and-racially-abuses-intervening-passengers
82. https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/tamil-disappearances-activist-attacked-days-af-
ter-cid-harassment
83. http://www.dailymirror.lk/article/Muslim-Marriage-and-Divorce-Act-Reforms-154817.html
some reports, 100 community members had managed to permanently move 
back to the island and have begun to rebuild the town.80 
On 7 May 2018 it was reported that a Sri Lankan attendant on a North-
bound train sexually harassed a Tamil woman and racially abused, and 
attempted to physically attack, male Tamil passengers who tried to inter-
vene.81 On 11 July it was reported that a Tamil disappearances activist was 
attacked upon her return from attending the UN Human Rights Council 
session in Geneva. Thereafter she was harassed by Sri Lanka’s Criminal In-
vestigation Department, who visited her home questioning where she had 
gone and what she had spoken about there.82 A civil society attempt to ques-
tion the impunity of perpetrators was made on 31 May 2016, when Eastern 
University staff protested against impunity for ethnic violence by Sinhalese 
students, following continued assaults and harassment of Tamil students 
and lecturers by Sinhalese students. This protest did not appear in the local 
media and the violence continued.
In July 2018, the Saleem Masroof Committee submitted its report on 
proposed amendments to upgrade Quazi Courts, which govern Muslim per-
sonal law in the country.83 This once again brought attention to the demand 
for reforms to the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act, which, among other 
things, does not set a legal minimum age for marriage and allows polygamy. 
The government is taking the issue to be a ‘Muslim issue’ rather than one 
involving fundamental rights, especially of Muslim women, who continue to 
suffer under Quazi Courts.
Section 5 examines effective participation and Section 6 discusses iden-
tity and culture. The attempt is to build a baseline on precepts and practices 
of minority rights in India. Section 7 provides a snapshot of the on-going 
debates, which have somewhat accelerated in recent years, seeking to re-
fashion majority-minority relations in the country; it also discusses secular-
ism with implications for minority rights. The chapter concludes with a set 
of recommendations for action.   
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Introduction
Bangladesh is a country of diverse population where Bengali is the major 
ethno-linguistic group. Other populations we term ‘minorities’, including 
those who belong to Indigenous, Adivasi or small ethnic groups, or religious 
minorities. The latest census (2011) identified that 1.8% of the population 
are from small ethnic groups. With regard to religion, the census stated 
that 86% of the population are Muslim, 12% are Hindu, 1% Buddhist, 0.5% 
Christian and 0.5% ‘other’. 
The term Adivasi covers the ethnic population that lives primarily in 
three districts of the Chittagong Hill Tracts: Khagrachori, Bandarban and 
Rangamati districts. Chakma, Marma, Tripura and Mro are the major eth-
nic groups in this region. Plain land Adivasi people mainly live in the north-
er district of Rajshahi and Rangpur Divisions. Santal, Munda and Oraon 
are the major ethnic groups in this region. The Garo community usually live 
in Tangail, Mymensingh, Sherpur, and Netrokona districts, while the Kha-
si, Jaintia and Monipuri communities are indigenous to the Sylhet Region. 
Some indigenous peoples (IPs) are also found in the southern part of Ban-
gladesh, like the Patuakhali and Sundarbans regions. Some communities, 
such as the Shias and the Ahmadias, also constitute religious minorities. 
Though people from the Dalit community and the tea community mostly 
belong to the Hindu religious community, they remain distinct in the com-
munity due to caste-based practices. The Bihari community, who were 
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previously known as stranded Pakistanis, is the largest minority group in 
terms of language (Urdu speaking). 
All these minority groups share one common feature: oppression by the 
dominant major ethnic group. Indigenous peoples are facing slow ethnic 
cleansing and in many places, especially in the plain land, they have been 
ejected from their ancestral land. Many elements of the harassment they 
face are rooted in this eviction from their land. They are also excluded from 
the socio-economic development of the state and deprived of its benefits. 
Just a decade ago people from the Dalit and tea community thought that 
deprivation was their fate. Due to centuries-long stigma derived from un-
touchability practices they were unable to imagine better employment, ed-
ucation, and access to health etc. Today, however they are organised and 
succeeding in persuading the state to address their issues. Though the Bi-
hari community have had their citizenship recognised, however, they are 
still not entitled to socio-economic benefits provided by the state. Besides, 
society is not yet ready to provide opportunities to this community due to 
their ancestors’ role during the liberation war. Talk of sexual minorities is 
still taboo in Bangladeshi society. Though both state and non-state actors 
have shown sympathy and even taken action to help the transgender com-
munity, talking about the LGBTQI+ community in general is still unusual, 
even among the most conscious citizens. 
This report intends to cover the socio-economic minorities of Bangla-
desh. Religious minorities do exist, including Hindus, Bhuddists and Ah-
madias etc. The discrimination they face in access to socio-economic rights 
and entitlements, however, is in line with the experiences of the mainstream 
population and inconsequential in comparison to the struggles of socio-eco-
nomic minorities. These religious groups mostly face discrimination with 
regard to civil and political rights. This report has therefore focused on the 
most vulnerable minority within the minority. 
Methodology
Secondary literature review was the major source for preparing this report. 
However, a number of individual interviews and focused group discussions 
(FGDs) were conducted with Dalit people, linguistic minorities, tea com-
munities and plain land indigenous peoples. Field visits to Dalit colonies, 
tea communities, and indigenous land – especially the northern districts of 
Rangpur division – were essential for obtaining practical information for 
the report. 
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Introduction
Bangladesh is a culturally, ethnically, religiously and linguistically diver-
sified country with approximately 54 ethnic minority groups (Bangladesh 
Bureau of Statistics 2011: 3) that live in three districts of Chittagong Hill 
Tracts (CHT) and in the plain land. These indigenous groups have distinct 
languages, scripts, literature, religions, and cultures. Though the latest na-
tional census estimates that there are 1.5 million Indigenous Peoples (IPs) 
in Bangladesh (1.10% of the national population) (ibid.), IPs and academics 
claim the true number is closer to 3 million (Kamal 2014). 
Indigenous peoples remain among the most persecuted of all minorities, 
facing discrimination not only on the basis of their religion and ethnicity but 
also because of their indigenous identity and their socio-economic status 
(Chakma 2009: 376). Although there are some policy provisions for the so-
cio-economic development of IPs, the implementation is very weak in prac-
tice. Even the government’s Seventh Five Year Plan (2016–2020) describes 
the situation of indigenous peoples as follows: 
CHT is one of the most disadvantaged and vulnerable regions in the 
country in terms of almost all major development indicators, such as 
income, employment, poverty, health, water, sanitation, education, 
women employment, access to infrastructure and national building 
institutions, intercommunity confidence, etc. (General Economics 
Division 2015: 637)
Land Status of Indigenous Peoples
Land grabbing and eviction are the major reasons behind the socio-eco-
nomic marginalisation of IPs, both in CHT and the plain land. According 
to a human rights report on indigenous peoples by the Kapaeeng Founda-
tion (2016), in 2016 several land-related incidents throughout the country 
killed at least six indigenous people and injured 84 both in CHT and the 
plain land. The land grabbing, led by the state and non-state actors, put 
the livelihood of thousands of indigenous peoples of the plain and CHT at 
risk (around 31699 families, 606 of them from the CHT and 31093 families 
from the plains). Along with the land grabbing, the perpetrators also demol-
ished at least 1208 houses belonging to IPs from the plain lands in various 
districts of the country. 
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Land acquisition in the name of development and economic purposes is 
going unabated in areas populated by IPs. According to a report published 
by the Kapaeeng Foundation in 2016 (ibid.), approximately 15429.98 acres 
of land belonging to indigenous peoples were under the process of acqui-
sition at the time, mostly for the establishment of special economic zones, 
special tourist zones and reserve forests. Around 1216 families were evicted 
from their traditional land and another 1035 families were under threat of 
eviction for land acquisition by the state. It was also reported that 17 houses 
belonging to IPs were destroyed and looted by the land grabbers, which left 
hundreds of indigenous men physically injured and a reported 37 women 
sexually assaulted during the vandalising of their houses. The state’s re-
sponse to these incidents is often merely for show, spurring violence against 
IPs through inaction. 
In 2016 IPs experienced brutal violence in a massive attack on Santals 
during the acquisition of thousands of acres of land. In November 2016 
state-backed miscreants led a brutal attack on the Santal community in Go-
bindaganj Upazila of Gaibandha district to evict them from 1831 acres of 
land. thousands of houses were destroyed, valuables looted, and crops and 
plantations damaged. Three Santal men were killed on the spot and doz-
ens more were shot by the police. Around 1200 indigenous families were 
forced to leave their land. It was reported that police themselves set fire to 
the houses of indigenous people (Daily Star 2016). 
Economic Status of Indigenous Peoples
Land grabbing and related atrocities, along with other forms of oppres-
sion, severely affect the socio-economic status of indigenous peoples, since 
the majority of them depend on land, forests and natural resources. Each 
year, thousands of indigenous people lose their jhum and mouza land due 
to encroachment by the state, and thus livelihood opportunities too. The 
Kapaeeng Foundation’s report stated that the livelihood of 80 jhum farm-
ing families in Lama Upazila, Bandarban district is under threat, allegedly 
due to regular obstruction, intimidation and death threats by Lama Rubber 
Industries Ltd. Moreover, the destruction of crop fields and fruit gardens by 
the Bengali settlers in CHT increased alarmingly last year. In 2016 Bengali 
settlers repeatedly attacked and destroyed the fruit gardens of indigenous 
people in Naniarchar Upazila, Rangamati district, but the state is yet to take 
any action. 
The socio-economic status of most indigenous communities in the 
plains, particularly in the north-western part of the country, is known 
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generally to be even worse than that of indigenous communities in the CHT. 
Incessant land grabbing has led to only 8% of indigenous people having 
ownership over land in the plain (according to Rabindranath Soren, 2016)1 
Most of these people are employed as sharecroppers – working on other 
people’s land – or as wage labourers. Though there is a special allocation for 
IPs of the plain land through the Special Affairs Division (SAD) of the Prime 
Minister’s office, most IPs are unaware of this.
In the southwest of Bangladesh, around the mangrove forests of the 
Sunderbans, where shrimp cultivation is widespread, many IPs are dis-
placed from their land forcefully or for nominal compensation. At Amuli 
Punjee, Kulaura Upazila, Moulavibazar district, land grabbers destroyed 
more than 4000 betel vines belonging to indigenous people (Deshwara and 
Eagle 2016b). Recently, implementation of the Land Boundary Agreement 
1974 caused a new problem for the indigenous peoples in these areas: a to-
tal of 360 acres of land, on which the livelihoods of around 350 indigenous 
Garo and Khasi people of Pallathol, Barlekha Upazila, Moulavibazar were 
dependent, was to be transferred to India according to the agreement. 
In recent years, the government’s planned Special Economic Zones 
(SEZ) have posed a new threat to the life and livelihood of peoples, par-
ticularly indigenous people. The proposed SEZ in Chandpur, Chunarughat 
Upazila, Habiganj district has threatened the livelihood of nearly 16,000 
tea garden workers, who come from various indigenous and marginalised 
communities that are dependent on the land (Ahmed 2015). 951 out of 3951 
acres are agricultural land, which has been used for the cultivation of rice 
by tea workers for the last 150 years. Similar attempts have been made in 
the name of an SEZ at Naharpunji, Sreemangal Upazila where around 700 
families from the Khasi community have been living for over 150 years 
and earning their livelihood by cultivating betel leaf (Deshwara and Eagle 
2016a). The demarcation of thousands of acres of land as reserved forest 
in Madhupur, Tangail district poses a threat to the life and livelihood of 
indigenous peoples.
Years of destruction of the livelihood opportunities of indigenous 
peoples eventually resulted in the eruption of famine in the CHT in 
2016. The Dhaka Tribune (2016) reported that thousands of people in 
1. Shared by Rabindranath Soren, President, Jatio Adivasi Parisad (JAP) (National Indigenous 
Council) in a public hearing on access to justice for indigenous people of the plain lands, 
organised by Nagorik Uddyog and Kapaeeng Foundation on 6 December 2016.
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Khoimukhipara, Tindu, Sangu, Boro Modak and Remarky were starving 
due to the shortage of food. Due to poor crop yields they had to depend on 
potatoes for several months and sometimes even had to pass their days eat-
ing leaves from trees (Barua 2012). The encroachment of jhum cultivation 
land for rubber cultivation and the introduction of hybrid and non-indige-
nous mango cultivation are considered to be the major reasons behind this 
famine. Similar incidents were also reported in the Sajek area of Rangamati 
district at the end of 2016. Though officials claim that were no hunger-re-
lated deaths reported, many families were threatened with starvation and 
children were the worst sufferers. Many people were complaining that the 
government and non-governmental organisations were yet to come up with 
any relief supplies. Local government officials denied ignoring the crisis and 
tried to reassure people, saying that plans were being drawn up to provide 
the best possible support to alleviate their suffering (Kapaeeng Foundation 
2016). 
Education Status of Indigenous Peoples 
 ‘We speak Chakma, our language, at home. My family members are edu-
cated. But no-one knows how to write in Chakma’ – Napoleon Talukder, 
student of Notre Dame College (Billah and Niloy 2016).
While the government claims almost 100% enrolment in primary edu-
cation with an average 20% dropout rate (The World Bank 2016), it seems 
that the status of indigenous peoples is never counted in these statistics. 
The dropout rate from primary education in the CHT and Haor areas is 
higher than in other marginalised areas. While the average enrolment rate 
in the CHT and Haor areas is 60–70%, the dropout rate is 30–40%. The lat-
est census by the Department of Primary Education shows that the dropout 
rate is 29% in Bandarban, 23% in Khagrachari and 22% in Rangamati, with 
the average dropout rate being at 25% in the three hill districts. Though 
there are no statistics available, enrolment and dropout rates are also 
alarming in the plain land, according to the indigenous community there. 
Reasons behind the high dropout rates in these areas include the dis-
tance of travel to school and language barriers. The majority of the primary 
schools in the CHT do not instruct local students in their respective indig-
enous mother tongues, which contributes to the huge dropout rates at the 
primary level. In the three hill districts – Rangamati, Khagrachar and Ban-
darban – only 125 primary schools out of 1561 have a mother tongue based 
Multi-Lingual Education (MLE) system at the pre-primary level (Alamgir 
2015). In the absence of MLE, hill students are suffering. Children often 
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find it difficult to understand lessons written and delivered in the Bengali 
language and dropouts are frequent. 
As part of the implementation of the National Education Policy 2010, the 
government decided in 2013 to introduce mother-tongue based pre-prima-
ry education by publishing primary text books in five different indigenous 
languages – Chakma, Marma, Tripura, Sadri and Garo. However, the gov-
ernment has so far failed to deliver, despite reiterating their commitment 
to publish textbooks in these languages in 2017. It is important to mention 
that the Santal language was excluded from the list following a debate over 
whether the script of the textbooks should be Bengali or roman. Hence the 
Santal children, despite coming from the largest indigenous community 
in the plain land, will lose out on the opportunity to learn in their mother 
language. 
Health and Hygiene
Exclusion of indigenous peoples from mainstream society in the plain land 
has led to poor access to health services and information. The few, Chris-
tian missionary run hospitals that do exist are inadequate. In CHT, dis-
tance is the major barrier to accessing health services and health-related 
information. Women are at the highest health risk, especially during child-
birth. Malnutrition, anaemia and malaria are the most common diseases in 
the CHT, to which indigenous women are particularly vulnerable (Waresi 
2017). Though many health and welfare services in Bangladesh are provided 
by both governmental agencies and NGOs, in hill areas these services are 
few and far between. Government and private health care centres are often 
made inaccessible to indigenous peoples by irregular and costly transport. 
As a result, dependency on traditional healers is still high among IPs. 
Access to Water and Sanitation 
Plain land indigenous people still depend on water from streams, rivers or 
ponds for drinking and household work. While some members of the com-
munity have a shallow tube well for water, landless people are unable to 
establish tube wells or sanitary latrines. Open defecation still prevails in the 
plain land indigenous community. In the CHT, access to safe drinking water 
is difficult due to the topography of the area. The safe water options avail-
able are often costly and require specific technical support that is not easily 
found in the CHT. Many of the paras (villages) continue to use hanging la-
trines or practise open defecation, increasing the prevalence of faeco-oral 
and other communicable diseases.
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Government Initiatives for Socio-Economic 
Development of Indigenous Peoples
The Seventh Five Year Plan (2016–2020) of Bangladesh mentioned that 
heterogeneous groups like indigenous peoples are particularly vulnerable 
to extreme poverty, natural disasters, and other external factors that may 
impact their well-being. Likewise, their access to health and nutrition ser-
vices is often restricted and their education participation and achievement 
tends to be low. Therefore, the different needs and priorities of these social 
groups must be considered when planning to eradicate poverty and improve 
Human Resource Development.
The National Social Security Strategy (NSSS) has several specific pro-
grammes for the indigenous [eoples of the Hill Tract. The three major pro-
grammes are: allowance for beneficiaries in the Chittagong Hill Tract Areas; 
food assistance in the Chittagong Hill Tract Area; and Non-Bengali Rehabil-
itation. The Seventh Five Year Plan says that during the Sixth Five Year Plan 
(2011-2015) there was an average benefit paid of 1,644 taka per household, 
but no data was shown. According to the report, in the fiscal year 2011–12 
(FY11–12), 170 million BDT was allotted for the rehabilitation of 0.11 mil-
lion non-Bengali settlers. The Chittagong Food Assistance Programme cov-
ers about 0.71 million people, allocating a 2259.00 million taka budget in 
FY11–12. However, the report also expressed that there was a lack of data 
availability in this regard. 
With regard to the socio-economic development of IPs, the Seventh Five 
Year Plan aims to guarantee indigenous people their social, political and 
economic rights; ensure their security and fundamental human rights; and 
preserve their social and cultural identity. This will only be achieved by pro-
viding indigenous people with improved health and education services and 
promoting their employment, as well as protecting their rights to land and 
other resources. One of the chief strategies is to fully implement the 1997 
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Peace Accord.2 Others include actions to pro-
mote the economic empowerment of IPs, improve their quality of life and 
legally protect them. 
2. Signed between representatives of CHT tribes and the Bangladesh Government, guarantee-
ing rights for local communities in return for cessation of the long-drawn hostilities by armed 
groups fighting government forces against deprivations faced by CHT tribes, including poor 
services and loss of land and forest resources.
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Implementation of State Laws and Obligations to 
International Treaties 
There are numerous international human rights instruments, national laws 
and policies that recognise and protect indigenous people’s right to land and 
natural resources.
However, there has been no positive effort from the government of Ban-
gladesh to respect, protect and fulfil of those rights. Land dispossession of 
indigenous peoples is in contravention of existing and functioning national 
and international laws, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of In-
digenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and the ILO Convention 107 – which safeguard 
the individual and collective rights of IPs. The Bangladesh government rat-
ified ILO Convention 107 on Indigenous and Tribal Populations in 1972. It 
remains reluctant, however to harmonise its national laws and policies in 
line with the spirit of the convention. Without implementation, therefore, 
the ratification of ILO Convention 107 in Bangladesh is of little significance. 
The East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950 regulates and for-
bids the transfer of lands owned by indigenous people to non-indigenous 
people in the plains without the consent of the government’s district officer. 
However, this is only partially practised in some parts of the plain land. 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child considered the fifth periodic 
report of Bangladesh and in 2015 made the following observations regard-
ing children belonging to minority groups: 
The Child Rights Committee is concerned that children from mi-
nority groups, especially Dalit children and indigenous children 
face discrimination and violence and lack access to quality educa-
tion, particularly education in their mother tongue. The committee 
is also concerned about the lack of recognition by the state party of 
the indigenous identity of Adivasi indigenous peoples. In the light of 
its general comment No. 11 (2009) on indigenous children and their 
rights under the convention, the committee recommends that the 
state party ‘(a) Take all measures necessary to protect minority and 
indigenous children from discrimination and violence;… (c) Adopt 
comprehensive measures, including affirmative ones to ensure that 
minority and indigenous children enjoy all their rights, especially in 
the areas of health and education’ (Committee on the Rights of the 
Child 2015).
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Despite these recommendations, however, no satisfactory initiative has 
been undertaken by the government with regard to the educational devel-
opment of indigenous children. As previously mentioned in this report, four 
years after the government’s commitment to publish textbooks in indige-
nous languages, no such action has materialised. 
Present State of Implementation of The CHT Accord 
There has been some implementation of the CHT accord, although funda-
mental aspects of the accord have not yet materialised, even 19 years af-
ter it was signed. The provisions that have been implemented are as fol-
lows: enactment of the CHT Regional Council Act 1998; amendment of 
the three Hill District Council Acts in 1998; formulation the of CHT Land 
Dispute Resolution Commission Act 2001, which was amended in 2016 as 
per 13-point recommendations; formation of the interim Chittagong Hill 
Tracts Regional Council (CHTRC) and the Ministry of CHT Affairs; repa-
triation of Jumma refugees from the Indian state of Tripura; withdrawal of 
around 100 temporary security camps (contrary to government claims that 
they withdrew around 200 camps); and formation of the CHT Accord Im-
plementation Committee, the CHT Land Dispute Resolution Commission 
and the Task Force on Rehabilitation of Returnee Refugees and Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs), etc. 
The important provisions that remain unimplemented are as follows: 
a) Legal and effective safeguards to preserve tribal-inhabited areas of the 
region; 
b) Devolution of powers and functions to the CHTRC and the three Hill 
District Councils (HDCs), including general administration, law and or-
der, land and land management, policing (local), forest, environment, 
etc;
c) Holding of elections to the CHTRC and the three HDCs through formu-
lating Electoral Roll Rules and Election Rules and preparing a voter list 
with permanent residents of the three hill districts in the CHT; 
d) Resolution of land disputes and cancellation of land leases given to 
non-residents; 
e) Withdrawal of all temporary security camps and de facto military rule 
‘Operation Uttoron’ (Operation Upliftment) from the CHT as per a time 
frame to be announced immediately; 
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f) Rehabilitation of internally displaced Jumma families and returnee (In-
dia-returned) Jumma refugees along with the restitution of their lands 
and homesteads to them; 
g) Appointment of permanent residents to all posts and services in the 
CHT with priority to be given to the indigenous Jumma peoples; and
h) Amendment of all the other laws applicable to the CHT, including the 
Police Act, Police Regulation and the CHT Regulation, 1900, in confor-
mity with the accord.
The government of Bangladesh claims that the majority of the provi-
sions of the CHT accord have been implemented. However, civil society or-
ganisations and indigenous rights organisations have rejected this claim, 
saying that only one-third of the provisions of the accord (25 provisions out 
of the 72) have been fully implemented (Kapaeeing Foundation 2016). Two-
thirds of the provisions of the accord, therefore, including its most critical 
provisions, remain unimplemented. Civil society, Indigenous People’s Or-
ganisations (IPOs) and development actors have been urging the govern-
ment to take the implementation process forward, but there has not been 
any perceptible change in this regard to satisfy the keen observers.
Status of Dalits and Excluded 
Communities in Bangladesh
Introduction
It is estimated that there are about 3.5–5.5 million Dalits in Bangladesh 
(Chowdhury 2009: 2). This community faces multiple forms of discrimina-
tion due to their caste and profession. Dalits often live far below the pov-
erty line and have extremely limited access to health services, education 
and employment. They live in ‘colonies’ with very poor housing and work 
almost exclusively in the ‘service sector’, doing unclean jobs in urban areas 
such as street sweeping, manual scavenging and burying the dead. They are 
frequently prevented from entering the homes of non-Dalits, and discrim-
inated against in access to education, public places, decent employment, 
renting houses or buying land, as well as access to basic services and gov-
ernment entitlements.
Land and Housing 
Urban Dalits used to be cleaners or sweepers for the city corporation, rail-
ways, autonomous industries, government hospitals or municipality. They 
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were provided by their employers a small piece of land to live on, without any 
other civic amenities. Over the course of time the numbers of Dalits increased, 
but they still had to live within the same land area. Moreover, frequent evic-
tions often force them to move into new housing with even less space. 
Dalit colonies are predominantly very old, two or multi-storeyed (in a few 
cases, especially in the city of Dhaka) buildings. In most cases, a family is al-
lotted a single room of 10x12 feet where they live for generations. Due to pop-
ulation increase, many families have to live in shabby huts inside the colony. 
Every urban Dalit colony shares a common scenario, including a crowded and 
clumsy environment, trash everywhere, dilapidated walkways, overflowing 
drainage systems, stagnant water, and rooms made from plastic and bamboo 
encroaching the open space. For instance, around five thousand people live 
at Nazira Bazar Pakistani Colony at Central Aga Sadek Road in Dhaka, which 
can accommodate a maximum of one thousand people. Electricity is also in-
adequate and the inhabitants often manage it illegally. 
These colonies are often evicted to fulfil the demands of urbanisation. 
In most cases, only the very minimum requirement for standard housing is 
maintained during the resettlement of Dalit colonies. In 2013 the govern-
ment planned to build 1148 flats for sweepers of Dhaka city. In 2015 the city 
corporation issued a notice to the dwellers of the colony to move out tem-
porarily (with compensation) to allow the construction of the building. Yet 
among the 2000 Dalit families in the colony, only 150 work for the Dhaka 
South City Corporation and, if implemented, the project will leave many of 
the dwellers homeless. 
Corruption is also liable for the poor housing facilities faced by Dalits. 
In 2005 the government allotted around BDT 209 million for the construc-
tion of two buildings. Each building was planned to have six floors, with 10 
rooms on each floor. The constructor, however, only built two buildings: 
one with two floors and the other with one floor. One decade later, no initia-
tive has been taken to complete the construction. 
In rural and urban areas, many Dalits are landless and they therefore ar-
range housing on land that is owned either privately or by the government. 
In most cases, Dalits live in ancestral houses that they have not acquired 
or bought themselves. In one study (Islam and Parvez 2014) on Dalit com-
munities, 60% of the respondents said that they are not the owner of their 
house. Caste identity is the main constraint on Dalit land ownership, even 
if individuals have financial ability. This study (ibid) found that 53.3% of 
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respondents faced a ‘complex situation’ while trying to buy land. 30% of 
respondents said that they would not be able to buy land from a non-Dalit, 
even if they had the financial ability to do so, because of their caste identity. 
Economic Opportunity and Employment
Dalits in Bangladesh usually do some of the most menial, low-paid and dan-
gerous jobs, such as cleaning toilets, sweeping streets, and emptying other 
people’s septic tanks. Parvez and Islam’s study (ibid) shows that 43% of the 
Dalit population live off sweeping and cleaning work. 22% of them are in-
volved in agriculture while labour in tea gardens is the livelihood of 14% of 
the Dalit population. However, Dalits are no longer secure even in their very 
‘own’ caste-ascribed jobs, as many of these have been taken up by non-Dalits 
too, destroying what little job security Dalits may previously have enjoyed. 
This is of grave concern to the urban sweepers who face a greater threat: if 
one member of a sweeper family is not employed in a city corporation job, 
the family will no longer be entitled to live in the tiny colony room that they 
have been living in for generations. 
On the other hand, caste-based identity prevents Dalits from undertak-
ing other professions, even when they have skills or education. The afore-
mentioned study (ibid) shows that only 38.4% of Dalits have a secure job, 
despite the direction given by the Prime Minister that there should be an 
80% quota for Dalits in sweeping jobs. The study (ibid) finds that 59% of 
Dalit employees face discrimination in the workplace due to their caste 
identity, and 30% are deprived of the privileges of the job, are paid very lit-
tle, and often face verbal abuse. Lack of investment and loan opportunities 
from conventional and micro-credit agencies also prevent Dalit and exclud-
ed communities from taking up an alternative profession.
Education Status of Dalits 
School dropout rates are very high among Dalit children and Dalit boys and 
girls rarely continue their education beyond primary school. Caste-based 
discrimination is a significant cause of low school admission and retention 
of the Dalit children. Dalit children study in a hostile environment, regularly 
facing verbal abuse, teasing and taunting on the basis of their caste identity. 
A study by Equity Watch (2014) found that around 26% of the respondents 
face obstacles in getting admission into non-community schools due to their 
family and caste identity. In many cases Dalit children have to hide their 
identity to get admission to schools. The study found that 30% of Dalit stu-
dents experienced abuse or hatred from their classmates and others, includ-
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ing teachers. Moreover, 6.5% of the respondents said they still had to sit on 
separate benches in school (ibid). 
Dalit students are also deprived of educational privileges and entitle-
ments like scholarships and stipends and the opportunity to participate in 
cultural programmes, sports and other recreational activities. Additionally, 
early marriage factors in significantly to Dalit girls’ backwardness in educa-
tion. In the above study (ibid), 76% of the respondents said that child mar-
riage is prevailing in their community and girls get married before reaching 
18 years of age. Another study shows that only 5.9% of Dalit girls complete 
secondary level education (Khan and Rowshan 2016). 
The government’s education programme is supposed to focus on mar-
ginalised communities’ education, yet it does not have any specific pro-
grammes for Dalit children (Equity Watch 2014). Moreover, the challenges 
in education faced by Dalits are not considered a serious issue in compar-
ison with those faced by other ethnic minorities. Although an affirmative 
action quota was introduced for Dalit students in public universities, the 
lack of legal recognition of their identity prevents them from taking up this 
privilege. During the 2014–15 academic year, many Dalit students were re-
fused a certificate from the Deputy Commissioner since there was no official 
gazette published recognising ‘Dalit’ as a separate identity. Consequently, 
in the 2015–16 academic year, the number of Dalits seeking admission 
under the quota privilege has significantly reduced (Nagorik Uddyog and 
BDERM 2015). 
Status of Water and Sanitation
In urban areas, Dalit colonies are usually found to be situated around un-
clean locations, on the periphery of mainstream society, near garbage 
dumping sites, with overflowing or choked drains, open sewers and a lack of 
latrines and bathrooms. There, Dalits depend largely on reservoirs for the 
preservation of water, which are not cleaned regularly, thereby making the 
water unsafe for direct consumption and increasing the risk of vector-borne 
diseases. In rural areas, the water crisis is acute due to a lack of water sourc-
es as well as prohibition of Dalits from using common water sources due to 
their caste identity. 
Since Dalits do not hold land titles, they are often considered ineligi-
ble for the allotment of sanitary latrines by the government. A 2015 study 
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found that 89% of rural Dalits use shared (common) latrines and 43% of 
their toilets are hanging latrines. 90% of the respondents used latrines ei-
ther without a roof or with a broken roof, which restricted their use during 
the rainy seasons (Equity Watch 2015). The latrines constructed of tin shed 
and plastic cause serious privacy issues for girls and women, as well as being 
unhygienic and posing various health hazards. On average, 16 households, 
or 84 people, use one water point in Dalit colonies in Dhaka city, and 8 
households, or 40 people, use one latrine. 21% of Dalit households in rural 
areas have their own tube wells and 65% share common tube wells. The 
remaining 14% use surface water for drinking and other purposes. In both 
rural and urban areas, many Dalit colonies do not have legal water points 
and are forced to use unauthorised connections. Additionally, even the most 
fortunate Dalits could not even dream of 20 litres of water per day. This 
shortage affects women and children most badly. 
Health and Hygiene 
Some of the worst victims of occupational risk and disease are the clean-
ers who are employed in ‘traditional’ waste disposal. They often suffer from 
long ailments caused by disposing of waste with bare hands and feet, in-
cluding fever, colds, back pain, stomach ache, gastric problems, skin disease 
and problems breathing. The environments in which they live and work put 
them serious health risk. 
Dalits face discrimination while attempting to access medical amenities 
at government, private or even NGO-facilitated centres. Parvez and Islam’s 
study (Islam and Parvez 2014) found that 21% of respondents faced dis-
crimination in getting medication from hospitals; 15% of respondents said 
that doctors and dispensaries did not provide them treatment and medicine 
due to their caste identity; 26% said that doctors do not visit Dalit patients 
at their homes, nor do midwives even help them in 26% of cases. Strikingly, 
18% of respondents get advice from nomads who use traditional medica-
tion – like Jhar-fuk (medication through chanting) and Tabiz (a pendant in 
which a written mantra is inserted) – and 16% received consultation from a 
Kobiraj or Hakim, who render ayurvedic medication. 22% did not go to any 
kind of physician and treated themselves by buying medicine from pharma-
cies. 54% of the respondents stated that there were no government hospitals 
near where they lived. 
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Government Initiatives for Socio-Economic 
Development of the Dalit Community
In light of the severe marginalisation of the Dalit community, the socio-eco-
nomic development programme in which the government has included 
them is inadequate. It has also seen poor implementation in terms of access 
for actual Dalits. 
Since the 2011-12 fiscal year there has been a specific allocation in the na-
tional budget for Dalits: BDT 100 million in 2011-12 fiscal year, 146 million 
in 2012-13 fiscal year, and 123 million in 2013-14 fiscal year has been allot-
ted in the national budget for the development of the Dalit, Bede and Trans-
gender communities. The Ministry of Social Welfare implemented various 
programmes under this allocation, separately for the Dalit, Bede and Trans-
gender communities. In the 2014-15 fiscal year around 92,294,000 Taka 
was spent, including a monthly old age allowance of 400 taka for 10,539 
Dalit people, a stipend for 2877 students and skill training for 1050 people. 
Moreover, 10,000 taka per head was also planned as a rehabilitation grant 
for 210 trained people. There were 14,676 targeted beneficiaries.3
The Seventh Five Year Plan (2016–2020) identified Dalits as the most 
economically marginalised and socially excluded group in Bangladesh, with 
limited social, economic and employment opportunities to blend with the 
mainstream. It referred to Dalits as ‘missing poor’. The Seven Five Year Plan 
reaffirms that the government remains committed and highly sensitive to 
the needs of these marginalised groups and claims that the adoption and 
eventual implementation of the NSSS will be a considerable step forward 
for the development of the Dalit population. It has expressed the strategy 
for Dalits as follows:
The vision of the Government is to erase the discrimination and ex-
ploitation faced by Dalit communities in Bangladesh, so that they 
can take their place as full citizens of the country. 
However, there has been no specific programme (except the social safety 
net programme) taken up according to the plan. 
Dalit leaders and community people say they knew little about the so-
cial safety net programme, but by strengthening their relationship with the 
3. See: https://msw.gov.bd/site/page/22f31a43-bdab-4613-9fa2-4bb9ab5fe539/Bede,-Dalit,- 
Harijan
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Department of Welfare, they have gained access to different services. In 
many instances, however, Dalit people are complaining that most of the 
beneficiaries were not Dalits. For instance, in Bhola district, the Department 
of Social Welfare received 2,592,000 for the educational stipend of 63 Dalit 
students and old age allowance for 580 Dalit people. The government offi-
cial claimed that the funds were distributed properly, but the general secre-
tary of the Bangladesh Dalit and Excluded Rights Movement (BDERM) said 
that in the case of the old age allowance for 580 people, no more than 100 
were from the Dalit community. He alleged that political influence had act-
ed in the enlistment of beneficiaries under the social safety net programme.
Status of Tea Garden Workers 
in Bangladesh
Introduction
There are around 360,000 tea workers in Bangladesh (Faisal and Hossain 
2016) who are directly involved with 164 tea gardens, while many others 
are employed as indirect labourers in other sectors related to tea plantation 
and procurement. Hunger brought them from different parts of the pres-
ent India, such as Bihar, Odisha, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Tamil 
Nadu, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh etc from 1840 to 1860 and beyond. At 
first they were engaged in railroad work, forest clearing etc, and they were 
later engaged in tea gardens. For centuries they have lived a most inhumane 
life, isolated from the mainstream community and treated as untouchable. 
Economic Opportunity and Employment
Tea workers are paid the lowest wage in the labour sector in Bangladesh. 
In 2016, after long negotiation, the daily wage of tea labourers was fixed at 
85 taka. It had been 69 taka since 2013, and before that as low as 32.5 taka 
(2008). Even this new income is below $2 per day, however, and therefore be-
Madhabpur tea workers starving, unpaid for 13 weeks
Workers of a tea garden in Madhabpur upazila, Habiganj were left starv-
ing in 2016 when they had not been given their wages or rations for 13 
weeks. Almost 400 workers – and their 2000 family members – from the 
Boikunthapur tea garden estate were living on boiled rice extract, mashed 
tea-leaves and chillies. An official from the tea garden said on condition of 
anonymity that they were unable to pay the wages because the tea garden 
had incurred a loss (Daily Star 2016).
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low the poverty line (BPL) according to the World Bank. Fringe benefits other 
than houses include some allowances, attendance incentives, rations, access 
to cultivable land for production of crops, medical care, provident fund, and 
pension etc. A combination of ever-growing inflation and wages far below the 
necessary keeps tea garden workers in a constant food safety crisis. 
A labourer is paid 85 taka for a daily target of 20 kg of pruned plant 
leaves or 16 kg of non-pruned leaves. An extra 2 taka is paid for surplus 
leaves beyond the target. If a labourer fails to meet his daily target, taka 3.45 
to 4.31 (for pruned and non-pruned leaves respectively) is deducted from 
his daily wage (Masum and Razu 2016). In addition, costs of house rent, ra-
tions, medical services, festival bonuses, provident funds, etc are deducted 
from their daily wage. After the deduction of all service charges a labourer 
receives around 350 taka a week. This scanty wage is not also paid regularly, 
with management often delaying payment for various reasons.
One of the alternatives available to tea garden workers to support their 
families is to cultivate vegetables and other agricultural products around 
their houses or on land not used for tea plantation, with permission from 
estate management. In recent times, however, management has often oc-
cupied that land for planation and other purposes, posing a threat to the 
survival of tea labourers. 
Land and Housing
Tea labourers generally have no ownership over the land they live on. In oth-
er words, they are the largest minority group who do not have any land title. 
This has made them very vulnerable and dependent on estate management. 
A tea worker is provided a house of 8x8 to 8x12 feet, which are designed to 
accommodate four people but are usually inhabited by 8-10 people. They 
have no separate kitchens and must use the same room for cooking. Some of 
the workers live with their cattle, goats or other livestock in the same room. 
Walls are built of clay, bamboo and straw. Workers interested in making the 
room more inhabitable at their own expense are forbidden to do so. More-
over, they have to leave the house if none of the family members are enlisted 
as registered workers.
Education Status of Tea Workers
Ensuring the education of the tea workers’ children (6–11 years old) is the 
responsibility of the company or the estate owners. There are very few gov-
ernment schools in the tea gardens. In recent times, some NGOs have been 
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No land title, no job
In 2016, two members of the tea garden community were denied jobs in 
the police force for not having any land, despite already having been select-
ed. Colins Rojario and Raju Prasad Kairi from Kamalganj and Kulaura tea 
gardens, Srimangal sub-district, passed all the tests for the job and were 
selected. During police verification of their identity, however, no land title 
was found belonging to their parents or themselves. According to police re-
cruitment policy, either the applicant or their parents must have a land title. 
After the police verification the two applicants received a letter from the 
Superintendent of the Police Department of Maulavibazar, detailing their 
disqualification. The Bangladesh Dalit and Excluded Rights Movement 
(BDERM) brought this issue to the attention of the media.4 Media cover-
age on this issue sparked the nation’s interest. The National Human Rights 
Commission reacted to the issue and served a Show Cause Notice to the 
Srimangal Superintendent of Police for violating the constitutional rights of 
the applicants. The Home Minister also expressed his concern, advocating 
for the change of this policy. Finally, the two young men were recruited in 
the police department. 
operating informal schools in the tea garden communities. However, the 
quality of education provided in these schools is a concern. Schools run by 
tea estates have no skilled teachers or essential learning materials. Some 
schools have no toilet facilities or drinking water. An overwhelming majori-
ty of the children of tea plantation workers drop out of school. Most guard-
ians employ their children gathering animal feed, taking care of younger 
siblings, or doing household work or petty work in the tea estate, instead of 
sending them to school. On the other hand, even tea workers’ children with 
Secondary School Certificates (SSC) or Higher Secondary Certificates (HSC) 
are denied of well-deserved jobs in the estate. 
Status 0f Water and Sanitation
Wells and streams are the major sources of water for tea workers. In Sree-
mangal Upazila, six tea gardens – Mitinga, Rajghat, Bhurburia, Madhab-
pur, Alinagar and Shomshernagar – host around 50,000 tea workers and 
their family members. There is no deep tube well for this vast population. 
They use shallow tube wells and stream water. In Mitinga, water from the 
tea garden pond is also used for drinking and household work. The situation 
becomes worst during the spring (Falgun and Chaitra), when most of the 
4. Daily Prothom Alo, 7 February 2016 [online]. Available at: https://www.prothomalo.com/ 
bangladesh/article/762466
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wells and streams dry up (Islam and Parvez 2014). Moreover, faeces and 
chemicals used for tea plantation often contaminate stream water during 
the rainy season and cause various diseases among the tea workers. Tea 
workers generally use shared latrines that may be broken or lacking a roof, 
and which in no way meet the criteria of a hygienic latrine. While the coun-
try is about to abolish open defecation, it is practised prevalently in the tea 
garden (Equity Watch 2015). 
Health and Medical Facilities: 
In most cases, medical centres on the tea estates provide common medicine 
for all kinds of diseases. According to the Tea Plantation Labour Ordinance 
of 1962 and the Plantation Rules of 1977, tea estate owners are liable to en-
sure workers a health service. In reality, this does not exist. Certain chronic 
diseases, such as gastric and urinary tract infections, chest pain, typhoid, 
anaemia, tuberculosis and more, are tea workers’ lifelong companions. 
Women workers commonly suffer immeasurable leg and back pain from 
plucking tea leaves on their feet all the hours of the day and holding bas-
kets on their back. Besides this, they are exposed to harsh weather condi-
tions, pesticides, mosquitoes and other insects, and poisonous snakes while 
plucking leaves. Tea garden workers will also often attempt to hide their 
illnesses and continue working with ill health, since they will not be paid if 
they take leave due to illness. 
Government Initiatives for Socio-Economic  
Development of the Tea Community
Tea workers do not have access to the government social safety net pro-
gramme allocated to the Dalit community. However, in 2015–16 the Min-
istry of Social Welfare started a programme for the socio-economic de-
velopment of the tea community. Under the scheme 20,000 tea workers 
were provided with food and other supplies. The National Social Security 
Strategy (NSSS) does not mention any specific programme for the tea com-
munity. However, the Sixth Five Year Plan (2011–15) included the issues 
of tea workers in the strategy saying ‘...priority will be given to disadvan-
taged communities in khas land allocation. Tea Garden owners will also be 
encouraged to assign some land within the estate to their extremely poor 
workers as a means for them to build their own garden.’ However, so far no 
such progress has been made. 
The Tea Plantation Labour Ordinance of 1962 and the Plantation 
Rules of 1977 contain provisions for providing quality housing, water and 
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sanitation, health services and education. The Labour Law 2006 specified 
the wage entitlements of labourers at different levels. Tea estates have not 
abided by these provisions. Companies generally lease the tea estate land 
from the government and govern the activities of the estate as per their 
management policy. According to them, state policies and mechanisms are 
not applicable to tea estates. Unfortunately, tea labourers generally lack the 
resources to bargain with the estate for the implementation of these laws, 
along with other national legal standards, including the constitution.
Status of Sexual Minorities 
in Bangladesh
Introduction
Sexual minorities in Bangladesh have long been overlooked in the human 
rights and development discourse. While society extends some sympa-
thy towards the transgender community, the gay, bisexual and intersexu-
al community are completely marginalised. According to the Ministry of 
Social Welfare, there are about 10,000 transgender people in Bangladesh.5 
However, human rights organisations claim that the actual number is much 
higher than the government estimation. There are no statistics at all about 
the numbers of gay, bisexual and intersex people from the government or 
from non-government agencies. 
Economic Status of LGBT+ People
In general, gay, bisexual and intersex people face few barriers to entering 
the mainstream job market and accessing economic opportunities, until 
their sexual identity is recognised. On the other hand, the transgender com-
munity faces severe exploitation in terms of economic activities and em-
ployment. Excluded and ostracised, people from the transgender commu-
nity often become involved in sex work or begging to earn their livelihood, 
among other economic activities, including performing dances and song, 
blessing new born babies by singing and dancing, and collecting money 
from shops in markets and passers-by. It has been reported that collecting 
money from traders and the public in this way has turned into quite a lucra-
tive business, and that some influential transgender leaders therefore turn 
to violence to ensure their dominance in the various areas of Dhaka city. In 
2016 one transgender leader was killed and another was shot in the back in 
5. See: http://www.msw.gov.bd/site/page/a3498c96-c94a-4fba-9518-13497bdfb46f
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disputes over the control of areas and the sharing of collected money (The 
Daily Star 2016). 
Since the 2012–13 fiscal year, the government has taken the initiative to 
materialise a programme for improving the living standards of the trans-
gender community. The objective of the initiative is to provide scholarships 
for the children of transgender people; provide training to improve the skills 
and earning efficiency of transgender people; develop the financial condi-
tion of the transgender community and ensure social security; and provide 
an old-age allowance to those aged 50 and above.6
On 10 June 2015 the Bangladesh Central Bank issued a notice to all 
scheduled banks, notifying them to take steps to include transgender peo-
ple in small-to-medium enterprise (SME) activities (Daily Star 2015). This 
initiative is a significant step towards changing the economic status of the 
transgender community. However, no specific examples of LGBT+ people 
taking loans for business initiatives are available.
Education Status of Sexual Minorities 
As a community, transgender people need a special mechanism for educa-
tion. This is non-existent in government planning and policies. As a result, 
many people from this segment of the population are illiterate. In most cas-
es, they are taken away from their family right after birth, and thus they 
miss vital parts of early education from parents or families. Generally, those 
who do have the opportunity to be enrolled in formal schools soon drop out 
due to discrimination, mocking and harassment by the teachers and their 
fellow students. Growing up amid such exclusion in family and school en-
vironments grossly impedes the education and development of any child. 
‘Ever since I was in first grade, I was teased by my classmates for my girlish 
behaviour. Back then, I didn’t even know I was gay and being called gay 
was quite offensive. I used to get teased, bullied, and was even beaten a 
few times for my “inappropriate” behaviour.’ – an anonymous gay student 
(Hossain 2013).
‘The University of Dhaka has included transgender issues in the gender 
studies course. The Open University of Bangladesh is another university 
where there could be further inclusion of transgender topics in the academ-
6. Ministry of Social Welfare 2015. See: http://www.msw.gov.bd/site/page/a3498c96-c94a-
4fba-9518-13497bdfb46f/Transgender-People,19
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The travails of gender identity and proof
After the government’s recognition of ‘transgender’ or ‘Hijra’ as a third gen-
der in 2013, the Ministry of Social Welfare began to attempt to ensure the 
decent employment of transgender people. In December 2014 the Ministry 
of Social Welfare invited applications from transgender people for govern-
ment jobs. However, applicants had a horrible experience throughout the 
recruiting process. During the interview they were harassed with inappro-
priate questions about their gender identity and sexuality. In June 2015 doz-
ens of transgender people who had been selected after the initial interview 
had to submit to a medical examination to prove that they were transgender. 
It is reported that these medical exams were conducted by non-medical staff 
such as custodians, who examined and touched the genitals of the applicants 
while groups of staff and other patients observed and jeered — sometimes in 
private rooms, sometimes in public spaces. Hospital staff instructed some of 
the transgender people to return multiple times, over the course of a num-
ber of weeks, to undergo additional examinations. Following these abuses 
at the hospital, photographs of the 12 transgender people were released to 
online and print media, along with the claim that they were ‘really men’ who 
were committing fraud to attain government jobs. Some transgender people 
reported that the publication of these photos sparked increased harassment 
from the general public. Following the exposure they have faced harassment 
while begging and sex work clients have refused to engage with transgender 
workers (Knight 2016).
ic curriculum’, said Mr. Robaet Ferdous, Associate Professor, Department 
of Mass Communication & Journalism, University of Dhaka, in an advocacy 
meeting with the National Curriculum and Textbook Board (NTCB) on the 
incorporation of transgender issues into the national textbook curriculum 
(Bandhu Social Welfare Society 2016: 25).
Housing and Land Rights
People from the transgender community generally live in slum or brothel 
areas. They face poor water, sanitation, and other civic facilities in these 
dwellings. It is near impossible for a transgender person to rent a house in 
mainstream society.  There is no government scheme in place for their reha-
bilitation. During the eviction of slums or brothels, no steps are taken by the 
state for the rehabilitation of the transgender community. Shockingly, they 
are even deprived of burial land or funeral services for members of their 
community. In many cases, dead bodies are just deposited in the river after 
death. In these cases, society, religious bodies and the state all fail to ensure 
basic respect to the departed soul of a human being. 
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Access to Health and Hygiene: 
LGBT+ people face severe discrimination in access to healthcare; they are 
denied services in both government and private hospitals, and even by pri-
vate practitioners. Sexual minorities are at a high risk of developing sexually 
transmitted diseases (STDs) and HIV/AIDS, but they receive no special med-
ical attention. They are also high-risk victims of physical, sexual, economical 
and emotional violence from the community (Math and Seshadri 2013). De-
spite all this, the government often erases the existence of LGBT+ people as 
well as discouraging them in the name of religious and social morality.
Government Initiatives for Socio-Economic 
Development Of LGBT+ People
Along with the recognition of ‘transgender’ as a third gender, the govern-
ment has included the transgender community under a social safety net 
programme for socio-economic development. However, other sexual mi-
norities have remained out of the state initiative’s focus. 
Since 2012–13 the government has had a special scheme for the trans-
gender community (along with the Dalit and Bede communities) under the 
social safety net programme. In 2015-16 the coverage was increased to 64 
districts and around 180 million BDT was allocated for allowances, stipends 
for transgender students, and skill development training. Transgender stu-
dents have been provided four types of stipend: 
a. 300 BDT at primary level for 856 persons; 
b. 450 BDT at secondary level for 306 persons;
c. 600 BDT at higher secondary level for 112 persons; and 
d. 1000 BDT at graduation level for 55 persons. 
According to the annual report7  of the Ministry of Social Welfare (6669 
transgender families have benefitted from different schemes under the so-
cial safety net programme. However, a detailed breakdown of beneficiaries, 
location and scheme is not available in the report.  The transgender com-
munity complained about the lack of publicity by the government about the 
social safety net programme. Moreover, transgender people have become 
distrustful of government aid due to consistent humiliation by different 
actors of society, including state agencies. 
7. https://msw.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/msw.portal.gov.bd/annual_reports/583f-
104d_5461_40e3_b131_dcc1651c34d8/Annual%20Report%20MoSW%202015-16.pdf  
(Bengali version)
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The National Social Security Strategy (NSSS) does not mention any pro-
gramme for sexual minorities. It only emphasises the social protection of 
HIV/AIDS affected people and households. The Sixth Five Year Plan (2011-
2015) envisages a society in which sexual minority groups can live with re-
spect and dignity and enjoy tolerance and social justice. However, its vision 
only emphasises building an HIV/AIDS free society with zero new infec-
tions, zero discrimination and zero deaths. 
Legal Safeguards for LGBT+ People: 
International and National Standards
National Standard
After repeated government statements denying the presence of any LGBT+ 
people in Bangladesh, a 2013 notification recognised sexual minorities for 
the first time (BD News 24, 2013). The notice termed transgender a third 
gender and recommended its inclusion in official documents relating to sex 
identification. However, LGBT+ and non-binary people are still not rec-
ognised under the current legal framework. 
Bangladesh is still using a penal code that criminalises same-sex sexual 
acts (Section 377). Although this section is gender neutral, it is usually as-
sumed to apply only to men. Section 377 attempts to cover a wide range of 
sexual acts, including homosexual activity. Even though there have been no 
known cases of deportation, fines or imprisonment under Section 377, the 
law is often invoked by law enforcers to harass, extort and blackmail LGBT+ 
people. 
Regional and International Human Rights Instruments 
While many other countries signed a United Nations (UN) declaration in 
December 2008 affirming that international human rights should include 
sexual orientation and gender identity, Bangladesh was one of 57 to sign a 
counterstatement. The counterstatement expresses serious concerns about 
granting rights to ‘certain persons on the grounds of their sexual interests 
and behaviours’ and suggests that the protection of LGBT+ people could 
lead to the normalisation of paedophilia. Bangladesh still continues to op-
pose recommendations of a number of international institutions regarding 
LGBT+ rights. One example was the sixth Asian and Pacific Population Con-
ference held in Bangkok in 2013, at which Bangladesh expressed its reser-
vations about promoting the rights of LGBT+ people. However, Bangladesh 
is a signatory to the ICCPR (International Convention on Civil and Polit-
ical rights), ICESCR (International Convention on Economic, Social and 
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Cultural Rights) and CEDAW (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimi-
nation against Women), which are valuable tools to advocate LGBT+ rights. 
Unfortunately, very few steps have been made to inject the spirit of these 
treaties into the sphere of domestic law. In 2013, the National Human 
Rights Commission (NHRC) of Bangladesh submitted a report that argued 
that it is now time to ensure that all groups, including transgender and in-
tersex people and other gender and sexual minorities, should be protected 
from discrimination.
Universal Periodic Review Recommendation 
on the Rights of LGBT+ People
Bangladesh was reviewed for the second cycle of the Universal Periodic 
Review (UPR) on 29 April 2013. During the session, Chile made a recom-
mendation (131.2) for the repeal of article 377 of the Criminal Code, which 
criminalises adult consensual sexual acts (UNHCR 2013). This did not enjoy 
the support of Bangladesh. In favour of rejection, the state’s comment was: 
‘Bangladesh considers that the laws of the land should be in conformity with 
the prevalent socio-cultural norms and values of the country. Activities sub-
ject to the concerned Article in the Penal Code are not a generally accepted 
norm in the country.’ The suggestion on formal approval of homosexual re-
lations was discarded by the Foreign Minister. In the first cycle of the UPR 
in 2009 Bangladesh had also rejected recommendations to decriminalise 
consensual same-sex sexual activity (OHCHR 2009). However, the Govern-
ment of Bangladesh accepted recommendations made during the 2013 UPR 
to provide human rights training to law enforcement and judicial officers 
on the protection of (among others) sexual minorities and to work to adopt 
measures to protect those people from violence. 
Status of Urdu Speaking  
People or ‘Biharis’
Introduction 
A large number of Urdu-speaking people in Bangladesh are known as 
‘Biharis’, a term that refers to approximately 300,000 non-Bengali, Ur-
du-speaking Bangladeshis, who are mostly stranded in camps popular-
ly known as ‘Geneva Camps’ in Bangladesh. There are 116 of these camps 
in urban settings in 13 regions of Bangladesh (Islamic Relief Bangladesh 
2016). The members of this community were previously known as ‘Stranded 
Pakistanis’ after the independence of Bangladesh, and until a decade ago 
they were legally defined as stateless citizens. 
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These Urdu-speaking Muslim people originated from different eth-
no-linguistic groups in Bihar and the neighbouring states of British India. 
Following communal riots during and after the partition of the Indian Sub-
continent they migrated from India to East Pakistan. In 1971, during the 
liberation war of Bangladesh, the Bihari community supported the Paki-
stani ruler and were involved in the genocide of Bengali civilians. After the 
emergence of independent Bangladesh, they faced retaliation and were kept 
for their safety in Red Cross camps in different parts of Bangladesh. 
Termed ‘Stranded Pakistanis’, by 1982 approximately 200,000 of them 
were repatriated to Pakistan (Joshua Project).  However, Pakistan later re-
fused to take back any more Bihari people. Following that approximately 
300,000 Biharis remained stateless in Bangladesh, until the Supreme Court 
gave orders on 19 May, 2008 to provide citizenship to the Bihari people 
who were born after the independence of Bangladesh. Their long period of 
statelessness, however, severely affected the socio-economic, cultural, and 
political development of this community. 
Economic Opportunities for 
Linguistic Minorities  
The Bihari community have very limited economic opportunity and most of 
their activities are based within their camp or living quarters. Denied citi-
zenship of Bangladesh, they do not have the opportunity to be employed in 
the government service or even in the private sector. They generally operate 
small-scale trade around their camps, including tailoring, dressmaking (of-
ten with Karchupi and sequin work), handicrafts, small auto repair, electric 
shops, metal work, grocery shops, vegetable selling, butchering etc. Many 
Bihari people also work as weavers, barbers, rickshaw pullers, drivers etc. 
The Mughlai food – tikka, kebab etc – served by roadside Bihari restaurants 
is very popular in the cities.  It is common within this community that most 
of the family members, including women and children, are involved in in-
come-generating activities. 
Despite having a national identity, we still are not considered for 
government jobs due to our Geneva Camp address; even private cor-
porations and banks refuse us due to our camp identity. As a result, 
our people have to work in the informal sector and small-scale trade. 
Many of us earn our livelihood through day labour – Mohammad 
Ziauddin, a camp dweller.
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A recent study (Islamic Relief Bangladesh 2016) surveyed 395 house-
holds in the Bihari community and found that only 0.3%  of the total re-
spondents are in government employment while only 3.2% are working for 
private companies. The survey also found that only 0.1% are operating large 
businesses, while others are somehow managing on a meagre income and 
are facing high levels of poverty, even though they are living in municipali-
ty/city corporation areas. The study (ibid) revealed that 38% of respondents 
earn BDT 3,001–6,000 a month while 31% earn BDT 6,001¬–10,000. Only 
3% of respondents are living with an income above BDT 15,000. It should 
be mentioned that the average national household income per family is BDT 
11,479 and the monthly income of the average urban family is BDT 16,475 
(HIES 2010, BBS). 
Land and Housing 
There are no housing schemes for the Bihari peoples other than camps (Ge-
neva camps) in urban areas. There are some fortunate Bihari people who 
have been able to protect their land or housing from government acquisi-
tion. A small number of Biharis live in their own houses or rented houses 
outside the camp, hiding their Bihari identity. The remaining thousands live 
in 116 camps across Bangladesh. 
The housing situation in these 116 recognised Bihari Camps in Bangla-
desh is dire and meets no kind of housing standard. In general, houses in 
the camps are tiny, usually less than 8x10 feet, and host entire families. As 
they have no living options outside the camp, several generations have to 
live under the same roof. Most of the dwellers of the camp are provided 
with only one room. Many of them end up raising their dwelling another 
one or two floors upwards. The staircases in the buildings are so narrow 
that inhabitants struggle to climb them. The threat of eviction of camp is of 
serious concern for camp dwellers, especially in Dhaka city. From 2001 to 
2012, nine petitions were filed on behalf of Biharis in various camps, asking 
the court not to allow any eviction in the camps before rehabilitation.  
Education Status of Linguistic Minorities
I remember my first day of school.  All the Bengali students were 
looking at us as if we were strangers and they were whispering to 
each other that we are Bihari and that we live in dirty camps… We 
were marginalised in the classroom and we had to sit in a separate 
row. – Mohammad Khalid, a member of the Urdu-speaking commu-
nity in Dhaka.  
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Poverty and discrimination prevent most Bihari camp dwellers from 
accessing education. Many families do not have ability to bear education-
al expenses, so they engage their children in labour instead. Moreover, the 
social stigma of being ‘Bihari’ and the identity of living in camps has also 
limited their educational opportunity. However, interest in education has 
grown among the younger generation and many can now be found studying 
at the undergraduate and postgraduate levels, despite their camp address 
and social identity. The study (ibid) on Bihari communities living in differ-
ent enclaves shows that 65.3% respondents said their children go to school. 
Strikingly, however, about 80% of these respondents said that their chil-
dren dropped-out of school. The major reason identified in the study for 
dropping out from education is the involvement of children in labour, along 
with the pejorative attitude of students and teachers towards Biharis.  
Health and Hygiene Status
Extreme overcrowding, unsanitary toilets, water clogging, broken drainage 
systems etc have contributed to a very unhealthy environment in the camps. 
Fevers, colds and waterborne diseases are especially common among the 
camp dwellers. The aforementioned study (ibid) found that 74.7% of re-
spondents get medical treatment by buying medicine from the pharmacy 
while only 17% go to a medical practitioner or hospital. 6% of the respon-
dents shared that they faced discrimination while getting treatment from 
government hospitals or buying medicine from pharmacies, due to their 
Bihari identity. 30% of the respondents shared that doctors did not attend 
to patients in the camp, even in times of emergency.  With regard to the 
camp dwellers’ reproductive health, the findings of the study (ibid) revealed 
that women in the camp usually give birth to their children at home. Only 
37% of the households shared that they go to a government hospital during 
childbirth.  31% of the respondents stated that the camp dwellers do not get 
post-natal services in the camp from any doctor or nurse. 
Water and Sanitation 
There are only 265 toilets for a population of 30,000 in Geneva Camp at 
Mohammadpur, Dhaka. Most of them are dirty and nearly 50% are out of 
order. On average, each toilet is used by 100 people. A growing trend in 
Geneva Camp is for families to build their own private toilets, but due to the 
congested living conditions, few have the space to do this inside their homes. 
Likewise, there is a scarcity of water points in the Geneva camp. There 
is one water pump in each sector of the camp and only the larger sectors 
have more than one. This public water point is used for drainage, bathing, 
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washing clothes, and more. The dwellers often have to stand in queue to col-
lect water from the water point. Unclean water infects Bihari children with 
water-borne diseases, and urinary tract infections are common in women 
and girls. Waste water created while cooking is typically dumped directly 
into the alleyways or into the infrequent above-ground drains, while solid 
food waste is disposed of in intermittently available trash bins or informal 
piles (Sholder 2011). 
Government Initiatives for Socio-Economic 
Development of Linguistic Minorities 
For the poorer and more vulnerable segments of the population, especial-
ly for marginalised and excluded groups, the Bangladesh government has 
introduced the Social Safety Net Programme, through which different kind 
of services are provided to these groups. However, ‘Bihari’ communities are 
carefully excluded from these services, due to their camp identity. The IRB 
study shows that, among the respondents, 97% never have access to the 
government social safety net programme, nor to any other services. 45% 
of the respondents shared that they knew about vulnerable group develop-
ment (VGD) and vulnerable group feeding (VGF) cards and allowances for 
widows, lactating mothers and the elderly, while the rest of them had never 
heard of these services.
Camp dwellers that require government services face obstacles due to 
their Bihari identity and, in some cases, they even face outright refusal to 
provide services. In recent years in Dhaka the government rejected 53 ap-
plications for birth registration due to various reasons, including a lack of 
proof of residency (many cannot use electricity bills as proof of residence 
because they have no individual electricity connection) and internal in-
structions not to issue birth certificates to ‘non-Bengalis’. However, other 
city governments have issued birth certificates to almost all applications by 
camp dwellers. This shows the lack of enforcement of the 2008 Supreme 
Court decision by some government officials.  In the case of passport appli-
cations, many were rejected on the grounds of lack of residential address; 
‘camp addresses’ are not considered proper residential addresses. The gov-
ernmental officials also say that they have written instructions not to issue 
passports to the Biharis. However, even after obtaining an official docu-
ment from the Home Ministry indicating that Biharis are qualified to secure 
passports, some applicants still failed to have their passport applications 
approved.
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The Supreme Court of Bangladesh confirmed that Biharis are citizens of 
Bangladesh in 2008; in the landmark decision of Md. Sadaqat Khan and 
others v Chief Election Commissioner (Writ Petition No: 10129 of 2007), 
the High Court Division reaffirmed that all members of the Urdu-speak-
ing community were nationals of Bangladesh in accordance with its laws 
and directed the Election Commission to enrol the petitioners and other 
Urdu-speaking people who want to be enrolled in the electoral rolls and 
give them National Identity Cards accordingly, without any further delay. 
The Election Commission very swiftly issued National Identity Cards to any 
member of the Urdu-speaking community who met the legal and adminis-
trative requirements. 
Situation of Rohingya Refugees 
in Bangladesh 
Introduction
There are two Rohingya Camps in Bangladesh, led by the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and controlled by the Bangla-
desh government: Kutupalong and Nayapara in Cox’s Bazar. 32,878 reg-
istered Rohingyas, along with their 5,000 unregistered children, live in 
these two refugee camps. Besides these, about 17,000 unregistered Rohing-
yas have been living in the makeshift Leda camp since 2008, and another 
35,000 unregistered Rohingyas live at Kutupalong camp at Teknaf, Cox’s 
Bazar. A total of 300,000 Rohingyas live without registration in the district, 
since the government banned registration for Rohingyas in 2005 (OHCHR 
2013: 2). 
It is estimated that of the total number of Rohingya refugees, only 12% 
are registered and the remainder live in different parts of Cox’s Bazar, Ban-
darban and Chittagong district. Many of them are also scattered in other 
parts of the country or are integrated with the mainstream population. The 
swathes of unregistered Rohingyas are considered illegal and live in fear of 
police arrest, abuse and want for food and other basic needs. Even those liv-
ing in the UNHCR camps fall victim to various types of oppression by local 
gangs. This untold suffering contributes to their status as one of the most 
persecuted groups in the world (International Labour Association).
Rohingyas in Bangladesh are deprived of basic food, education, medical 
care and livelihood, and they live an utterly unsecured and vulnerable life. 
Even the inhabitants of the registered camps are living in a miserable situ-
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ation as they do not have humanitarian aid of any kind. As the Bangladesh 
government is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Proto-
col, nor to the 1954 and 1961 Statelessness Conventions, it feels less obliged 
to provide fundamental rights to refugees. There is no national legislation 
to guide the prevention and reduction of statelessness or the protection of 
stateless persons (OHCHR 2013: 2).
Access to Food, Education, Health Care 
and Other Services 
The movement of Rohingyas is restricted, and this means that they have 
limited access to education and health services. Refugees outside the camps 
do not have access to refugee status determination and are subject to arrest 
and deportation. Children of refugees are not eligible for birth registration. 
The Rohingya refugees are provided with basic food, medical services, ed-
ucation etc by UNHCR, but recently these services have been inadequate. 
Those living in unregistered camps live with scarcity of food, shelter, water 
and sanitation. Besides this, they are often victims of physical assault, police 
arrest, rape, sexual assault etc. Children remain the most vulnerable among 
the Rohingya people. In the two registered camps, UNHCR provides edu-
cation up to primary level, but secondary education is not provided. Mean-
while, an entire generation of refugee children have grown up in the camps 
with no means to achieve self-reliance and no hope for the future. With no 
right to higher education and no permission to work in mainstream society, 
they spend their days without purpose. This lost generation is a wasted, la-
tent talent that holds very little hope of contributing to the improvement of 
the world outside the camp (Isaacs 2016).
Government restrictions on NGO activities also affect access to food, 
health and education services. For example, Muslim Aid, UK has had to stop 
its operations with the Rohingya people due to government control. At pres-
ent MSF-Holland (Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders) is 
working for the refugees and local population, providing basic health care 
by running a clinic and supervising the health condition of Rohingya refu-
gees in the camp. Still, there is no security for the refugees in either camp 
and no regular supply of food items, sanitation and water. Malnutrition is 
at an alarming level among the Rohingya.  A lack of tube wells in the make-
shift camp forces the inhabitants to depend on unclean water from canals 
and ponds, which increases the risk of disease among them. Women often 
have to collect water from hillside streams and face sexual assault by the 
Bengali villagers. Sanitation is totally absent in the camps; even the kacha 
87
Profile of a vulnerable minority: 
 Dalits in Bangladesh
Introduction
Discrimination based on social strata and deprivation along the lines of 
caste, descent and profession has a long history in Bangladesh. Dalits face a 
major part of this deprivation. Discrimination based on caste and untouch-
ability is associated with the lives of Dalit people to such a great extent that 
they remain the most backward community with regard to socio-economic 
development. 
Who are Dalits? 
There is no disaggregated data available on the Dalit population. Some have 
estimated that there are about 3.5–5.5 million Dalits in Bangladesh (Chow-
dhury 2009: 2), others that there are 5.5 to 6.5 million Dalits (3–4% of the 
total population) (Islam and Parvez 2013). Traditionally, Dalit people are 
involved in jobs that are considered menial by society, such as sweeping, 
cleaning etc. They are viewed by society through the lens of their work and 
their descent and are considered untouchable, which limits their socioeco-
nomic development. Their standard of living, in both rural and urban ar-
eas, demonstrates their deprivation, as well as the state’s wilful ignorance 
of their condition.
There are three broad categories of Dalits in Bangladesh:
i) Bengali Dalits, who live in villages all over Bangladesh. These people are the 
part of the mainstream rural community but are identified as Dalit due to 
the work they do – traditionally considered menial by society. This group 
includes people from communities such as: Rishi, Rabidas, Muchi, Majhi, 
Jaladas, Paroi, Kaiputro (Kawra), Beara, Nikari, Shikari, Swarnaker, Kapa-
li, Kumor/ Kulal, Kuar, Sutradhar, Karmakar, Hari, Goala, Chamar, Bauri, 
Suri, Mali, Jogi, Bhuimali, Shiali, Kaibarta, Kahar, Keshra, Dholak, Nalua, 
Dhani, Napit, Bagol, Basar, Bajonder, Buno, Dai, Dhopa, Pandrakshatria 
(Pod), Patni, Fasua, Shahjee, Meso, Kotal, Bhuputra, Bhagobene, Chandal 
(Charal), Antoj, Namashudro, Dhangor, Mathor;
ii) Urban Dalits, who migrated (or were forced to move) from India to 
what was previously East Bengal. Though this migration began in 1605, 
during the Mughal period, a considerable number of Dalits migrated 
between 1835 and 1940, during the British colonial period. They were 
brought by the British colonial rulers to do menial jobs such as sweeping, 
clearing sewage, and working in tea plantations and railway stations. 
They include the following groups: Bashpore, Sabari, Dom,Domar, Har-
ijan, Masuwara, Mushaheries, Methor, Maithal, Balmiki, Lalbegi,  Pasi, 
Sweeper, Mala, Madiga, Magaiya, Raut, Hela/Hadi, Saberi, Chakali, 
Dewali, Kanpuri, Telegu, Madraji; and
Contd...
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Sura Khatun’s painful life in the refugee camp
Sura Khatun (56) runs a grocery shop in the Leda makeshift camp area. She 
also lives in the same camp in a tiny room. ‘Living outside your own home 
is always hard,’ says Sura, ‘and when eleven members of a family live in a 
10 x 7 ft. room, you can easily understand the situation. My husband is ill. 
My two young sons work outside the camp area. One is a day labourer and 
the other is a restaurant waiter. We are united. Besides these, we have two 
other sons. They eat separately with their family members, but we live in the 
same room! We have three daughters. Our eldest daughter was married in 
Myanmar, another is living with her husband in this camp and the youngest 
one lives with her husband in a village outside the camp area. I don’t want 
to go back to Myanmar. And why should I? The Myanmar Army and Border 
Guard Police (BGP) are torturing women and killing innocent children and 
Rohingya men every day. Living in the refugee camp is miserable, but at 
least we are safe here.’ (Roy 2016)
Report of Independent Experts and 
Special Rapporteurs on Rohingya Refugees
• Independent experts on extreme poverty and on water and sanitation 
noted that despite improvements in the conditions of the camps, reg-
istered refugees do not fully enjoy freedom of movement, the right to 
work or the right to education, which leaves them extremely vulnerable 
to abuse and exploitation.
• The Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty called on Bangladesh to pri-
oritize improving the situation of the Rohingya refugees; finalize its ref-
ugee policy and take measures to reinstate the resettlement programme, 
and encouraged the Government to seek out resettlement options that 
prioritise and protect the rights and interests of refugees
• In 2010, the special rapporteurs on health, on migrants, on food and 
on racism sent a joint communication to the Government drawing at-
tention to allegations received regarding the situation of unregistered 
Rohingya asylum seekers, refugees and migrants. According to reports 
received, some 220,000 unregistered Rohingyas were not permitted 
to receive official relief and were reportedly victims of violence and at-
tempted deportation by both state and non-state actors.
(makeshift) toilets have to be shared by hundreds of camp dwellers. Dehy-
dration, diarrhoea, fever, pneumonia, coughing and skin disease are fre-
quent among the camp dwellers. Due to regular Border Guards Bangladesh 
(BGB) monitoring of local clinics, Rohingya refugees even avoid getting 
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iii) Muslim Dalits, who can also be found across the country. Though as a 
religion Islam does not recognise any division based on caste or creed, 
in the socioeconomic and cultural context of South Asia some Muslim 
communities as considered inferior to others based on their occupation. 
These are groups like Jola, Tati, Tele, Kolu, Kulu, Behara, Hajam, Bede, 
Bainna Bede, Darji, Mazi/Khottra, Kasai etc. 
Discrimination faced by Dalits
The lives of Dalits are particularly harsh, due to the practice of caste dis-
crimination. Dalits are frequently prevented from entering the homes of 
non-Dalits or even public places, and the majority of them live in extreme 
poverty. Traditional jobs for Dalits are usually part of the informal sector 
and they are badly paid and exploited. 
According to Parvez and Islam (2014), the monthly income of 42% of Dalit 
families is between 3000 and 6000 taka; 18% earn below 3000 BDT; 17% 
earn 6000 to 9000 BDT; and 12% families earn 9000 to 12,000 BDT. Only 
11% of Dalit families earn more than 12,000 taka (BDT) monthly. Despite 
their skills, educated Dalits often remain trapped in their traditional pro-
fessions due to various social and economic factors, instituted by dominant 
social actors, thus remaining confined to a state of chronic poverty. Hence, 
caste-based identity impedes them from switching to decent professions, 
even when they have skills or education. 
The caste and untouchability issues surrounding Dalit people also affect 
their access to education and other development indicators. Parvez and Is-
lam (2014) show in their study that among enrolled (72%) children in pri-
mary schools, around 63% dropped out due to caste-based discrimination, 
among other reasons. The study also found that only 12.5% of Dalit children 
are studying at secondary level, 4.3% at higher secondary level and 1.9% 
Dalit students at under-graduation and graduation level. Dalit girls also 
often face sexual and psychological harassment in educational institutions, 
which discourages them from attending school or college. Khan and Row-
shan’s recent study (2016) showed that only 5.9% of Dalit girls completed 
secondary level education.
Dalits are discriminated against in access to education, decent employment, 
renting houses and buying land, as well as to basic services and entitlements 
from the government. Mainstream development paradigms have over-
looked their existence as special communities with special needs, and in-
dicators assessing development have rarely taken Dalits into consideration. 
For example, maternal mortality rates are higher amongst Dalit women and 
levels of education are far lower in Dalit communities. Despite this, there is 
no official recognition that specific groups, like Dalits are particularly vul-
nerable and deserve special protection and access. As a minority group, they 
are excluded at every level.
... Profile of vulnerable minority continued ...
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medical treatment out of fear of detainment or deportation. The houses in 
the camps fulfil no standard of living, and rainwater often floods the camps. 
During summer the camp dwellers cannot cope with the heat, while in the 
winter they have no warm clothes or supplies such as quilts or blankets to 
tackle the cold (Medecins Sans Frontieres 2017).
Government Initiatives 
The Bangladesh government is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Conven-
tion or its 1967 Protocol, nor to the 1954 and 1961 Statelessness Conven-
tions. Nonetheless, for three decades Bangladesh has been hosting more 
than half a million Rohingya refugees, respecting their international human 
rights obligation. Since 2012, however, the government has resisted the 
influx of Rohingyas and has deported many of them to their countries of 
origin. Still, under an agreement with UNHCR, the government has been 
hosting approximately 29,000 refugees in two refugee camps in Cox’s Ba-
zar district, with a total expenditure of $47.5 million per year.8 Despite 
repeated recommendations from the international community to provide 
human rights and basic privileges to Rohingya refugees, the government 
has imposed restrictions on UNHCR with regard to registering unregistered 
refugees and providing assistance to them. Even the activities of NGOs are 
restricted by the constant threat from the government. The Bangladesh 
government has denied these allegations and has stated that Rohingyas 
are enjoying the privileges to which they are entitled as refugees.9 Recently 
the government has planned to relocate the two legal camps in to ‘Thengar 
Char’, an island in the bay of Bengal (Lahiri and Yanofsky 2017). This island 
has been newly formed out of silt and has 30,000 acres of land. However, 
it is feared that this may leave Rohingya people exposed to further disaster, 
as most of the island is under water during high tide and vulnerable to the 
impact of climate change.
Recommendations
Indigenous Peoples
• The Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord should be implemented ef-
fectively. The government should come up with a specific timeline for 
8. See: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G13/107/07/PDF/G1310707.
pdf?OpenElement
9. See: Bangladesh national report, UPR 2nd cycle.
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Good practice case study:
Sahebganj-Bagdafarm Land Recovery Movement Committee: 
A movement for recovering land of the people
The Sahebganj-Bagdafarm Land Recovery Movement Commit-
tee has become an iconic movement for both the indigenous Santal com-
munity and the Bengali people to recover their ancestral land from the 
government-backed perpetrators that took it, including the Administration 
of Rangpur (Mahimaganj) Sugar Mill Corporation; a local MP, Abul Kalam 
Azad; and Shakil Alam Bulbul, Chairman, Sapmara Union Council.
Background of the Movement
In the name of Rangpur (Mahimaganj) Sugar Mills Ltd, what was then the 
East Pakistan government acquired 1842.30 acres of land in 1962 from in-
digenous and Bengali people, evicting 15 indigenous peoples and five Benga-
li villages, including Sapmara, Madarpur, Narangabad and Chakarahimpur 
mouza under Gobindaganj upazila, Gaibandha district.
The agreement drawn between the government and the affected families 
clearly mentions that the land would be returned to the original owners if 
the land was used for any purpose other than the cultivation of sugarcane. 
In this scenario, according to clause 5 of the contract, the government would 
take back the acquired land from the Pakistan Industrial Corporation and 
return it to the original land owners. However, the sugarcane cultivation was 
interrupted several times, and in March 2004 production finally stopped 
due to mismanagement, corruption and loss. After 1982 the Sugar Mills Au-
thority leased out the property to influential individuals and racketeers for 
the cultivation of rice, wheat, corn, tobacco, potatoes, mustard etc, instead 
of sugar cane. Under the circumstances, the poor indigenous and Bengali 
owners demanded several times that the government return the 1842.30 
acres of land, due to the breach of the agreement between the government 
and the Sugar Mills authority. 
The Demand for their Ancestral Land
Since 2004, indigenous peoples and Bengalis have been demanding the land 
be returned, alleging that the authorities violated the contract by allowing 
the cultivation of crops other than sugarcane and leasing out parts of the 
land to influential people.
On 5 March 2014 the affected people organised the ‘Sahebganj-Bagdafarm 
Land Recovery Movement Committee’. The committee was formed by the 
affected people of the area. Mr. Sahjahan Ali Prodhann from Sapmara vil-
lage was the pioneer of the movement and served as the president from the 
beginning. Filimon Buskey remains the General Secretary of the movement. 
Contd...
Bangladesh 
Cracks in the Foundation
92
South Asia State of Minorities Report 2018 
Exploring the Roots
proper and speedy implementation of the accord. Resolution of land dis-
putes by amending the contradictory provisions of the CHT Land Dis-
putes Resolution Commission Act 2001, in line with the CHT Accord;
• ILO-convention 169 (the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention) 
should be ratified.  The government should take appropriate measures 
for the effective implementation of ILO Convention 107, the State Ac-
quisition and Tenancy Act 1950 and other laws and policies related to 
indigenous peoples;
• The government should end the forced eviction of indigenous peoples 
for land acquisition in the name of special economic zones, reserved 
forest, military bases, national/eco-parks, tourism complexes, develop-
ment projects and government establishments;
• Measures should be undertaken for the restitution of the land of indig-
enous peoples in the plains and a separate land commission should be 
formed. Traditional land rights, including the individual and collective 
rights of indigenous peoples,  must be recognised and respected, as en-
visaged in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO-convention 169;
• Schools in remote areas should be ensured, with adequate facilities and 
quality teachers. Textbooks should be published in the languages of in-
digenous communities;
• Health coverage should be increased among indigenous peoples. Health 
centres with available materials and doctors in remote areas; and
• The food security and livelihood of indigenous peoples should be en-
sured by protecting agricultural practices (eg jhum cultivation) and ex-
cluding cultivable land from acquisition by the government for develop-
ment projects and other purposes. 
Dalits and Socially Excluded Minorities 
• Disaggregated data on the basis of caste and gender should be made 
mandatory in the collection of basic statistics regarding all major so-
cio-economic and political aspects of life;
• Participation of Dalit children in primary education should be ensured 
through campaigns, raising awareness, increased educational scholar-
ship/stipends and other facilities;
• Formulate and implement special administrative measures by the 
Ministry of Education and University Grants Commission to ensure a 
mandatory quota system for Dalits in all public and private educational 
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In 2015 the committee organised a huge gathering in the premises of Saheb-
ganj High School, in the presence of members of parliament. In response 
to the committee’s plea, the district administration conducted an investiga-
tion and reported that the acquired land was being used for the cultivation 
of other crops instead of sugarcane. Since then, the Sahebganj-Bagdafarm 
Land Recovery Movement Committee has been increasing its movement to 
recover lands. In December 2015 they organised another huge gathering at 
the Bagdafarm area, demanding the return of land to its original owners. 
They also held a press conference at Dhaka to organise civil society and hu-
man rights activists around their demands. On 10 April 2016, the committee 
organised a long march and walked 32 kilometres from Katarmore, Bagda-
farm to Shaeed Minar, Gaibandha district. After the march they submitted 
a memorandum to the Deputy Commissioner of Gaibandha to return the 
land to its owners, since the agreement was violated by the Sugar Mill Au-
thority. Around 50,000 indigenous people, including 10,000 Bengalis, par-
ticipated in the march. The administration again investigated the issue and 
found that the land was not being used for sugarcane cultivation. However, 
they proposed that the government build an Export Processing Zone on the 
conflicted land, instead of returning it to the affected indigenous people and 
Bengalis who were the original owners. 
On 30 June 2016 the Sahebganj-Bagdafarm Land Recovery Movement 
Committee organised a gathering in observation of Santal Rebellion Day, 
with the participation of around 6000 indigenous people and Bengalis. 
During the gathering they decided that they would recover their land them-
selves. The next day they entered the land, raised houses and started living 
and cultivating. The committee helped to raise two thousand houses. On 12 
July 2016, the mill authority tried to evict these people, but they put up a 
strong resistance and protected their land. The committee helped to estab-
lish schools, water and sanitary facilities in the reoccupied land. 
As the long deprived indigenous peoples and Bengalis were settling down 
on their ancestral land, a massive attack was carried out on 6 November 
2016 by the Sugar Mill authority, accompanied by law enforcement agencies 
and local goons. Three Santal men were killed on the spot, 30 were severely 
injured, and 200 houses were burnt. Moreover, more than 1200 families fled 
the area, following widespread looting, vandalisation and arson attacks on 
their houses. A false case was lodged against 42 named indigenous Santals 
and Bengali farmers, as well as more than 400 other unknown villagers, at 
the Gobindaganj police station. The injured were arrested from hospitals. 
This incident resulted in huge criticism, both at home and abroad. Civil so-
ciety groups, human rights activists, political parties, and the National Hu-
man Rights Commission expressed their solidarity with the affected people 
Contd...
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institutes at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels along with other 
government privileges like stipends and scholarships, etc;
• The draft ‘Anti-discrimination Act’ to address untouchability and dis-
crimination-based work and descent should be enacted. The state 
should undertake an effective initiative to ensure the full implementa-
tion of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination;
• Both temporary and permanent removal of Dalits from their land or 
ancestral colonies without provision of proper rehabilitation should be 
stopped. Khas land should be allotted to Dalit and excluded communi-
ties on a priority basis. Khas lands allotted to Dalits should not be trans-
ferable  to non-Dalits under any circumstances;
• Coverage by the social safety net programme should be increased for 
Dalit and excluded communities and discriminatory-free access should 
be ensured to the beneficiaries of these schemes. Strong monitoring also 
should be in place to prevent corruption and access to this service by 
non-Dalits; and
• Decent employment and discriminatory-free workplaces should be en-
sured for Dalits. Alternatives to traditional employment opportunities 
must also be established for Dalits. Implementation of the Prime Min-
ister’s a quota of 80% for Dalits in sweeping and cleaning positions in 
government and autonomous bodies should be ensured. 
Tea Labourers 
• Application of state laws and policies must be ensured in tea estates, 
rather than only the company’s own rules and guidelines; 
• Steps must be taken to increase the wages of tea labourers as per the 
labour laws of the country and considering inflation and other concerns; 
• Both registered and non-registered workers should be provided with ad-
equate and quality housing, water and sanitation, education, and health 
services. Adequate, quality rations with nutritious ingredients should be 
provided;
• Steps should be taken to provide land titles to tea workers through dis-
tribution of khas land; and
• Skill development training should be provided to the workers and their 
family members along with flexible loan facilities, so that they can enter 
into alternative professions. 
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and demanded the return of the land to the original owners. However, the 
government ignored the demands and thousands of indigenous people and 
Bengalis in the area remain homeless, without food, education, or medicine. 
Besides this, they regularly face harassment by the police and local Bengali 
perpetrators. Since the incident of November 2016, the Sahebganj-Bagda-
farm Land Recovery Movement Committee has been trying to unite the peo-
ple to stick to their rightful demand, as well as providing shelter, food and 
education to the affected people. At the same time they have been fighting a 
legal battle in the court for the affected people and to punish the perpetra-
tors. They dream that one day the rightful claim of the affected Indigenous 
Peoples and Bengalis will be fulfilled. This is the biggest movement around 
the land of IPs and Bengalis since the Santal Rebellion of the British era (30 
June 1855).
The Future of the Movement
At present the Sugar Mill authority has occupied all the disputed land and 
fenced around it so that people cannot enter. Police have not withdrawn the 
cases lodged against the affected people and many of them are still hiding to 
avoid arrest. On the other hand, the affected Bengalis and IPs lodged a case 
against 33 people for torching their homes, evicting them from their land, 
and murder, but police only arrested one of the accused. 
The Sahebganj-Bagdafarm Land Recovery Movement is still fighting to 
realise their demands, while simultaneously helping the rehabilitation of 
the victims, despite the decrease in assistance from civil society and rights-
based organisations. The committee has established some temporary shelter 
houses for the affected people as well as raised a school for the children. 
At the national level, they have connected with a good number of lawyers 
who are supporting the case in the supreme court as well as in local courts. 
They are still providing support to those who received bullet injuries during 
the conflict. The committee is also still holding on to their demand for the 
ancestral land occupied by the Rangpur Sugar Mill. Despite this, the govern-
ment is terming these rightful owners ‘landless’ poor people and is trying to 
rehabilitate them on abandoned land.
... Good practice case study continued ...
Sexual Minorities
• Initiative should be taken to repeal Article 377 of the Criminal Code, 
which criminalises adult consensual sexual acts;
• Steps should be taken to grow awareness on LGBT+ issues among law 
enforcement agencies, government officials and wider society. Special 
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training should be provided to law enforcement agencies about the 
rights of LGBT+ people and how to treat them;
• Discrimination-free access to education should be ensured for transgen-
der people. School environments should be friendly to transgender peo-
ple;
• A special chapter on sexual education should be incorporated into text-
books. The rights of LGBT+ people should be reflected positively in this; 
and 
• The government should accept the UPR’s recommendations regarding 
recognition of LGBT+ people. 
Linguistic Minorities 
• Necessary action should to be undertaken by the government to remove 
all legal and other barriers and ensure equal access to all public services 
for every citizen of Bangladesh;
• The government should make camps liveable by repairing old dwellings 
and providing suitable water and sanitation facilities;
• Small-scale and craft industries should be supported through provision 
of flexible finance, market promoting, skill building and training etc;
• Enrolment in primary education should be ensured for all children, 
school environments should be improved and educational institutes 
should have a discrimination and stigma free environment; 
• High Court orders with regard to the rights of linguistic minorities as 
citizens should be implemented effectively. There should be no obstacle 
to obtaining government documents like passports, trade licenses, birth 
certificates, national identity cards etc; and
• Bihari people should be brought under social safety net programmes to 
ensure their equal access to allowances for widows and the elderly, VGD 
and VGS cards, educational stipends for children, skill building and 
training etc. 
Rohingya Community
• The Bangladesh government should ratify the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and sign its protocol to ensure access for Rohingya people seeking asy-
lum and strengthen refugee status determination procedures, without 
any kind of discrimination;
• The government should take steps to establish legislation and proce-
dures to allow access to procedures determining refugee status to all 
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refugee children and their families, as well as to provide them with birth 
registration, security, and access to education and health-care services;
• The government also should ensure that refugees, after taking refuge in 
Bangladesh, are not detained, prosecuted or punished solely for their 
method of arrival in Bangladesh; and
• The government should allow all international aid agencies, including 
UNHCR and the International Red Crescent Society (IRCS), and NGOs 
to provide aid to refugees. 
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Introduction
The Kingdom of Bhutan is sandwiched between India and China. Excavat-
ed artefacts like stone tools and weapons suggest that Bhutan existed as 
early as 2000 B.C. It is a small country and was in the past among the least 
known countries in the region, in part due to self-imposed isolation. Bhu-
tan has never been colonised. Its modern history commenced from 1907 
after the first King of Bhutan, Ugyen Wangchuck, consolidated the coun-
try under monarchical rule. In 2008, Bhutan adopted the Constitution of 
Bhutan, following which Bhutan became a constitutional monarchy. Since 
2008, Bhutan has held two rounds of democratic elections. The third one 
is due in 2018.   
In the course of history, different peoples settled in different regions, 
populating Bhutan. These peoples are the ethno-linguistic groups who cur-
rently inhabit the country. This paper maps the different ethno-linguistic 
groups in Bhutan and examines minority issues faced by minority groups 
in the country.
Methodology
The primary method for data collection and for the preparation of this re-
port has been secondary data review, collation and analysis. Information 
was mostly downloaded from websites of various agencies and other doc-
umentation was searched and extracted from the web. Secondary statistics 
in Bhutan on topics of interest to this report are scarce and, where they are 
available, they are not shared in the public domain. 
To supplement the information collected, in-depth interviews were 
conducted with key persons representing the Lhotsampa ethnic group and 
Christians. It was not possible to conduct focus group discussions since the 
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issue of human rights is a sensitive topic in Bhutan and people are cautious 
about discussing human rights in groups. Besides, any survey activity has to 
be endorsed by the government, and potential subjects of the study will only 
comply with prior written approvals, physically produced on request when 
they are approached for interviews. 
Limitations
This paper has been written in the context of data limitations. Data is either 
not available or, if it is available, not shared in the public domain. Further, 
human rights are not an issue that the government is comfortable discuss-
ing on a regular basis. For this reason, it is challenging to collect primary 
data. A limited number of interviews were therefore conducted with only a 
few representatives of minority groups.
The Ethnic Mosaic of Bhutan
Mapping the diverse groups of people inhabiting Bhutan is necessary to es-
tablish the ethnic mosaic of Bhutan and to correct the misperception of out-
siders that Bhutan comprises a homogenous Buddhist population. In this 
report, ethnic groups shall be identified based on ethno-lingual differenc-
es and geographical residence. Ethnic groups have not been mapped until 
now. However, the state authority (Dzongkha Development Commission) 
and internationally acclaimed linguists (among others, George van Driem) 
have carried out language surveys. This report has taken inspiration from 
the work of van Driem. 
Ethnic groups are social groups with a shared culture such as language, 
customs and institutions. Ethnicity can no longer be qualified by race based 
on genetic constitution. Taking this as the point of departure, there are sev-
eral ethnic groups in Bhutan. While some differ in the languages they speak, 
others have cultures that are distinct from the others. Whether others con-
sider them different and whether they also consider themselves different 
from the others is a useful basis for identifying ethnic groups in the country.
Western Bhutan comprises the districts of Thimphu, Paro, Punakha, 
Chukha, Gasa, Wangdue Phodrang and Haa. The Ngalongpas of Tibetan 
descent are in the majority in these districts. The Ngalongpas came to Bhu-
tan in the 8th and 9th centuries along with the Drukpa Kagyu Buddhism 
missionaries from Ralung in Tibet. Ngalongpas speak Dzongkha, which is 
now the national language of Bhutan. The intonation of Dzongkha spoken 
in the western districts of western Bhutan can vary but it is essentially the 
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same language. The Ngalong follow Drukpa Kagyu Buddhism. The Ngalong 
speakers constitute an estimated 21.13% of the total population of Bhutan – 
around 160,000 speakers.
There are also other ethnic groups in western Bhutan. In the northern 
areas, in Gasa district, there are people from Laya called Layaps who are 
highland pastoralists and speak a dialect similar to Dzongkha. The GNH 
Survey 2015 (Center for Bhutan Studies and GNH Research 2015) estimates 
that 0.25% of the population speaks Layapkha. The Layaps have a distinc-
tive way of life. The women wear a unique dress. In Wangdue Phodrang 
district, there are several small groups – such as those living in Phobjikha, 
Rukubji and Sephu – who speak Hoen kha (also called La kha) (0.02% of 
the population), and semi-nomadic people who speak Brokkat. The small 
groups of people who live in a few villages in Ada Rukha and who originally 
spoke Olekha are called Oleps. Until a few years ago, there was only one 
woman in the village who spoke Olekha. Oleps share a common language 
and way of life with the Monpas of Trongsa in the Black Mountain region. 
The Black mountain region extends from Wangdue Phodrang to Trongsa 
and Zhemgang districts. The Lhop are an ethnic group from Samtse district 
in southwestern Bhutan. People of Nepali origin called Lhotsampas inhabit 
the southern areas of Chukha district. 
The central Bhutan region comprises the districts of Trongsa, Bumthang 
and Zhemgang. The borders of Zhemgang district extend to the south of 
Bhutan. This region was populated around the 1st millennium BC – long 
before the Ngalongs came to Bhutan. The people of Bumthang are called 
Bumthaps and speak Bumthang kha. The GNH Survey 2015 estimates that 
2.89% of the population speaks Bumthangkha. In Bumthang district there 
is a small group of people living in the Dur area who are pastoralists and 
who speak a dialect called Bjobikha, which is closely related to Tibetan.
There are several ethno-linguistic groups in Trongsa district. People 
from villages in Tangsibji county and Taktsi Yuesa village under Trongsa 
village speak Hoenkha, also called Nyenkha and Nga ked. The GNH Sur-
vey 2015 estimates that 1.70% of the population speaks this language. The 
people living in Nubi Gewog, Trongsa speak a Bumthangkha dialect called 
Nubi Choetoe, but some writers have placed this dialect under the Hoenkha 
group. In Trongsa district, the people living in areas to the east of the Mang-
dichhu river all speak Khengkha, the predominant language spoken under 
Zhemgang district. A people called the Monpas live in three villages under 
Langthel county in the Black Mountains; they speak Monkha and depend 
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on a mixed farming system, depending on agriculture and largely on the 
forests for their livelihoods. The GNH survey estimates that 0.19% of the 
population of Bhutan speaks Monkha. There is a small population of Mon-
pas in Reti village, Korphu county. There are also some Lhotsampas living 
in Reti village. 
The predominant ethnic populations of Zhemgang district are Kheng-
pas, who speak Khengkha. The GNH survey estimates that 8.05% of the 
population of Bhutan speaks this language. There are small groups of peo-
ple, such as the Monpas, living in Berti village, Trong county and Sharchok-
pas in Dogar country in southern Zhemgang. The inhabitants of the central 
region generally follow the Nyingma Buddhist religion.
The eastern Bhutan region comprises the districts of Trashigang, Mon-
gar, Lhuentse, Trashiyangtse, Pemagatshel and Samdrupjongkhar. The 
majority ethnic group in eastern Bhutan are the Sharchokpa people, who 
came around 2000 years ago.  They speak a language called Sharchokpa or 
Tsangla kha and follow the Nyingma Buddhism religion. The GNH Survey 
2015 estimates that 33.72% of the population of Bhutan speaks Tsangla. 
This makes them the largest ethno-linguistic group in Bhutan. 
Trashigang has populations of the Brokpa people in Merag, Sakten and 
Phongme counties. Brokpas are pastoralists who rear yak and sheep, speak a 
distinct language called Brokkat and have a unique traditional dress and so-
cial customs. The GNH Survey 2015 estimates that 0.16% of the population 
speaks Brokkat. There are Choecha Ngacha speakers living in some villages 
in Bartsam, Bidung and Shongphu counties as well. There are a few Brahmi-
lo (Dakpakha) speaking households living in Thangrong village, Phongmey 
county. The majority of the population, however, speaks Tsangla.
In Mongar district, besides the majority Sharchokpa people, there are 
also populations of people speaking Choecha Ngacha (also called Kurmed-
kha), a language related to Dzongkha and spoken by people living along the 
lower Kuri chu river in Tsakaling, Saleng and Tsamang counties. The GNH 
Survey 2015 estimates that 2.95% of the population speaks this language. In 
the southern part of Mongar, the people in Gongdue county speak Gongdue 
kha, a language not related to any language of Bhutan. The GNH Survey 
2015 estimates that 0.36% of the population speaks this language. A small 
Khengkha-speaking group live in a village in Narang county, Mongar, while 
all the people living in Silambi county, Mongar speak Khengkha. The people 
of Chhali county speak Chhalikha; a dialect considered a mixture of several 
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Bhutanese languages. The GNH Survey 2015 estimates that 0.30% of the 
population speaks Chhalikha. 
The people in Lhuentse district speak Chocha Ngacha – a dialect related 
to Dzongkha – and another dialect called Zhakat (also called Kurtoed kha) 
¬– a dialect of Bumthang kha. The GNH Survey 2015 estimates that 2.93% 
of the population speaks this language. The people of Khoma county in 
Lhuentse speak Dzala kha (also called Khoma kha), which is also spoken in 
the northern part of Trashiyangtse district. The GNH Survey 2015 estimates 
that 1.22% of the population speaks Chocha Ngacha.
In Trashiyangtse district there are groups of people speaking Dzala kha 
in Yangtse and Bomdeling counties. Choecha Ngacha is spoken by people 
living in Tongphu Zhangtsen county and some populations in Yangtse and 
Khamdang counties. A small population in a few villages under Tongphu 
Zhangtsen also speaks Khengkha. Dakpa kha (also called Brahmi lo) is spo-
ken by the entire population of Thoedso county and some villages under 
Khamdang county. The GNH Survey 2015 estimates that 0.61% of the pop-
ulation speaks Dakpakha. Populations in Khamdang, Ramjar and Yalang 
counties speak Tsangla. 
The language spoken by all people living in Pemagatshel is Tsangla. In 
Samdrupjongkhar district, the majority of the population speak Tsangla, 
but in the southern part of the district there are Lhotsampa people speaking 
Lhotsamkha, who live in Samrang, Pemathang, Langchenphu and Phuen-
shothang counties.
The southern region comprises the districts of Samtse, Sarpang, Tsirang 
and Dagana. The people living in these districts are predominantly of Ne-
pali origin, are called Lhotsampas (people of the southern border), and are 
mostly Hindus. They speak Lhotsamkha or Nepali. The GNH Survey 2015 
estimates that 18.69% of the population speaks Lhotsamkha. The Lhotsam-
pa, however, are not a homogeneous population; there are several sub-eth-
nic groups of people such as the Tamang, Rai, Limbu, Gurung, Ghalley, 
Magar, Newar (Pradhan), Lepcha, Sunwar, Sherpa, Giri, Bahuns, Chhetris, 
Kami, Darjee and Sarki, who all fall under the broad term Lhotsampa. Many 
of these sub-ethnic groups have their own languages and their own social 
customs. There are also Lhotsamkha-speaking people to be found in the 
southern region of Chukha district. In Dagana, besides Lhotsamkha, Dz-
ongkha is spoken in most of the northern counties. There are also Khengkha 
speaking people in Drujeygang county. 
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Samtse district has a group of people called the Lhops (also called Doya) 
living in Jigme, Singye and Wangchuk villages in Dopuchen county and 
in Taba and Dramtoey villages, Tading county. The Lhops are considered 
indigenous – the first people who inhabited Bhutan. They have their own 
language, Lhokpukha, unique dress, social customs, and they follow an ani-
mist religion. The GNH Survey 2015 estimates that 0.13% of the population 
speaks Lhokpukha. A small group of Adivasis (indigenous people)  
with a socio-cultural affinity to the Adivasi population of West Bengal live 
in the counties of Ugentse, Chengmari, Yoeseltse and Tashichoeling. The 
Adivasis have their own language, called Kurukh, and their own social cus-
toms. Samtse district also has a small Lepcha population. 0.15% of the total 
population of Bhutan speaks Lepchakha.
A small population of Monpas can also be found in Chungshing village 
in Jigmechholing county, Sarpang district. In the mid-1990s people from 
other parts of the country were resettled in the southern region after they 
received land grants under the resettlement programme. The ethnic compo-
sition of southern Bhutan has therefore become more diverse than before, 
with an estimated 10–20%, as observed, now comprising of re-settlers from 
other parts of the country. 
After the annexation of Tibet by the Chinese in 1959, Tibetans fled their 
country and many settled as refugees in Bhutan, mainly in areas such as 
Hongtsho and Begana, close to Thimphu. A few Tibetan families live in oth-
er districts, mainly in the urban areas of Trongsa, Bumthang and Trashi-
yangtse. In the 1970s Tibetans were given the choice to accept Bhutanese 
citizenship, which many accepted. Those who chose not to were allowed 
to stay as special residents. Tibetans speak a language called Boekha. The 
GNH Survey 2015 estimates that 0.25% of the population speaks Boekha.
The first National Population and Housing Census in Bhutan was con-
ducted in 2005. The next census is long overdue and was conducted recent-
ly, in June 2017. The National & Population Housing Census 2005 Report 
contains data disaggregated by district, county, sex and a number of other 
variables. Ethnicity was not a data item in the census protocol, so statistics 
on population by ethnic group is not available.  However, language spoken 
by respondents featured in the Census of 2017. Rough estimates (eg Khan & 
Rahman (2009)) show the Ngalong population to be around 15%, the Shar-
chokpa population to be 50% and the Lhotsampa population to be around 
30–35%. 
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In light of the above analysis of the many ethno-linguistic groups in 
Bhutan, it seems that Khan & Rahman (2009) have subsumed the many 
small ethnic groups discussed above under these three major ethnic groups 
of Bhutan. It is possible to establish a more accurate picture of the situation 
of ethnic groups in the country if data on ethnicity were to be collected and 
made accessible. This could then be supplemented with a survey to fill in 
data and information on ethnic groups where there are gaps. As it is, it is 
difficult to obtain such data because it is not available or not accessible in 
the public domain.
Minorities and their Rights
Among the many definitions as to what constitutes a ‘minority’, the most 
accepted definition is that of the Special Rapporteur on Prevention of Dis-
crimination and Protection of Minorities: 
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, 
in a non-dominant position, whose members – being nationals of 
the state – possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics dif-
fering from those of the rest of the population and maintain, if only 
implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their 
culture, traditions, religion or language. (Capotorti, 1977: 98)
In opposition to Capotorti’s definition, some have argued that numerical 
inferiority is not sufficient to label a group as a minority (Panikkar 2005). 
Rather, it is incumbent on certain groups’ feelings and experience of being 
discriminated against. Further, the social, economic and political position-
ing of groups can be analysed to determine power dynamics and their rel-
ative position in society.  The question of minority groups in Bhutan can 
be explored using Panikkar’s formulation of experience of discrimination. 
This can entail delving into the different ethno-linguistic groups; examining 
whether they perceive their own identity as being the same or different from 
others; examining the development record in Bhutan; and finally exploring 
the recent history of ethnic issues, which had been brewing for decades, but 
which erupted into a movement in 1990 involving Lhotsampas in Bhutan. 
If we define an ethnic group as a group that is considered to be differ-
ent by others and also considers themselves to be different, then we can 
aggregate people into four broad ethnic groups in Bhutan from the many 
ethno-linguistic groups described above. The first are the Ngalongpas of 
western Bhutan; the second are the Sharchokpas of Eastern Bhutan; third 
are the Lhotsampas of southern Bhutan and lastly the Bumthangpa–Kheng-
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1. The Bumthang and Kheng people share a common language but they may consider them-
selves different from each other.
pa people of central Bhutan.1 Many authors writing about ethnic groups in 
Bhutan tend to categorize people into the first three ethnic groups and in-
clude the Bumthangpa–Khengpa people under the Sharchogpa people. 
As mentioned in the section above, there are some groups who are con-
sidered to be the indigenous people of Bhutan, such as the Monpas of the 
Black Mountains and the Lhops of southwestern Bhutan. These groups live 
in remote areas and until a few decades ago were not mainstreamed into 
development. As a result, the areas these groups live in have remained back-
ward, which in turn affects the socio-economic status of these marginalized 
groups. This is in spite of the balanced development programmes that the 
government has commissioned to ensure equitable regional development 
throughout the country. However, under the initiatives of the government, 
which are supplemented by NGOs, many development programmes have 
been launched in the areas inhabited by these people. As a consequence, 
there is rapid development, but the cost is the dilution of a traditional way 
of life of these groups. There are a few other pastoralist groups living in 
the remote alpine regions of the country, such as the Brokpa, the Layaps, 
Lunaps and the Brokkat and Lakha-speaking people, who face similar chal-
lenges. However, this does not make them ‘minorities’ if we apply the defi-
nition adopted in this report. The fact alone that their culture and traditions 
may be at risk, without the added element of domination by another ethnic 
group, does not qualify them as a ‘minority’, since this risk is more devel-
opment-related. 
The Ngalong of western Bhutan are numerically fewer than the Shar-
chokpas of eastern Bhutan and the Lhotsampas of southern Bhutan. Howev-
er, they are politically ascendant and form the most dominant ethnic group 
in Bhutan. The reasons for their dominance can be traced back throughout 
history to when the first incursions of Buddhist missionaries from Tibet 
were directed to western Bhutan. They were thus the first people to embrace 
Buddhism, whence the term Nga (first), long (rise) came into usage – the 
first to ‘rise from the darkness’. The higher exposure of the Ngalong to Bud-
dhism and religious practice compared to other ethnic groups had therefore 
already created a sense of superiority over other groups. 
The second reason for the dominance of the Ngalong is that when 
Bhutan was a country of minor fiefdoms that were frequently at war with each 
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other, Jigme Namgyal from Kurtoe in Lhuentse in the east defeated all the 
contesting chieftains of eastern Bhutan and marched onto Trongsa to con-
solidate his power and establish his political base there, in order to become 
the most powerful political entity in Bhutan. It was his son, however, Ugyen 
Wangchuck, who fought against all the warring overlords of western Bhutan 
and unified the country under his rule. In 1907, he was crowned the first King 
of Bhutan of the Wangchuck dynasty ruling from western Bhutan, namely 
from two capitals – Thimphu and Punakha. Western Bhutan thus became the 
centre of political power and the Ngalongs, by extension, also became politi-
cally powerful, owing to their proximity to the seat of royalty and officialdom. 
This is also the reason behind Ngalongkha being adopted as the national lan-
guage – now called Dzongkha or ‘the language spoken in the Dzong’. 
The third reason, connected with the second, is that the districts of 
western Bhutan, namely Thimphu, Paro and Punakha, in the early years 
received most of the development assistance, due to which the value of the 
land served by these developmental facilities increased significantly, com-
pared to other districts in the country. As the assets that the Ngalong owned, 
namely land, appreciated significantly, the Ngalong also became more 
economically powerful. 
The Sharchokpas are numerically the largest ethnic group. They in-
habit the six districts of the eastern region. Sharchokpas are also found in 
many other districts, where they have migrated for work or residence. The 
non-Sharchokpa people of the districts of Lhuentse, Trashigang, Mongar 
and Trashiyangtse (ethno-linguistic groups) also consider themselves Shar-
chokpas in an attempt to assume a regional identity. The people of Trong-
sa, Bumthang and Kheng, residing east of Pelala were also considered as 
peoples of Sharchog Khorlo Tsibgye (Eight Spokes of the Wheel of Eastern 
Bhutan) and in earlier times were considered Sharchokpas, though Shar-
chokpas may not consider them so (Gyeltshen 2004). What distinguishes 
Sharchokpas from the Ngalongpas is that the Sharchokpas have a separate 
language and follow the Nyingmapa sect of Mahayana Buddhism, while 
the Ngalongs follow the Kagyupa sect of Mahayana Buddhism. The Drukpa 
Kagyu sect of Mahayana Buddhism is the official religion of Bhutan. The 
Sharchokpas have their own customs. They also prefer to marry from within 
their own ethnic group, though marriage to people from other ethnic groups 
also occurs. Sharchokpas, though the most numerous group, are neither a 
dominant group nor a minority. For that matter, no ethnic group in Bhutan 
is in the absolute majority; each one constitutes less than 50% of the total 
population. 
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The Lhotsampa are the only ethnic group in Bhutan practising a 
non-Buddhist culture, and the only ones who speak Nepali, an Indo-Aryan 
language (called Lhotsamkha in Bhutan). The Lhotsampas came to Bhutan 
in the 1870s, mainly from the middle hills and the lowland Terai of eastern 
and central Nepal. Thereafter, they migrated to Bhutan at various points in 
history. In southern Bhutan they found a landscape similar to the one they 
had left behind in Nepal, so they rapidly adapted to their new home. They 
cleared jungles for habitation, dug irrigation canals, terraced land for grow-
ing paddy and cultivated cash crops such as orange, betel, cardamom and 
ginger. They grew and harvested a variety of agricultural crops from the fer-
tile soil. For many years, Lhotsampas were the only cash-paying taxpayers 
in Bhutan, while people from other regions paid their tax in kind. 
As for the circumstances leading to the migration of Lhotsampas from 
Nepal, there are several theories. A Bhutanese historian, Phuntsho (2013), 
states that Lhotsampas were recruited from Nepal as labourers to extract 
lumber from the forests of southern Bhutan. According to anecdotal evi-
dence, however, the Bhutanese government resettled the Lhotsampas in the 
hot, humid, malaria-infested forests of Southern Bhutan. Bhutanese resid-
ing in more temperate regions Bhutan avoided living in the South in those 
days. The twin objectives of opening up the south to habitation were to cre-
ate a buffer with the southern neighbour, India, and to open up the forests 
for the economic extraction of timber, crops and other produce. 
Mapping of Minorities
According to Capotorti’s definition of minorities, only the Lhotsampas can 
be considered a minority group in Bhutan. They have a history of being dis-
criminated against in Bhutanese society. Their marginal situation became 
more overt and more pronounced from the late 1980s up until 2008. The 
year 2008 was significant in that democracy was introduced to the country. 
The advent of democracy was probably more significant for the Lhotsampas 
than for any other ethnic group in Bhutan in terms of conferment of rights. 
Before 2008 the Lhotsampas’ social, economic and political rights had been 
systematically curtailed. 
In the late 1980s the government advocated and implemented a ‘One 
Nation One People’ policy, which was essentially an acculturation project. It 
focused on rolling back certain cultural endowments, such as the teaching 
of the Nepali language in schools; enforcing a countrywide dress code; and 
removing Lhotsamkha (Nepali) as one of the languages used in the nation-
al parliament. The government also ceased the integration policy wherein 
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they had been providing cash incentives for inter-marriage between ethnic 
Lhotsampas and members of other ethnic groups. Further, the government 
started the national citizenship census exercise, wherein people were re-
quired to prove their registration and residence in Bhutan before 1958. As a 
result, many people who could not show proof became non-nationals over-
night, even though many had been born and raised in Bhutan. 
There were political demonstrations, some of which turned violent, in 
various parts of southern Bhutan in September 1990. Following this, the 
government militarised southern Bhutan. There were anecdotal reports of 
villagers being harassed by the local administrations and the military. The 
result was an exodus of Lhotsampas to the refugee camps in eastern Ne-
pal. Concurrently, the government imposed the requirement for a security 
clearance for recruitment in government jobs, promotions of civil servants, 
training and studies, business licences, passports for international travel 
and admission of children in schools. The certificate was commonly called 
a ‘police clearance’ because citizens had to apply to the Royal Bhutan Po-
lice, who then conducted a review of documents and registers maintained 
at the district level. If any family member of the applicant had participated 
in the demonstrations of 1990 or had a record of family members being 
imprisoned, the clearance was denied to all family members, including the 
applicant, though they themselves were innocent. This instrument was suf-
ficient to marginalise the Lhotsampas economically, politically and socially. 
Most families of Lhotsampa ethnicity were affected. Thus began almost two 
decades of suffering for the Lhotsampa people of Bhutan. Many families 
were divided, with some family members resident in the refugee camps in 
Nepal and some within Bhutan. Schools and medical facilities in southern 
Bhutan were closed down and all development activities in the southern 
districts ceased after anti-government miscreants who left the country re-
turned and vandalised facilities. Thus, the majority of innocent Lhotsampa, 
stereotyped as anti-nationals, underwent harrowing experiences of public 
shaming and deprivation of their rights. 
There were no avenues for Lhotsampas to advocate for their rights, 
since they had already been labeled anti-national. Many were arrested ar-
bitrarily, detained and tortured in prison. This was because there were no 
legal frameworks assuring individual rights. Southern Bhutan was in a state 
of emergency. Intimidation, harassment and perpetration of violence by the 
local state machinery against Lhotsampas in the country were common. By 
decree of parliament, more than 200 civil servants were terminated from 
the civil service on the grounds that they had family members in the refugee 
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camps in eastern Nepal. The dismissal letters issued by the Royal Civil Ser-
vice Commission cited ‘in the interest of public service’ as the reason for the 
dismissal of the Lhotsampas.
After 2008, with the enactment of the Constitution of Bhutan and in-
troduction of a constitutional monarchy, access to rights for Lhotsampas, 
as for all the citizens of Bhutan, was guaranteed. As such, Lhotsampas are 
now treated equally before the law and can invoke their rights, and overt 
discrimination has decreased. 
The provisions of the constitution provide a framework within which no 
citizen or institution can overtly discriminate against other citizens. After 
the constitution was endorsed in 2008, Lhotsampas no longer had difficulty 
in obtaining the documents they needed. Consequently, children were read-
ily accepted into schools. Lhotsampa applicants for higher studies in pro-
fessional occupations and college graduates could obtain opportunities for 
tertiary studies and jobs based on merit. Civil servants availed promotions 
based on performance evaluations by supervisors and training opportuni-
ties based on their needs. Lhotsampas aspiring to start up businesses could 
easily obtain licences. It was no longer problematic for Lhotsampas to avail 
travel documents such as passports to travel abroad.  In short, Lhotsampas 
seemingly were not discriminated any longer.
Lhotsampas: After Democracy
It is not easy to identify and distinguish if and how Lhotsampas are being 
discriminated against since 2008. Data disaggregated by ethnicity is not 
available. The recourse adopted here, therefore, is to fill this gap with in-
formation from in-depth conversations with Lhotsampas serving in govern-
ment and operating businesses, as well as several other categories of people, 
including students and youth. 
Lhotsampa civil servants still feel a sense of insecurity, especially with 
regard to performance appraisals by their supervisors. Some also felt that 
they did not get the recognition they deserved, compared to colleagues from 
other ethnic groups, who they felt sometimes enjoyed more favour from su-
pervisors. Therefore, they feel a sense of nepotism practised on ethnic lines. 
For similar reasons, some felt that Lhotsampa civil servants could not aspire 
for senior executive posts, since the ministries did not nominate them, even 
though they felt they fulfilled all the criteria. Many businesses also recruit 
people based on family and ethnic affiliations. Some Lhotsampa students 
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felt deprived because not all the criteria for selection for further studies 
were favourable towards them. 
Religious Minorities
Buddhism is the state religion of Bhutan. Hinduism is accepted in the coun-
try because Hindus are free to practice their religion. While being represent-
ed in the Council for Religious Organizations, Hindus have also received 
state support for the construction of temples in some parts of the country, 
including Thimphu, the capital city.
A few Muslim families are also reportedly living in Samtse district, but 
like the Adivasis they are a very small group and are therefore overlooked. 
Christians are a religious minority in Bhutan who adhere to several de-
nominations of Christianity, such as Roman Catholic, Protestant and Pen-
tecostal, among others. The exact number of Christians cannot be deter-
mined, owing to a lack of data. It is observed that the number of conversions 
to Christianity is on an upward trend. This may be the reason that Chris-
tians are not always looked upon in a positive light.
Although the Constitution of Bhutan, 2008 allows the freedom to prac-
tise any faith, Christians have not been allowed to legally register them-
selves as a religious organisation under the Religious Organisations Act, 
2007. Only Buddhists and Hindus are members of the Council for Religious 
Organisations. There have been reports of instances of harassment of Chris-
tians, especially in rural areas. Christians across the country have not been 
given the permission or the means to construct a church, though Buddhists 
and Hindus continue to enjoy state patronage and funds for establishing 
temples across the country. Christians therefore congregate in private hous-
es to worship. Christians have also not been allocated a proper place for 
burial of their dead, though they continually request that such a place be 
allocated by the government. Reports indicate that Christians are looked 
upon with suspicion, as potential proselytisers and converters. According to 
the Constitution of Bhutan 2008, proselytisation is banned. The Penal Code 
of Bhutan has provisions to penalise people who forcefully convert people 
to other faiths.
People from Low Castes
Lhotsampas are mostly Hindus. As in neighbouring countries, such as 
India and Nepal, the Hindus of Bhutan also practice the caste system. 
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However, there is no dowry system. Bhutan is a secular state and the laws do 
not espouse caste differentiation. On the other hand, constitutional provi-
sions are unclear about the prohibition of caste discrimination because caste 
is not specifically mentioned as a category. Lhotsampas are caste conscious 
and observe purity and pollution aspects prescribed by the caste system. 
Though caste practices are not followed as stringently as in the past, dis-
crimination based on caste is very much a reality in rural southern Bhutan. 
In the case of marriage, people from different castes often observe en-
dogamy to maintain ‘purity’. There was a case in 2016, which garnered me-
dia attention, wherein a man from a low caste married a woman from a 
higher caste. The people marrying were ostracised ceremoniously, as the 
bride’s parents symbolically expelled their daughter from the higher caste 
to a lower one. When the person from the lower caste filed a case in court, 
the case was dismissed on the grounds that it was not within the mandate 
and purview of the court to settle such cases. That such cases do not come to 
the attention of the media regularly does not imply that these do not happen 
on a regular basis. Events such as these demonstrate that low caste people 
face discrimination not only from higher caste Lhotsampas but also from 
the legal system. People who are both ethnically Lhotsampa and from a low 
caste are positioned in an intersectional category, rendering them open to a 
double burden of discrimination.
Constitution and Law
The Constitution of Bhutan 2008 does not recognise ‘minorities’, as evi-
denced by an absence of specific provisions discussing minorities and their 
rights in the constitution. The constitution states that ‘all persons are equal 
before the law and are entitled to the equal and effective protection of the 
law’. Further, the constitution stipulates that no person can be discrimi-
nated against on the grounds of race, sex, language, religion, politics etc. 
Likewise, there is no other legislation dealing with minorities. 
Therefore, there is no official policy or position on minorities in Bhutan. 
The provisions for equal treatment before the law and non-discrimination of 
people based on their differences suggest that the law does not differentiate 
people by minority status.  This implies, therefore, that while all are equal 
before the law, minorities are not even recognised by the law, and therefore 
have little opportunity to have their issues legally addressed, even if they are 
not prevented from approaching the courts to voice their grievances. 
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There are legislative provisions for non-discrimination, but these tend to 
overlook the needs of minorities. Therefore, there is a justification for over-
arching legislation for the protection of minorities. This is because member-
ship of the social category ‘minority’ may change over time and context. A 
group that is a minority today may cease to be one once they have realised 
their rights, and another social group may become a minority. Whichever 
group becomes a minority will need protection and the best means for this 
is to ensure that protection of minority rights is enshrined in legislation.  
Parliamentary Committees
There are two committees in parliament, namely the Social and Economic 
Committee and the Human Rights Committee, which are identifying and 
discussing issues of concern. However, it is difficult to tell if these commit-
tees are active and responsive to the issues that everyday people and minori-
ties face. Further, there are no reports of their work in the public domain.   
Civil Society Organisations
The Civil Society Organisations Act was enforced in 2007, and CSOs started 
formal registration in 2010 after the Rules and Regulations of the Act were 
endorsed. Currently, there are 50 CSOs in Bhutan. However, none of the 
CSOs registered work in the area of human rights and advocacy for human 
rights. This reflects that the type of CSOs that are being registered are the 
ones supplementing and complementing efforts in service delivery, or mu-
tual benefit organisations. There is a clear lack of human rights advocacy 
CSOs in Bhutan. 
While the Civil Society Act establishes the rationale for civil society and 
legitimises the existence and operation of civil society organisations (CSO), 
it is weak in the area of facilitating advocacy work by CSOs for its target 
groups and constituents. There have been on-going discussions among 
CSOs and the government on the need to amend provisions that empower 
the CSO Authority to approve the CSO registration applications of organi-
sations that have applied to advocate and address emerging social issues.  
Religious freedom
The Constitution of Bhutan (2008), while designating Buddhism as the 
spiritual heritage of the nation, confers the right to follow any religion. 
Proselytization, however, is banned. The penal code categorises coercion 
or inducement to convert as a misdemeanour, which is punishable with a 
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sentence of three years in prison. Further, the law prohibits oral or written 
communication that promotes enmity between religious groups. Violations 
are punishable by up to three years in prison. 
The Penal Code of Bhutan (2004) also criminalised promoting civil un-
rest by advocating religious abhorrence, disturbing public tranquillity, or 
committing an act that is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony be-
tween religious groups, stipulating a penalty of five to nine years in prison. 
Religious groups are required to register with the government. Without 
registration, a religious organisation is not recognised by the government 
and will not enjoy rights to organise publicly, own property, accept money, 
conduct outreach activities, import literature, or hold worship services. The 
law permits the government to ‘avoid breaches of the peace’ by requiring 
licences for public assembly, prohibiting assembly in designated areas, and 
imposing curfews. Religious organisations considered a threat to the spir-
itual heritage of the country are prohibited from registering. Some years 
ago, a group of Lhotsampa people from the Kirat sub-group (consisting of 
Rai and Subba ethnicity) applied to register themselves as a Kirat Dharma 
group with the organisation. Their application was turned down.
An eight-member board of the Commission for Religious Organisations 
defines the structure of religious institutions, enforces the prohibition on 
religious leaders running in secular elections, and monitors religious fund-
raising activities. The Commission for Religious Organisations is required 
to ‘ensure that religious institutions and personalities promote the spiritual 
heritage of the country’ by developing a society ‘rooted in Buddhist ethos’.
Further, religious groups are required to acquire government approv-
al to construct temples. All religious buildings are subject to legal require-
ments to adhere to traditional Bhutanese architectural standards. Religious 
organisations are prohibited from being involved in political activity. Or-
dained members of the clergy, irrespective of religion and including the 
sizable population of Buddhist monks, are barred from political activities. 
The Role of ICRC in Bhutan
Up to 2008 the government received periodic visits from the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross to monitor the condition of prisons and 
treatment of prisoners detained on political grounds. Based on their obser-
vations, the government would receive recommendations from the ICRC. 
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Over the years, such visits have had a beneficial impact on the condition of 
prisons and prisoners in Bhutan. 
Life and security
The Constitution of Bhutan (2008) guarantees all citizens the right to life, 
liberty and security of persons. The constitution also entrusts to the state 
the responsibility to provide security in the event of sickness and disability 
or lack of adequate means of livelihood for reasons beyond one’s control. 
Before the constitution came into force, there were reports of people going 
missing if they criticised the government or came into conflict with author-
ity. Since 2008 such incidents have not been commonly heard of. There 
are now laws in place that people must be produced within 48 hours to be 
charged in court for crimes they are alleged to have committed, but this was 
not the case before. People used to languish in detention for extensive and 
indefinite periods of time, without access to legal aid for redress and due 
process of law. 
There have been a few cases of kidnapping in southern Bhutan in the last 
few years. Most of them occurred in Sarpang district. The kidnappers are al-
leged to be from across the border in India. Kidnappers were encouraged to 
continue their activities after a lukewarm response from security personnel 
on both sides of the border – in India and Bhutan – to investigating the kid-
nappings. The limited security arrangements in place at the southern borders 
are insufficient to quell future attempts at kidnappings and other crimes. 
Efforts are underway to implement the existing rules that guarantee se-
curity of person. Much can be done to ensure a rapid response in times of 
violence against individuals, and to provide legal aid and settle cases for 
crimes committed against people. 
As with so many aspects of life in Bhutan, data is scarce. Either such data 
are not collected or, if collected, such data are not made available for public 
consumption. Hence, data on such disappearances are mostly not shared in 
the public domain. One only hears about these cases on the grapevine. For 
instance, no one heard about the two Christian pastors who were sentenced 
to four years of imprisonment in 2014 on the grounds of illegal receipt of 
unauthorised funds from abroad and unauthorised assembly of people for 
viewing of a documentary. This was reported in the Religious Freedom Re-
port (US State Department 2015). The pastors were released on bail in 2015, 
only after paying fines. In 2017 the Royal Bhutan Police have posted pho-
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tographs on their website of 29 missing persons. It is possible that some of 
these missing persons are those absconding from the law.
Participation
The constitution guarantees as a fundamental right the right to equal ac-
cess and opportunity to join the public service and to practise any lawful 
trade, profession or vocation. 
In terms of the participation of Lhotsampas in institutions, electoral 
events and bureaucracy, much has changed over the years. For instance, be-
fore the 1990s there were a substantial number of Lhotsampas who were re-
cruited to the civil service and the armed forces. Between 1990 and 2008 this 
number decreased because many could not produce documents such as secu-
rity clearances for the application process. Besides this, taking Lhotsampas 
into the armed forces may have been perceived as a risk to national security. 
Since 2008 many Lhotsampas now enter service based on merit and not 
ethnicity. However, even now there are no Lhotsampas occupying senior 
executive posts. While the ruling governments try to balance out the minis-
terial portfolios based on regions and ethnicity, there are comparatively few 
Lhotsampa executives. There are two Lhotsampa ministers in the current 
ruling government. Among members of parliament, there are six who are 
from the Lhotsampa ethnic group out of a total of 47 currently representing 
their constituencies in the National Assembly (parliament). From the total 
25 members of the National Council, only two are Lhotsampas. In the pre-
vious government there was only one serving Lhotsampa minister. There 
are no Lhotsampas in the post of secretary, which is the highest executive 
position in the civil service. There are around half a dozen Lhotsampas serv-
ing as directors or commissioners. There is only one Lhotsampa District 
Administrator (Dzongda) in a total of 20 districts. In terms of local gov-
ernment, 40 of the 205 County Executive Officers (Gups) are of Lhotsampa 
ethnicity. There are only a few Drangpons (judges) of Lhotsampa ethnici-
ty in the judiciary. Since the language of the court in Bhutan is Dzongkha, 
the national language of Bhutan, most Lhotsampas are overlooked when it 
comes to nominations for the post of judge.
All adult citizens in Bhutan are eligible to cast their vote at the time of 
elections. Since 2008 Lhotsampas have not been discriminated against in 
terms of their right to cast their vote.  However, it is estimated that there 
more than 10,000 persons of Lhotsampa ethnicity who as yet are not 
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citizens. Many could not vote in the last elections in 2013 and many may 
not exercise this right in 2018, during Bhutan’s third round of democratic 
elections. Besides the inability to vote, Lhotsampas without citizenship doc-
uments face immense difficulties travelling abroad and seeking jobs. In fact, 
they face many difficulties asserting their self-determination for a better and 
more fulfilling life in Bhutan. There have been efforts by the Department of 
Census and Immigration to collect data and information to establish the 
status of Lhotsampas without citizenship. However, as per constitutional 
provisions, His Majesty, the King of Bhutan holds the prerogative to award 
citizenship. Several batches of people received citizenship in the last couple 
of years from His Majesty, the King. There are still people in Bhutan still 
without citizenship. It is reported that more than 8,000 persons have now 
received citizenship from His Majesty, the King. It is not known how many 
of these recipients were Lhotsampas.
Profile of a vulnerable community:
LGBT+ Community in Bhutan
The LGBT+ community is an emerging entity in Bhutan. Though homosexu-
ality among men has always been known of, for example among monks and 
in prisons, gay women were unacknowledged until recently. It was only a 
few years ago that LGBT+ people began to gain some attention in the media 
and consequently in society. The issues of LGBT+ people are still emerg-
ing because only a few have come out and declared their status; many have 
not, fearing societal stigmatisation and discrimination. There are currently 
92 LGBT+ people who are registered members of an informal organisation 
called Rainbow Bhutan: Celebrating Diversity. The UNDP estimates there 
to be more; through mapping and size estimation helped by forthcoming 
individuals, they estimate that there are 9,105 men who have sex with men 
in Bhutan. Similar estimates regarding other members of the LGBT+ com-
munity are not available.
LGBT+ people are stigmatised in society. A commonly held perception about 
LGBT+ people is that they are abnormal. Due to this, most LGBT+ people in 
Bhutan are afraid to declare their sexuality. This discriminative attitude also 
translates to derogatory name calling and both physical and sexual violence 
towards LGBT+ people in Bhutan. Legislation is strongly biased towards 
LGBT+ people in Bhutan; Article 213 in Chapter 14 of the Penal Code of 
Bhutan states: ‘A defendant shall be guilty of the offence of unnatural sex if 
the defendant engages in sodomy or any other sexual conduct that is against 
the order of nature.’ Classified as a crime, same-sex sexual intercourse is 
punishable by a prison sentence from one month up to a year. As a result, 
LGBT+ people are compelled to exist as a ‘hidden population’ for fear of 
Contd...
Bhutan 
An Uneasy Mosaic
120
South Asia State of Minorities Report 2018 
Exploring the Roots
The constitution categorises all Lhotsampas as ‘citizens by registration’, 
implying that they were only conferred citizenship in 1958 because either 
they or their parents were domiciled in Bhutan and registered in the records 
of the government. 
Culture and Identity
The constitution entrusts the state to preserve, protect and promote the cul-
tural heritage of the country by conserving and encouraging research on 
local arts, custom, knowledge and culture, to encourage free participation 
in the cultural life of the community. Further, the constitution permits the 
enactment of legislation necessary to advance the cause if it leads to the 
cultural enrichment of Bhutanese society. One of the domains of the Gross 
National Happiness framework is cultural diversity, but the government 
and GNH advocates did not, until recently, pursue the promotion of cultur-
al diversity and resilience in the country. It is very difficult to identify any 
work on language or other cultural studies done on the Lhotsampa culture.
As described in earlier sections, Lhotsampas have a distinct culture, 
which gives them an identity built on their language, religion, customs, tra-
ditions and the feeling of being Lhotsampa. The period between 1990 and 
2008 was a time when Lhotsampas could not practise their culture as de-
sired.  Although the right to practise religion, language and other aspects of 
culture is now being exercised, certain aspects of cultural deprivation still 
exist. For example, with the withdrawal of the Nepali language in schools, 
it is now taught in only two Pathshalas in southern Bhutan. The Nepali 
language is in a state of decay and decline in Bhutan. The current generation 
of Lhotsampa children cannot read and write in their own language any lon-
ger because there is no formal support for its teaching in schools. Parents 
could teach their children at home but many parents themselves are defi-
cient in the written language. There is a concurrent stress on promoting the 
national language, Dzongkha, which suggests that the relegation of minority 
languages could lead to the assimilation of minority groups to the dominant 
culture within a few generations.    
All Bhutanese citizens are expected to wear the national dress – the gho 
for men and the kira for women – when visiting government institutions 
and temples and when attending official functions. Otherwise, people are 
free to wear their ethnic dress. There is no objection to Lhotsampas wearing 
their ethnic dress during festivals and while participating in cultural pro-
grammes like music and dance. In official functions such as the National 
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Day (17 December), a few Lhotsampa dances feature in the cultural pro-
gramme. Schools also feature some Lhotsampa cultural entries such as 
songs and dances in their cultural programmes. 
Non-discrimination and Equality 
(Socio-economic Rights) 
Under the Principles of State Policy in the Constitution of Bhutan (2008), 
there are several clauses guaranteeing socio-economic rights for all citizens. 
The first fundamental right enshrined in the constitution is that ‘all persons 
shall have the right to life, liberty and security of person and shall not be 
deprived of such rights except in accordance with due process of law.’ Also, 
article 8 states that ‘inequalities of income and concentration of wealth will 
arrest or being blackmailed on the grounds of this law. As a small society 
where visibility can become pronounced, many LGBT+ people fear being in 
the spotlight and having to experience the stigmatisation that accompanies 
being the subject of talk and gossip.
In the last decade, there has been a shift in the strength of the group’s 
self-mobilisation, as well as wide-ranging support from prominent person-
alities in Bhutanese society, which has been captured by the media.  Some 
LGBT+ people have set up and are operating websites. In recent years sever-
al LGBT+ people have declared their sexuality in public. Media coverage has 
been increasing, through news articles, television interviews and posts on 
social media. LGBT+ people are participating in international and regional 
conferences and symposia to share their work in Bhutan. Article 213 of the 
Penal Code has been discussed occasionally in parliament with regard to its 
discrimination against a sexual minority, but no serious attempts have yet 
been made to amend the law. On the other hand, there have never been any 
convictions under the law. Donors both within the country and outside have 
been providing financial support for events to create public awareness and 
to enhance the visibility and acceptance of LGBT+ people in Bhutan.
Though the LGBT+ movement has started, therefore, it is still weak. No 
studies have yet been conducted to assess economic discrimination against 
LGBT+ people as a group, but they remain vulnerable to societal and leg-
islative discrimination as well as to Sexually Transmitted Infections and 
HIV/AIDS. Education and awareness among the general public, as well as 
amendments to the law, will be determining factors for societal acceptance 
of LGBT+ people in Bhutan.  
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be minimised’, while article 11 entrusts the state with the ‘responsibility to 
ensure all citizens secure an adequate livelihood, and for this if people are 
not capable, to institute capacity through the right to work, vocational guid-
ance and training.’  Further, article 14 ensures ‘the right to fair and reason-
able remuneration for one’s work.’
The socio-economic situation of the Lhotsampas has particularly im-
proved after the discontinuation of discriminatory procedures. Many Lhot-
sampas joined the private sector as employees in business firms or started 
their own, mostly small businesses. This was not necessarily due to any 
desire for a career in business. Many were compelled to enter the private 
sector because government jobs were not accessible to Lhotsampas who had 
been denied the Security Clearance Certificate. This is also the reason that 
a large number of Lhotsampas currently subsisting in the small-scale retail 
business sector. Earlier, a crime committed by a family member, whether 
alleged or convicted, was used to implicate all other family members when 
they applied for a Security Clearance Certificate. Currently, security clear-
ances are issued on an individual basis and no adverse records of erring 
family members are transferred.
Income
The discussion on income is addressed indirectly mainly because of the 
dearth of data and information. The approach adopted here is to ascertain 
economic status, here meaning poverty, by districts in Bhutan. The Poverty 
Analysis Report 2012 (National Statistical Bureau 2012) shows that while 
poverty rates in majority-Lhotsampa districts such as Tsirang and Sarpang 
are mid-range, the districts of Dagana and Samtse have higher rates of pov-
erty. In fact, Samtse has among the highest poverty rates in the country. Of 
the total population of poor people in the country in 2012, 17% resided in 
Samtse. Likewise, Samtse had the highest proportion of poor and subsis-
tence poor households. Reasons for high poverty rates in Samtse include the 
protracted period of closure of development works from the 1990s, as well 
as its high population and inaccessibility – to reach Samtse, travellers used 
to have to go through India. The road connecting Samtse in southern Bhu-
tan with other places along the border has only recently been completed.  
Employment
The Constitution of Bhutan guarantees Bhutanese citizens the right to prac-
tise any lawful trade, profession or vocation. The constitution also states that 
Bhutanese citizens shall have the right to equal pay for work of equal value. 
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The Ministry of Labour & Human Resources carries out regular Labour 
Force Surveys, so data from the last ten years is available. Though data is not 
segregated by ethnicity, the data is again approached indirectly here by exam-
ining the incidence of unemployment by district – mainly in the southern dis-
tricts. It must be clarified here that the gross population counts in the south-
ern districts also include people of other ethnicities residing in the district. 
However, since more than 80% of the population in the southern districts are 
Lhotsampas, for the sake of comparison and discussion, the commentary will 
Good practice case study:
The Tarayana Foundation
The Tarayana Foundation was founded in 2003 by Her Majesty the Queen 
Mother and launched by His Majesty the King. It was registered as a civil 
society organisation and has the status of a public benefit organisation. It 
is governed by a board of directors and guided by an executive committee, 
while its operations are executed by a Secretariat. The main objective of the 
Tarayana Foundation is to uplift and enhance the lives of vulnerable individ-
uals and communities in Bhutan. Since 2003 the foundation has grown sig-
nificantly – in strength of staff, in resources, and in the diverse programmes 
and activities that it implements among the poorest and most vulnerable 
sections of the country. It is one of the few CSOs that have partnered with 
the government for many development programmes, facilitated by their 
deep reach into the villages and their ability to respond rapidly and effec-
tively to address community-level and community-articulated development 
needs. 
The Lhops (also called Doya) are a small ethnic group living in four to five 
villages in the southwestern district of Samtse, among the foothills of south-
ern Bhutan. They are considered to be the indigenous people of Bhutan. The 
Lhops have a distinct language, religion and culture, and follow unique cus-
toms and traditions. Owing to their isolation and voicelessness, they have 
been left out of the development process and face a quality of life much lower 
than that of neighbouring communities. High infant mortality; disease; poor 
sanitation and hygiene practices; low economic capacity due to unsophis-
ticated farming technology; and few economic opportunities all make this 
ethnic group very vulnerable. 
Since 2005 the Tarayana Foundation has been working in the Lhop com-
munities of Jigme, Singye, Wangchuk, Taba and Ramtoed, using a multi-
pronged approach to address the development needs of the Lhops. In the 
area of education and capacity building, the foundation has been sponsor-
ing children to study in schools by paying for their school uniforms, meal 
and travel allowances, and nominal fees paid to the school. It has also 
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consider these southern districts (Dagana, Tsirang, Sarpang and Samtse) as 
the ones inhabited by Lhotsampas in the southern districts. 
A review of statistics shows that in 2014 four districts with predomi-
nantly Lhotsampa populations – namely Dagana, Tsirang, Sarpang and 
Samtse – together contained 1,376 of the total number of unemployed 
people in the country (9,174), which is 15% of the total. This is a decrease 
from previous years; in 2012 this number went as high as 25%. Data on the 
number of Lhotsampas employed by the government are not available. The 
number of Lhotsampas in the private and business sector is also not avail-
able, but it is observed that many Lhotsampas joined the business sector 
after the 1990s, as is evident in the number of small businesses, such as 
restaurants and retail shops, that are owned and operated by Lhotsampas. 
Land and property
The Land Act (2007) specifically mentions that the Royal family, individu-
als, families, government institutions, NGOs and religious organisations in 
Bhutan are authorised to own land. 
The Constitution of Bhutan bestows to all Bhutanese citizens the right to 
own property. They are, however, barred from selling or transferring land 
or any immovable property to persons who are not citizens of Bhutan, ex-
cept in keeping with laws enacted by parliament. Further, the constitution 
protects the right to property by acquisition or requisition, except for public 
purpose, and on payment of fair compensation in accordance with the pro-
visions of the law. 
Land is dear to all Bhutanese people. Only citizens can own land in 
Bhutan. Non-nationals are not permitted to hold land within Bhutan. The 
sole prerogative to grant land to Bhutanese people lies with His Majesty, 
the King of Bhutan. Many people with marginal or no land have been and 
continue to be granted land. There have been several resettlement pro-
grammes; the ones in the mid-1990s in the southern districts took place 
en masse, with settlers from throughout the country occupying the land 
of Lhotsampas who had left Bhutan for refugee camps. Officials from the 
government, the army or their relatives were allotted the best land. Many 
recipients of prime land were not necessarily landless. Further, periodic 
land measurements revealed that the land of many Bhutanese people was 
in excess of what was reflected in the land documents. Now, either the 
excess land of people from other parts of the country has been regularised 
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and made legal holding, or those with excess land have been allowed to 
re-purchase excess land. 
Lhotsampa citizens, like other ethnic groups in the country, are free 
to purchase land and settle down in any part of the country. Lhotsampas, 
mainly those working away from their parents, have moved out from their 
traditional homeland in southern Bhutan and settled down in other parts of 
the country, including in Thimphu, the capital city of Bhutan. Many villag-
ers from southern Bhutan migrated to urban centres in the 1990s, when it 
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provided scholarships for the tertiary education of a Lhop girl studying in 
India. The foundation has also invested in enhancing the capacity of Lhop 
people – mainly women – by training them in a range of skills, including 
house building, commercial and organic farming practices, tailoring and 
cloth weaving from nettles for women, and paper-making. By enhancing 
economic opportunities for Lhop people, the foundation has facilitated the 
forming of production groups for growing and marketing farm products 
such as cardamom, orange and vegetables. It has also provided microloans 
for small business activities. Self-help groups have also been formed in the 
communities to enhance participation in enterprise. Over 50 houses have 
been constructed thanks to facilitation and provision of CGI roofing material 
by the foundation. To enhance social cohesion, the foundation has organ-
ised the ‘Doya Way of Life Festival’ to create awareness of this little-known 
group. They have also established a Doya Community Radio to increase the 
dissemination of information in the communities.
Though the foundation has worked intensively with the Lhop people, it has 
also faced challenges in the process, mainly posed by the isolated nature of 
the communities and rugged terrain, which make service delivery difficult. 
Further, many programmes require behavioural changes on the part of the 
Lhop people; these take time and should not be forced on the Lhops. In spite 
of these challenges, much progress has been made; the Lhops are on their 
way to finding a place in the country’s development initiatives and many 
of the development issues that have confronted them so far are being ad-
dressed. All this has led to the Lhop people living a more wholesome and 
dignified life in the remote areas in which they live.  One important lesson 
that can be learned from this case study is that challenges such as these can 
be overcome if all agencies involved in the development process, including 
organisations such as the Tarayana Foundation, and other stakeholders, 
such as government entities and the Lhop people themselves, all collectively 
contribute to the timely mobilisation of resources, constant communication, 
and reciprocal appreciation.
...Good practice case study continued...
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was no longer secure to stay in their villages. While many returned, some 
have continued to live in urban areas having found new vocations.
Health 
The Constitution of Bhutan (2008) entrusts to the state the responsibility 
to provide free access to basic public health services providing both modern 
and traditional medicines. Also, the state is to endeavour to provide security 
in the event of sickness and disability or lack of adequate means of liveli-
hood for reasons beyond one’s control. 
The health needs of the Bhutanese population are met through a tiered 
system of health facilities at the capital, district and county levels. This net-
work of health facilities provides both preventive and curative services to all 
citizens, free of cost. For diseases that cannot be treated within the coun-
try due to lack of expertise or equipment, patients are referred to India for 
treatment at the government’s cost. There are no distinctions in access and 
treatment, no matter what the citizen’s ethnicity. Even people from India 
working on projects and private construction avail medical treatment and 
care free of cost, just like the rest of the Bhutanese population. 
The southern districts together have six (19%) of the total number of 
hospitals and 42 (20%) county-based Basic Health Units. As such, the dis-
tribution of health facilities is as sufficient for catering to the population of 
each health facility’s jurisdiction as it is in other parts of the country.  
Education
The Constitution of Bhutan (2008) entrusts to the state the responsibili-
ty of providing education for the purpose of improving and increasing the 
knowledge, values and skills of the entire population, with education being 
directed towards the full development of the human personality. Further-
more, the state is to provide free education to all children of school-going 
age, up to the 10th standard, and to ensure that technical and professional 
education is made generally available and that higher education is equally 
accessible to all on the basis of merit. 
Primary education (up to class 10) is free for all citizens. The four dis-
tricts inhabited by Lhotsampas have 117 (19%) schools out of a total of 
620 schools in the country. Of the total 117 schools in southern Bhutan, 41 
schools do not have road access, i.e. they are located in remote areas and 
are not connected with roads of any kind. School admission is no longer a 
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problem for Lhotsampa children, as long as they fulfil the age requirements 
(minimum six years of age). Samtse is one of the least reached districts in 
the country and is the cause of high rates of poverty in the country. Samtse 
is the district with the highest proportion of schools with student-teacher 
ratio more than 24 (the maximum class size) suggesting that schools may 
be inadequate or teachers may not be enough to distribute to all districts in 
the country. 
Conclusion and Recommendations
Bhutan is a mosaic of different ethnic groups, with around 21 different 
groups, identified mainly on linguistic profiles built from linguistic studies 
carried out in Bhutan. The number of ethnic groups, however, is provision-
al and can benefit from a more comprehensive study on ethnicity in Bhu-
tan. The absence of any legislation in Bhutan on minorities as a category 
and their issues, including in the Constitution of Bhutan (2008), does not 
suggest that there are no minorities and that they do not have issues. Bhu-
tan’s recent history, particularly from the late 1980s to 2008, has seen a 
turbulent political period revolving around citizenship, rights and ethnicity, 
mainly concerning the Lhotsampas of southern Bhutan. The groups that 
currently face the most discrimination, therefore, are Christians and Lhot-
sampas. However, this discrimination often takes more subtle forms. 
The following recommendations are proposed:
• A comprehensive study, including field research, is required to identify 
the various ethnic groups in the country so that the nuances of ethnic-
ity might be documented and that groups who are distinct in their own 
right might not be agglomerated with other dominant ethnic groups, as 
is the case now. The outcome of such a study would be a useful contri-
bution to the mapping of ethnic groups and hence the exploration of an 
important component of Bhutan’s cultural heritage;
• The committees in the Bhutanese Parliament constituted to address 
social and economic issues need to be sensitised. Agencies should ad-
vocate and lobby with parliamentarians to encourage them in turn to 
advocate for legislation on minorities and minority issues;
• Minority issues are relevant and important to the Bhutanese context. 
Minorities and their issues need to be discussed and legislation enacted 
to ensure their protection. It is also necessary to bring about amend-
ments to other legislation, namely the Civil Society Organisations Act 
(2007), to permit the registration of civil society organisations with 
Bhutan 
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strong advocacy roles and to give CSOs more freedom to do advocacy 
work;
• There is no civil society organisation as yet registered to advocate for 
human rights in Bhutan. Now is the time for an entity such as this to 
apply, and for the government to approve its registration. Human rights 
advocates would be able to work towards protecting the rights of all the 
citizens of Bhutan and preventing discrimination; and
• It is recommended that data disaggregated by ethnicity be collected 
and made available in the public domain. Furthermore, public access to 
census data –which could be made dependent on researchers justifying 
their need for the data sets – would be most useful for social research. 
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Introduction
Worsening Condition of Minorities in India 
India has traditionally enjoyed much international goodwill for its working 
democracy, secular values, and tolerance, all of which have a direct bearing 
on the freedoms and rights of its minorities. Lately, however, it has been the 
subject of much negative attention. The most recent edition of the Social 
Progress Index ranked India a dismal 104 (out of 128) on discrimination 
and violence against minorities (Social Progress Imperative 2018). A 2017 
Pew Research Center Analysis of 198 countries ranked India as fourth worst 
in the world for religious intolerance, trailing only behind Syria, Nigeria 
and Iraq.1 The US Commission on International Religious Freedom, in its 
2017 reports, noted that ‘in 2016, religious tolerance and religious freedom 
conditions continued to deteriorate in India’.2 These are worrying develop-
ments in India’s record on minority rights. 
In this chapter we examine India’s record specifically on the socio-eco-
nomic rights of minorities, to examine trends and patterns. In doing this, 
we use the framework of the Human Rights Indicators to systematically 
unpack and examine commitments and efforts by state parties, to 
understand and explain minority outcomes (United Nations, 2006, 2012; 
Unable to Protect; 
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Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2015). We first define who mi-
norities are in India’s context. We then briefly survey the literature on the 
condition of India’s minorities in terms of socio-economic conditions, in-
cluding poverty; employment; health and nutrition; and education, to try 
to understand outcomes for minorities (Section 2), following this up with 
a quick scan of literature to try to understand the poor outcomes (Section 
3). In Section 4 we look at India’s commitment to minority rights, based 
on a reading of the Constitution, case laws and India’s ratification of rel-
evant International treaties. Section 5 examines India’s efforts to provide 
for minorities – programmes and schemes put in place to close the gap, 
and resources targeted – and how they work. In Section 6, we conclude our 
discussion on understanding the missing links, examining this particular-
ly in today’s context, with heightened violence against minorities and the 
impact that this is having on minority wellbeing. We conclude with a set of 
recommendations. 
Who are India’s Minorities?
To answer that question, one must follow the developing policy agenda for 
minorities. 
The term ‘minorities’ occurs only occasionally in the Constitution and 
is not defined: in Articles 29 and 30, which are grouped as the educational 
and cultural rights of ‘linguistic, religious and cultural minorities’ and are 
included under part IV of the Constitution as fundamental rights; and Arti-
cle 350B, which relates specifically to linguistic minorities. These provisions 
guarantee certain rights to minorities. 
• Article 29 protects the interests of minorities, defined as any section of 
citizens having a distinct language, script or culture of its own, and their 
right to conserve the same. It also mandates that there should be no 
discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, or language in ad-
missions to schools maintained by the state. 
• Article 30 mandates that (i) all minorities, whether based on religion or 
language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational 
institutions of their choice. It also mandates that (ii) there shall be no 
discrimination by the state in granting aid to educational institutions 
on the grounds that it is under the management of a minority, whether 
based on religion or language. 
• Article 350B provides for the appointment of a special officer for linguis-
tic minorities by the president. 
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In 1992, faced with demands to better provide for minorities, and in the 
context of the UN Minority Declaration (December 1992), which required 
member states to take active measures to protect and promote the rights of 
minorities, the Government of India enacted the National Commission for 
Minorities Act (1992) and set up the National Commission for Minorities. 
In 1993, as part of the measures, the government conferred minority status 
to Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists and Zoroastrians/Parsis – all reli-
gious minorities. This was applicable at the national level. Jains were added 
to the list in 2014. The Supreme Court of India, in TMA Pai Foundation & 
Ors. v State of Karnataka & Ors. (2002), held that ‘minority’, particularly 
in relation to Article 30 of the Constitution, is determinable at the state lev-
el, not nationally. 
This lack of clear definition has led to multiple interpretations and has 
created confusion. Not all minority religious groups are officially recognised 
as such. Jewish people, numbering about 4,000 in all nationally, have mi-
nority status at the state level in Maharashtra, but are not nationally rec-
ognised as minorities.3 On the other hand, a Public Interest Litigation in the 
Supreme Court is seeking recognition of Hindus as a religious minority in 
eight states of India where they are in the numerical minority.4 This matter 
has been referred by the court to the National Commission for Minorities 
(NCM) for examination. Separately, The NCM chairman has been reported 
in the press as having favoured Kashmiri Pandits, a religious minority in 
Jammu & Kashmir, by giving them minority status.5 
At the same time, groups that are traditionally sects of Hindu religion 
have also been demanding and obtaining separate minority status. Jains 
gained recognition as a separate minority group at the national level in 
2014. Recently, Lingayats in Karnataka state have been making similar 
3. ‘For India’s Jewish Community, Wait for Minority Status Continues’. The Wire. 28 July 2017
 https://thewire.in/162251/for-jewish-community-in-india-wait-for-minority-status-continues/
4. ‘SC declines plea to declare Hindus as minority in eight states’. Time of India. 10 November  
2017 https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/sc-declines-plea-to-declare-hindus-as- 
minority-in-eight-states/articleshow/61589757.cms
5. ‘Kashmiri Pandits should get Minority community Status, says NCM Chairman, Goirul 
Hasan Rizvi.’ First Post. 13 June 2017. http://www.firstpost.com/india/kashmiri-pandits- 
should-get-minority-community-status-says-ncm-chairman-gairul-hasan-rizvi- 
3594687.html 
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demands, claiming that if Buddhists, Sikhs and Jains can be recognised as 
separate communities, Lingayats should be too.6 
Notably, India’s Constitution also does not define the term Hindu, the 
majority religious grouping, but it does allude to a definition. Article 25 on 
freedom of conscience et al (Explanation II, sub clause (b) of clause (2) re-
gards throwing open Hindu religious institutions to all classes and sections 
of Hindus7) deems that ‘reference to Hindus shall be construed as including 
a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jain or Buddhist religion...’.8 The 
Constitution also defines to whom ‘Hindu Law’ applies. For example, the 
Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, in Section 2, stipulates that the act applies to:
(a) any person who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms and develop-
ments, including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat or a follower of the Brahmo, 
Prarthana or Arya Samaj;
(b) any person who is a Buddhist, Jain or Sikh by religion; and
(c) any other person domiciled in the territories to which this act extends 
who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion.9  
There are other groups in India which are not recognised as minorities 
under Indian law, but qualify as such based on international jurisprudence, 
as defined by both the UN Minorities Declaration (1992) and the UN In-
digenous Peoples Declaration (2007). These are the groups known under 
Indian law as Scheduled Castes (also known as Dalits, meaning ‘the broken 
6.   ‘30 seers demand minority religion status for Lingayat community’. The Hindu, 11 August 
2017. www.thehindu.com/news/national/karnataka/30-seers-demand-minority-reli-
gion-status-for-lingayat-community/article19467734.ece
7. This Constitutional provision is remarkable, as it connotes that even as a multi-faith state, 
India seems to be concerned about the social welfare of only one religion (Hinduism) and its 
religious institutions. 
8. This provision, in a similar way to other ‘Hindu law’, including the Hindu Succession Act 
(1956), Hindu Marriage Act (1955), Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act (1956), and 
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act (1956), by its grouping of Buddhism, Sikhism and 
Jainism with Hinduism is viewed as forcing legal assimilation of these minority religions into 
Hinduism, and thus as discriminatory.
9. This last also implies that Hindu is the residual category – anyone not Muslim, Christian, 
Parsi or Jew, is Hindu.    
10. These categories find mention in the Constitution in Article 15, providing for reservation in 
educational institutions for socially and educationally backward classes; Article 16, providing 
for reservation in government jobs for any backward class not adequately represented and for 
weaker sections (Article 46, mandating the promotion of educational and economic interests, 
and protection from social injustice and exploitation).
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Muslim Christian Sikh Buddhist Jain Zoara-
strian
Population 172,245,158 27,819,588 20,833,116 8,442,972 4,451,753
% of 
all-India
14.23 2.30 1.72 0.70 0.37 n/a
Table 1. India’s religious minorities
Source: 2011 Census.
11. ‘Why governments are afraid of statistical data’. Live Mint. Himanshu. 22 July 2015. 
https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/LqJvVX3Q94H3b6GapkvleI/Why-govern-
ments-are-afraid-of-statistical-data.html 
people’); Scheduled Tribes (Adivasis, the ‘original inhabitants’) and Back-
ward Classes.10 Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes 
are not minorities within the meaning of Articles 29 or 30.
The focus of our report is religious minorities, which together make up 
over 19% of India’s population (2011 census). These, officially recognised 
nationally, are Muslims, Christians, Buddhist, Sikhs, Parsis and Jains. We 
take a special interest in intersectionality, whereby some religious minori-
ties are also linguistic minorities, ethnic minorities, or from indigenous or 
Dalit communities. Women and girls among these minorities bear a large 
burden of the disadvantages experienced on the whole (see Table 1). We 
have a special interest in the condition of these minorities within religious 
minorities – caste and gender, particularly. 
How do minorities perform on 
socio-economic rights? 
While assessing how socio-economic rights have been provided, we will first 
look at outcomes for religious minorities in terms of key indicators of de-
velopment and/or lack thereof: poverty, employment, health and nutrition, 
and education, among others. This will help us understand how equality 
works for minorities at the impact level. 
The Data Challenge 
The first barrier to this pursuit is statistical – standardised data, disag-
gregated by religious group for the range of socio-economic indicators, 
is not available in India. The government usually does not share census 
data (headcount) for religion in a transparent manner.11 For example, the 
India 
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2011 data on religion was released only in late 2015, and did not include 
cross-tabulated data correlating religion and socio-economic indicators.12   
In the place of standardised disaggregated data, we have survey re-
ports, mostly on outcome indicators. These are the National Sample Survey 
Organisation (NSSO) 61st round consumer expenditure data (2004–05); 
the NSSO 68th round data (2011–12) examining employment and unem-
ployment; and the National Family Health Survey (NFHS).  These datasets 
will be the basis of much of our discussions and our argument. We also use 
socio-economic surveys of Minority Concentrated Districts (MCDs) by the 
Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR) (2008). Besides these, 
some states have commissioned specific minority-focused studies, a good 
example being the survey report on the socio-economic status of Muslims 
in Bihar, commissioned by the Bihar Minorities Commission (2002). We 
make use of studies such as these, where helpful.  
Data on efforts by the government varies. There is some public policy 
data, mostly at an all–India level, documenting efforts mostly by the na-
tional government, such as the Kundu Committee report (Government of 
India 2014), although the Sachar Committee report (Government of India 
2006) provided many state-level breakdowns too, as well as case studies 
and research reports. Most of these reports, as well as the data they use, are 
also not up to date. Data on efforts at providing for minorities, especially 
policies and programmes, and financials – budget allocation, releases and 
spending – are fragmented and out of date. These are very scarce at state 
level, where much of the welfare provisioning takes place. This was a clear 
challenge for this report.  
Poverty
Poverty indices for different religious groups (what percentage of the popu-
lation of the group lives below the official poverty line) show variations for 
rural and urban areas. 
Table 2 shows that, overall, poverty incidence was 28.29 in rural ar-
eas and 25.62 in urban. Poverty incidence among specific religious groups 
shows much variation. In rural areas, it was highest amongst Buddhists. It 
was also high among Zoroastrians and Muslims. In urban areas, it was the 
12.  ‘The dumbing down of data’. Kumar, Vikas. The Hoot. 16 September 2015. http://www.
thehoot.org/research/media-monitoring/the-dumbing-down-of-data-8917
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13. According to the Sachar Committee report, poverty among Muslims in 2004–05 stood at 
31%, just under that for SCs/STs (at 35%). This was more pronounced in urban areas, where 
nearly half of all Muslims (44%) counted amongst the poorest, compared to the national 
average of 29%. In rural areas too, Muslims lagged behind the national average poverty ratio 
– 33%, against 28% overall. The significantly high urban poverty among Muslims is reported 
also by the India Human Development Report (HDR), using NSS 2007–08 data, at 23%, 
compared to 13% for Hindus as a whole. (Government of India 2011: 4).  
14. Other indicators of poverty show similar trends. Mean per capita consumption expenditure 
(MPCE), another measure of economic well-being, was low for Muslims and Buddhists. 
Buddhists had the lowest MPCE in rural areas at Rs 506.26 (against the national average of 
Rs 558.71) with Muslims not far above; in urban areas, Muslims did significantly worse than 
other groups at Rs 776.50 (against the national average of Rs 1,052.36) (Thorat 2013: 19).
Religious groups Rural Urban
Buddhist 40.59 28.62
Christian 16.21 12.47
Hindu 28.90 23.35
Jain 2.59 2.57
Muslim 29.26 41.38
Other 36.02 22.91
Sikh 5.00 6.08
Zoroastrian 35.42 10.74
All groups 28.29 25.62
Table 2. Poverty incidences across religious communities
Source: Thorat (2013: 16) based on NSSO Consumer Expenditure (2004-05).
highest among Muslims by a wide margin, compared to the next group – 
Buddhists. Overall, Hindus, the dominant group in the country, do much 
better than many of the minorities on poverty incidences.13  
Another way to look at the poverty trend is to see the share of religion 
in the overall population of poor people (Table 3). All minority groups did 
poorly on this count, being in higher number among the poor than their 
population would warrant. However, the figure that stands out is the dis-
proportionately high share of Muslims among the poor in urban areas. This 
marginalisation of Muslims overall, and specifically in urban areas, is a run-
ning theme in our study of poverty trends in the country.14  
India 
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Religious 
groups
Rural Urban
 Population (2001 
Census)                  
    The Poor 
(NSSO, 2004-05)
      Population 
(2001 census)       
     The Poor 
(NSSO, 2004-05)
Buddhist 0.77 0.89 0.66 1.07
Christian 1.14 2.81 2.14 2.86
Hindu 85.52 79.99 82.33 75.60
Jain 0.01 1.10 0.14 1.12
Muslim 11.78 12.93 11.96 17.26
Other 0.43 0.09 0.81 0.22
Sikh 0.34 2.12 1.90 1.79
Zoroastrian 0.01 0.07 NA NA
Table 3. Share of the poor (in all-India poor)
Source: Thorat (2013: 16) .
Research can tell us that much of the problem stems from poor access 
for minorities such as Muslims and Buddhists to productive livelihood op-
portunities. The relative deprivation of Muslims and Buddhists was evident 
in their ownership of assets as well – the access index of asset ownership 
across social groups was the lowest for SCs and across religious communi-
ties for Muslims in 2002–03 (Government of India 2011: 6) 
The picture that emerges is of minority groups doing worse than the 
majority community, as well as vast differences between minority groups 
as well, with Muslims and (neo) Buddhists (officially categorised mostly as 
SCs) worse off than others. The Sachar Committee, tasked with examin-
ing deprivation among the country’s Muslims, found that Muslims in Uttar 
Pradesh, Bihar, Assam and West Bengal constituted the poorest sections 
of India’s population, along with SCs and STs. These were also the states 
where the most Muslims lived. Their report also found that poverty among 
Muslims in 2004-05 stood at 31%, just under that of SCs/STs (at 35%). 
This was more pronounced in urban areas, where nearly half of all Mus-
lims (44%) were counted amongst the poorest, compared to the national 
average poverty ratio of 29%, meaning the percentage of the national urban 
population that are below the poverty line. Muslims also lagged behind the 
national average poverty ratio in rural areas: 33% of Muslims in rural areas 
were below poverty line compared to only 28 % of the national population 
in rural areas. Other reports like the India Human Development Report 
show similar trends (Government of India 2011: 4): the India-HDR, using 
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Table 4. Poverty levels of Dalits among religious groups
Source: Deshpande (2008: 28, 29), based on NSSO (2004-05).
NSS 2007-08 data, found significantly high urban poverty among Muslims 
– 23%, compared to 13% for Hindus. 
Notably, it is Dalits who make up the bulk of the poor within each reli-
gious group. Table 4 confirms that poverty trends for religious groups as a 
whole are reflected in poverty trends for the Dalits among them. This ap-
plies as much to Muslims and Christians as it does to Hindus, Sikhs and 
Buddhists. Even so, communities within Muslim and Christian religious 
groups with origins similar to Hindu Dalits – the poorest of the poor – are 
not categorised as Scheduled Caste: Article 341 (3) of the Constitution pre-
vents non-Hindus (interpreted in Indian jurisprudence as those following 
‘non-indigenous’ faiths – Islam, Christianity, Judaism) from being con-
ferred Scheduled Caste status, thus depriving them of a range of affirma-
tive action policies and priority coverage under anti-poverty schemes. This 
failure of the state is one of the clearest examples of discrimination in law 
against sections of religious minorities.
Employment 
The workforce participation rate (WPR) measures the population that 
are participating in the national workforce across the different categories. 
Among the major religious groups, WPR in 2004–05 (based on Employ-
ment/Unemployment Survey, NSSO 61st round, 2004-05) was the highest 
among Zoroastrians in urban areas and among Buddhists in rural areas. 
The WPR of Hindus, Christians and Sikhs was comparable, ranging from 
34 to 37% in urban areas, but was lower for Muslims, at close to 32% in 
both urban and rural areas (Thorat 2013: 24). As Arjun Sengupta’s report 
on workers in the unorganised sector shows, most Muslims in the workforce 
are in the unorganised sector (Government of India 2007a). Organised 
sector participation, again based on NSSO 61st round survey (both in the 
Rural Urban
Buddhists 45.9 28.9
Christians 30.1 32.3
Hindus 37.7 40.9
Muslims 39.6 46.8
Sikhs 7.6 24.8
All Dalits 36.8 39.8
India 
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public and private sectors) was lowest for Muslims, out of all religious 
groups. 
In the public sector, according to data collected by the Sachar Committee 
(Government of India 2006), Muslims represent only 4.9% of all employees 
(in central and state governments). Their representation in state public sec-
tor undertakings (PSU) was 10.8%, only slightly better than in central PSUs 
– 3.3% (Government of India 2006: 165). Overall public sector employment 
data showed better representation of Muslims at the lower rungs than at 
higher managerial levels; in university jobs, especially non- teaching; and in 
clerical positions at the postal department and the railways. 
Health and Nutrition
We turn now to look at the health and nutritional status of marginalised 
sections, particularly children and women, across religious groups. When it 
comes to children’s health, we take two measures as evidence – nutritional 
status and level of immunisation. The health of pregnant women is mea-
sured by the place of delivery. Data confirms that while it is true that overall 
health indicators (outcome – IMR, U5MR, MMR) are improving, and that 
over time these indicators for marginalised groups like SCs/STs and Mus-
lims are converging with the national average (Government of India 2011: 
8); process indicators such as the immunisation rate, institutional deliv-
eries and contraception prevalence rates are less robust, especially when 
it comes to excluded groups.  When it comes to input indictors (public in-
vestment in health, as well as availability of health facilities and human re-
sources, access to sanitation, safe drinking water and the like), according to 
NHFS III data (2005-06), Muslims and other marginalised groups face the 
most problems. STs and Muslims had the highest total fertility rate (TFR); 
only one-third of Muslim and SC women had institutional deliveries; only 
around 50% of Muslim, SC and ST women received three or more antenatal 
care (ANC) visits (Government of India 2011: 10). 
Table 5 provides a snapshot of child immunisation status across religious 
groups.  It is clear that access for Muslims to essential services that poten-
tially impact health well-being is limited, with particularly poor rates for 
Bacillus Calmette–Guérin (BCG), which targets tuberculosis, and the com-
bined diphtheria, pertussis (whooping cough), and tetanus vaccine (DPT).
Similarly, the percent distribution of live births by place of delivery and 
percentage delivered in a health facility (Table 6) is a good measure of ac-
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cess (and awareness) among communities to health facilities and good 
health practices. Here too, the statistics were bad for Muslims, with only 
33% live births in a health facility as compared to 39% for Hindus and much 
higher figures for other groups.  (NFHS III, 2005-06, data)
Finally, malnutrition is an indicator of chronic hunger, which is criti-
cally linked to people’s health status. As we know, India fares badly on this 
count. The incidences of children suffering from anaemia and stunting, and 
female malnutrition were above the national average among Muslims, par-
ticularly in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and other states with a high concentra-
tion of Muslims. While female malnutrition has been reducing over time at 
the national level, it is increasing for Muslims (data between 1998–99 and 
2005–06) (Government of India 2011: 8). Table 8 shows the status of child 
malnutrition across religious groups, providing data on the percentage of 
children under five years old classified as malnourished according to two 
anthropometric indices of nutritional status: height-for-age and weight-for-
age. Minority groups, particularly Muslims and Buddhists, do particularly 
poorly across the two measures.
Education
Poverty and education have a well-established correlation. To find out 
the relative performance of religious groups on this count we take three 
measures – literacy rate, school attendance and education level. As is clear 
(Table 8, based on 2001 census), there were wide variations across reli-
gious groups on these counts. Jains and Christians had the highest literacy 
rates, much higher than Hindus as a whole. Again, Muslims ended up at 
the bottom.
The variances in school attendance were similar (Table 9) with just over 
42% Muslim boys and 37.52% Muslim girls between 6 and 14 years old at-
tending school, according to the NSSO survey (2004–05). Jains and Chris-
tians were in the lead here too, ahead of the majority Hindus.
According to Census 2001, Muslims were the least literate among all 
religious communities. An NSSO survey (2007-08) further confirmed that 
a high proportion of Muslims are illiterate. This proportion was on par 
with that of SCs/STs and higher than that of OBCs. Muslim women were 
amongst the most illiterate sections of society (47.3% illiterate), compara-
ble to SC/ST women (53.2%). A substantial proportion of Muslims — 18% 
male and 15.4% female — had attained only primary education. Meanwhile 
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Public 
sector 
NGO Private 
Own 
home 
Parents Other 
In a health 
facility 
Hindus 18.4 0.5 20.3 50.9 9.3 0.4 39.1
Muslims 15.4 0.3 17.3 56.7 9.6 0.5 33.0
Christians 23.6 0.9 28.9 42.0 3.8 0.7 53.4
Sikhs 15.1 1.2 42.0 32.3 9.2 0.1 58.3
Buddhists 37.2 0.2 21.3 23.4 17.2 0.6 58.8
Jains 30.9 2.6 59.6 4.1 2.8 0 93.1
Table 6. Place of delivery
Table 7. Child nutrition levels across religions
Table 8. Literacy rates
Source: Thorat (2013: 33), based on NFHS –III. 
Source: Thorat, (2013: 3–4), based on Census of India 2001
Source: Thorat, (2013: 41), based on NFHS –III (2005-06). 
Religious group    Height-for-age-status Weight-for-age-status
Chronically 
malnourished
Severely 
malnourished
Chronically 
malnourished
Severely 
malnourished
Hindus 23.4 48.0 16.1 43.2
Muslims 26.2 50.3 15.6 41.8
Christians 17.9 39.0 8.7 29.7
Sikhs 13.4 29.8 7.8 22.0
Buddhists 23.2 56.1 14.7 39.2
Jains 5.9 31.2 6.6 24.0
Others 34.0 58.5 35.4 62.7
Religious groups    Person       Male    Female
Hindus 54.92 64.22 44.92
Muslims 48.05 54.99 40.63
Christians 69.45 72.76 66.17
Sikhs 60.56 65.03 55.56
Buddhists 62.16 71.05 52.83
Jains 84.09 86.67 81.35
Others 38.57 49.78 27.27
All Religions 54.51 63.24 45.15
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at the higher levels — upper primary and above — the proportion of Muslim 
children was significantly lower than children from other groups, including 
SCs. Most seriously, the incidence of ‘out-of-school’ children was the high-
est among Muslims, out of all social groups (Fazal 2013a: 6). 
The main concern with regard to education for Muslims remains low 
retention rates, which lead to dropouts and poor transition as children 
progress through the school system. A government fact-finding report, us-
ing data from 2011–12, found that Muslim children constituted 16.6% of 
the total national enrolment in Grade I, but that this declined to 8.4% at 
Grade VIII (Government of India 2013: 11), leading the report to conclude, 
‘...transition to upper primary stage is one of the major bottlenecks in the 
education of Muslim children.’ (ibid: 14). Table 11 confirms this. The other 
concern is girls’ education, with only a minuscule proportion of Muslims 
girls having completed secondary and graduate education (ibid: 5).
The data shows a varied picture of education among India’s religious 
minorities. While some are doing better than the national average, Muslims 
especially are lagging behind on almost all fronts. Apart from low literacy 
and access to higher education, only 0.44% have technical or non-techni-
cal diplomas, only 4.44% were educated to the higher secondary level and 
6.33% to the matriculation level. The highest number of literate people in 
the Muslim community are educated to the primary level (16.08%), fol-
lowed by 14.32% at below primary level and 9.73% at the middle school 
level (Times of India, 2016). These numbers are comparable to educational 
figures for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. 
Estimates by the United Nations suggest that 17.8 million children — 
including 34% of children with disabilities — do not attend school. Dalit, 
Adivasi and Muslim children, and children from female-headed households 
are particularly vulnerable to educational exclusion (United Nations 2017). 
In 2008, the UN Committee on Economic Social Cultural Rights (CESCR) 
expressed concern that the wide disparity in enrolment and drop-out rates 
in primary schools continued to persist, particularly affecting girls and chil-
dren from Muslim, SC and ST communities. CESCR urged India to take 
further initiatives to eliminate child marriage and child labour, especially 
among school-aged children, and to target disadvantaged and marginalized 
groups in particular (ibid). 
According to the HDR (Government of India 2011), number of out-of-
school children is related to poverty. The report found that financial con-
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Religious group Male Female
Jain 54.68 57.20
Christian  52.22 47.14
Buddhist 49.82 46.43
Sikh 47.83 44.34
Hindu 46.76 39.74
Other 43.10 39.30
Muslim 42.27 37.52
Zoroastrian 41.55 34.31
Table 9. School attendance (6–14 years old)
Table 10. : Education levels (Males, 7 years old and above)
Table 11. : Education levels (Males, 7 years old and above)
Source: Thorat, (2013: 7–8) based on NSSO, 61st round, 2004–05.
Source: Thorat, (2013: 13), based on NSSO (2004-05).
Source: The Hindu (2016), based on Census 2011.
Illiterate 
Literate 
without 
formal 
edu. 
Literate 
but 
below 
primary  
Primary Middle 
Secondary 
and above 
Graduate 
&above  
Hindus 26.66 36.75 18.91 9.23 4.81 0.52 3.12
Muslims 30.12 43.19 16.34 6.13 2.49 0.24 1.49
Christians 15.26 36.26 25.08 11.85 5.72 2.28 3.54
Sikhs 27.10 35.43 14.48 13.54 6.19 0.74 2.51
Jains 11.63 25.72 20.58 24.07 8.53 0.34 9.13
Buddhists 16.60 38.07 24.19 11.73 6.33 0.25 2.82
Zoroastrians 17.28 27.57 0 27.57 0 0 27.57
Illiterate Graduates 
Hindus 36.4 5.98
Muslims 42.72 2.75
Christians 25.66 8.84
Sikhs 32.49 6.39
Jains 14.00 25.65
Buddhists 28.17 6.17
Parsis – –
National – 8.15
The situation seems to have endured (Table 11).
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straints are the main barrier to continuation of education, forcing children 
into child labour. In 2007-8 this was higher among Muslims (3%) than the 
national average (2.4%). Involvement of Muslims in traditional occupations 
(weaving carpets and working with glass, locks and brassware, among other 
things), which attract child labour due to the old technology they use, has 
been a factor here. Overall, the literacy problem among Muslims is the worst 
in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal (Government of India 2011: 229).
Why is the Outcome for Minorities Poor – 
Especially for Muslims? 
Muslims, the largest minority in India, who make up 14.2 % of India’s 1.25 
billion population (2011 census), come out pretty much at the bottom of 
most socio-economic indices, even a decade after the high-level government 
probe (Prime Minister’s High Level Committee on Social, Economic and 
Educational status of Muslim Community in India, known popularly as the 
Sachar committee – Government of India, 2006) into their historical disad-
vantages led to a clutch of policy actions. The condition seems to endure.15   
The Sachar report, exploring the situation of Muslims, concluded that 
structural factors — such as economic circumstances of households, educa-
tional status of parents, and local levels of development — play a major role 
in inhibiting parents’ willingness to educate their children (Government of 
India 2006: 58). Regarding poor representation in public sector employ-
ment, the Sachar report noted the general perception among Muslims that 
discrimination against them — in procedures (such as unhelpful eligibility 
criteria), practices (unrepresentative selection boards), and a general sense 
of discrimination in selection processes — is a result of an absence of Mus-
lims in positions of authority to raise their voice for them. This, the report 
noted, hints at a lack of any concerted focus by governments for Muslim 
development, as well as prejudice against them, leading to the denial of 
Muslims’ rightful share of services, even in grade IV positions. These are 
positions where high qualifications are not required (ibid: 20-21). 
Access for Muslims to public services and development programmes, 
especially the many beneficiary-oriented schemes, and those that offer 
15. ‘Untouched by economic growth: One in 4 beggars in India a Muslim, reveals census’, Zia 
Haq. 30 July 2016. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/untouched-by-econom-
ic-growth-destitution-illiteracy-hurt-india-s-muslims/story-Lz5HhyifFkPxZ4pu5gT85N.
html
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Group 
Buddhist The poverty level in this community is the highest among the four notified mi-
nority communities (NMCs) (30%). Almost 72% of Buddhists do not possess 
any operational landholdings. There is large migration to urban areas in the 
casual labour market. The rate of urbanisation among the community is com-
paratively high (38%). Further, the work participation rate is highest among 
Buddhist women (41%). Since most of them are entering into the casual labour 
market, their situation remains vulnerable. The educational level of this com-
munity is the poorest. Only 6% of Buddhists are graduates. Poor educational 
levels prevent them from accessing regular employment.
87% of the 8.4 million Buddhists in India are converts — mostly they are Dalits. 
These converts have better literacy rates than their Hindu Dalit counterparts. 
Furthermore, female literacy among Buddhists, at 74.04%, is higher than the 
national average of female literacy 64.63%.16
Christian Christians are the largest NMC other than Muslims. 33.1% of the total Christian 
population is made up of general population (upper caste), 32.8% Scheduled 
Tribes, and 25.5% people from Other Backward Classes. Only 8.3% of Chris-
tians are from Scheduled Caste groups. Poverty level among Christians is rel-
atively low (11%), and landless population is 55%, which is low compared to 
other communities. 
The rate of urbanisation among Christians is 34%. Christian literacy and educa-
tional levels are relatively higher than in other communities (except for Parsis). 
The male-female gap in literacy is also lower. This enables them to enter into 
regular employment in higher proportions. Even the rate of self-employment 
among Christians is high. The rate of casual employment among Christians is 
23%, which is lower than the national average but higher than that of Sikhs.
Sikh Sikhs record a relatively low poverty level (5%). The community is constituted by 
46.4% general population, 31.1% people from Scheduled Castes, and 21.8% 
people from Other Backward Classes. It has the largest proportion of self-em-
ployed workers (63.65%).
The educational level among Sikh women is higher than among the men. Nearly 
16% of Sikh women are graduates, which is the highest among all the com-
munities.
Parsi Parsi community is predominantly urban-based, with only a very small proportion 
residing in rural areas. The community has achieved universal literacy and higher 
education is also pursued extensively by both men and women. Work participa-
tion rates are also generally higher in urban areas, not only for men but for Parsi 
women too (33% for Parsis overall). Given the higher educational qualifications, 
it is to be expected that the urban regular workforce among the community is the 
highest (59%) of all the four NMCs. 
16. ‘Conversion To Buddhism Has Brought Literacy, Gender Equality And Well-Being To Dalits’, 
1 July 2017. http://archive.indiaspend.com/cover-story/conversion-to-buddhism-has-
brought-literacy-gender-equality-and-well-being-to-dalits-18224.
Source:  Rustago et al (2008).
Box 1: Religious groups and socio-economic deprivation
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direct and sizeable benefits to the poor, was reported as being poor (ibid: 
178). These include housing, livelihood and employment programmes, in 
rural as well as urban areas; health and nutrition schemes; social security 
schemes, such as pensions; maternity and other benefits etc. The case of 
access to civic amenities and infrastructure is similar. Muslims are being 
increasingly ghettoised and forced into slums, where the provision of ser-
vices is extremely poor — missing health centres, Anganwadis, and schools; 
ill-kept roads; lack of piped water and sanitation; poor electricity coverage; 
poor availability of banks for credit provision. Staff shortages in these plac-
es, or at least staff absence, combined with negative attitudes among staff 
posted there, result in the overall poor working of those services for the 
inhabitants of the slums. There is also little effort to track and measure the 
quality of services, resulting in poor outcomes. 
The perception among Muslims about poor access and uptake is that 
poor awareness about these programmes is to blame, as well as widespread 
discrimination in the provision of services; such as when Muslims are 
hindered, rather than facilitated, in getting their caste certificates to avail 
scheme benefits (Government of India 2006: 23-24). People also attributed 
the poor reach of the services for Muslims to the low participation of Mus-
lims in the political process, especially at the local level, in panchayats and 
block samitis (ibid: 188). 
Discrimination emerges in many of these accounts as the principal 
explanatory factor.    According to Amitabh Kundu, an academic who has 
studied minority development efforts in India closely, these failures point to 
discrimination. Another minority rights observer, Rowena Robinson, notes, 
‘these facts regarding education, health, physical and financial infrastruc-
ture and health facilities indicate a distinct and disturbing bias in public 
service provisioning in Muslim concentration areas’ (Robinson 2008).
This conclusion is also confirmed by poll data. A Gallup survey in 2010-
201117  revealed that a third (32%) of the country’s Muslims were ‘suffer-
ing’, compared to 23% of Hindus and 15% of the rest of the religious sects18 
17. Based on nationally representative studies (relying on face to face interviews) conducted in 
2010 and 2011 with a total of 9,518 Indians, including 1,197 Muslim Indians.
18. Gallup classifies respondents as ‘thriving’, ‘struggling’, or ‘suffering’ according to how they 
rate their current and future lives on a ladder scale with steps numbered from 0 to 10, based 
on the Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving Scale. See: https://news.gallup.com/poll/157079/
muslims-india-confident-democracy-despite-economic-educational-challenges.aspx
149
(Gallup, 2012). The survey revealed that this was down to their poor eco-
nomic and educational conditions. Muslims were found to be less likely 
(51%) than Hindus (63%) and others (66%) to be satisfied with their stan-
dard of living. It is revealing that although Muslims were as likely as other 
groups to show confidence in tenets of democracy, freedoms and equality, 
they expressed less confidence in some of the key national institutions, par-
ticularly, the government (only 49% of Muslims said they were confident, to 
60% of Hindus) and — notably — the judiciary (68%, to 75% for Hindus and 
91% the rest), validating the perceived discrimination theory. 
The Sachar report used the framework of identity, security and equity, 
to explain the multidimensional nature of Muslim exclusion. In essence, it 
showed that problems faced by Muslims related to a combination of identi-
ty, security and equity related concerns — and that these three overlap and 
feed into each other in myriad ways, to create the lived experiences of ex-
clusion faced by Muslim communities (Government of India 2006: 11). To 
take an example, the Muslim identity of Muslim youth makes it increasingly 
difficult for them to find a room to rent in mixed habitation settlements or 
to land a job in a private company. Frequent and periodic targeted violence 
against Muslims and discriminatory actions by the police contribute to poor 
security, which places the youth, in this case, in a constant state of siege, 
resulting in poor mobility and a lack of ability to access education opportu-
nities, especially by girls (ibid: 14). Exclusion, of course, most directly im-
pacts what are called equity concerns. In the case of education, for example, 
school infrastructure is poor in Muslim concentred areas, and the quality of 
education is poor too, including insensitive text books, low perceived ben-
efits from education, and poverty preventing children from fully utilising 
available opportunities (ibid: 15).
Providing for Minorities: 
Question of Commitment
In the following section, we explore India’s commitment to providing for its 
minorities. This is gleaned from provisions in the Constitution, case laws 
and judgements, and ratification of international treaties. First, we look at 
overall equality and anti-discrimination provisions in the Constitution, and 
how courts have interpreted them. This is followed by specific commitments 
on individual thematic areas.  
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Constitutional Guarantees 
Socio-economic rights in the Indian Constitution are mostly incorporated 
as directive principles of state policy. These are not directly enforceable, 
unlike civil and political rights, but are intended merely to serve as guid-
ance for government policy.  However, over time the Indian Supreme Court 
has incrementally made many of these directive principles justiciable by 
reading them into the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of 
the Constitution. Specifically, it has helped to protect certain economic and 
social rights, including the right to adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter, 
the right to medical facilities, the right to earn a livelihood, and environ-
mental rights. 
There is an impressive array of socio-economic rights written into law in 
India. These include:
- The National Food Security Act, 2013, which provides subsidised food 
grains to almost two thirds of India’s 1.2 billion population. The act 
includes flagship programmes such as the Public Distribution System 
(PDS), for provision of subsidised food grain to the poor; the Mid-Day 
Meal programme (MDM), for free school meals; Integrated Child De-
velopment Services (ICDS), a package of interventions for health and 
nutrition support to mothers and infants; and pensions programmes for 
the elderly and infirm. Each one of these programmes serves the largest 
numbers of beneficiaries in its category, anywhere in the world;
- The Right to Education Act, 2009, which guarantees free and compulso-
ry education for children between 6 and 14 years old;
- The Unorganised Workers’ Social Security Act, 2008, which provides for 
the social security and welfare of unorganised workers (meaning home-
based workers, self-employed workers or daily-wage workers);
- The Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007;
- The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005, a labour law and 
social security measure that aims to guarantee the ‘right to work’. It aims 
to enhance livelihood security in rural areas by providing at least 100 
days of wage employment in a financial year to every household whose 
adult members volunteer to do unskilled manual work;
- The Child and Adolescent Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act of 
1986 (2016), which prohibits the employment of a child (below 14 years) 
in any employment, including as domestic help, and of adolescents (be-
low 18 years) in hazardous occupations and processes;
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- The Persons with Disability (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights 
and Full Participation) Act, 1995; and 
- The Minimum Wages Act 1948, which sets the minimum wages that 
must be paid to skilled and unskilled labourers.
These laws are expected to apply universally to all citizens, including 
minorities, although there may be specific eligibility qualifications under 
specific laws. Since data on the uptake of these laws and their impact is not 
disaggregated by religion, however, it is difficult to know how these laws 
have worked in practice for minorities. Most such laws and related pro-
grammes do report uptake and impact by caste category and gender, but 
none by religious affiliation.
The Indian Constitution also has strong provisions against discrimina-
tion and to eliminate inequality. These include provisions for equality (Arti-
cle 14, and Article 16 (1) [2]) and non-discrimination (Article 15[1] [2]). The 
Constitution also makes it the state’s duty to eliminate inequalities (Article 
38 [2]) and promote the educational and economic interests of weaker sec-
tions (Article 46). More concretely, the law authorises the state to make spe-
cial provisions for the economic advancement of socially and educationally 
backward classes (Article 15 [4]) and to make reservations in appointments 
for backward sections (Article 16 [4]). 
International Obligations 
India has adopted the United Nations Minority Declaration, 1992. This in-
cludes, on the specific subject of socio-economic rights, the following pro-
visions: 
“Persons belonging to minorities may exercise their rights, includ-
ing those set forth in the present Declaration, individually as well 
as in community with other members of their group, without any 
discrimination” – Article 3(1);
“No disadvantage shall result for any person belonging to a minori-
ty….” – Article 3(2); and
“States should consider appropriate measures so that persons be-
longing to minorities may participate fully in the economic progress 
and development in their country” – Article 4(5).
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Additionally, India is signatory to most international human rights trea-
ties (Box 2). Equality and non-discrimination provisions are at the core of 
each of these international instruments.
Even so, equality provisions in the Constitution as well as India’s hav-
ing ratified international treaties have failed to prevent the socio-economic 
marginalisation of sections of minorities. As we saw in the catalogue of out-
come indicators, not all groups fare equally. Muslims in particular do very 
poorly. Rural Buddhists and sections of Sikhs (both predominantly SCs), 
Christians (many STs), and Muslims, particularly urban based, form the 
bulk of these marginalised minority groups. 
India’s Lack of Non-discrimination Law
Part of the problem lies in how Constitutional guarantees have been oper-
ationalised into domestic law. The subject of non-discrimination is a good 
example of the gap between Constitutional guarantees and extant law, es-
pecially as it impacts minorities and other vulnerable groups. Articles 15 
(1) and 16 (2) promise non-discrimination in employment, but this has not 
resulted in legislative action; furthermore, the guarantee is not extended to 
private and non-state spheres. Atrocities against SCs and STs are the ex-
ception.19  Article 17 prohibits ‘untouchability’. Article 46 enjoins upon the 
state to protect SCs and STs (and other vulnerable sections of society) from 
social injustice and exploitation. The Protection of Civil Rights Act 1955, 
operationalises the untouchability prohibition into law, creating offences. 
The Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 
1989, the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) 
Rules 1995, and the Act’s amendment in 2015 take this forward, and are 
the bulwark of the anti-discrimination regime, aimed at safeguarding the 
rights of SCs and STs. Unfortunately, they do not cover religious minorities, 
particularly Muslims and Christians, as we will see below.   
The UN Commission on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 
in a recent hearing on India, was deeply concerned that, despite the Con-
stitutional guarantee of non-discrimination as well as the criminal law 
provisions punishing acts of discrimination, ‘widespread and, often, social-
ly accepted discrimination, harassment and/or violence persisted against 
members of certain disadvantaged and marginalized groups, including 
women, scheduled castes and tribes, indigenous peoples, the urban poor, 
19. Given the presence of instruments such as the SC ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 2015.
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Treaty Year
Universal Declaration of Human rights, 1948 1948
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - ICESCR 
(1966)
(especially Article 2(2) on non-discrimination) 
1979
International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD), 1965
1968
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDW), 1979
1993
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 1989 1992 (acceded) 
Optional protocol to CRC, on involvement of children in armed conflicts, 2000 2005
Optional protocol to the CRC on the sale of children, child prostitution and 
pornography, 2000 
2005
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), 2006 2007
Forced Labour Convention, 1930 1954
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (# 105) 2000
Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (# 100) 1958
ILO 111 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 1960
ILO 169 Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 1989 _
Box 2: International human rights based treaties ratified by India 
Source: NHRC: A Handbook on International Human Rights Conventions.
informal sector workers, internally displaced persons, religious minorities 
such as the Muslim population, persons with disabilities and persons living 
with HIV/AIDS’. (United Nations 2017a) 
While noting the significant role played by the Supreme Court of India 
in interpreting the Constitution with a view to achieving justiciability of eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights, CESCR recommended that India take the 
necessary legal measures to give full effect to the International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural (ICESCR) in domestic law.
CESCR also recommended that India strengthen enforcement of exist-
ing legal prohibitions on discrimination and consider enacting comprehen-
sive anti-discrimination legislation, specifically prohibiting discrimination 
in employment, social security, housing, health care and education. CE-
SCR also urged India to step up efforts to remove obstacles faced by vic-
tims of discrimination when seeking redress though the courts (United 
Nations: 2017).
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The Negative Discrimination within 
Positive Discrimination      
Another problem is that religious minorities – particularly Muslims and 
Christians, deemed ‘non-indigenous faiths’ – have not been extended the 
benefit of affirmative action contained in policy for ‘reservations’ in jobs and 
educational institutions, and in access to services and social security bene-
fits. Indeed, discrimination against Muslims and Christians is written in the 
law, with Dalits within these religious groups denied inclusion under the SC 
category. A review of the regime of affirmative action, called ‘reservations’ 
in India, will be instructive. 
The Constitutional provision for affirmative action is contained in Arti-
cle 46, which mandates the state to promote the educational and economic 
interests of weaker sections of society, in particular SC and STs, and protect 
them from social injustice and exploitation. Articles 341 and 342 include the 
list of castes and tribes entitled to such provisions. These are the Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes. As a consequence of this provision, a policy of 
compensatory discrimination via reserved positions has been implemented 
both at the national and state levels in the allocation of educational insti-
tution places and public service appointments. This accounts for 23 % of 
all such places. Constitutional (SC) Order, 1950 restricts SC status only to 
Hindu groups.21 Muslims and Christians of similar origin have been exclud-
ed from the benefit.22  The 1950 order is widely felt to be inconsistent with 
Articles 14, 15, 16 and 25 of the Constitution, which guarantee equality of 
opportunity and freedom of conscience and protect citizens from discrimi-
nation by the state on the grounds of religion, caste or creed (Government 
of India 2006). There is no such restriction to inclusion in the ST list. How-
ever, Muslim representation in the ST list is minuscule (according to 1991 
Census, 0.25% of total ST population). On the other hand, Christians are 
widely represented. 
The Constitution also defined another group, ‘socially and educational-
ly backward classes’, as worthy of affirmative action, as mentioned in Arti-
cle 15 (4) and Article 16 (4) of the Constitution, as well as Article 340 (1); 
the latter empowers the state to appoint a commission to investigate the 
21. Based on the 1936 Imperial (SC) Order that rejected SC status to Christians and Buddhists of 
similar origin. The 1950 order has been amended twice, in 1956 and 1990, to include Sikhs 
and neo Buddhists, respectively, within the category. 
22. Under the claim, against empirical evidence, that the caste system exists only among Hindus 
(and other ‘indigenous’ religions – Sikhism, Buddhism and Jainism).
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23. Rohit Vemula was a Dalit student leader in Hyderabad University, who for his radical politics 
was hounded by university authorities and right-wing Hindu groups, resulting in his commit-
ting suicide on 17 January 2016.
Rohith Vemula’s tragic suicide23 has put the need for anti-discrimination legislation back on 
the map. India is among the few regimes with a Constitutional commitment to a liberal de-
mocracy that nevertheless lack a comprehensive, multi-ground, antidiscrimination legislation. 
The Bhopal Declaration issued in 2002, seeking to chart a new course for Dalits, welcomed 
‘winds of change the world over’ towards inclusion and diversity and against discrimination. 
A conversation on the need and shape of an anti-discrimination law began after the Sachar 
Committee recommended it in 2006. While the UPA government did briefly consider setting 
up an Equal Opportunity Commission, the idea was quietly buried.  Anti-discrimination law 
remains a key demand of groups representing women; gay, lesbian, and transgender people; 
and persons living with disability. The policy debate on an anti-discrimination law has been 
going on for about a decade. It is hoped that the existence of a draft bill will give concrete 
shape to this conversation and draw attention to details. The Anti-discrimination and Equality 
Bill, 2016 is one such effort. It is based on extensive conversations with various activists and 
academics over a period of two years, including at a workshop organised by the Alternative 
Law Forum in Bangalore in 2014. An earlier version of the draft was discussed at a workshop 
organised by the Centre for Policy Research, Delhi, in December 2015. It was given its current 
form by the researchers in the office of Dr. Shashi Tharoor MP.
Highlights of this bill:
• The bill creates civil liability for acts of discrimination;
•  Discrimination includes direct discrimination, indirect discrimination, harassment, victim-
isation and aggravated discrimination;
•  Aggravated discrimination includes boycott, segregation and discriminatory violence;
•  In addition to these general concepts, the Central Equality Commission has the power to 
issue sector-wise and group-specific guidelines to characterise certain types of acts as 
one or another form of discrimination;
•  The duty to refrain from discrimination applies not only to public authorities and private 
persons performing a public function but also to public and private employers, landlords, 
traders and service providers;
•  The duty on these persons includes the duty to institute an internal complaints mechanism;
•  Everyone has a duty to refrain from aggravated discrimination;
•  The protection against discrimination is generally equally available to dominant as well as 
disadvantaged groups and to majorities as well as minorities: to men as well as women, 
Hindus as well as Muslims, Brahmins as well as Dalits;
•  This equal protection does not affect the validity of affirmative action and diversification 
measures to benefit disadvantaged groups;
•  Public authorities and private persons performing public functions have a diversification 
duty to progressively increase the participation of substantially excluded disadvantaged 
groups;
•  Public authorities have a duty to give due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination;
•  If the internal complaints mechanism fails to deliver, State Equality Commissions have the 
main responsibility for civil enforcement;
• A permanent and independent Central Equality Commission, acting along with State 
Equality Commissions, has the responsibility to promote the objectives of the Bill and aid 
its implementation; and
• Protection orders against aggravated discrimination may be obtained from the Magis-
trate’s court.
Box 3: Anti-discrimination and Equality Bill, 2016
India 
Unable to protect; Reluctant to promote
Source: Tarunabh Khaitan, Personal communication. (Also the anti-discrimination bill project at 
https://sites.google.com/site/tarunabh/Home/discrimination-law).
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24. Constituting groups such as halalkhors, helas, lalbegis or bhangis (scavengers), dhobis 
(washermen), nais or hajjams (barbers), chiks (butchers), faqirs (beggars) etc, being 
converts from untouchable/‘unclean’ occupational castes, akin to Hindu SCs. 
25. Constituting momins or julahas (weavers), darzi or idiris (tailors), and rayeens or 
kunjaras (vegetable sellers), being converts from ‘clean’ occupational castes, and whose 
Hindu counterparts are included in OBC list.  
condition of socially and educationally backward classes. A report by the 
Mandal Commission, which was set up under this provision, was adopt-
ed in 1991, seeing the launch of reservations for Other Backward Classes 
(OBC) . The report identified 3743 separate OBC communities, comprising 
54.4% of the country’s population, and recommended quotas for them in 
public sector jobs and educational institutions, totalling 27 % of all such 
positions. Minority religious groups are included in this list – 82 Mus-
lim groups, identified using a mix of caste/occupation and poverty crite-
ria. These include the ‘untouchable’ Arzal24  along with middle occupation 
Ajlaf groups.25 The former, akin to Hindu SCs but excluded by law from the 
SC list, must compete with more advanced OBC groups, and remain the 
principal losers of the affirmative action regime of the country.  
Provinces have an older history of their own affirmative action instru-
ments for backward classes, compared to the centre. There is also great 
variance in how minority groups have benefited from them.  Kerala and 
Karnataka have – based on their historically more nuanced system of affir-
mative action – covered all Muslim and Christians within their state OBC 
lists, as a separate group. Andhra Pradesh and Manipur have carved out 
separate quotas for Muslims within their OBC quota. In Tamil Nadu, 95 % 
of Muslims are included within the OBC category. Bihar has created sepa-
rate OBC and Most Backward Class (MBC) lists, and the majority of Mus-
lim groups have been included in the MBC category. These measures have 
facilitated the inclusion of most Muslims within the OBC category in these 
states. Notable exceptions are West Bengal and Assam, where only a mi-
nuscule population of Muslims is included, with the overwhelming majority 
falling in the general category, thus depriving deserving members of the 
benefits of reservation (Government of India 2006). 
Consequent to the Constitutional (SC) Order, 1950, successive govern-
ments and courts have refused to extend the affirmative action provisions of 
the Constitution to religious minorities. A UN report noted, ‘Dalit Muslims 
and Christians from the Scheduled Caste category – suffering equal levels of 
social and economic exclusion – have been excluded, thus depriving them 
of the extensive and elaborate regime of compensation’ (United Nations: 
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Profile of a vulnerable minority:
Stateless in Assam
Monowara Bewa is a widowed mother of two, who used to work as a cook 
for a school in Kokrajhar district in lower Assam. She moved to her father’s 
ancestral village in the same district after her husband’s demise. Born and 
raised in Kokrajhar district, India, she has school records up to Class IV with 
her parents’ names. Her father’s name is recorded in consecutive voter lists 
and the 1951 National Register of Citizens (NRC) and consecutive Electoral 
Registers. Despite all this, Monowara is languishing in a Detention Centre 
in Kokrajhar, Assam, arrested on the claim that she is an illegal migrant. 
The lives of her two children stand destroyed, with her own stuck in limbo.
The home of another school cook has seen a similar story.1 In Assam’s Dhu-
bri district, Jaibun Khatun’s  life came to a standstill on 30 July 2018 when 
her son Haidar Ali Khan was not included in the draft National Register of 
Citizens. On Indian Independence Day, 2017, Haidar swam in what was neck 
deep water for him to stand beside the Indian flag, his right hand raised in 
salute. The image of Haidar, his friend Jiarul, and two teachers, went viral on 
social media; but the mark of deference and patriotism, along with his linkage 
and legacy data, were not enough to qualify Haidar as an Indian. The rest of 
his family, including his brother and sister, found their names in the draft.
Background to the National Register of Citizens (NRC)
These are two of the four million people whose names have been excluded 
from the National Register of Citizens – a government of Assam undertak-
ing. Assam is a state in India’s Northeast that lies along the Brahmaputra 
river valley, to the south of Eastern Himalayas. It shares an international 
border with Bhutan and Bangladesh. Politically, the state has a tumultuous 
history of identity-based politics and ethno-nationalism. A part of this was 
focussed on those considered illegal migrants or infiltrators, along Assam’s 
international borders. The Assam Accord, signed in 1985, which ended a 
six year long agitation, mandated that foreigners who entered the state post 
24 March 1971 would be identified and deported.2 This date was selected 
to signal a wave of refugee migration from Bangladesh during its war with 
Pakistan.3 
1. ‘Assam Boy, In Viral Video Saluting Flag, Not In Citizens’ List: Teacher’, 16 August 2018. 
https://www.ndtv.com/cities/boy-who-saluted-national-flag-in-flood-water-not-in-as-
sam-citizens-list-1901078
2. ‘THE SPECTRE OF CITIZENSHIP: HISTORY & POLITICS OF NRC IN ASSAM’ 23 Janu-
ary 2018. http://raiot.in/the-spectre-of-citizenship-history-politics-of-nrc-in-assam/
3.  ‘The citizenry test: Assam NRC explained’ 31 July 2018. https://www.thehindu.com/
news/national/other-states/the-citizenry-test-assam-nrc-explained/article24560028.ece
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2017). This includes protection from hate crime and violence, and discrimi-
nation (under the SC ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, 2015); inclusion in res-
ervation schemes in educational institutions and public sector employment; 
and preferential treatment in access to universal services and social security 
benefits. As evidence demonstrates (Table 4 above), Dalit (SC) Muslim and 
Christians are as deprived as Dalit Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists, and ex-
cluding them from accessing benefits designed for uplifting Dalit people is 
clearly discriminatory.  
Various UN mechanisms have highlighted this anomaly: 
- The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
recommended restoring the eligibility for affirmative action benefits of 
all members of SC and ST that have converted to another religion;
- The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief recom-
mended in 2009 that SC status be delinked from the individual’s reli-
gious affiliation (United Nations 2017a);
- The UN Special Rapporteur on Executions noted with concern that the 
SC ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act of 1989 had not incorporated Dal-
it Muslims and Christians into the definition of SC and ST and recom-
mended that the legislation be reviewed to extend the definition; and
- The UN Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues highlighted in 2016 this 
exclusion of Dalits who had converted or were born and raised within 
non-Hindu religious communities, such as the Dalit Muslim and Chris-
tian communities (United Nations 2017a).
Efforts by Christian and Muslim groups and civil society to correct the 
anomaly have only seen successive governments drag their feet, providing 
lame justifications for keeping Muslims and Christians out of the category. 
A 2004 PIL in the Supreme Court on the subject has yet to result in any ju-
dicial outcome. A central minister recently revealed the hostility with which 
the current Hindu-majoritarian BJP ruled government considers the idea, 
when he announced that the government was opposed to granting SC cate-
gory to minority communities (i.e. Muslims and Christians), as that would 
encourage conversion (from Hinduism to these faiths).26  It is to be noted 
that the Indian Constitution guarantees to every citizen freedom of religion, 
to ‘profess, practice and propagate religion’ of one’s choice (Article 25). 
26. ‘SC status to Dalit Muslims, Christians will encourage conversion’, Deccan Herald. 15 
February 2016.  http://www.deccanherald.com/content/529072/sc-status-dalit-mus-
lims-christians.html
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The issue, however, continued to remain contentious and, after prolonged 
litigations, the Supreme Court ordered an update of the NRC in the state, 
last updated in 1951. This update would strike off anyone unable to prove 
their residence in Assam before the March 1971 cut-off date. In parallel, since 
1997, the Election Commission had started marking people as D-voters, or 
‘doubtful’ voters. By 31st December 2017, about 244,144 persons had been 
declared as such.4 These individuals were then tried by the police.5 D-Voters 
and Reference Cases are referred to Foreigners Tribunals (FT), established 
under the Foreigners (Tribunal) Order, 1964. FT has so far declared 90,206 
persons as foreigners. In the case of the rest, proceedings are still underway. 
‘Declared foreigners’ have no voting rights and are denied access to welfare 
schemes. 
Six detention centres in Assam house the declared foreigners. They hold 
961 detainees – detained like convicted prisoners, but without any rights, 
including parole. All detainees suffer indefinite incarceration – no foreign 
governments accept them. Manowara is in one such detention camp, run in 
a makeshift fashion inside jail premises. 
Proving citizenship
The draft NRC, published on 30 July 2018, deems 4,070,707 persons as 
ineligible, rendering them potentially stateless if they are unable to prove 
citizenship during the second chance they have to furnish papers, as part 
of the claims and objection process –, currently underway. According to a 
Supreme Court monitored process, definitive proof of citizenship is through 
providing one of the 15 legacy documents (evidence of the citizenship of a 
person the applicant claims as her legacy person) and a ‘link document’, that 
provides linkage between the applicant and the legacy person.   
These documents, however, are difficult to present for migrants and women, 
among others. Even if they are available, small errors in spellings of names 
or villages render them useless. In Monowara’s case, for example, while 
she does have the requisite documents, her father’s name has been spelt 
differently in the different documents she possesses – something not un-
common for non-English names transcribed in English. These documents 
are Monowara’s only link with her paternal village and her only way to 
prove her descent, and so she languishes, separated from her family, due to 
4.  ‘Declared Illegal Citizens, Uncertain Future Lies Ahead For ‘D-Voters’ in Assam’ 31 July 
2018. https://www.news18.com/news/india/declared-illegal-citizens-uncertain-future-
lies-ahead-for-d-voters-in-assam-1829169.html
5. Assam Legislative Assembly Debates, Unstarred Question no. 734. Date: 26-03-2018
Contd...
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The irony of the government itself undermining the Constitution clearly did 
not dawn on the minister.  
Notably, India has not ratified some operative international instruments 
for redress of grievances, foreclosing the option for individuals and groups 
affected by discriminatory laws and practices to access international forums 
of adjudication. At the same time, national mechanisms for grievance re-
dressal, such as could be provided through the National Commission for 
Minorities,27 for example, but also others, have not delivered, especially on 
issues of socio-economic rights of minorities.
Backing Words with Action? 
The Poor effort on Minority Rights 
In this section, we examine ‘efforts’ by the state to deliver on commitments, 
in order to understand how commitments made are followed through with 
actions, and how states provide for minorities’ socio-economic develop-
ment. Here we look at, among other things, policies, programmes, budgets, 
and structures put in place, to try to understand if they square up, and what 
weaknesses there might be for delivering on minority commitments, as well 
as the wider policy space in the country for minority welfare. 
Programme Performance and Minorities   
We begin with a 2015 study by Misaal on the working of flagship anti-pover-
ty programmes for Muslims, based on a survey of 10,724 families (collected 
by the National Confederation of Dalit Organisations (NACDOR) as part of 
a micro-level study) in three poor districts in the northern part of the state 
of Uttar Pradesh– Badayun, Sharawasti and Mirzapur. The study demon-
strated the extremely poor working of many of the flagship anti-poverty 
programmes for Muslims, at least in the three focus districts. The report 
concluded: 
27. Established with the following remit: (i) Evaluate the progress of the development of mi-
norities under the Union and States; (ii) Monitor the working of the safeguards provided 
for minorities in the Constitution, and national and state law; (iii) Make recommenda-
tions for the effective implementation of safeguards for the protection of the interests 
of minorities; (iv) Look into specific complaints regarding deprivation of rights and 
safeguards of the minorities and take up such matters with the appropriate authorities 
(v) Also carry out studies and research on discrimination against minorities, and for 
socio-economic and educational development of minorities; and recommend measures 
to central and state governments.
161
typographical errors. For Haidar, his mother claims to have submitted the 
Legacy document, but though his siblings were adjudged Indians, Haidar 
has been left out, for reasons unknown to the family.
Married women – especially those with limited or no schooling and those 
married early – have been especially vulnerable to the process, as they do 
not have documents linking them to their paternal house. In their husband’s 
villages they do not have identification documents such as marriage cer-
tificates or voter IDs, with many marriages not being registered. Many of 
them submitted Gram Panchayat certificates as proof of residence. The Su-
preme Court in a judgement on this asked for rigorous verification of these 
certificates for ‘original inhabitants’ of Assam. This has led to complaints 
from amongst Bengali-speaking applicants that they are being discriminat-
ed against. Widows like Monowara who return to their paternal village also 
continue facing problems with their citizenship claims rejected.
Many stories of those left out of the draft show confusion, pain and suffering. 
Bir Bahadur Thapa, a Kargil war veteran, has not made the list. Babul Das, a 
teacher conducting verifications for NRC found his name excluded from the 
draft. Moinal Mollah was declared a foreigner and sent to a detention camp 
until the Supreme Court intervened, ordering a fresh trial, which found him 
to be an Indian. He has not found his name included in the draft NRC either.6 
The final NRC, to be published at an unspecified date, will have the names 
of all verified as Indians. What will eventually happen to those left out of the 
final NRC is not clear. Presumably they will be  referred to the Foreigners’ 
Tribunals, for determining their citizenship. However, it is anybody’s guess 
what the outcome of that process will be. The entire process seems to have 
become geared towards declaring as many Bengali-speakers foreigners as 
possible – especially Muslims. So far 33 persons excluded from the draft 
NRC have been reported to have committed suicide out of desperation.7  
Assam’s tryst with immigrants, especially Bengali-speaking Muslims, saw 
the tragedy of the Nellie massacre of 1983, where over 2000 persons, all 
Bengali Muslims, were murdered in a single day. The community continues 
to remain vulnerable – easy targets for the ‘foreigner’ label. Many Bengali–
origin Muslims in Assam reside in the chars – the riverine islands of Brah-
maputra and its tributaries. Frequent floods lead to annual cycle of displace-
ment, resulting in many migrating to newer locations, where they are looked 
at suspiciously. Frequent displacement also means they lack adequate 
5. ‘Left Out Of Assam’s List, Soldier, Teacher, Farmer Demand Answers’, August 22 2018. 
https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/left-out-from-assams-list-soldier-teacher-farmer-de-
mand-answers-1904143 
6. ‘33rd Suicide Victim of D Voter in Assam: NRC’, 16 November 2018.
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International convention on the protection of the rights of all migrants and families, 1990
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, 2008 – recognises the competence of CESCR to receive and consid-
er complaints from individuals or groups within its jurisdiction. 
Optional protocol to the CEDAW, 1999 – recognises the competence of CEDAW to receive and 
consider complaints from individuals or groups within its jurisdiction.
Optional protocol to CRPD, 2006  – recognises the competence of CRPD to receive and consider 
complaints from individuals or groups within its jurisdiction.
Core ILO Conventions not ratified by India
Freedom of Association and Freedom of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (# 87)
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (# 98) 
Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (# 138) 
Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (# 182)  
Box 4: International human rights treaties not ratified by India
Source: NHRC: a Handbook on International Human Rights Conventions
i.  While we already know that Muslims are poorly serviced, what is some-
what new is the realisation, from this survey data, that anti-poverty pro-
grammes work so badly for Muslims, much more so than they do for 
other excluded groups – Hindu Dalits, in this case (Misaal 2015: 46);
ii. Education: Muslim children’s access to education is problematic. Al-
most a quarter of children had not been enrolled in schools; the quality 
of Mid-day Meal (MDM) provided was poor and unpredictable. Books 
and uniforms bypass many; scholarships seemed to have almost entirely 
failed; and support services – safe drinking water and clean toilets – are 
not provided;
iii. National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS): there were 
various problems with the working of NREGS: awareness about the 
scheme was poor; half of all respondents had not been allocated work, 
despite having applied; and more than half had not received payments 
within the stipulated time period. Malpractices abounded, eg entries in 
job cards, were, as a matter of practice, not made;
iv. Water and sanitation services work poorly for Muslims, with a majori-
ty claiming they had no access to safe drinking water; handpumps take 
much longer than stipulated to be repaired; and sanitation staff are 
mostly not available;
v. The Public Distribution System (PDS) does work for Muslims, with only 
9% of respondents claiming they receive rations regularly. An over-
whelming section of pensioner respondents claim they receive payments 
very late. 82% of respondents said their children had not been registered 
within the stipulated 21 days; and
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documents, important for proving their nationality.8  Already attacked as 
‘illegal immigrants’, many continue to languish in detention camps, in in-
definite incarceration. 
Instilling discrimination in citizenship 
The Bharatiya Janata Party government ruling in the Centre is attempting 
to pass the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill 2016. This amendment to the Citi-
zenship Act 1955 would allow Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis, Chris-
tians from India’s neighbourhood, especially from Bangladesh, Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, to apply for Indian citizenship.9 The Amendment relaxes the 
residence condition for naturalisation for these minorities from Muslim 
majority countries from the current 11 years to 6 years. In 2015 and 2016, 
exemptions were made to the Foreigners Act 1946 and Passport (Entry into 
India) Act 1920 to allow persons from these backgrounds indefinite resi-
dence in India if they arrived before 31 December 2014. Making laws that 
differentiate between faiths, these legislations and rules run the risk of being 
discriminatory in a purportedly secular country. The proposed amendment 
to the Citizenship Act 1955 has implications for the NRC process. It is signal-
ling to Hindus excluded from the NRC that they might still have a chance for 
naturalisation – something that Muslims would be denied.
8. ‘How Assam’s Supreme Court-mandated NRC project is targeting and detaining Bengali 
Muslims, breaking families’ 2 July 2018. http://www.caravanmagazine.in/politics/as-
sam-supreme-court-nrc-muslim-families-breaking-detention
9. ‘Advertising Simply Put: Why Citizenship Bill disturbs Assam’, 19 May 2018. https://
indianexpress.com/article/explained/simply-put-why-citizenship-bill-disturbs-as-
sam-5176741/
... Profile of a vulnerable minority continued ....
vi. Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS): dismal working in Mus-
lim pockets. This takes various forms and is driven by multiple factors 
– many Anganwadis (child care centres) do not open at all; there is poor 
awareness about core services; the health component in particular is 
problematic, with large exclusions from TT, Hepatitis B and Vitamin A 
dosage, and from immunisation.
What causes such poor outcomes for Muslims? Evidence shows that 
programmes for the poor work poorly in India, especially in Uttar Pradesh 
and other northern states. This is also the case for Muslims. But for multi-
ple programmes to work so poorly for a section of the poor, there must be 
factors that go beyond the general, and we must also look at specific causes 
affecting the reach of these schemes for the specific group – Muslims, in 
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this case.  We contend that such complete failure can only be the outcome 
of failures of the state, both to ensure programmes reach minorities equally 
(ie measures to prevent discrimination in provisioning), as well as the fail-
ure to target the poorest Muslim groups proactively, through affirmative 
action. None of the schemes covered – all flagship programmes of the cen-
tral government, with elaborate reach, budgets and structures – has given 
a thought institutionally to their reach to the poorest Muslims. There is no 
data collected, disaggregated by religious groups, that would help capture 
the poor delivery for the group. There is little planning to improve scheme 
performance among social groups defined by religious identity, and little 
targeting of implementation keeping these in mind. 
This is so because the weaknesses at the policy level for religious mi-
norities in India – the absence of robust anti-discrimination measures and 
weak promotional/affirmative action efforts – are carried through at the 
programmatic level too. All that exists for ‘targeting’ religious minorities 
are a handful of schemes implemented by the central Ministry of Minori-
ty Affairs, including scholarships and schemes for the modernisation of 
madrasas; the Multi-sectoral Development Programme (MSDP), aimed at 
enhancing infrastructure investment in minority concentrated areas; and 
the Prime Minister’s new 15 point programme, which claims to ensure ad-
equate spending on minority groups under flagship programmes. Unlike 
efforts for SCs, STs, women, and in some cases people with disabilities, 
who see more robust targeting measures, targeting of religious minorities is 
shallow – mere window dressing. 
Minorities and the Narrow Policy Space 
The Sachar Committee report broke new ground in public discourse on the 
deprivation of the Muslim community in the country. By collating and an-
alysing considerable empirical evidence, perhaps for the first time in inde-
pendent India, and by using official data sources, the report shifted the pub-
lic debate on the conditions of Muslims from one based on perceptions and 
rhetoric (that denied the deprivation faced by the poorest Muslims) to one 
that was evidence-based, thus establishing Muslims as a legitimate subject 
of public policy (Government of India 2006: 2). The Sachar Committee re-
port led to the government declaring a package of measures for, surprising-
ly, all religious minorities, not just Muslims, containing affirmative action 
measures; special development initiatives; enhanced access to credit and 
education opportunities; social inclusion measures; and efforts for better 
sensitisation of government functionaries on minority issues (Government 
165
of India 2009). Though modest by comparison with the size of the problem, 
the policy interventions seemed like a good start.
Four years after the Sachar Committee report an assessment of the 
working of these ‘minority’ schemes, especially for Muslims, based on qual-
itative research in three districts with large Muslim populations, revealed 
serious drawbacks in their working – principally the Multi-Sectoral Devel-
opment Programme (MsDP), the 15 Point Programme and the Scholarship 
Schemes. These were traced to a combination of factors: poor design of so-
called flagships programmes for minority development; the poor resourc-
ing of the programmes, resulting in them being little more than symbolic 
gestures; and a weak institutional environment that prevents robust im-
plementation – the last including weak structures and processes, and poor 
capacities of implementing agencies, combined with a pervasive inability on 
the part of those agencies to connect purposefully with Muslim groups and 
communities (Centre for Equity Studies 2011: 40). The CES report, pointing 
to the tentative nature of these interventions, noted how ‘…. diffidence at 
policy level to clearly focus on Muslims and their deprivations translates 
into active reluctance by implementing agencies on the ground, to target 
Muslims and the drivers of their deprivations…’ (ibid: 41).
A more recent analysis confirms this assessment. The first official eval-
uation of the working of programmes set up on the recommendation of the 
Sachar report (Post-Sachar Evaluation Committee, 2014, popularly called 
Kundu Committee) concluded that not a great deal had changed since these 
measures were introduced in 2006. The findings of the Kundu report include: 
(i) Schemes under the PM’s 15-point programme and MsDP were area de-
velopment schemes, with little targeted focus on minority communities. 
Barring the odd exception, such as scholarship schemes, there was little 
attempt to specifically target minority communities through clear oper-
ational plans and beneficiary lists;
(ii) Connected to this is the problem of sound data. Except a very rapid base-
line survey of the minority concentrated districts (MCDs), ‘there has not 
been any systematic assessment of the development deficits in MCDs and 
determination of the target under different schemes.’ There seemed to be 
no clear plan or roadmap, with targets and allocations fluctuating year 
on year.  Furthermore, the lack of availability in several of the schemes of 
local data disaggregated by religious group constrained the assessment of 
the effectiveness of the schemes for different communities; 
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(iii)There was a lack of institutional mechanisms and implementation staff 
at the state, district and block levels. Further, among the existing staff, 
in many of the states a large proportion lacked motivation. There was 
also no effective evaluation of any programme; and
(iv) Plans and financial allocations were modest in relation to the depriva-
tion of the minorities, especially Muslims, and for some of the schemes 
this meagre amount had not been fully utilised, showing a lack of zeal 
and coordination among officials and agencies (Government of India 
2014: 152–153).
Minority Provisioning on the Cheap: 
The Question of Resources   
Recent data on the working of minority schemes, including at the state lev-
el, provides further evidence of poor effort, particularly since the current 
Hindu right wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government took power. 
A report published by the Centre for Social Justice (2017) examined the 
2017–18 central budget and its minority-specific schemes (implemented at 
the centre principally by Ministry of Minority Affairs (MoMA); Ministry of 
Human Resource development (MoHRD); and Ministry of Civil Aviation 
(MoCA)) on multiple counts, specifically (i) allocation of resources and 
their adequacy; (ii) distribution of resources across different sectors; and 
(iii) fund utilisation. We first look at schemes implemented by central gov-
ernment departments.
The report revealed direct allocation of only 0.21% of the union bud-
get for minorities (Table 12). Minorities make up 19.32% of the national 
population. Clearly, minority welfare is not high on the government’s agen-
da. The volume of support is too limited to be of much help to minorities, 
faced with such serious problems. Overall, the offering is very modest. Al-
most half of the investment was devoted to education, particularly scholar-
ship schemes (pre- and post-matric, and merit-cum-means); Maulana Azad 
fellowship; and free coaching and allied schemes. Because the allocation 
was based on 2001 data, the report concluded, it was too low with respect 
to the need. The 2017–18 budget failed to increase the allocation according-
ly (ibid: 14). The Parliament’s Standing Committee on Social Justice and 
Empowerment (2015–16) had recommended the need for a demand-led 
model of allocating resources for scholarship schemes, rather than an al-
location-based model. This was rejected by the government (ibid: 14). Data 
on targets and achievements (Table 13) reveals that whilst the level of al-
location for scholarship schemes has remained consistent over the years, 
achievement has dropped drastically, forcing one to conclude that there is 
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Good practice case study:
Extra-judicial Execution Victim Families’ 
 Association Manipur (EEVFAM)
On 11 July 2009 a group of widows and mothers of those killed in extra ju-
dicial killings in the state of Manipur came together with some civil society 
activists and lawyers to talk about their pain and loss. The meeting was a 
culmination of over a decade of work, and eventually led to the birth of EEV-
FAM – Extra-judicial Execution Victim Families’ Association Manipur. The 
acronym sounds like the local word for bloodstain – capturing the trauma 
and suffering of the grieving families and their struggle for elusive justice.
Manipur – A ‘disturbed region’
Manipur is a state in India’s Northeast, with a long history of trade and mi-
gration with Southeast Asia and China, and a shared international border 
with Myanmar. The state has three main ethnic groups: Meitei, Naga and 
Zo (also known as Kuki, Chin, or Mizo) (Ngaihte 2013). 2011 census figures 
show that the state’s Scheduled Caste population is 3.8% and the Scheduled 
Tribe population 35.1%. The state has seen its share of insurgency, leading 
to it being declared a ‘disturbed area’ and to the imposition of the Armed 
Forces (Special Powers Act) in 1980.1  The act gives armed forces extraordi-
nary powers, including immunity from legal action, and the licence to shoot 
to kill and arrest people without obtaining warrants. The Act has long being 
criticised for violating human rights, though it continues to be applicable 
in states like Assam, Nagaland, Jammu & Kashmir, and parts of Arunachal 
Pradesh.2 In 2014, it was withdrawn from 7 assembly constituencies in Ma-
nipur’s capital, Imphal, but it continues in the rest of the state.
A committee set up by the Prime Minister in 2004, called the Jeevan Reddy 
Committee, unambiguously recommended repealing the law, calling it ‘too 
sketchy, too bald and quite inadequate in several particulars’. The commit-
tee further observed that the act ‘has become a symbol of oppression, an ob-
ject of hate and an instrument of discrimination and high-handedness’.3 The 
act as an instrument of discrimination was further highlighted by the UN’s 
Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination categorically urging the 
Government of India to repeal the law in 2007 (Loitongbam 2009). Neither 
1. ‘The AFSPA and Manipur: 10 key points’, 9 August 2016. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.
com/the-afspa-and-manipur-10-key-points/listshow/53613784.cms
2. ‘What is AFSPA, and where is it in force?’ 23 April 2018. https://www.thehindu.com/
news/national/what-is-afspa-and-where-is-it-in-force/article23648102.ece
3. ‘Repeal Armed Forces Act: official panel’, 8 October 2006. https://www.thehindu.com/
todays-paper/repeal-armed-forces-act-official-panel/article18485943.ece
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something of a tacit rule in the implementation, to starve these schemes of 
resources. 
The other education schemes for minorities are implemented by the 
Ministry of Human Resources Development (MoHRD), viz. Scheme for 
Providing Quality Education in Madrasas (SPQEM) and Scheme for In-
frastructure Development in Minority Institutions (IDMI). The budget for 
both schemes was slashed in half in the last budget (2016–17), and this has 
not been undone for the 2017–18 budget.28
What of access of minorities to universal programmes? Budgetary anal-
ysis of the 15 Point Programme – by far the major policy response to poor 
minority wellbeing – is a good indicator of progress in the central govern-
ment’s efforts on the subject. The 15 Point Programme was envisaged as an 
exercise in minority budgeting, to ensure a certain percentage of allocation 
on universal programmes was earmarked for minorities. This requirement 
for minority budgeting, however, is largely notional, without there being 
28.  The other minority scheme is MsDP, aimed at improving infrastructure in minority con-
centrated districts – those with more than 25% of their population belonging to religious 
minorities. The main concern here is poor physical progress – so even while 80% of the 
12th plan budget under MsDP is reported to have been spent, actual physical progress on 
the ground was a problem (Centre for Social Justice 2017: 15).  
Year MoMA MoCA MHRD Total 
2017-18 4195 200 120 4515
2016-17 3827 450 120 4397
 
Table 12. Allocations for minority schemes (Rs crores) 
Source: Centre for Social Justice (2017: 12).
2014–15 2015–16 2016–17
Pre-matric scholarship
Financial target 1130.00 1040.10 931.00
Financial 
achievement
1128.81 906.22 584.90
Post-matric 
scholarship
Financial target 598.50 580.10 550.00
Financial 
achievement
501.11 385.72 275.76
Merit-cum-means 
based scholarship
Financial target 335.00 335.00 395.00
Financial 
achievement
381.27 357.98 218.60
Table 13. Allocations for minority schemes (Rs crores) 
Source: http://www.minorityaffairs.gov.in/sites/default/files/Schemes.pdf.
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recommendation has been accepted by successive Indian governments to 
date. The leaders of Manipur’s struggle against extra judicial killings and the 
AFSPA include long-standing human rights defenders Babloo Loitongbam, 
Irom Sharmila, Renu Takhellambam, and the victims’ families challenging 
state impunity and demanding justice. 
EEVFAM – the initial years
The movement took its roots in 2000, with an independent people’s com-
mission set up to look into the long-term human rights impact of prolonged 
imposition of AFSPA in the region. Former Bombay High Court judge Jus-
tice H. Suresh highlighted that sanction to kill can never be Constitutional. 
A group called FIDAM was formed – Families of Involuntarily Disappeared 
Association Manipur – looking for a solution to the ever-growing problem 
of disappearances. FIDAM, with its acronym meaning ‘ideal’ in Manipuri, 
started filing habeas corpus petitions in the court on behalf of families of 
disappeared persons. This ensured that individual families could escape re-
prisal, while also demanding accountability and seeking justice. Resultant-
ly, the phenomenon of disappearances reduced.
However, encounters remained largely unchallenged. A week after the in-
quiry commission completed its report, security forces killed 10 civilians, 
in what came to be known as the Malom massacre, November 2000. This 
was the catalyst prompting Irom Sharmila to begin her 16-year-long hunger 
strike, demanding AFSPA be repealed. 
When the brother of a young electronic engineer shot by security forces be-
came exasperated at the lack of remedies and state response to these wanton 
murders, the meeting of 11 July came about, less as a solution and more as 
a cathartic exercise. These fortnightly meetings became a place for these 
grieving families, most of them young widows, to build a support structure 
around them, and find a sense of community. The group brought validation 
that what happened to them was not right, and that their husbands or sons 
were not criminals. Pertinent issues such as their right to inheritance and 
their children’s right to education were discussed. Towards economic inde-
pendence and sustenance, Self Help Groups (SHG) were formed, beginning 
with a small loan of Rs. 5000, for these women to engage in trading, fishery, 
weaving, or anything else towards income generation. The first round of the 
SHG saw a 100% return. These women were then given Rs. 10,000. The ear-
ly 50 beneficiaries became the nucleus of this successful model. The money 
is used by the beneficiary as per her choice and convenience to improve their 
lives; such as running grocery shops, weaving, farming, running clothes 
businesses or making washing detergent, according to Neena Ningombam, 
Contd...
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any specific targeting of minority beneficiaries. The absence of effort to 
collect data disaggregated by religious group comes in the way of any at-
tempts at specific targeting (ibid: 10). In contrast, central ministries and 
state governments routinely plan specific spending on women and SC and 
STs – referred to as the Gender Budget, SC Sub-plan and ST Sub-plan – and 
append reports on this spending to their budget proposals and reports. And 
whilst there are various problems with allocation and implementation for 
all deprived groups (women, SC and ST), planning and reporting spending 
by group provides policy-based data and creates an opportunity for con-
structive debate on how programmes work for specific deprived groups. In 
the absence of data, and indeed effort, nothing like this exists for religious 
minorities.   
The 15 Point Programme was introduced to improve the education, em-
ployment skill development, living conditions and security of minorities 
by bringing them under an overarching programme, to enable greater pro-
grammatic focus on minorities. Clearly that objective was never operation-
alised. The Centre for Social Justice report reveals there are various flaws 
with the working of the programme. Firstly, there is very poor knowledge 
about the 15 Point Programme among minority groups. Of greater concern, 
the report found that awareness among duty bearers – the providers and 
functionaries – was also low (ibid: 30). Many field staff in key departments 
showed little awareness. With the duty bearers unaware and unable to take 
action, the chances of the programme being promoted and implemented 
well are very poor. This is all ten years after the 15 point programme was 
introduced – more than enough time for teething problems to have been 
resolved. 
A more fundamental flaw, the study revealed, was institutional. There 
was a lack of effective detailing of the budget and breaking down of targets, 
so as to reach the neediest minorities. There were no instructions or guid-
ance issued by sponsoring ministries and therefore no monitoring of the 
implementation of these by the departments. Adding to the problem was, of 
course, the absence of data disaggregated by religion (ibid: 33). The report 
concludes on a sombre note: 
‘poor performance (in minority welfare) visible in the official statis-
tics is an outcome of poor awareness among target groups and no 
clear instructions to the duty bearers, structural issues in the imple-
mentation mechanism of the schemes, and the near absent monitor-
ing system’ (ibid: 28).
171
founding member and widow of an extra judicial killing victim.4  Economic 
independence gave these women the strength and voice to live with dignity 
within their communities and avoid further deprivation and abuse, as well 
as to be able to stand up and fight for justice.
Bringing the issue to the centre stage 
In March 2012 the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or ar-
bitrary executions visited India. The group led 70 mothers and widows of 
those killed in extrajudicial executions or ‘encounters’ in Manipur to meet 
him. Not wanting to let this opportunity pass, a group of 16 civil society or-
ganisations sat together, sharing notes and information, preparing a mem-
orandum listing 1528 cases of extrajudicial killings in the state from 1979 to 
2012. The Special Rapporteur’s report mentioned ‘evidence gathered con-
firmed the use of so-called ‘fake encounters’ in certain parts of the country… 
Moreover, in the North Eastern States, and Jammu and Kashmir the armed 
forces have wide powers to employ lethal force.’ The Special Rapporteur fur-
ther stressed ‘The main difficulty in my view has been these high levels of 
impunity’.5 
Bolstered by the Special Rapporteur’s acknowledgment of the problem, and 
the high number shown by the memorandum that had been published as 
a report, the group decided to file a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the 
Supreme Court of India. To avoid reprisal for the families, EEVFAM was 
created to be the first petitioner in the case, with Human Rights Alert being 
the co-petitioner. There were obstacles even while registering the group; the 
registrar asked that they change the name as it was antinational. The group 
was eventually registered as a trust. 
The Supreme Court appointed a commission to look into the veracity of six 
randomly selected cases of the 1528 mentioned in the PIL. The commission 
found that none of the six were genuine encounters, with all killed being 
innocent civilians with no criminal history.6  Following this report, the court 
in 2016 has asked the petitioner EEVFAM to verify all 1528 cases and see if 
the families are willing to pursue justice.
A long road still ahead
Preparing for the long haul, the group set up a temporary office at the Ma-
nipur Bar Association, taking depositions and affidavits pursuant to the 
4.   See: https://www.countercurrents.org/ningombam300912.htm
5. ‘India: Concern expressed about extrajudicial executions’ 30 March 2012.  https://newsar-
chive.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12031&LangID=E
6. See: http://www.hrln.org/hrln/criminal-justice/reports/1501-santosh-hegde-commis-
sion-submits-report-on-manipur-extra-judicial-killings.html Contd...
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Over the past years, under the current BJP rule, the very modest minori-
ty provisions are also being rolled back. One example of this is the public 
reporting of outcome data of minority programmes. The Centre for Social 
Justice study reported that data on outcomes on the Ministry of Minority 
Affairs website is not updated regularly. Data on the ICDS, schools, and 
other aspects as not been updated in a year. Data on recruitment in govern-
ment employment and on communal violence has not been updated since 
2015. Data on the rehabilitation of victims of communal violence, the report 
notes, has never been reported (ibid: 26).
States of Denial: Minority Provisioning at 
Sub-national Level 
Having examined efforts at the central level, it will now be useful to delve 
into the states of India. The Centre for Social Justice study analysed 2017–
18 budgets for minority welfare in seven states – Gujarat, Jharkhand, Kar-
nataka, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Telangana, and West Bengal. The ques-
tions explored were the same as with the central government, viz. adequacy, 
distribution and utilisation. The findings are noteworthy.
Table 14 demonstrates that the lowest allocation of budgetary resources 
to minority specific schemes, as well as the lowest percentage of total state 
budget allocated, was in Gujarat (Rs. 51 crores and 0.029%, respectively) 
and the highest was in West Bengal (Rs. 3470 crores and 1.9%). West Ben-
gal, Telangana and Karnataka stand out as the states most committed to mi-
nority welfare. With Karnataka’s very high rate of utilisation of budgetary 
allocations, it stands as the leader in backing its minority welfare commit-
ment with resources and actions (ibid: 23). These are exceptional stories of 
the commitment to providing for minorities, in a sea of neglect. Overall, the 
policy space for minority welfare in India is very limited. States like Guja-
rat and Madhya Pradesh, both Hindu right-wing BJP ruled for many years, 
were revealed as hostile even to minority concerns. As the report notes: 
‘Their economic development model (preferred by BJP ruled states) 
is presented as universal and not vulnerability specific. And majori-
tarian compulsions drive much of their agenda, and this compulsion 
does not allow them to be seen as being too accommodating to mi-
nority needs.’ (Centre for Social Justice 2017: 64)
These are states that have gone to great lengths to uphold their non-mi-
nority stance.  All provinces are required by law to have minority com-
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court’s directive. Around 900 families responded, with 655 of these being 
part of the original PIL. The cases were divided into 7 categories, ranging 
from those found to be fake encounters by the Government of Manipur’s 
Commission of Enquiry, to those in which the families had no witnesses or 
written complaint but were quite certain an encounter had taken place. In 
July 2017 the court took the first three categories, including 87 victims, and 
handed them over for enquiry to the Central Board of Investigation. This in-
vestigation is still ongoing, with the sluggish investigation called into ques-
tion by the group.7
For both the group and the victims’ families, the road to justice continues, 
with decades gone by. Both have seen respites and reprisals. Keeping mo-
rale high has been a continuous effort. For the families, some of whom have 
decided not to perform last rites till justice is served, everyday life needs to 
continue along with their battle to know the truth of what happened to a 
loved one. Babloo Loitongbam recalls that during the Supreme Court ap-
pointed Justice Hegde Commission, a mother of one of the victims said she 
was so relieved to know that her son was killed by the first bullet of the AK47 
that hit him and did not live to suffer the other 14 bullets. 
This truth coming out is the first step of the transitional justice EEVFAM is 
working towards. They are hoping the process will now move to identifying 
the kingpins – those giving the orders – and bring them to account. Though 
the lives lost can never be repaid, the state owes it to the victims’ families to 
provide them with restitution. Genuine closure can only be achieved with 
an apology by the state and a guarantee that this will never be repeated. 
Security itself needs to be reformed to be security for the citizens – for their 
protection. Finally, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act must be repealed 
to lift the veil of immunity. 
EEVFAM is continuously charting a course of challenging the Indian state 
through its Constitutional and democratic processes. Their experience is 
unique and exemplary for attempting to carve a road for similar civil society 
efforts demanding justice and equal treatment for all, including minorities. 
Babloo Loitongbom emphasises that state institutions are much more so-
phisticated and there is a lot of scope for availing support from international 
human rights diplomacy and advocacy. 
Key challenges have been sustaining morale as justice takes its long road; 
political pressure rendering their advocacy efforts in vain; and every succes-
sive government’s false promises. Finances also took a hit, with partnering 
7.  ‘Protest against sluggish CBI probe’ 18 July 2018. https://www.telegraphindia.com/
states/north-east/protest-against-sluggish-cbi-probe-245679
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State 
% share of minority 
specific allocation in 
state budget 
Share of minority popula-
tion in state population
Utilisation as % of 
allocation 
Gujarat 0.029 11.30 23
MP 0.039 08.15 43
Odissa 0.057 05.04 18
Jharkhand 0.150 18.27 60
West 
Bengal 
1.900 28.18 60
Telangana 0.830 12.68 20
Karnataka  1.170 15.72 120
Central 
Govt.  
0.195 19.32 100
Table 14. Allocation of resources for minority 
welfare in states (2017–18) 
Source: Centre for Social Justice (2017: 19).
missions. According to the MoMA, however, many BJP ruled states have 
not set these up yet.29  Many states have not established minority welfare 
departments either. These include Gujarat and Haryana, which have estab-
lished elaborate structures and systems – ministries, departments, auton-
omous commissions and police task forces, all with large budgets – for the 
protection of cows (considered holy by a section of Hindus), but see no rea-
son to follow the law in establishing minority commissions as institutions 
to protect and promote the rights of their minority citizens. As mentioned 
above, Gujarat’s was also one of the lowest allocations of resources for mi-
nority specific programmes. Furthermore, throughout the three years in 
which the report examined budgets, the allocation decreased sharply, year 
on year, demonstrating a hardening stance.30 
Minority Protection in an Age of 
Majoritarian Upsurge
Traditionally, the BJP has played down the need for targeted public policy 
to uplift Muslims. It has consistently rejected the Sachar Committee and 
Ranganath Mishra Committee reports and their policy recommendations, 
both of which suggested increased investment in social and economic cap-
ital to overcome barriers that persist for Muslims and minorities. As soon 
29.  See: http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=155028
30. ‘Gujarat’s allocation for minorities is ten times lower than Karnataka; it is 0.029% of state 
budget: Rehnuma report.’ Counterview. 4 December 2017. https://www.counterview.
net/2017/12/gujarats-allocation-for-minorities-is.html
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NGOs having their FCRA8 permissions revoked, and even the group’s efforts 
branded a foreign conspiracy. Families grew fatigued with the system and 
not all have come forward for the depositions. There is also a recent Public 
Interest Litigation filed by 350 army personnel, which the Supreme Court 
has admitted, challenging the registration of FIRs against them for opera-
tions in areas where AFSPA in enforced.9 For EEVFAM these are the rough 
edges of democracy, which need the efforts of civil society and citizens to be 
smoothed; the ebb and flow of successes and challenges. It becomes key to 
strengthen voices socially and economically, so they are able to stand up and 
demand justice.
Sustaining any grassroot process takes time and energy. EEVFAM sees jus-
tice as a cyclical process, understanding setbacks to be a part of the process 
and awaiting opportunities to move forward. Most of their energy is spent 
on supporting the victims, acknowledging their spirit with empathy and un-
derstanding. If the grassroots processes of justice are sustained, eventually 
institutions will respond. The group now awaits results of their long-drawn 
struggle, aware that the road does not end there.
8. Foreign Contribution Regulation Act 1976, for non-government organisations receiving 
foreign funding. See: http://www.fcra.co.in/
9.  ‘SC to hear plea of 300 army personnel, Manipur Police commandos challenging FIR 
against them in AFSPA enforced areas’ 14 August 2018. https://www.firstpost.com/india/
sc-to-hear-plea-of-300-army-personnel-manipur-police-commandos-challenging-fir-
against-them-in-afspa-enforced-areas-4961711.html
... Good practice case study continued ...
as the BJP took power in the centre in 2014, the union minister in charge 
of MoMA, Najma Heptullah, went on record saying that Muslims were not 
minorities ‘by any stretch of the imagination’. Indeed, as reported by the 
press, ‘on her first day in office, Heptullah appeared determined to reorient 
the ministry by playing down its role in welfare of Muslims….’.31 Vishwa 
Hindu Parishad, a denominational group close to the BJP, has been 
demanding the scrapping of the central Ministry of Minority Affairs and the 
National Commission for Minorities (NCM), in response to NCM’s opening a 
helpline for Muslims targeted by recent rise in hate crime, claiming the 
helpline encouraged separatism.32  This was despite the new look NCM has 
31. ‘Muslims are not minorities, Parsis are: Najma Heptullah’ Times of India. 28 May 2014. 
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Muslims-are-not-minorities-Parsis-are-Naj-
ma-Heptullah/articleshow/35651799.cms
32. ‘VHP demands scrapping of Ministry of Minority Affairs; says Muslim helpline will 
create separatism’. Firstpost, 27 June 2017. http://www.firstpost.com/india/vhp-de-
mands-scrapping-of-ministry-of-minority-affairs-says-muslim-helpline-will-create-sepa-
ratism-3747825.html
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33. ‘New minority panel chief, 2 of 4 members belong to BJP’. The Indian Express. 25 May 
2017. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/new-minority-panel-chief-2-of-4-mem-
bers-belong-to-bjp-4672554/
34. ‘Min of Finance urged to create posts under IT category to make minority data bank fully 
functional’ 12 Dec  2016 - http://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/create-
posts-to-make-minority-data-bank-fully-functional-116121200657_1.html
35. ‘Why We Should Worry That The BJP Doesn’t Have A Single Muslim Candidate In UP’. 
Sanjay Jha, 14 February 2017. http://www.huffingtonpost.in/sanjay-jha-/why-we-
should-worry-that-the-bjp-doesnt-have-a-single-muslim-ca_a_21713576/  
acquired, and what many believe is partisan character, with its chairman a 
former General Secretary of the BJP Minority Cell and two of its members 
active BJP members.33  
Alongside all this, the modest gains of recent years in strengthening mi-
nority rights protection and promotion regimes are being rolled back. On 
the recommendations of the Expert Group on Equal Opportunities Com-
mission (EOC, 2008), the union cabinet had in 2014 approved the proposal 
to set up EOC through an act of Parliament. The new government has since 
sent the proposal down for consultation, and no decision has been taken 
since. The fate of the Diversity Index, which was recommended by a sepa-
rate Expert Group set up by the previous Congress government for the pur-
pose – has been similar. A third, related decision, regarding setting up the 
national data bank, has also floundered. Newspapers reported recently that 
a lack of staff meant the national data bank could not take off.34  Finally, the 
Assessment and Monitoring Authority, created under the Planning Com-
mission as a home for developing and tracking data on marginalisation, has 
also been wound up, in light of objections by its successor Niti Ayog to being 
saddled with the agency.   
The case of Uttar Pradesh – India’s largest state, with a 19% Muslim 
population share – is instructive. The BJP took power in Uttar Pradesh in 
March 2017.  In state elections that were run on an Islamophobic campaign, 
the BJP did not field a single Muslim candidate among the 403 seats it con-
tested to the state assembly.35 On assuming charge, the government – led 
by Yogi Adityanath, a Hindu cleric accused in multiple cases of inciting and 
leading hate violence against Muslims and other minorities – abolished 
the previous state government’s policy of prioritising minorities in 20% of 
beneficiaries of (universal) social welfare schemes. This policy had applied 
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to some 86 schemes of the Social Welfare and Rural Development depart-
ments of the state government.36  
A series of policy actions in the state – particularly the arbitrary shut-
ting down of meat shops, thus affecting the meat supply chain business that 
employs a very large section of Muslims – have had the effect of adversely 
affecting the livelihoods of large sections of Muslims.37 Soon after Aditya-
nath took office, UP state administration came down heavily on meat shops 
all over the state, sealing those that did not have all the licenses. Whilst this 
was a noble effort, the vehemence with which the action was enforced – in 
a sector that has hitherto largely been unregulated – and Adityanath’s rep-
utation of being hardline Hindutva, gave the lie to the government’s claim 
of just regulating the retail meat sector and introducing health and hygiene 
measures. No due process was followed, outlets were neither given time to 
set their house in order nor given notice before summary closure actions. 
According to a representative of the Jamiatul Qureish, the body repre-
senting meat retailers, ‘our business are being destroyed and we are being 
hanged without a court hearing’.38 A similar crackdown against the largely 
Muslim-dominated meat supply chain has been taken by BJP governments 
in the states of Haryana and Maharashtra. At the same time, cow-related 
lynchings in these same states, and the largescale vigilante anti-Muslim mo-
bilisation surrounding them, have affected transport and trade in cattle, and 
hence the large labour force dependent on the supply chain and retail – all 
Muslim dominated.39   
36. ‘Yogi Adityanath to end minority reservation in Govt. schemes.’ India Matters, 23 May 
2017.    http://mattersindia.com/2017/05/yogi-adityanath-to-end-minority-reserva-
tion-in-govt-schemes/
37. ‘Meat traders, butchers in UP say “livelihoods have been affected’’. Indian Express. 13 
September 2017. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/meat-traders-butchers-in-ut-
tar-pradesh-say-livelihood-has-been-affected-4840947/. ‘Beef Ban and the deprivation 
of livelihoods”. India Resists, 31 April, 2016.   
38. ‘BJP punishing Muslims’, 27 March 2017. http://www.business-standard.com/article/
current-affairs/bjp-punishing-muslims-up-s-crackdown-has-meat-industry-panicked-
scared-117032700180_1.html
39. “Emboldened by Modi’s ascent, India’s cow vigilantes deny Muslims their livelihoods”. 
Reuters. 6 November 2017. https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/in-
dia-politics-religion-cows/
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Conclusion: Mobilising Anti-minority 
Violence, Reinforcing Deprivation 
Hasan et al. point to the paradox of the Sachar committee having firmly 
succeeded in reconstructing the Muslim community as “developmental 
subjects of the state, rather than as a religious and cultural community”, 
but this not having undone “the continuing failure (of the state) to en-
large the scope of state intervention and budgetary allocation to reverse 
(Muslim) deprivation” (2013: 242-243). This, then, is the central failure of 
policy making for minorities in India – the inability to see Muslims and 
other deprived minorities as a legitimate subject of development and, by 
extension, of affirmative action policies. 
There have been many attempts by policy bodies to get the government 
to sharpen the Muslim focus of its ‘minority’ programmes, including under 
political dispensations of the past, which are not considered to have been 
hostile, as is the case now. However, these have not yielded any results, 
showing how entrenched the opposition is. In 2012 the National Advisory 
Council to the Prime Minister, in its memorandum on Muslim rights, asked 
for the government to sharpen its Muslim focus. The standing committee 
of the central government’s Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment 
severely criticised the performance of the government on minority welfare, 
making the point that the Ministry of Minority Affairs was not addressing 
the roots of the problem highlighted in the Sachar report (ibid: 247). Nev-
ertheless, moves proposing the establishment of a Diversity Commission 
and Equal Opportunities Commission, made by the government’s own 
Expert Group on Diversity Index to equalise opportunities, turned out to 
be non-starters for want of adequate political support; and proposals for 
a minority sub-plan, along the lines of the Tribal Sub-plan and SC Spe-
cial Plan, were shot down by the Planning Commission, who argued that 
this would communalise the planning process, again citing Constitutional 
hurdles (op. cit.).
The reluctance of policy makers to concede safeguards for Muslim and 
other deprived minorities continues. This is despite clear evidence now that 
Muslims, at least the poorer among them, are falling behind the rest of the 
population on all counts of development and need support. While SCs and 
STs face very weak implementation of social policies regarding safeguards and 
affirmative action, in the case of Muslims, effective policies and safeguards for 
improvement are lacking in themselves. There is ample evidence emerging 
that points to safeguards and affirmative action policies for SCs and STs re-
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sulting in improved outcomes for the groups, whereas the absence of similar 
safeguards for Muslims means equally marginalised sections among the latter 
are either catching up very slowly or not at all (Gayer et al 2013: 3, 316.)
A closer look at our material reveals a more sinister design, beyond the 
old story of poor effort for minorities. The evident limited policy commit-
ment for religious minorities has clear implications for the access of the 
poorest minorities, specifically Muslims, to entitlements and services on the 
ground. Evidence points to discrimination in public provision of services to 
Muslims, as well as market discrimination (in relation to employment), with 
both formal and informal structures perpetuating the exclusion (Hasan et 
al 2013: 9). There is a rich body of evidence pointing to the discrimination 
against Muslims in job market, even more than against Dalits; in the pri-
vate sector, and particularly in the public sector (Attewell et al 2007; Jeffrey 
2010; Basant 2012). 
Trivedi’s recent case study on Muslim development experiences at mul-
tiple sites across the country (2013) makes the same argument, but also 
advances the argument  to report that communal polarisation in Baraban-
ki district (Uttar Pradesh), combined with poor hold of Muslims over po-
litical/bureaucratic power there, enables discrimination by frontline state 
agents (eg school teachers and panchayat workers) against poor Muslims, 
forcing most Muslims to withdraw their wards from government schools 
and join madrasas, which are not particularly effective centres of learning. 
The study demonstrates that, on the other hand, the absence of commu-
nal polarisation along with the presence of Muslim Anganwadi workers and 
ASHA (village level health) workers in Murshidabad (West Bengal) and Ka-
tihar (Bihar) districts enables the Muslim community in those locations to 
access services better, while keeping the services relatively approachable to 
Muslims (Trivedi 2013: 233). The author concludes, ‘it is this communal 
character that induces discrimination in the form of social welfare schemes 
not reaching the Muslims’ (ibid: 235). The dominant power structures (in 
Barabanki, in this case) use the communal card to monopolise bureaucratic 
and political power (panchayat elections) and that impacts the provision of 
services to poor Muslims.
Other observers confirm this thesis of communal polarisation being 
a prime factor in discrimination by the state and its actors against Mus-
lims, impacting the ability of Muslims to access rights and services equi-
tably. Looking at the condition of Muslims across multiple cities, Gayer & 
Jaffrolet (2012) found that it was the absence (or presence) of communal 
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violence (keeping other factors constant) that determined much of the re-
silience of Muslim communities (cosmopolitanism) in the peaceful cases 
(in Khozhikode and Bangalore, as opposed to Ahmedabad and Lucknow) 
– in the latter case they argue that the resulting ghettoisation of Muslims 
was a consequence of organised violence, ‘and only secondly of econom-
ic marginalisation or discrimination in the housing market’ (ibid: 325). 
These conclusions echo those of the Sachar report on differences in service 
quality for Muslims in a violence-prone Lucknow, compared to peaceful 
southern cities.   
Poor outcomes for Muslims and other minorities are not just about 
poor resource allocation, programme design and implementation, but 
they are crucially about how service providers weigh their options based 
on local context and take decisions, either facilitating or inhibiting pro-
visioning for citizens. In areas with heightened communal mobilisation 
and recurring violence, ie where society is polarised along religious lines, 
programmes work very poorly for Muslims, due to discriminatory choic-
es that service providers make at the frontline. As the evidence cited 
above shows, this heightened polarisation is an anomaly, with only spe-
cific areas in the country having a history of communal polarisation.  As 
society continues to become increasingly polarised, pockets hostile to 
Muslims have expanded. These are areas where Muslims suffer more di-
rect forms of discrimination in accessing public services, benefits and 
opportunities. 
Today, with the Hindu nationalist BJP gaining ground everywhere, us-
ing a model of growth that favours polarising society along religious lines 
– indeed often using violence strategically and instrumentally to divide the 
electorate and consolidate Hindu support behind it – Muslims face the real 
prospect of suffering not only violence at the hands of majoritarian mobs, 
but also increased discrimination at the hands of duty bearers, potentially 
resulting in complete exclusion from basic services, jobs and opportunities, 
and hence more concentrated forms of deprivation. The prospects of Mus-
lims becoming India’s ‘second-class citizens’ are increasingly real.
Recommendations
For state parties
Commitments
- Enact anti-discrimination legislation
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- Establish equality commission
- Enact hate crime legislation 
- Include Muslim and Christian Dalits within the definition of SCs for af-
firmative action policies, and under the purview of the SC ST Prevention 
of Atrocities Act, 2005.  
Efforts
- Crack down on communal mobilisation 
- Ensure greater allocation to minority programmes, with more directed 
to key needs; and better utilisation, implementation and monitoring;
- Recognise 15 Point Programme as a useful vehicle for improving access 
to universal programmes. Bring further programmes/schemes under its 
purview and improve implementation;
- Create minority sub-plan/minority budgeting, and provide breakdowns
- Collect programme management data, disaggregated by religious groups
- Increase allocation for scholarships, not fixing any targets, demand de-
termining quantum; or fix allocation on 2011 census figures (rather than 
older one currently)   
- Ensure transparency in implementation of minority schemes – 15 Point 
Programme and others.         
International community
- Encourage India to deliver on its promises to minorities;
- Encourage India to confirm all UN human rights conventions; 
- Encourage India to make use of UN resources on human/minority rights 
protection and promotion, including lesson learnings;
- Call India to account on specific violations of minority rights; and 
- Ensure greater visibility of India and current key minority concerns in 
India at the UN and other public events and discussions.
Civil society
- Create awareness among the public of programmes and opportunities 
for minorities; and for all, where minorities could also partake; 
- Ensure better documentation and tracking of programme performance 
and discrimination, as well as of hate violence
India 
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- Encourage better engagement with the policy community, through bet-
ter advocacy; and
- Ensure greater engagement with parliament and state assemblies.  
Minority groups 
- There is a need for greater mobilisation on rights, entitlements and op-
portunities;
- A need for platforms and alliances on core issues, and linkages to plat-
forms of other groups/campaigns that could help; and 
- A need for better capacity of activists, and state and national level for-
mations, to make use of opportunities, deliver projects, report violations 
and mobilise and advocate for rights.
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Introduction
Pakistan ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights (ICESCR) in 2008 and committed itself to implementing the 
covenant in letter and spirit by incorporating these rights in its constitution 
and legal system; as well as to respecting, protecting and fulfilling all its 
international obligations. Unfortunately, even after eight years, Pakistan 
is yet to make any significant progress in effectively implementing these 
rights. Without these two essential steps, no country can progress towards 
the realisation of economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights and make living 
conditions better for its millions.
In Article 2.1 of the ICESCR, it is clearly mentioned that state parties 
have obligations to incorporate these rights into the domestic legal system 
through appropriate legislation. There are two legal models of incorporating 
these rights into the domestic jurisprudence – one is the doctrine of incor-
poration (monist) and the other is the doctrine of transformation (dualist). 
Pakistan follows a dualistic model system, so it is obligatory for Islamabad 
to recognise ESC (economic, social and cultural) rights within the consti-
tution and they should be made part of the first chapter, which deals with 
fundamental rights, in order to make them more effective. However, with 
the passage of the 18th Amendment, a new window of opportunity has been 
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opened, as now provincial assemblies can also legislate directly to include 
ESC rights in their respective jurisprudence.
In recent years, Pakistan has registered modest economic growth, low 
inflation and price stability (Government of Pakistan 2016). Despite this, an 
estimated 29.5% of the population lives below the poverty line (ibid: 284–5). 
The situation is more alarming when other socio-economic indicators are 
looked at. 38.8% of people in Pakistan are ‘multi-dimensionally’ poor (Gov-
ernment of Pakistan and UNDP 2016: 15), meaning that 38.8% of people 
are deprived in at least one-third of the indicators under education (years 
of schooling, school attendance, and educational quality), health (access to 
health facilities, immunisation, ante-natal care, and assisted delivery), and 
living standards (water, sanitation, walls, overcrowding, electricity, cooking 
fuel, assets, and land/livestock ownership in rural areas).1 
Multidimensional poverty also varies significantly across regions. 
For example, it stands at 74% in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA) and 71.2% in Balochistan, compared to 31.4% in Punjab (Govern-
ment of Pakistan and UNDP 2016: iv, 15–16).
According to the National Nutrition Survey, around 58% of households 
are food insecure in Pakistan (Government of Pakistan 2011: 22). It is es-
timated that 44% of children in the country are stunted or too short for 
their age (UNICEF 2015: 7).2 In Pakistan, the percentage of stunting hap-
pens to be higher among children whose mothers were not able to complete 
their schooling than among those whose mothers have completed at least 
10 years of education (ibid: 14).3 Stunting varies across regions, with the 
highest prevalence found in FATA (58%), followed by Balochistan (52%) 
(ibid: 15). 
1. The concept of multidimensional poverty and multidimensional poverty index (MPI) is based 
on the Alkire Foster method developed by Sabina Alkire and James Foster of Oxford Poverty 
and Human Development Initiative. See Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, 
available at: http://www.ophi.org.uk/research/multidimensional-poverty/alkire-fos-
ter-method/  
2.  Stunting is an outcome of malnutrition and repeated infections, and slows down cognitive 
development in children under two years of age. For an overview, see World Health Organ-
isation (2014). Global Nutrition Targets 2025: Stunting Policy Brief. Available at: http://
www.who.int/nutrition/topics/globaltargets_stunting_policybrief.pdf 
3.  See also Arif, G.M. et al (2012). ‘Child Malnutrition in Pakistan: Trends and Determinants’, 
Working Paper, July 2012. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics. p. 9. 
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Provincial and federal assemblies have recently adopted new laws 
against domestic violence, so-called ‘honour’ crimes, and child labour.4 
However, there remain significant gaps in the legal recognition and pro-
tection of several covenant rights. Women, children, religious minorities, 
refugees, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTQI) 
persons continue to face barriers in the realisation of their rights. 
This report focuses on religious minorities within Pakistan, as a specific 
disadvantaged class or category of people (as so defined by the state), and 
the challenges unique to them. 
Disclaimer Regarding Data Presented 
On 15 March 2015, after a long delay, Pakistan began conducting its fifth 
population census. The last population census had been held in 1998. The 
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CE-
SCR) has emphasised the importance of ‘reliable’ and ‘disaggregated’ data 
to the implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, especially in relation to poverty eradication (CESCR 
2001: paragraph 13). This census was finally completed in 2017 with a pro-
visional report of the results released.5 However, as of yet, there has been 
no publication of a complete collation of the breakdown of the results to 
reflect updated numbers of religious minorities.6 Therefore, despite the cen-
sus having taken place just last year, the numbers being presented in this 
report are, unfortunately, still grossly out of date. In the absence of current 
census data, economic and social planning risks turning into guesswork. In 
Pakistan, the census plays an important role in delimiting electoral constit-
uencies, distributing resources to the provinces under the National Finance 
Commission award, and allocating provincial quotas for recruitments in 
the federal bureaucracy7 (hence, the cynicism in questioning the reason for 
holding the breakdown of results back). 
4.   See, for example, The Sindh Child Marriages Restraint Act, 2014; the Domestic Violence 
(Prevention and Protection) Act, 2013 (Sindh Act No. XX of 2013); the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
Prohibition of Employment of Children Act, 2015; the Balochistan Protection Against Harass-
ment of Women at Work Place Act, 2016; and the Criminal Law (Amendment) (Offences in 
the Name or on the Pretext of Honour) Act, 2016
5.  http://www.pbscensus.gov.pk/ 
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6. ‘Minorities demand inclusion in census report’, 16 January 2018. https://www.pakistanto-
day.com.pk/2018/01/16/minorities-demand-inclusion-in-census-report/
7. Pursuant to Article 51 (3) and Article 160 (2) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic 
of Pakistan. 
Therefore, whilst this report makes every effort to present the status quo 
with as much accuracy as possible, there will be discrepancies that will fully 
come to light very soon, once the updated census numbers are released. 
Furthermore, whilst every care has been taken to present a comprehen-
sive and detailed account of the persecution and discrimination faced by 
the many different religious minority communities of Pakistan, certain aca-
demic and research liberties have been taken vis à vis the incidents reported 
and the communities highlighted. This in no way takes away from the expe-
riences of communities not discussed herein nor from the tragedy of each 
incidence of violence or persecution. 
Overview of Religious Communities 
The situation for many religious communities in Pakistan has become in-
creasingly harsh in recent years. Communities such as Hindus, Christians 
and Ahmadis have long faced challenges to ‘belonging’ in Pakistani society 
and fully participating in the political life of country, and, despite some signs 
of progress, according to reports on the ground the situation for minorities 
continues to deteriorate. According to the annual ranking of Peoples un-
der Threat, produced by Minority Rights Group International (MRG) since 
2008, Pakistan has consistently been one of the top 10 countries where the 
‘large-scale violence’ is greatest. The environment in which minorities find 
themselves is characterised by hate speech, frequent invocation of blasphe-
my laws and increasingly violent attacks on places of worship. This oppres-
sive environment has made it increasingly difficult for many religious com-
munities to live securely and free from danger in places where they have 
often spent the majority of their lives. As a result, they are regularly pushed 
to relocate to safer environs in the country or abroad. 
In illuminating the precarious situation faced by many religious com-
munities in Pakistan, it is crucial to avoid stereotypical portrayals of a 
country which is too easily characterised in over-simplistic terms as ‘Is-
lamic’ or ‘Islamist’. Pakistan is a pluralistic society with myriad religious 
and ethno-linguistic identities. This diversity has been shaped by ongoing 
demographic changes throughout its existence. Broadly, however, the pro-
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portion of religious minorities in relation to the overall population has dras-
tically declined. The upheaval wrought by partition in 1947 saw an outflow 
of Hindus and an inflow of Muslims from India. In subsequent decades, 
but particularly from the 1980s onward, migration has changed the com-
position of Pakistani society, and many members of minority communities 
have fled Pakistan to escape persecution and pursue better economic pros-
pects abroad. In Baluchistan, for instance, a spate of recent abductions and 
murders targeting minority members has contributed to migration among 
these groups. 
A sense of exclusionary nationalism has also developed in Pakistan, and 
this has had dire effects on the status and rights of many religious groups in 
the country. Islam is, of course, not monolithic, and growing emphasis on a 
particular understanding of ‘Muslimness’ has severe repercussions not only 
for non-Muslims but also for intra-Muslim ideological divides and the re-
sulting efforts to identify ‘enemies from within’ (Malik 2002: 7). In addition 
to the divide between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims, there are further notable 
subdivisions within Sunni Islam, primarily between Barelvi and Deobandi 
strands, which are perceived by hardliners to be at odds with one another. 
Consequently, in many aspects Shi’a Muslims share a common experience 
of discrimination, persecution, and violence with other marginalised re-
ligious communities in the country. In addition, although there are other 
smaller religious groups in Pakistan, including Sikhs, Parsis, Zikris, Bahais, 
Buddhists and Kalasha, the largest and most prominent minority religious 
groups are Hindus, Christians and Ahmadis. This report will focus particu-
larly on these groups. The following is a brief overview of the situation faced 
by each of these groups.
Ahmadis 
The Ahmadi community in Pakistan comprises approximately 0.22% of 
the population, according to the country’s last national census, conducted 
in 1998. However, Ahmadi population statistics are especially contested. 
While the community is officially numbered at
less than half a million, other sources estimate it at 600,000 and even 
into the millions (UNHCR 2012: 20). They are relatively well-educated as 
a group and many make their home in Rabwah, Punjab district. While Ah-
madis consider themselves to be Muslims rather than a non-Muslim mi-
nority group, they are regarded by many representatives of dominant Islam-
ic groups as heretics and are legally prohibited from declaring themselves 
Pakistan 
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Muslims. They are unable to exercise their right to vote because, in order to 
do so, they must declare themselves non-Muslims, which they are unwill-
ing to do. The marginalisation and persecution of Ahmadis has reached ex-
treme levels in recent years, and Ahmadis are now the target of a ‘sustained 
and vicious hate campaign’ (HRCP 2014).
Ahmadis live in constant fear of harassment or assault either to them-
selves or their homes, workplaces and places of worship. For example, in 
December 2012 suspected militants desecrated 120 Ahmadi gravestones in 
Lahore,8 while in March 2013 an Ahmadi family in Kasur was brutally at-
tacked in their home by local clerics after they allegedly refused to convert 
to Sunni Islam.9 Later in 2013 a vigilante group forcibly expelled an Ahmadi 
family from their business premises in an attempt to thwart the production 
of the Ahmadi-run magazine, The Weekly Lahore.10 In July the same year, 
at the onset of Ramadan, a group of Sunnis assaulted Ahmadis in Fatehpur, 
Gujrat, after which they attempted to assert ownership rights over the Ah-
madi place of worship.11 
This hostility has been accompanied by a marked increase in targeted 
killings of Ahmadis. In a particularly severe incident on 28 May 2010, 94 
people were massacred when gunmen attacked two Ahmadi mosques in La-
hore (Human Rights Watch 2010). Successive governments have failed to 
prosecute injustices or provide meaningful protection to Ahmadis. While 
Ahmadis are frequently sentenced for various dubious charges of blas-
phemy, the state has repeatedly failed to bring to justice those responsi-
ble for numerous attacks against members of the community, including a 
mob attack on 27 July 2014 on a small Ahmadi settlement that resulted in 
the deaths of two children and their grandmother (Amnesty International 
2014).
8. Yusuf, H., ‘Ahmadis, a special target of discrimination in Pakistan’, The New York Times, 6 
December 2012. https://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/06/ahmadis-a-special-tar-
get-of-discrimination-in-pakistan/
9.   Tanveer, R., ‘Clerics attack Ahmadi house, torture family in Punjab’, Express Tribune, 
26 March 2013. https://tribune.com.pk/story/526633/clerics-attack-ahmadi-house-tor-
ture-family-in-punjab/
10.  Tanveer, R., ‘Ahmadi-owned magazine’s office under siege’, Express Tribune, 14 June 2013. 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/562923/ahmadi-owned-magazines-office-under-siege/
11.  Tanveer, R., ‘Dispossession: Ahmadis banished from place of worship’, Express Tribune, 31 
July 2013. https://tribune.com.pk/story/584181/dispossession-ahmedis-banished-from-
place-of-worship-lahore-city/
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Christians 
Unlike many Hindus and Sikhs who emigrated to India at the time of par-
tition, Christians for the most part remained in newly-founded Pakistan 
(Bharadwaj et al. 2008). According to the 1998 Census, Christians make 
up approximately 1.59% of Pakistan’s total population (Government of Pa-
kistan 1998). In fact, the exact number is unknown and estimates range 
from less than 2 million to as many as 3 million (Immigration and Research 
Board of Canada 2013). There are Christian communities in Khyber Pa-
khtunkhwa province, including around 70,000 in Peshawar, but the bulk 
of Pakistani Christians live in Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad, and numerous 
small communities in Punjab (BBC 2013).
While Christians in Pakistan are overwhelmingly poor – working in 
menial jobs as cleaners, labourers and farmhands – there are notable ex-
ceptions. More than any other non-Muslim religious group, Christians have 
made significant contributions to social sector development in Pakistan, 
evident in the building of educational institutions, hospitals and health fa-
cilities throughout the country (Rais 2007: 122). Yet, like other religious 
minorities, Christians have faced discrimination and victimisation through-
out Pakistan’s history. This is evident, for instance, in the nationalisation 
of Christian properties and institutions under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1971–
7). Still largely unaddressed, this has resulted in a loss of control over the 
very educational and health institutions the Christian community has built 
(Karim 2014).
Since 2001 violence and discrimination against Christians has in-
creased. Seen as connected to the ‘West’ due to their faith, Christians have 
at times been scapegoated for the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, as well 
as the immense human suffering seen as a consequence of interventions in 
other countries with large Muslim populations (Malik 2002: 22). Violence 
has not abated in recent years, with an unprecedented suicide attack on a 
Christian church in September 2013. In what was also the largest attack 
against the Christian community in the country’s history, suicide bombers 
massacred more than 100 people at the All Saints Church in Peshawar as 
the service was ending.12 Prior to this, over 100 Christian homes were de-
stroyed by two large mob attacks against Christian communities in Punjab 
in March and April 2013 (ibid). Other cases of violence perpetrated against 
Christians include land-grabbing in rural areas; abductions, forced conver-
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sion and marriage of women; and the vandalising and torching of homes 
and churches. In addition, many Pakistani Christians have been convicted 
of blasphemy under the country’s repressive laws.
Hindus 
Hindus in Pakistan account for approximately 1.85% of the country’s 
population according to the 1998 Census (Government of Pakistan 1998) 
– amounting to less than 2.5 million people. However, as with other mi-
nority groups, these figures are regarded by community organisations to be 
unreliable and out of date. The Pakistan Hindu Council, for instance, has 
estimated that the total Hindu population now exceeds 7 million.13Of this 
group, approximately 94% inhabit the province of Sindh, with more than 
half of Sindhi Hindus concentrated in the south-east district of Tharparkar, 
bordering India. The remainder of Pakistan’s Hindu population reside in 
small pockets of Punjab, as well as Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
provinces (ibid).
Since 1947, levels of animosity towards Hindus have correlated close-
ly with the vicissitudes of Indo-Pakistani relations (Malik 2002). Issues 
and tensions on the international level have fed into the characterisation 
and targeting of Pakistani Hindus as foreign agents. Widespread violence 
perpetrated against Hindus flared, for instance, in the form of large-scale 
killings, desecration of temples, and the kidnapping and rape of women 
during the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1947–8, 1965 and 1971. The destruction 
of the Babri Mosque in India in December 1992 also led to reprisals against 
Hindus in Pakistan (ibid).
In recent years Hindus have remained not just a target of suspicion, 
but also severely discriminated against and persecuted in numerous ways. 
Hindu marriages, for instance, are not recognised or registered under Pa-
kistani law, thus allowing for police to make accusations of adultery and 
demand extortion payments.14 There have been many recent reported cases 
of Hindu women being kidnapped and forced to convert to Islam before be-
ing coerced into marriages with Muslim men (USCIRF 2014). Desecration 
of places of worship and burial sites has persisted as well: in October and 
12. While official estimates and news coverage put the death toll at around 85 people, minority 
communities claim that the actual numbers were much higher.
   Pakistan Hindu Council, http://www.pakistanhinducouncil.org/hindupopulation.asp.
13.  The News International, ‘Pakistani law doesn’t recognise Hindu, Sikh marriages’, 20 Febru-
ary 2013
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December 2013 angry mobs in Badin district, Sindh, dug up Hindu graves 
and disinterred the bodies (ibid). Due to mounting threats of violence and 
poor economic conditions, in April 2013 approximately 500 Hindus report-
edly left Pakistan in the hopes of finding safety and security in India (ibid). 
There had also been an alarming rise in attacks on Hindu temples in 2014. 
According to the non-governmental organisation (NGO) Life for All, there 
were five attacks in March alone – the most violent month in terms of at-
tacks on Hindus in two decades (ibid).
Shi’as 
Although technically not a religious minority per se due to their official legal 
status as Muslims, the Shi’a have effectively been relegated to the status 
of a very large and prominent minority due to the extremely high levels of 
violence and persecution they have increasingly faced over the past decade. 
Shi’a account for approximately 10–15% of the Muslim population of 
Pakistan (CIA).15 They include a number of different ethnic groups and 
can be found throughout the country. Among them, the most vulnerable is 
the sizeable Hazara population in Quetta, due to their ethnicity. Pakistani 
Shi’a are represented in all walks of life, but in many cases have succeed-
ed in playing prominent roles in Pakistan’s cultural sphere and attaining 
influential, high-profile positions. Though as Muslims they are free from 
certain restrictions affecting other religious groups, Shi’a are still regarded 
as apostates by some extremist Sunni groups and individuals. As a result, 
many face regular hostility from extremists and public calls for members to 
be killed (Mihlar 2014: 1). 
However, there was relatively little strife between Sunni and Shi’a 
groups until, under General Zia ul Haq, a radical, exclusionary brand of 
Wahhabism was welcomed into Pakistan.17 In response to the perceived in-
tent of post-revolutionary Iran to export Shi’a Islam to Pakistan and beyond, 
Zia tightened ties with Saudi Arabia and soon presided over the widespread 
dissemination of extremist Sunni ideology through sermons, in madrassas, 
14. The News International, ‘Pakistani law doesn’t recognise Hindu, Sikh marriages’, 20 February 
2013.
15. See Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook, available online at: https://www.
cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html
16. See ‘The Wahhabisation of Pakistan’, 27 June 2008 https://www.theguardian.com/commen-
tisfree/2008/jun/27/middleeast.pakistan; and ‘The sectarian state’, 1 December 2013. http://
tns.thenews.com.pk/the-sectarian-state/#.W_ZA65NLgWo
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and via other channels. In 2011 militants sent an open letter to the Shi’a 
community in Quetta, which numbers around 600,000 people, stating that 
‘all Shias are worthy of killing’ and their intention to ‘make Pakistan their 
graveyard’ (Mir 2011).
These statements have been accompanied by a systematic campaign of 
violence directed towards the community in Pakistan, including Shi’a pro-
fessionals, officials and pilgrims travelling to and from holy sites and fes-
tivals. Between 1999 and 2003, around 600 Shi’a were killed as a result of 
extremist violence and, in this span of time, approximately 500 Shi’a doc-
tors fled the country as a result of the assassination of more than 50 of their 
colleagues in Karachi alone. The targeting of Shi’a professionals by militant 
groups continues to the present day, and in recent years these attacks have 
been especially bloody. Bombings carried out by militants and terrorist or-
ganisations have targeted social gatherings and crowded Shi’a areas with 
near impunity. There have been no meaningful crackdowns or investiga-
tions into the perpetrators of this violence, and police have generally been 
unable to stop attacks when they occur (USCIRF 2014: 76).
Recent incidents include an attack in August 2012 when 25 Shi’a from 
Gilgit-Baltistan were forced off a bus travelling from Rawalpindi and sum-
marily executed on the basis of the ID cards they were carrying.17 In January 
2013 a suicide attack followed by a car bomb in the same location killed a 
total of 91 people in Quetta. The following month, another bomb in Quetta’s 
Hazara Town left another 110 dead. In March of the same year, two explo-
sions outside a Shi’a mosque in Karachi killed at least 50 people. Another 
30 people were killed in a further suicide attack in June outside a mosque in 
Hazara Town. Similar incidents have occurred consistently since, including 
a very high-profile suicide attack in January of 2014 on a busload of Shi’a 
pilgrims, which left at least 22 dead.
Legal and Institutional Discrimination 
Against Minority Religious Communities
Since the early days of its existence Pakistan has seen the implementation 
17. ‘Shias killed in Gilgit sectarian attack’, 16 August 2012. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-19280339
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of various policies, constitutional amendments and pieces of legislation 
that promote the discrimination of religious minorities in the country. This 
discriminatory legislation, which ascribes an inferior status to religious mi-
norities at an institutional level, severely impacts the daily lives of members 
of religious minorities and limits their role in the Pakistani polity. This is 
despite the fact that Pakistan has either signed or ratified various interna-
tional agreements guaranteeing freedom of religion and protection from 
persecution. 
However, a significant gap remains between formal ratification and im-
plementation. The failure to incorporate these conventions into domestic 
legislation has resulted in their frequent violation, as well as a variety of 
legal gaps with regard to the protection of religious freedom in Pakistan. 
For example, the Second Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan, which 
designates Ahmadis as a ‘non-Muslim minority’, as well as Ordinance XX, 
undermine a legal
framework that would allow all Pakistanis to enjoy freedom of religious 
belief by violating key aspects of the aforementioned conventions, such as 
Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (IC-
CPR), which emphasises a person’s ‘freedom to have or to adopt a religion 
or belief of his choice’ and to ‘manifest his religion or belief in worship, ob-
servance, practice, and teaching’ in public or private. Legal and institutional 
gaps such as these contribute to the marginalisation of certain religious mi-
norities, particularly Ahmadis, and are exacerbated by prejudice within the 
judiciary towards these groups (Amnesty International 2012).
A more detailed account of the infringement of Pakistan’s religious 
minorities’ civil and political rights is available in the South Asia State of 
Minorities Report 2016, and therefore an in-depth analysis of the discrim-
ination, persecution, and violence faced by them is outside the parameters 
of this report. This report aims to be more expansive, and hence, moving 
beyond a state-centric analysis to look at socio-economic and culture fac-
tors, will point out how prejudice and discrimination against certain reli-
gious communities, including some Muslims, has become ingrained within 
Pakistani society. Pakistan’s Shi’a, for example, while exempt from much 
of the formal legal discrimination affecting Ahmadis, Christians or Hindus, 
are nevertheless subjected to comparable levels of prejudice and violence. 
Beyond discriminatory laws and constitutional injunctions, religious mi-
norities in Pakistan encounter discrimination in a variety of public spac-
es on a daily basis, including school, work, local neighbourhoods and the 
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media. Graffiti and banners on city walls, voices from the loudspeakers of 
mosques, popular television programmes, and even children’s textbooks 
carry messages that incite hatred towards minorities. Stereotypes of reli-
gious minorities also deeply impact minorities’ interactions with the Mus-
lim majority: for example, because of negative associations Christians are 
often restricted from drinking water from the same source as Muslims.18 
The socio-economic challenges that come with this discrimination also 
affect the daily lives of religious minorities in Pakistan who are often rele-
gated to living in decrepit conditions in slums such as ‘French Colony’ in 
Islamabad. In this sense, the exclusionary nationalism that has been pro-
moted in Pakistan over the years is deeply connected to the lives of Hindus, 
Christians, Ahmadis and other religious groups, who are ‘othered’ through 
a variety of everyday practices. Increasingly, this discrimination has been 
accompanied by widespread violence that impacts on the lives of margin-
alised religious groups in profound ways. The situation is particularly de-
plorable for those who confront discrimination on multiple levels such as 
the Hazara Shi’a community, whose freedom of mobility and security have 
been heavily restricted due to the threat of sectarian violence. Mounting 
sectarian violence against Shi’a, as well as discrimination against religious 
groups who until recently had managed to escape systematic targeting, such 
as Ismaili Muslims, points to the growth of an even more exclusionary form 
of nationalism based on a very specific understanding of ‘Muslimness’. As a 
result, these groups are socially excluded, and the space ceded for them to 
practise their religions or achieve scholastic and economic success remains 
extremely limited.
The Challenges of Intersectional 
Discrimination 
Discrimination against religious minorities in Pakistan manifests in myr-
iad forms, ranging from restrictions on political participation and limited 
economic opportunities to outright violence. These different forms of dis-
crimination do not operate in isolation, but rather work together and rein-
force one another. It follows that religious discrimination does not function 
separately from other systems of oppression that take hold in Pakistan, but 
alongside them. For this reason, members of different religious groups, as 
17. See ‘Justifying the killing of Christians’, 25 September 2013. https://tribune.com.pk/ 
story/609239/justifying-the-killing-of-christians/and Beall 2006: 81–7.
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well as members of the same religious group, may experience discrimina-
tion in different ways depending on other factors such as gender, class or 
ethnicity. Groups such as Scheduled Caste Hindu women suffer from mul-
tiple and intersectional forms of discrimination that affect their lives in 
profound ways. In comparison, the discrimination encountered by religious 
minorities belonging to the elite and urban middle class is somewhat mild, 
and the inclusion of these minorities in positions of power within politics, 
the economy, or the military has often been used to deflect criticism from 
the blatant religious discrimination that pervades the country. Yet it is im-
portant to note that members of this relatively privileged group are few and 
even they do not have immunity from discriminatory structures, which pre-
vent them from enjoying full citizenship rights (Shaun 2012: 197).
With regard to the different systems of oppression that operate in Paki-
stan, gender-based discrimination is particularly severe, as highlighted by 
the Global Gender Gap Index for 2013. Measuring ‘relative gaps’ between 
men and women in areas including education, health, economics, and pol-
itics, this ranking placed Pakistan second to last out of the 136 countries 
assessed (World Economic Forum 2013). It is therefore unsurprising that 
minority women – who encounter multiple and intersectional discrimina-
tion – find themselves in a particularly dire situation.
Incorporation of Covenant (ICESCR) 
Rights in Domestic Law 
The Constitution of Pakistan does not include all economic, social and 
cultural rights under the chapter on ‘Fundamental Rights’, meaning not all 
are enforceable in court. Article 11 of the constitution prohibits ‘slavery’ and 
‘forced labour.’ The same article forbids the employment of ‘a child before 
the age of fourteen years’ in ‘any factory or mine or any other hazardous 
employment.’ The constitution guarantees ‘freedom of assembly’ (Article 
16), ‘freedom of association’ (Article 17), and ‘freedom of business, trade 
and profession’ (Article 18). The 18th constitutional amendment, adopted 
by the parliament in 2010, added to the catalogue of rights ‘the right to have 
access to information in all matters of public importance’ (Article 19A) and 
the right to education ‘for all children up to 16 years of age’ (Article 25A). 
Chapter 2 of the constitution outlines the ‘Principles of Policy’ (Articles 
29–40), which call upon the state to ‘make provision for the just and hu-
mane conditions of work; to provide necessities of life such as food, clothing, 
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housing, education and medical relief’; and ‘to reduce disparity in income 
and earnings.’ While the ‘Principles of Policy’ have persuasive value and 
have been used to develop the substantive content of fundamental rights, 
they are not directly enforceable in the courts.19 The Supreme Court, un-
der the former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhary (2005–13), made extensive 
use of its ‘original jurisdiction’ under Article 184(3) of the constitution to 
initiate suo moto proceedings on a range of human rights issues, particu-
larly health and environment (Qazi 2015: 321). For example, in a series of 
cases, the Supreme Court ordered the government to prevent the contami-
nation of drinking water and the dumping of solid waste in various parts of 
the country.20 The court, however, did not develop reasoned jurisprudence 
on economic, social and cultural rights.21 As a result, the judgements have 
limited value as precedents today. Furthermore, references to international 
human rights law have been extremely rare in Pakistan’s domestic case-law. 
Constitutional rights, as yet, do not extend to the Federally Adminis-
tered Tribal Areas (FATA). Earlier this year, the National Assembly passed 
a bill that approved the merger of FATA with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, thereby 
extending all constitutional rights to the region, but this has not taken ef-
fect yet and implementation will take place over a five-year transition peri-
od.22 The government has yet to clarify whether it intends to introduce the 
constitutional amendment extending ‘Fundamental Rights’ to the people of 
FATA during the five-year transition period or at the end of it (Government 
of Pakistan 2016a: 42).
The National Commission for Human Rights was established in May 
2015 with the appointment of its chairperson and members. The commis-
19. CESCR (2016) paragraph 1; In some cases, dating back mostly to the 1980s and 1990s, 
Pakistan’s courts read the “Principles of Policy” into the guarantees of “Fundamental Rights”. 
See, for example, Shehla Zia v WAPDA, PLD 1994 SC 693; Pakistan Chest Foundation v 
Government of Pakistan, 1997 CLC 1379; Benazir Bhutto v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1988 
SC 416; and Benazir Bhutto v President of Pakistan, PLD 1998 SC 388.  
20.   See, for example, Suo Motu Case No. 14/2007 (Polluted water in Dera Ghazi Khan); Suo 
Motu Case No. 10/2010 (Contamination of Machar Lake); Suo Motu Case No. 13/2010 (Sup-
ply of contaminated water to Rawalpindi from Rawal Dam); and Suo Motu Case No. 18/2009 
(Dumping of solid waste by Safina Sugar Mills on Sargodha-Chiniot road).  
21.  The Court also turned controversial by involving itself too closely in public policy and remov-
ing an elected prime minister (Yusuf Raza Gilani) from office for “contempt of court” on 19 
June 2012.
22. ‘National Assembly green-lights Fata-KP merger by passing ‘historic’ bill’, 24 May 2018.
https://www.dawn.com/news/1409710 and Beall 2006: 81–7.
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sion has the power to take suo moto action on cases of violation of human 
rights. The commission does not have the power to investigate violations of 
human rights by the military and intelligence agencies directly.23
The Status of Socio-Economic  
Rights in Pakistan
The Right to Work and Trade Union Rights – 
Articles 6–8 of the ICESCR
The concept of the right to work entails that people have a human right to 
work and to engage in productive employment and that they should not be 
prohibited from doing so. The right to work is enshrined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, where the right to work emphasises eco-
nomic, social and cultural development.
The Constitution of Pakistan provides a range of provisions with regards 
to workers’ rights in Part II: ‘Fundamental Rights and Principles of Policy’: 
- Article 11 prohibits all forms of slavery, forced labour and child labour;
- Article 17 provides for a fundamental right to exercise the freedom of 
association and the right to form unions;
- Article 18 describes the right of its citizens to enter upon any lawful pro-
fession or occupation and to conduct any lawful trade or business;
- Article 25 lays down the right to equality before the law and prohibition 
of discrimination on the grounds of sex alone; and 
- Article 37(e) makes provision for securing just and humane conditions 
of work, ensuring that children and women are not employed in voca-
tions unsuited to their age or sex, and for maternity benefits for women 
in employment.
Pakistan has ratified 36 ILO conventions (of which 33 are in force), in-
cluding conventions on the freedom of association and protection of the 
right to organise; the right to organise and collective bargaining; abolition 
of forced labour; equal remuneration; minimum age; the worst forms of 
23. According to Section 14 of the National Commission for Human Rights Act, 2012, the com-
mission can only seek a report from the federal government or make recommendations to it 
in relation to ‘complaints of human rights violations by members of the armed forces.’ 
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child labour; and against discrimination (employment and occupation).
The main laws that deal with industrial relations; employment and ser-
vice conditions; occupational health and safety; wages/remunerations; and 
social safety nets/social security are:
- Industrial Relations Act 2012
- Factories Act 1934
- The Shops and Establishment Ordinance 1969
- The Workmen’s Compensation Act 1923
- Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1992
- The Minimum Wages Ordinance 1961
- The Payment of Wages Act 1936
- The Industrial & Commercial Employment (standing orders) Ordinance 
1968
- Protection against Harassment of Women at Workplace Act 2010.
The promotion and implementation of the right to work and decent 
work should be a significant priority for the government, who should be 
creating employment opportunities that are productive; that provide fair 
wages; and that ensure occupational safety and health and a mechanism of 
social protection, in an effort to achieve equitable, inclusive and sustainable 
development and reduce poverty. 
The overall unemployment rate in Pakistan has decreased slightly in re-
cent years. According to official figures, it currently stands at 5.9% (Govern-
ment of Pakistan 2016: 11). However, the unemployment rate is significant-
ly higher in cities (8%) compared to rural areas (5%) (ibid: 20924). Industrial 
development in urban Pakistan has not kept pace with the rising population 
as migrants from the rural areas are also moving to cities. Research suggests 
that the internal migration is at least partly linked to environmental stress, 
including climate-related crop failures and water scarcity (Leadership for 
Environment and Development (LEAD) Pakistan 2014: 17–28). Despite 
experiencing high levels of internal migration, Pakistan does not have a 
24. See also CESCR (2016). List of issues in relation to the initial report of Pakistan. Available at: 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5881e6904.html  
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‘migration policy’. A policy framework, consistent with human rights, is re-
quired in the context of rural to urban migration, not only to fulfil the right 
to work but also to ensure that other covenant rights, such as the right to an 
adequate standard of living, are respected. 
In the absence of appropriate planning, those migrating to cities some-
times have to live in informal settlements in hazardous locations without 
proper access to drinking water and healthcare facilities (ibid: 36). In re-
cent times, Pashtuns from FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, who 
make up a large proportion of internal migrants, have alleged experiencing 
discrimination from private employers, making it harder for them to access 
work.25 These allegations surfaced after the authorities blamed Afghans – 
and people belonging to Pakistan’s predominantly Pashtun northwest re-
gion – for certain terrorist attacks against civilians that took place in early 
2017.26 In February 2017 the police in various cities of Punjab province re-
portedly put individuals from FATA under surveillance.27 On 21 February 
2017 a traders’ association in Lahore circulated a notice asking Pashtun 
traders to report to the police for security clearance.28 
Latest figures indicate that the formal sector employs just 27.4% of the 
total labour force (Government of Pakistan 2016: 208). Outside agriculture, 
most Pakistanis work in the informal sector of the economy, which is large-
ly unregulated, and they have no access to social security, health benefits, 
or occupational safety. The Factories Act, 1934, which governs the working 
conditions of industrial labour, only applies to companies employing 10 or 
more workers.29 Labour inspection remains weak and is absent in the in-
formal sector (Pakistan Institute of Labour Education & Research (PILER) 
2015: 22–38). According to a 2015 ILO assessment, there were only 547 
labour inspectors in the country, out of whom only three were women (ibid: 
25. ‘HRCP condemns “racial profiling of Pashtuns by Punjab govt officials”’, 27 February 2017. 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1317344; Pakistan’s Pashtun Profiling’, 1 March 2017. https:// 
thediplomat.com/2017/03/pakistans-pashtun-profiling/
26. ‘Why Pakistan associates terrorism with Pashtuns and Afghans’, 20 March 2017. http://www.
dw.com/en/why-pakistan-associates-terrorism-with-pashtuns-and-afghans/a-38024338
27. ‘People of FATA origin put under surveillance in Pindi division’, 22 February 2017. https://
www.dawn.com/news/1316244. See also, ‘Labourers in Islamabad feel stigma of being Pash-
tuns’, 28 February 2017. https://www.dawn.com/news/1317514.
28. ‘Pakistan’s Pashtun Profiling’, 1 March 2017. https:// thediplomat.com/2017/03/paki-
stans-pashtun-profiling/
29.  The Factories Act, 1934, clause 2(j). 
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65). In recent years, Pakistan has experienced many workplace accidents 
in the garment and ship-breaking industries. Around three hundred work-
ers were killed when a fire broke out at a textile factory in Karachi’s Baldia 
Town in September 2012.30 In November 2015 a four-storey factory build-
ing collapsed in Lahore’s Sunder Industrial Estate, killing 39 workers. Over 
30 workers were killed in multiple accidents at Gadani ship-breaking yards 
on the Balochistan coast in November 2016 and January 2017.31 
As noted by the Committee, bonded labour continues to exist in Pa-
kistan, particularly in agriculture and the brick kilns industry (CESCR 
2016: paragraph 13). The practice is rooted in unequal land ownership 
patterns, and disproportionately affects certain caste and ethnic groups. 
In Sindh province, a majority of agricultural and brick kiln workers who 
are in debt-bondage are Hindus from so-called ‘lower’ castes. Christians 
and Afghan migrants make up a sizeable proportion of those who work in 
brick kilns in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Qureshi and Khan 2016: 
xv). Bonded labour was formally banned in Pakistan in 1992 through the 
Bonded Labour Abolition Act, 1992, which made forcing anyone to work 
in bondage a crime punishable with imprisonment for a term extending 
up to five years.32 The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and other 
NGOs have since successfully used the law to secure freedom for a number 
of bonded labourers (Society for the Protection of the Rights of the Child 
(SPARC) 2015: 47–9). However, employers are rarely punished as required 
under the 1992 law due to a myriad of reasons, including but not limited to 
many judges in the lower courts often being unaware of the provisions of 
the Bonded Labour Abolition Act (Qazalbash 2016: 1–22). However, many 
of the reasons are more insidious and corrupt than a mere lack of knowl-
edge, with countless reports of the police being complicit in protecting em-
ployers in exchange for bribes (ibid: 19; Solidarity Centre 2014: 13). Since 
the employers tend to be economically and politically powerful, they easily 
evade justice. The situation is further exacerbated as limited access to insti-
tutional credit and an absence of alternative livelihoods continues to push 
workers into a cycle of debt bondage and poverty, despite the law seemingly 
being on their side. There have been many reports of, in the rare case the 
judicial system works in their favour, bonded labourers who have been set 
30.  ‘More than 300 killed in Pakistani Factory Fires’, 12 September 2012. http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/09/13/world/asia/hundreds-die-in-factory-fires-in-pakistan.html  
31. ‘The Wasteland: The Ugly Side of Gaddani’s Ship-breaking Industry’, 12 January 2017. http://
herald.dawn.com/news/1153615.
32. The Bonded Labour Abolition Act, 1992, Sections 11 and 12.
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free by the courts returning to their former ‘employers’ when they fail to find 
other work (Menski 2000: 106–132).
Procurement law in Pakistan does not oblige commercial and public sec-
tor entities to ensure that their suppliers adhere to human rights standards, 
including the prohibition of forced labour.33 According to an assessment 
conducted in Sindh and Punjab provinces, local government departments 
procure bricks without screening whether suppliers use bonded labour (Sol-
idarity Centre 2014: 13–14).
Following the passage of the 18th Constitutional Amendment, provinces 
have enacted new industrial relations laws. The new laws, patterned on the 
previous legislation at the federal level, have excluded workers in the infor-
mal economy (including domestic and home-based workers) from the right 
to form and join trade unions.34 
With 949 registered unions in the entire country, only around 3% of 
Pakistan’s workforce is currently unionised (PILER 2015: 37). Businesses 
have increasingly resorted to hiring contract workers, which allows them to 
dilute the power of trade unions and escape paying pensions and employ-
ment benefits.
The situation is even more dire in the context of religious minorities. 
Religious minorities in Pakistan are largely confined to low-wage, menial 
employment, with little opportunity to improve their socio-economic po-
sition. There are, of course, members of religious minorities who do hold 
influential positions, but a glass ceiling remains, and the socio-economic 
ladder is much more difficult to climb. This is in large part a consequence 
of the limited educational opportunities available to minorities, particularly 
women, and other forms of institutionalised discrimination. For instance, 
although 5% of jobs are legally required to be filled by religious minorities, 
as per a law passed in 2009, these measures are not always followed. For 
example, in a recent case, Sargodha University ignored this quota, leading 
33.  See Public Procurement Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002; Pakistan Public Procure-
ment Rules, 2004; The Balochistan Public Procurement Regulatory Authority Act No. VIII of 
2009; The Punjab Procurement Regulatory Authority Act, 2009; Sindh Public Procurement 
Act, 2009; and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Procurement Regulatory Authority Act, 2012.  
34.   The Sindh Industrial Relations Act, 2013; the Punjab Industrial Act, 2012; the Balochistan 
Industrial Relations Act XIII, 2010; and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Industrial Relations Act, 
2010.  
35. ‘5% minority quota in university recruitment a must’, 23 May 2013.
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a Christian political representative to appeal against the school.35 Bonded 
labour remains common in the country, as highlighted by the Global Slavery 
Index 2013, which ranked Pakistan as the third worst place in the world for 
forced labour and debt bondage. Scheduled Caste Hindus are especially vul-
nerable to these practices (Walk Free Foundation 2013). Similarly, signifi-
cant numbers of Christians residing in Sindh and Punjab work as bonded 
labourers in areas such as carpet-weaving and the brick kiln industry. This 
situation is often closely intertwined with inequalities between religious mi-
norities and the Muslim majority. 
Bonded labour is widely condemned as a form of modern-day slavery, 
as those who are consigned to this form of work are effectively kept in cap-
tivity, with little freedom of movement, and often encounter physical abuse. 
As a consequence of the interest rates that landowners apply to these loans, 
coupled with extremely low wages for their work, bonded labourers expe-
rience extreme difficulty escaping their debt, which is often passed on be-
tween generations.36 Although the majority of bonded labour is found in 
rural Sindh, similar conditions plague those who work in the brickmaking 
sector in Punjab. Despite the aforementioned legislation against bonded 
labour in Pakistan, developed in the early 1990s, which has helped bring 
about the release of some individuals from these conditions, it remains a 
significant problem in the country. According to recent estimates by the 
Asian Development Bank, approximately 1.8 million people are in bonded 
labour across the country, although some estimates are higher (US Depart-
ment of State 2012).
Beyond this, Hindus and Christians in cities often take on menial work, 
such as low-level sanitary jobs, that Muslims are generally unwilling to do. 
A large number of Christians, for example, are occupied as street sweepers, 
and this work feeds into negative stereotypes. This social stigmatisation re-
inforces their economic marginalisation, undermining their ability to access 
even basic livelihoods as a result. 
The workplace also serves as yet another site in which gender discrim-
ination is widespread, particularly towards minority women. According to 
the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), a large proportion of Hindu 
and Christian women in cities are employed as scavengers or sanitary work-
36.  ‘The Australian tycoon who wants Pakistan to free its slaves in return for coal’, 27 January 
2014. http://time.com/1788/the-australian-tycoon-who-wants-pakistan-to-free-its-slaves-in-
return-for-coal/
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ers, on very low wages and without basic labour protections. In some rural 
areas, the situation is compounded by feudal power structures. In Sindh, 
for instance, many Hindu women work in slave-like conditions as bond-
ed labourers to local ‘owners’ (AHRC 2010). The combination of economic 
marginalisation, gender discrimination and religious exclusion means that 
young minority women are particularly vulnerable to extreme abuse from 
their employers.
The Right to Social Security and Adequate Standard 
of Living – Articles 9–11 of the ICESCR
The right to ‘social security and social insurance’ acquires added urgen-
cy in Pakistan given that 39% of its population lives in multidimensional 
poverty (Government of Pakistan and UNDP: 9–11, 15). As the Committee 
has explained: ‘Social security, through its redistributive character, plays 
an important role in poverty reduction and alleviation, preventing social 
exclusion and promoting social inclusion’ (CESCR 2008: paragraph 3). His-
torically, social security programmes in Pakistan have suffered from poor 
coverage and design errors. For example, the pension scheme under the 
Employees Old Age Benefits Institution (EOBI) does not cover agricultur-
al and informal sector workers, thus bypassing the majority of Pakistan’s 
workforce. According to one estimate, only 3.1% of individuals in the work-
ing age population (15–64 years) are active contributors to the scheme (CE-
SCR 2016: paragraph 15; ILO 2014: 275). The other contributory benefits 
scheme, known as the Workers’ Welfare Fund (WWF), similarly has low 
coverage. 
The Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP), Pakistan’s flagship so-
cial safety programme, was launched in 2008. Through the BISP, the gov-
ernment pays unconditional cash transfers (currently set at 1,500 rupees 
or US $15 a month) to eligible families based on a “poverty scorecard”.37 
The BISP also offers health insurance to its beneficiaries (Waseela-e-Sehat), 
provides vocational training opportunities (Waseela-e-Rozgar), and access 
to interest-free financial support (Waseela-e-Haq). The BISP has had a ‘dis-
cernible effect in reducing poverty’ based on the poverty line.38 However, 
the programme has not improved education and health outcomes in a sig-
nificant manner (Mumtaz and Whiteford 2017: 16–38, 21). Though the cash 
37. The poverty scorecard is based on a range of indicators, such as the household size, education 
status, agricultural landholding, housing and toilet facilities, and livestock ownership.  
38. ‘Overview – Benazir Income Support Program’, available at: http://bisp.gov.pk/overview/
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transfers are helping the poorest households survive, the monthly amount 
(US $15) is not enough to help break the cycle of multidimensional poverty. 
For that to happen, there is a need to improve the coverage of other social 
protection programmes, and education and health services. To its credit, 
the programme focuses on women. However, it does not ‘give special at-
tention’ to some of the other groups ‘who traditionally face difficulties’ in 
exercising the right to social security, as outlined by the committee. These 
include: ‘persons working in the informal economy, sick or injured workers, 
people with disabilities, older persons, children and adult dependents, do-
mestic workers, homeworkers, minority groups, refugees, asylum-seekers, 
internally displaced persons, returnees, non-nationals, prisoners and de-
tainees’ (CESCR 2008: paragraph 31). For the purposes of our analysis, it 
is religious minorities that are once again excluded from an essential social 
security programme. 
In relation to article 11 of the covenant (‘an adequate standard of living’), 
‘the right to food’ and ‘the right to water’ remain key areas of concern given 
Pakistan’s agrarian economy and its vulnerability to climate change. These 
rights are also linked to the right to health (article 12) and have serious im-
plications for the wellbeing of women and children (article 10). 
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has directive prin-
ciples that contribute to the realisation of the right to adequate food. Article 
38(d) of the Constitution of Pakistan ensures provision of basic necessities 
of life, including food, for the citizens of Pakistan. It says: ‘The State shall 
provide basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, housing, education 
and medical relief, for all citizens, irrespective of sex, caste, creed or race, 
as are permanently or temporarily unable to earn their livelihood on ac-
count of infirmity, sickness or unemployment’ (Food and Agriculture Or-
ganisation: 1998). The 18th constitutional amendment in 2010 has involved 
the devolution of 17 subjects to the provinces, including the food and agri-
culture sector. Now the provinces are being given more powers in order to 
bring services away from the central government and closer to the people.
The federal Ministry of National Food Security and Research was set 
up on October 26, 2011 because after the adoption of the 18th Amendment, 
some functions listed in the federal legislative list related to the Ministry 
were retained at the federal level, and keeping in view the importance of 
food security and better execution of related functions. According to a noti-
fication issued by the Cabinet Division, the new ministry includes economic 
coordination and planning in respect of food; import and export of food 
207
39.  See www.mnfsr.gov.pk
grains and food stuff, including import and export of food grains; coordi-
nation with aid/assistance agencies with respect to the food sector, and 
PARC and other federal agriculture research organisations; the import and 
standardisation of plant protection-pesticides; and aerial spray and plant 
quarantine.39
To address the unprecedented hunger and malnourishment in the 
country, the newly established Ministry of National Food Security and Re-
search (MNFSR) launched a ‘National Zero Hunger Action Plan’ in March 
2012. The program is a five-year plan that aims to reach a total of 61 mil-
lion food insecure people across the country, with a total cost of 16 billion 
USD. The World Food Programme (WFP) and MNFSR have also signed an 
agreement, under which some 500,000 metric tons of wheat, donated by 
the government of Pakistan, will be converted by WFP into nutritious food 
commodities that will be used to combat hunger among the most vulnerable 
sections of society – particularly malnourished children, pregnant women 
and primary school children.
The programme also features what it calls a ‘School Feed programme’ 
and is establishing ‘Zero Hunger Shops’ in 45 extremely food insecure dis-
tricts in Pakistan, in order to try and tackle food insecurity through schools 
and local markets. Some of the other salient interventions of the Zero Hun-
ger Plan include: 
- Support to food-insecure households,
- Cash and food support in disaster-hit areas, 
- Expansion of farm outputs and market access,
- Targeted social safety nets, 
- Rationalisation of market prices of food commodities,
- Improved nutritious quality of food intake (fortified food), 
- Diversification of food, 
- Food processing industry even at community level,
- Food and nutrition awareness and education programmes, 
- Food security surveillance, 
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- Research for food policy and production, quality improvement, storage 
and distribution; and 
- Enhanced coordination among various federal and provincial minis-
tries, and public-private-civil society partnerships (Sustainable Devel-
opment Policy Institute 2012).
The State also adopted the ‘Pakistan Vision 2025’ policy framework in 
2014. Food security and nutrition are among its important seven pillars.
The government has initiated programmes focused on short term re-
sults, including food stamps and safety net schemes (eg BISP, Watan cards, 
funds under Zakat & Ushar (both Islamic taxes) etc). Pakistan is a signato-
ry to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 
25(1) of which ensures the right to food for everyone.
The right to water and sanitation is not specifically mentioned in Article 
11 of the ICESCR under ‘adequate standard of living’, but it is considered an 
integral part of the right. Article 11, paragraph 1 of the covenant specifies a 
number of rights emanating from, and indispensable for, the realisation of 
the right to an adequate standard of living, ‘including adequate food, cloth-
ing and housing’. The use of the word ‘including’ indicates that this group 
of rights was not intended to be exhaustive. The right to water clearly falls 
within the category of guarantees essential for securing an adequate stan-
dard of living, particularly since it is one of the most fundamental condi-
tions for survival. Moreover, the committee has previously recognised that 
water is a human right contained in General Comment No. 6 (CESCR 1995).
The right to water is also inextricably related to the right to the highest 
attainable standard of health (Article 12, paragraph 1) and the rights to ade-
quate housing and adequate food (Article 11, paragraph 1). The right should 
also be seen in conjunction with other rights enshrined in the International 
Bill of Human Rights, foremost amongst them the right to life and human 
dignity (CESCR 2003).
The right to water also obliges states to prevent the contamination of 
water with harmful elements such as industrial waste, as well as freedom 
from the arbitrary disconnection of water.
The provision of water is recognised under Article 38 of the constitution 
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Profile of a vulnerable minority: 
The Hazara Shias of Pakistan
Who are the Hazaras and what kind of persecution do 
they face? 
The Hazaras constitute a distinct ethno-religious group – historically per-
secuted on both ethnic and religious grounds – that live predominantly in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. The Hazara population is estimated to be 
between 8 to 10 million, although no official statistics have been gathered 
so far. For more than a century, the Hazaras have repeatedly experienced 
human rights violations. In Pakistan, the Hazara population (estimated to 
be between 0.5 and 0.6 million –although this is an outdated number as 
Pakistan held its first census in 2017 after almost two decades, the results of 
which have not yet been disclosed in their entirety) is largely concentrated 
in Quetta city, the provincial capital of the South-western restive and in-
surgency-riddled province of Baluchistan.1 The population in Quetta have 
been living in two separate and distinct areas called Alamdar Road and Haz-
ara Town. The perpetual attacks on the members of the community have 
compelled the community to live their lives in an ‘open jail’ (Hazara Town 
stretching to only 4 square kilometres). In the last few years, hundreds of 
government civil servants, students and entrepreneurs from the Hazara 
community have abandoned their jobs, studies and businesses for security 
reasons.2 Their facial features, which have been termed the ‘fault in their 
faces’ by a senior officer from Baluchistan, easily distinguish them from the 
rest of local population and they are thus easily targeted (ibid).
Over the course of the past 15 years, more than 1,500 Hazaras have been 
killed and over 3,500 wounded in a series of 190 attacks across Pakistan 
(ibid).3 In fact, the most recent numbers collated in a report released by the 
National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR) in February 2018 stat-
ed that 509 members of Hazara community were killed and 627 injured 
in various incidents of terrorism in Quetta during the last five years.4 The 
NCHR report, titled ‘Understanding the Agonies of Ethnic Hazaras’, lists the 
attacks on the Hazara community from January 2012 to December 2017, 
based on the data shared by the Balochistan home department (NCHR 
1. Who Are the Hazara? 5 October 2015. http://tribune.com.pk/story/267225/who-are-the-
hazara/
2. For more details see the Hope report (a non profitable organisation based in USA): http://
www.hazara.net/HOPE/
3. See also: ‘The Forgotten Victims of Terror’, 4 September 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.
co.uk/john-denham/nato-summit-afghanistan_b_5765136.html
4. ‘509 Hazaras killed in terror-related incidents during last five years in Quetta: NCHR 
report’, 20 March 2018. https://www.dawn.com/news/1396273
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of Pakistan under Principles of Policy; the same article that deals with other 
necessities of life. Article 38 recognises that the state shall provide the basic 
necessities of life to all citizens and water is included in that.40 The National 
Drinking Water Policy (NDWP), 2009 formally recognises that safe drink-
ing water is a fundamental human right and that the provision of drinking 
water is a constitutional responsibility of provincial governments.
The provincial governments are slow to respond to this basic right. 
There also remains a lot to be done for the regulation of the performance 
of the municipal bodies in this regard, which results in the violation of the 
right to water in Pakistan. Governance of water on the local scale has re-
mained under municipal councils or corporations, and district administra-
tions are meant to deal with it. But this two-tiered division of governance 
has been woefully ineffective due to political infighting, which has left the 
provincial local governmental system either stagnant or, in many cases, 
simply non-existent. 
A recent study by the Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources 
(PCRWR) states that only 72% of the water supply schemes were reported 
to be functional, of which 84% supplied water not suitable for human con-
sumption.41 Water facilities in Pakistan suffer from contamination mostly 
due to leakage of water supply pipes, and pollutants entering from the sew-
erage pipes due to improper distribution. There have been several studies 
undertaken to ascertain the effect of this contamination:
- A UNICEF report highlighted that contaminated water contributes to 
40% deaths in Pakistan;42 
- A study by the World Bank found that less than 8% of urban wastewater 
is treated (World Bank 2005); and
- A study by the Ayub Agricultural Research Institute suggests that over 
65% of agricultural land in Punjab is now uncultivable due to the use of 
contaminated water to cultivate the land.
The UNDP’s development advocate shared that 27.2 million Pakistanis 
still do not have access to safe water. In the face of this crisis the government 
has failed to respond adequately. Furthermore, due to the fragmented in-
40.  With the Eighteenth Amendment, the issue of water was devolved from a federal concern to 
a provincial issue.
42. ‘84pc of population lacks access to safe drinking water’. https://www.dawn.com/
news/1319157
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2018). Shockingly, all the aforementioned deaths took place in Quetta city 
alone. The regional head of the Hazara Democratic Party (HDP) places the 
figure much higher.
These attacks have included assassinations, suicide bombings, rocket shell-
ing, and targeting Hazara public gathering places such as hotels and sports 
clubs to maximise their fatalities. There have been instances where Hazara 
passengers have been identified on public transport and taken off for mass 
executions.
The individuals and groups responsible for the systematic killing of the Haz-
aras are known to the Pakistani state institutions. Indeed, Lashkari Jangavi, 
Ahle Sunnat Wa Jamait and Jaish ul Islam have been accepting responsibil-
ity for these attacks on Hazaras. Nonetheless, not a single culprit has been 
charged and brought to justice so far. In many cases, the individuals and 
groups responsible for massacres have enjoyed government and communi-
ty protection (Human Rights Watch 2014). Their terrorist activities against 
the Hazaras still continue uninterrupted, especially in Quetta city, the pro-
vincial capital of Balochistan, Pakistan. 
The numerous attacks on Quetta’s Shia Hazara have had a profound im-
pact on the social, cultural, and economic life of the community. Since 2012, 
Quetta’s Hazara have been compelled to limit their activities to the Haz-
ara-dominated neighbourhoods of Marriabad and Hazara Town. As a result, 
they face increasing economic hardship, little safe access to education, and 
severe limits on their freedom of movement. 
Challenges and Migration 
The NCHR report reveals that Quetta has become ‘a prison for them, every-
one tries to escape if they get an opportunity’ (NCHR 2018). The unceasing 
violence has created a perpetual sense of despondence and fear within the 
community, forcing large numbers of young Hazara to migrate internally 
and out of Pakistan. Many have sought asylum in Australia, Indonesia, the 
U.K., the U.S.A., and different parts of Europe. This creates a unique situa-
tion for organisations seeking to work to alleviate the problems faced by the 
community. Faced with what can only be called an exodus of sorts, many 
NGOs have struggled to get cooperation from the Hazaras left behind as the 
youth are desperate to leave and to eventually have the rest of their families 
follow them. When the primary aim of a community becomes to leave, work-
ing on rehabilitation and progression on the ground becomes increasingly 
hard. Furthermore, the ever-volatile security situation in Balochistan makes 
mobilisation extremely difficult, with little to no support being offered by 
Contd...
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stitutional structure for water management and the lack of a national water 
policy, Pakistan is moving from being a water stressed to a water scarce 
country. 
In 2016 the water sector under the Public Sector Development Pro-
gramme of the federal budget was allocated PKR 33 billion, compared to 
the previous year’s allocation of PKR 31 billion. These funds are released 
in phases over the project completion stages, with back-to-back budgetary 
allocations. Much of this funding is invested in the construction of large and 
small dams, lining of water courses, and flood dispersal structures. Due to 
a sharp increase in population and climate-driven environmental changes, 
along with growing industrial demand, there has been a great focus on water 
conservation projects, where the provincial governments’ demand for funds 
exceeds the budgetary supply. The budget allocation for the water sector has 
significantly reduced over the years from PKR 70 billion to PKR 31 billion, 
whereas the demand has risen to PKR 150 billion.43 In 2015 the Sindh Irri-
gation Department demanded PKR 12 billion against its allocation of PKR 
8.6 billion for the year.44 
It is estimated that one million acre-feet (MAF) of water generates $600 
million worth of economic benefits and that Pakistan, due to a shortage of 
storage capacity, has wasted about $18 billion annually for the last 40 years 
by not using over 30 MAF, which eventually flows into the sea, notwith-
standing environmental flows to the sea.
The right to water can be extended to irrigation water. Over 95% of all 
ground and surface water is used for irrigation in Pakistan. While the irri-
gation system suffers from inequitable distribution among and within the 
provinces, it is estimated that up to 40% of water used for irrigation is wast-
ed while irrigating the fields.45 Groundwater quality is deteriorating rapidly 
as well. This issue should be given top priority.
Since 1995 the country has suffered recurrent droughts and floods. As 
a result, Pakistan ranks among the ten countries that are most affected by 
extreme weather events on the Global Climate Risk Index (German Watch 
43.  Only 25pc of allocated budget released for water & power sector’ https://nation.com.pk/16-
Feb-2017/only-25pc-of-allocated-budget-released-for-water-power-sector 
44. ‘More funds likely for water conservation’, 8 June 2015. https://www.dawn.com/
news/1186764
45. ‘Enormous waste of water’, 13 June 2016. https://www.dawn.com/news/1264520
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security forces (who many argue have the harder task of maintaining law 
and order in the province – a claim others refute by citing security and in-
telligence forces’ heavy-handedness with Baloch nationalists and dissidents, 
which is presented as the main catalyst to the unrest in the province). 
Road Ahead 
Under international law, the Pakistani government is ultimately responsi-
ble for the lives and well-being of its population. Internationally recognised 
human rights set out in core human rights instruments guarantee all peo-
ple equal and inalienable rights by virtue of their inherent human dignity. 
Under these instruments, the state, as the primary duty holder, has an ob-
ligation to uphold these rights. This includes not only preventing and pun-
ishing human rights violations by government officials and agents, but also 
protecting communities from criminal acts committed by non-state actors 
such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. Pakistan is party to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), one of the core international human 
rights treaties. The Human Rights Committee, the international expert body 
that monitors compliance with the ICCPR, has observed that a state’s failure 
to ‘take appropriate measures or to exercise due diligence to prevent, pun-
ish, investigate or redress the harm caused by such acts by private persons 
or entities’ itself constitutes a violation of the ICCPR (UN Human Rights 
Committee 2004: paragraph 8). Similarly, the UN special rapporteur on ex-
trajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions has observed that ‘once a pat-
tern [of killing] becomes clear in which the response of the Government is 
clearly inadequate, its responsibility under international human rights law 
becomes applicable. Through its inaction the Government confers a degree 
of impunity upon the killers’ (Alston 2004: paragraph 72).
Therefore, it is absolutely imperative that the Pakistani government take ac-
tion against the leadership of sectarian terrorist outfits that have been com-
mitting these acts of violence against not just the Hazara but all religious 
minorities within the country. The government – and one hopes that the 
new government following the forthcoming election in July 2018 will have 
stronger political will than the current and previous subsequent govern-
ments – must establish an independent federal commission to investigate, 
recommend criminal prosecutions, and publicly report on sectarian killings 
in Balochistan. Furthermore, the government must immediately remove 
from service any administrative or security personnel implicated in sectar-
ian attacks or who failed to investigate and arrest alleged perpetrators of 
such attacks. 
Contd...
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2017). In the 2015–16 fiscal year, agriculture, which provides employment 
to 42% of the country’s workforce, recorded a negative growth of minus 
0.19%. Extreme weather accounted for a drop in the production of cotton, 
rice, and other crops, underscoring the potentially negative impact of cli-
mate change on the right to work and food (Government of Pakistan 2016: 
1–2). There is also a nexus between food insecurity and the country’s ineq-
uitable water economy. Large land-owners monopolise the dwindling water 
resources; small farmers find it difficult to access water for subsistence food 
crops (Oxfam GB 2010).46 
There is now serious concern across both domestic and international 
sectors that ground water sources are depleting fast in Pakistan as a result 
of years of excessive pumping.47 Women and girls, especially in the arid 
regions of Sindh, Balochistan and Southern Punjab, have to travel long 
distances every day to draw water for household use. The burden of fetch-
ing water affects women’s health, and often prevents girls from attending 
school (Oxfam GB 2012: 29).
Pakistan needs to direct investments toward renewable energy and cli-
mate-sensitive development. The government has yet to move in that di-
rection. For example, under its flagship infrastructure development project 
– the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) – the government plans to 
build new power plants over the next six years, which will run on imported 
and locally mined coal.48 
The fact that there is close to no disaggregated data with regard to reli-
gious minority communities is extremely telling and is worth noting. While 
we can wait for the numbers from the census to be released, there is no 
questioning that many minorities who are living in abject poverty and who 
tend to be on the margins of society due to their non-Muslim status are 
being impacted by the lack of social security and poor living standards (par-
ticularly water, food, and housing) at more extreme levels than members of 
the majority. There can be nothing achieved, nor measures implemented 
without full knowledge of exactly how many people from various commu-
46. Oxfam GB, 2010. Migration, Water Stress, and Climate Change in the Indus Delta. Unpub-
lished.
47. For an overview, see The World Bank, Pakistan’s Water Economy: Running Dry (Karachi, 
OUP 2006)
48.  For details, see Government of Pakistan, ‘CPEC- Energy Power Projects’, available at http://
cpec.gov.pk/energy.
215
No progress for the socio-economic development of the Hazaras can possi-
bly take place whilst there is an active threat to their lives. Till the security 
situation in Quetta improves, the Hazaras will continue to be relegated to 
the fringes of society, both socially and economically, and to be forced to 
look towards what they perceive to be salvation and freedom in the form 
of asylum outside the country, thereby having to abandon their homes and 
their lives in Pakistan. 
... Profile of a vulnerable minority continued ....
nities are being negatively affected, as they sit at that unique and troubling 
intersection of abject poverty and minority status. 
The Right to Health – Article 12 of the ICESCR 
The Constitution of Pakistan does not explicitly recognise the Right to 
Health; however, following the 18th Amendment to the Constitution (for 
devolution of power from federal to provincial ministries), a series of 
amendments have been introduced: health is now regarded as a provincial 
subject, enabling each province to administer health departments according 
to their needs. This is considered a progressive step, for better outreach and 
administration of healthcare.
The right to health is widely considered under the realm of the funda-
mental rights – specifically the right to life – guaranteed to the citizens of 
Pakistan under the Pakistan Constitution: ‘No person shall be deprived of 
life or liberty, save in accordance with law (Article 9)’. The right to health is 
implicit in the right to life. It is the economic, social and cultural right to a 
universal minimum standard of health, to which all individuals are entitled.
Public health spending, an important indicator of the state party’s com-
mitment to implementation of the right to health, currently stands at 0.45% 
of the GDP. This level of spending is low compared to many other middle 
and low income countries. People in Pakistan rely on private healthcare, 
which many find difficult to afford (Hafeez 2014). At the national level, lack 
of access to health facilities is the largest contributor to multidimensional 
poverty after deprivations in education (Government of Pakistan and UNDP 
2016: 18). Women and girls in Pakistan have poor access to necessary re-
productive health services. The Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) has re-
duced from 297 per 100,000 live births in 2007 to its current level of 170 per 
100,000 live births (Mahhabul Haq Centre 2016: 16; National Institute of 
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Population Studies 2008: 177). As the government has acknowledged, how-
ever, the MMR in Pakistan ‘is still very high as compared to the other coun-
tries in the region’ (Government of Pakistan 2016: 193). Approximately 40% 
of pregnant women do not receive skilled prenatal care or full protection 
against tetanus (Government of Pakistan 2015a: 258–61). The coverage of 
prenatal care varies noticeably across regions and sub-regions (ibid: 258–
61). Delays in seeking medical care for complications during pregnancy are 
common due to lack of transport and family support, and the non-availabili-
ty of essential services at health facilities.49 Women often do not have access 
to skilled birth attendants, which leads to unsafe deliveries and health risks 
for women, including preventable injuries and health conditions, like ob-
stetric fistula (UN General Assembly 2008). Women who develop obstetric 
fistula sometimes face isolation and stigmatisation because they are aban-
doned by their husbands and rejected by communities. An estimated 5000 
cases of fistula occur in Pakistan every year.50 
The domestic legal framework on abortion continues to be restrictive. 
According to Section 338 of the Pakistan Penal Code, as amended in 1997 
to ‘bring it in conformity’ with Islamic teachings, ‘Whoever causes a woman 
with child whose organs have not been formed, to miscarry, if such mis-
carriage is not caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the 
woman or providing necessary treatment to her, is said to cause ‘Isqat-i-
Haml’ (abortion)’.51 The punishment is set at ‘three years if the abortion is 
performed by the woman’s consent, otherwise a maximum of ten years’.52 
Though the law does not specify a gestational limit, Islamic scholars tend 
to believe that foetal organs are developed by the fourth month of gestation 
(Shapiro 2014: 483–494). Thus, abortion would be legal as ‘necessary treat-
ment’ if carried out in ‘good faith’ up to the end of the fourth month of preg-
nancy. That marks some improvement on the previous law, which allowed 
for abortion only to save the life of the pregnant woman. However, abor-
tion remains criminalised in several circumstances, including in cases of an 
unwanted pregnancy as a result of rape, sexual assault or incest; in case of 
49. For recent empirical evidence, see Qureshi R. N. et al (2016). ‘Healthcare seeking behaviours 
in pregnancy in rural Sindh, Pakistan: A qualitative study’, Reproductive Health¸ 2016, 
Volume 13 (Supplement 1).  
50.  ‘Up to 5000 fistula cases surface in Pakistan every year’, 23 May 2015.
51. Section 338 and sub-sections 338A, 338B and 338C of the penal code were initially amended 
in 1991 through a presidential ordinance. The parliament adopted the necessary statutory 
amendments in 1997. See Criminal Law (Amendment Act) 1997, available at: http://www.
na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1324604341_299.pdf
52. 338A, Pakistan Penal Code, 1860.
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Good practice case study: 
The Grief Directory 
What is The Grief Directory? 
The inception and the formulation for the idea of The Grief Directory 
(TGD), was a deeply personal endeavour for the women at the helm of this 
initiative – Dr Fatima Ali Haider, one half of the duo behind TGD, has her-
self been a victim of the terrorism and sectarian violence that has plagued 
Pakistan for the better part of the last two decades. Following the target 
killing of her husband and eleven-year old son in February 2013, Dr Haider 
found herself reeling from the tragedy and overwhelmed with grief. There 
was no appropriate support available for the families of victims of terror 
attacks and/or survivors of terror attacks, either from the state or private 
providers of mental health care. In the event that there were mechanisms of 
support available, there was no information on how to access them. In fact, 
access to information proved to be the biggest challenge. This led to what 
the founders of TGD call the ‘bridge of compassion’, which in many ways 
was a practical embodiment of that very idea – a dispassionate and profes-
sional provision of compassion, support, and a pooling of resources. Under 
the oversight and management of Dr Fatima Ali Haider and Dr Narmeen 
Altaf Hamid, both medical professionals, TGD came to life. 
TGD formally started functioning in January 2015 with the aim of match-
ing the needs of affected families with those professionals, organisations, 
and individuals who were willing and able to provide support. This support 
ranged from financial (preferably in kind), to medical, psychological, legal, 
and administrative. It involved working with banks, insurance companies, 
the police, and government organisations. Providing help also took the form 
of emotional support which could include sharing a meal, attending a spe-
cial occasion or lending a listening ear; simple things which were no less im-
portant. Help was given without distinguishing between faiths or sects. TGD 
aimed to use compassion and empathy to promote unity where violence was 
dividing. Early on in this endeavour though, it became apparent that the 
scale of the problem was far bigger than had been anticipated. Accessible 
and systematic support systems could not be provided through working on 
an individual basis alone. Simultaneous efforts had to be made to build in-
stitutional mechanisms of support as well. This tied in to an acknowledg-
ment on the part of TGD that most victims and survivors of terror attacks 
also happen to belong to already marginalised and persecuted minority 
communities, who due to their religious and/or ethnic identities, also find 
themselves in compromised circumstances with regard to their socio-eco-
nomic rights. By finding themselves in situations including but not limited 
Contd...
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foetal impairment; or after the fourth month of pregnancy, unless there is a 
risk to the woman’s life. Additionally, healthcare professionals lack aware-
ness of the law. Some women for whom the pregnancy amounts to a serious 
health risk are turned away by health facilities (Sathar et al 2013).53 This, to-
gether with poverty, leads women to opt for unsafe abortions conducted by 
unskilled practitioners (Gilani and Azeem 2005: 412–15). At least 5.6% of 
maternal deaths in Pakistan occur due to abortion-related complications.54 
Furthermore, transgender individuals – many of whom work as com-
mercial sex workers – continue to face discrimination in accessing health 
services in Pakistan. In May 2016, Alisha, who worked with an activist 
group called Transgender Alliance, was allegedly shot by a disgruntled cus-
tomer. Alisha died from her wounds at a Peshawar hospital after the doctors 
ignored her and refused to admit her either to the male or the female ward.55 
Religious minorities face similar difficulties in accessing proper health 
care. Whilst it is difficult to present data as to exactly how members of mi-
nority communities are able to realise their right to health in Pakistan, there 
is ample anecdotal evidence of the discrimination they face. There are fre-
quent reports of Pakistani Christians working as sanitary workers (jobs re-
served for low caste Christians and Hindus as they are considered too dirty 
for or ‘beneath’ Muslims) who are denied emergency medical care or basic 
health care in hospitals due to being ‘filthy’.56 There are also frequent reports 
of Christians and Hindus being violently attacked in hospitals for touching 
‘clean’ medical supplies implicitly understood to be only for Muslims.57 Fur-
thermore, following the tragic twin terrorist attacks on Ahmadi mosques in 
Lahore in 2010, when the victims were rushed for emergency medical care 
to Jinnah Hospital (a public hospital), doctors and medical staff were hesi-
tant to treat them out of fear for their own lives (not unfounded, as the same 
night terrorists did attack Jinnah Hospital and the wing where victims and 
53. See also, ‘Resorting to unsafe abortion for family planning’, 25 September 2016. https://
www.dawn.com/news/1285965
54.   ‘5.6% of maternal deaths in Pakistan attributed to abortion-related complications’, 12 March 
2015. https://www.dawn.com/news/1168938  
55.  ‘Transgender Alisha succumbs to wounds at Peshawar hospital’, 25 May 2016. https://www.
dawn.com/news/1260559.
56. The last hours of a Christian sanitary worker in Pakistan’, 11 June 2017. https://www.scss.
tcd.ie/~spillab/BBC/Origional/The%20last%20hours%20of%20a%20Christian%20sani
57. ‘The last hours of a Christian sanitary worker in Pakistan’, 11 June 2017. https://www.scss.
tcd.ie/~spillab/BBC/Origional/The%20last%20hours%20of%20a%20Christian%20sani-
tary%20worker%20in%20Pakistan%20-%20BBC%20News.html
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to where the primary breadwinner of the family had been killed in a terror 
attack, they found their living standards worsened and their difficulties ex-
acerbated. Thus, over time the goal of TGD evolved to include more aware-
ness raising about the needs of such families, doing advocacy for them, and 
ultimately working towards a centralised system at the national level where 
families could receive efficient, comprehensive, and compassionate support. 
Work so far 
In the past two years TGD has carried out a number of projects, which in-
clude establishing a support network of health practitioners in Peshawar, 
running a summer internship that has been converted into a year round pro-
gram, collaborating with Shaheed Foundation on establishing a network of 
health professionals in Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan, and 
setting up a health fund in Quetta. 
In January 2017, in collaboration with the Centre for Public Policy and 
Governance (CPPG), FC College, Lahore, TGD held its first annual five-
day conference, titled ‘An Initiative For The Sufferers of Political Violence 
In Pakistan’.  The trainer and lead facilitator for the event was Professor 
Marie Breen Smyth, a professor at the department of Conflict Resolution, 
McCormick School of Global Governance, Massachusetts University, USA. 
The conference took a three-pronged approach to discuss and explore the 
support mechanisms required by families of victims and survivors of polit-
ical violence. The first three days focused on the training of mental health 
professionals, followed by a one-day seminar for researchers and academics 
interested in working in this field. A policy dialogue took place on the last 
day with the representatives of various government organisations and state 
actors discussing ways to implement institutional mechanisms of support. 
In November 2017 TGD conducted a workshop at the University of La-
hore as part of the first South Asian Regional Child Rights Conference The 
key speaker was Dr. Karen Olness, Professor of Paediatrics, Global Health 
and Diseases at Case Western Reserve University in Colorado, Ohio, USA. 
Participants were a diverse group comprising educationists, human rights 
workers, parents, affected children and healthcare professionals. The objec-
tive of the workshop was to identify the issues that children who have suf-
fered loss, particularly loss related to political violence, face and to see how 
the various stakeholders can better support them. 
In April 2018 a workshop was held at the Centre for Public Policy and Gover-
nance to look at the feasibility of starting a Trauma/Healing Centre, which is 
one step closer to the main objective of TGD. This workshop was facilitated 
by a group of Korean doctors who gave presentations as well as the com-
mitment to collaborate in this initiative in the future. A working group has 
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survivors of the mosque attacks were being treated).58
The example of the attack on Jinnah Hospital presents a unique situ-
ation in which the discrimination being faced by Ahmadis in need of dire 
medical attention is not perpetuated by their economic status (or their 
caste, as in the case of Christians and Hindus), and is thereby a result 
purely of their religious identity. This is interesting and presents a particu-
larly challenging situation in which even financial and class-based privilege 
does not protect religious minorities from facing violence and discrimina-
tion in being able to access adequate and pressing medical care. 
The Right to Education – Articles 13–14 
It is worth noting that access to schooling has increased in Pakistan. How-
ever, at 53%, the Net Enrolment Ratio (NER) for girls is still lower than for 
boys (60%) (Government of Pakistan 2016: 171). Of all the provinces, the 
NER for girls is lowest in Balochistan at 35%. The gender gap in enrolment 
has narrowed to some extent in Sindh and Punjab (ibid: 170-71). There are 
noticeable regional variations in access to schooling for girls across regions 
(CESCR 1999). Except for Punjab and the capital Islamabad, all provinces 
continue to have far fewer middle and secondary schools for girls than for 
boys. FATA and Balochistan are particularly disadvantaged in the availabil-
ity of quality educational facilities. Less than 10% of primary schools in Ba-
lochistan and 30% in FATA have drinking water for pupils (CESCR 2016: 
paragraph 29). Half of the middle schools in Balochistan and FATA do not 
have toilets (Government of Pakistan 2015: 158–60). FATA and Balochistan 
feature at the bottom of district education rankings based on access, attain-
ment, literacy and gender parity (Alif Ailaan and SDPI 2016). The regions 
that have the lowest enrolment for girls (Balochistan, FATA and Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa) also have significantly lower percentages of female teachers 
(Government of Pakistan 2015: 107–8, 110). Textbooks contain stereotypes 
of women and some religious minorities (Hazirullah and Christina Skelton 
2013: 183–194).
In recent years, non-state groups have attacked school buildings and 
targeted students and teachers in many parts of the country, including in 
Balochistan, Punjab, FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Human Rights 
Watch 2017). The brutal attack by Taliban gunmen on the Army Public 
School in Peshawar in 2014 created an atmosphere of insecurity among chil-
58 ‘Jinnah Hospital attack mastermind arrested’, 22 July 2010. https://tribune.com.pk/sto-
ry/29560/mastermind-of-jinnah-hospital-attack-uncovered/
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been formed which is following up on the discussions in the workshop and 
endeavouring to give them practical shape.
TGD is currently working with Rescue 1122 emergency services in Lahore, 
where a team of psychologists is providing psychological assessment and 
counselling services to a hundred first responders in one of their main sta-
tions. This is a pilot project and from the extremely positive response it is 
garnering, it is likely that the service will be replicated in other stations and 
cities as well. 
Another project that is in its initial stages is an e-Health initiative for the 
Hazara community in Quetta, Balochistan. This will provide much needed 
health services to this persecuted community and promote inter-sect and 
inter-provincial harmony. 
What makes this inspirational? 
TGD has been providing what are clearly essential and much-needed ser-
vices to victims of political and terror-related violence, but their most 
ground-breaking venture is the aforementioned e-Health initiative for Quet-
ta’s Hazaras. 
The Hazaras are an ethnic group native to the region of Hazarajat in central 
Afghanistan. They make up the third largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. 
They also make up a significant minority group in Pakistan, largely living in 
the city of Quetta. 
The Hazaras find themselves particularly vulnerable to attack because of 
their distinctive facial features and Shia religious affiliation. More than 500 
have been killed in attacks since 2008, but their precarious position is par-
ticularly reflected in the increasing percentage of Hazaras among all Shia 
victims of sectarian attack. 
The half-million members of the Hazara community in Quetta live in fear, 
compelled to restrict their movements, leading to economic hardship and 
curtailed access to health, education and employment. This oppressive situ-
ation has prompted large numbers of Hazaras to flee Pakistan for refuge in 
other countries. 
This forced isolation and ghettoization has had a severe negative impact on 
the emotional and physical health, as well as employment and financial sta-
tus, of the vulnerable people of this community. The women are per force 
doubly marginalised. Because of the risky security situation, it is difficult 
for outsiders to offer support, but with technological progress, there can 
be innovative ways to reach out and help, which is exactly where the TGD 
steps in. 
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dren, parents and teachers, which still persists. More recently, on 20 June 
2016, the Taliban targeted Bacha Khan University in Charsadda (Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa province), killing at least 21 people, most of them students.59 
Another major area of concern is a lack of integration into mainstream 
schooling for children living with disabilities in Pakistan (CESCR 1999: 
paragraph 6). Official education statistics in Pakistan do not incorporate 
data on children with disabilities.60 Enrolment, drop-out, and transition 
rates are not compiled separately for such children (ibid). It is not known 
how many children with mental and physical disabilities are currently out of 
school. Lack of disaggregated data and research impedes the development 
of effective policies to promote inclusive and quality education. Except a few 
donor-supported projects, school buildings in Pakistan do not have ramps, 
support bars or other disability-friendly facilities (UNICEF 2003).
Since the insertion of the right to education in the constitution, all four 
provinces have introduced laws ‘guaranteeing’ the right to ‘free and com-
pulsory education’. This is a positive step forward. However, the provincial 
laws have certain shortcomings. For example, under the laws enacted in the 
capital Islamabad, Balochistan and Sindh, parents face fines for failing to 
send their children to school.61 However, the laws do not stipulate minimum 
basic facilities within schools, such as drinking water and toilets, and do not 
ensure schools are accessible for children with disabilities (Pakistan Coali-
tion for Education 2015: 37–50).
This problematic situation appears to be even more complicated when 
looking at the specific issues that religious minorities confront with regard 
to education in the country. In terms of barriers to education, the situa-
tion varies for different religious minorities, depending on factors such as 
class, gender and geographic location, as well as the religious group that 
they belong to. Given that economic position and gender are two of the key 
factors determining the access an individual has to education in the country, 
poor women from minority communities tend to face some of the greatest 
challenges. For example, recent surveys have pointed out that, in the same 
community, illiteracy rates for Scheduled Caste Hindu women and men were 
59. ‘APS mastermind claims responsibility for Charsada varsity attack, 21 killed’, 21 January 
2016. https://www.dawn.com/news/1234200
60.  See for example, GoP (2015). Pakistan Education Statistics 2013-14. 
61. The Balochistan Compulsory Education Act, 2014 (Section 8); Right to Free and Compulsory 
Education Act, 2012 (Section 8); The Sindh Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Edu-
cation Act, 2013 (Section 8).
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The e-Health project is modelled around remote service provision, where-
by women in the community are to be provided health information, advice 
and consultations via internet, with referrals to local facilities for medicines 
and inpatient care.  The system will work with local community workers, 
an online resource facility and a local referral centre.  The project envisages 
beneficiaries at multiple levels:
The primary beneficiaries will be the women of the Hazara community. They 
will get information, consultations and support at their door-step or within 
their community. 
The secondary beneficiaries will be the community workers who will be 
selected from within the community, trained and paid a stipend (albeit a 
nominal one at this stage). They will learn skills and be able to contribute to 
their communities.
Whilst beginning with health, the access that this system provides to the 
women could also potentially trickle to other aspects of the community, 
whereby the youth and men will also be enabled to access e-resources in 
other areas, thus empowering the community as a whole.
This project, or rather any of the work the TGD does, is not without chal-
lenges. Apart from the obvious financial constraints that all grassroots lev-
el social mobility providers face, the TGD also faces an added security risk 
due to the sensitive nature of their work. Working so closely with heavily 
persecuted groups like the Hazaras puts the TGD, its volunteers and its af-
filiates at direct risk of violence from sectarian terrorist organisations. Fur-
thermore, due to the fact that much of the TGD’s work involves working 
with state-operated services, eg emergency first responders, they also have 
to contend with governmental bureaucracy and the inevitable pushbacks 
that non-governmental organisations in such situations face. However, it is 
exactly this tenacity and resilience that the TGD embodies, deeply rooted 
in their own violent origins, that allows them to continue working for the 
rehabilitation of the most marginalised and persecuted. 
Whilst responsibility of this rehabilitation lies with the state, the TGD util-
ising its expertise and networks in the state’s absence is an excellent exam-
ple of how grassroots organisation and mobilisation can successfully work 
towards the efficient and effective provision of essential socio-economic 
services. 
... Good practice case study continued ...
87% and 63.5% respectively, while the literacy rate for in the country overall 
was approximately 58% for women and 35% for men (Shah 2007: 74). 
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Growing violence in the country has also reportedly affected the ability 
of some Muslims to access education, especially those such as Hazara Shi’a 
in Baluchistan.62 For example, an attack in Quetta by a female suicide bomb-
er on a bus carrying students of Sardar Bahadur Khan Women’s University 
in June 2013, followed by another suicide bomb in the hospital where the 
injured were being treated, left 14 students dead and also killed four nurses. 
Even those religious communities that do have the opportunity to re-
ceive an education face challenges. This is in large part a result of historical 
processes which have significantly impacted how education is approached 
in Pakistan, including the nationalisation of schools under Zulfiqar Ali Bhu-
tto, followed by efforts to ‘Islamise’ the curricula under Zia. Given that Ar-
ticle 22 of the constitution stipulates that those attending educational in-
stitutions will not be obligated ‘to receive religious instruction, or take part 
in any religious ceremony … if [it] relates to a religion other than his own’, 
non-Muslim students are not officially required to study Islam. However, 
because non-Muslim students are not commonly given an alternative and 
receive extra credits for taking Islamiyat or Islamic Studies, they are often 
induced or forced outright to take these classes by their teachers.63 
Beyond challenging the constitution, this pressure also leads to the 
vulnerability of religious minority students. Indeed, there have been cas-
es where non-Muslim students have been severely punished for seemingly 
minor errors in the current education system. For example, in September 
2011, after a Christian student misspelt a word in a response to a question 
about a religiously-inspired poem in an Urdu exam, she was expelled from 
school and her mother was forced to transfer jobs.64 Although education 
was devolved to the provincial level in 2010, similar issues persist. Recent 
studies have pointed out that textbooks – particularly those used in classes 
such as social studies, civics, Urdu and English – contain a ‘distorted pre-
sentation of national history, insensitivity to the existing religious diversity 
62.  ‘Only those who are above the age of 21 should be allowed to change religion’, 30 December 
2012. https://tribune.com.pk/story/486423/only-those-who-are-above-the-age-of-21-
should-be-allowed-to-change-religion/
63. ‘Textbook biases show when Muslim students ask non-Muslim high achievers to convert’, 19 
March 2013. https://tribune.com.pk/story/522886/textbook-biases-show-when-muslim-
students-ask-non-muslim-high-achievers-to-convert/; ‘Teaching hatred – a glimpse into 
Pakistan’s education system’, 20 August 2014. https://www.hafsite.org/media/pr/teach-
ing-hatred-glimpse-pakistan-education-system-2012-2013
64. ‘Girl accused of blasphemy for spelling error’, 25 September 2011. https://tribune.com.pk/
story/259907/girl-accused-of-blasphemy-for-a-spelling-error/
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in Pakistan, views encouraging prejudice, bigotry and discrimination to-
wards fellow citizens, women, religious minorities and other nations, and a 
glorification of war as well as an incitement to militancy and violence’ (Thom-
bani 2010: 33).65 As a result, these textbooks and the curricula more broadly 
have been both ‘nationalised’ and ‘Islamised’ in a way that portrays Pakistan 
as ‘a Muslim country for Muslims alone’, thereby erasing the role religious 
minorities have had in Pakistani society and promoting discriminatory atti-
tudes towards them (ibid: 34).
Although the government officially recognised this as a problem in 2006 
and efforts to adopt new education policies have been made in recent years, 
a 2013 report by the National Commission for Justice and Peace (NCJP), 
focused on Punjab and Sindh, points to the fact that discriminatory content 
in school syllabuses has not only remained in place, but in some cases even 
increased (NCJP 2013). Similarly, there continue to be calls to further os-
tracise religious minorities in school curricula. For example, in September 
2013 an influential cleric expressed that additional information about Ah-
madis should be included in curricula in an effort to further institutionalise 
their discrimination.66 
Although the content of textbooks has rightfully been a key area of fo-
cus in recent years, it is also important to look at the role of teachers in 
educational institutions. Teachers in public schools have been slightly more 
ambivalent with regard to religious minorities and tolerance in the class-
room. While some teachers do promote more inclusive ideas and respect 
for religious minorities, a significant proportion of educators themselves 
harbour acrimonious views regarding religious minorities (Hussain et al. 
2011). Teachers from religious minority groups are also not immune to the 
discrimination encountered by students. Although a detailed discussion of 
madrassas (religious schools) is outside the ambit of this report, it is im-
portant to note that very similar issues persist with regard to the curricula 
and teaching in these institutions, although the context is different because 
religious minorities do not attend them. Despite the purported acceleration 
of efforts to regulate madrassas over the last decade or so, these measures 
have not been successfully realised. Recently, the government has launched 
a ‘National Plan of Action to Accelerate Education-Related MDGs [Millen-
nium Development Goals]’ for 2013–16, but the impact of this plan to pro-
mote a more inclusive and tolerant education system remains to be seen. 
There is also an important role for educators and the wider community to 
foster greater cooperation between students of different faiths. 
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Conclusion 
2017–18 has been an important period for Pakistan, not only in terms of 
being held accountable for its international human rights commitments but 
also for the increased scrutiny it has been facing in the lead up to the 2018 
Elections, held earlier this year. In November 2017 Pakistan had its third 
Universal Periodic Review before the United Nations Human Rights Coun-
cil, where it presented its national report and answered questions raised 
by the international community. The outcome of the UPR found Pakistan 
to have insufficiently addressed the concerns of the working group. Fur-
thermore, earlier in the year, Pakistan also presented its initial report to 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, upon which the 
committee noted certain positive aspects in the report – limited to the rat-
ification of multiple international human rights treaties and the passing of 
certain domestic legislation in lieu of this. However, there were far more is-
sues of concern than there was cause to praise the country. Pakistan appears 
to be failing in its commitments to uphold the socio-economic rights of its 
citizens across the board. The country is facing a severe water shortage and 
people are facing abject poverty on unprecedented levels. In such a situa-
tion, making a case for the specific provision of these rights for its religious 
minorities appears to many within the country as singling out communi-
ties when all citizens are suffering. However, as has been seen through the 
course of this report, the socio-economic conditions of religious minorities 
in Pakistan are significantly worse than those of the majority, and the effects 
of intersectional disadvantage go on to further compound and exacerbate 
the living conditions of very specific sub-sets within those communities as 
well – for example, women belonging to minority religious communities. 
The fact that these communities also face the threat of violence on a daily 
basis makes it increasingly hard for them to be able to demand the realisa-
tion of their international and constitutional human rights. 
Pakistan needs to do better to protect its most vulnerable. If it cannot 
provide adequate security to protect them, their places of worship, and their 
right to practise their faiths with freedom, from the violence perpetrated 
against them by non-state actors, it needs at the very least to provide mech-
anisms of support for them to actualise their rights to an adequate standard 
of living. 
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Recommendations 
1. Pakistan needs to take all necessary measures to ensure that ICESCR 
rights are fully incorporated into its domestic legal order with a consti-
tutional rank equal to that of civil and political rights, and to ensure that 
all these rights are applied by the domestic courts at all levels;
2. Pakistan must ensure that constitutional protections are extended to 
FATA at the earliest, and that people in the tribal region have equal ac-
cess to judicial remedies for violations of their rights;
3. Pakistan should ratify the Optional Protocol to the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
4. Pakistan must produce the results of the latest census with disaggregat-
ed data for religious minorities at the federal, provincial, and territorial 
levels, so that measures can be taken to ensure appropriate fulfilment of 
the socio-economic rights of the members of such communities;
5. Pakistan must consider revising articles 25–27 of the constitution, with 
a view to ensuring that the constitution prohibits discrimination on all 
grounds; adopt comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation prohib-
iting all direct, indirect, and multiple forms of discrimination, on any 
ground; and provide for effective remedies for victims of discrimination, 
including through judicial and administrative proceedings; 
6. Pakistan must carry out a study on the situation of the ‘scheduled castes’ 
or Dalits (within both Christian and Hindu communities), with the par-
ticipation of the members of that community and of relevant experts, 
which should include information on the situation of Dalits in the coun-
try, including relevant statistical data; 
7. Pakistan must take effective measures, such as awareness-raising 
campaigns, to eradicate stigma and prejudice against members of the 
‘scheduled castes’ or Dalits, and to combat discrimination against them, 
particularly in the employment and education sectors;
8. Pakistan must take effective measures to facilitate increased employ-
ment quotas in the public sector for religious minorities, taking into 
consideration their share of the total population, and must fully imple-
ment the quotas;
9. Pakistan must make every effort to increase public expenditure in the 
health sector and strengthen it with a view to providing free, quality 
basic health services to all, including disadvantaged and marginalised 
individuals from religious minority communities;
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10. Pakistan must intensify its efforts to ensure that all children enjoy, with-
out discrimination, the right to education, which will empower children, 
particularly those who are disadvantaged and marginalised, to lift them-
selves out of poverty and obtain the means to participate fully in their 
communities and national life;
11. Pakistan must reform legislation that disadvantages minorities imme-
diately, such as sections 298-B and 298-C of the Pakistan Penal Code, 
which restrict religious groups from freely practising their faith. Clauses 
295-B and 295-C on blasphemy should be reformed in the short term to 
prevent their continued abuse, with improved evidence thresholds, the 
immediate removal of the death penalty, the introduction of prison sen-
tences for those guilty of false accusations, compensation for victims, 
and the clarification of imprecise terminology;
12. Pakistan must address hate speech by implementing current legislation 
and introducing new measures. It needs to develop a clear definition of 
what constitutes hate speech in the media and enforce legislation that 
designates hate speech a crime, namely section 153-A of the PPC. It 
needs to work with the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulative Authority 
in order to monitor hate speech online;
13. Pakistan must end religious discrimination in schools and madrassas. 
There needs to be a review and removal of textbooks and curricula that 
endorse discrimination against minorities. Authorities should engage in 
teacher training in order to increase faculty knowledge of the issues that 
religious minorities face, and develop educational materials and sylla-
buses to encourage learning about Pakistan’s diverse society;
14. Pakistan must bring an end to bonded labour, enforce the legal prohi-
bition on bonded labour, and help those who are subject to this form 
of outlawed exploitation find alternative employment, with particular 
reference to the challenges that marginalised minorities face in escaping 
the practice; and
15. Pakistan must take steps to ensure that existing social security systems 
cover all persons, including members of religious minority communities 
who are working in the informal economy. 
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Introduction
Minorities in Sri Lanka are typically classified along reductive ethno-re-
ligious lines, identifying as Sinhalese (74.9%), Tamil (15.3%), Sri Lankan 
Moor (9.3%), and other minority groups (0.5%), including Dutch-Burgher, 
Malay, Sri Lankan Chetty, and indigenous groups such as the Veddhas (Sri 
Lanka Department of Census and Statistics 2012). The religious classifica-
tions are Buddhist (70.1% of the population), Hindu (12.6%), Islam (9.7%), 
Roman Catholic (6.2%), and other groups accounting for 1.4%. Since the 
overlap of ethnic and religious identities is so strong, such classifications are 
arguably reductive and fail to capture the contentious issue – especially pat-
terns of discrimination, which occur between and across these classification 
lines. Moreover, although the Constitution prohibits discrimination based 
on caste and descent, and on the surface such discrimination isn’t visible, 
in practice the caste system is a part of the consciousness of the population, 
with a reported 90% (Silva et al 2009) recognising it to some extent, and the 
system coming into play especially with regard to employment (Minority 
Rights Group International 2017: paragraph 3). Livelihood, caste, heritage, 
and gender all inform the non-visible classifications adopted by communi-
ties (ibid.: paragraph 4), resulting in further intersectional discrimination 
of minority persons. 
This chapter seeks to capture these dynamics through the discussion 
of intersections of class and political relations, access to entitlements, 
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1. The reports of sub-committees can be found at http://english.constitutionalassembly.lk/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=126:interim-report&catid=9:uncatego-
rised& Itemid=437 
the public’s ethnicised narratives pertaining to economic power and re-
sources, and the link between these dynamics and violence. 
The chapter was primarily informed by secondary material due to con-
straints on time. It draws quantitative data from the Household Income and 
Expenditure and Labour Force surveys, and, wherever relevant, also in-
cludes discussion of relevant laws, jurisprudence, policies, and regulations. 
Commitments towards protecting the 
socio-economic rights of minorities
Constitutional, International and 
Policy Commitments 
In 2016 the Parliament of Sri Lanka formed a Constitutional Assembly 
for the purpose of drafting a new Constitution with a comprehensive Bill 
of Rights. The sub-committee on fundamental rights affirmed the positive 
consideration given to socio-economic rights as justiciable rights in the con-
stitution, noting in addition that these recommendations were also includ-
ed in the Constitutional Bill and proposals of 2009.1  The sub-committee 
report recommended a series of rights to this effect, including the right to 
education, the right to health, and social rights such as the right to clean 
water and sanitation, sufficient food and nutrition, adequate housing and 
shelter, appropriate social protection, and decent employment. The Public 
Representations Committee (PRC) of the Constitutional Assembly is pres-
ently discussing the reports of six such sub committees.
In January 2017 Sri Lanka also adopted the National Human Rights Ac-
tion Plan (NHRAP) for 2017–2021, which contains a chapter on economic, 
social, and cultural rights. 
The Constitution of Sri Lanka (adopted in 1978 and amended up to 2015) 
pledges to eradicate illiteracy and ensure that all persons have the right to 
universal and equal education at all levels. The Education Ordinance of 
1939 provides the framework on equality in education, and the Education 
Act of 1945 introduced free education and instruction in the mother lan-
guage from pre-school to university level (CESCR 2017: 1). The Regulation 
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2.  Section 365 refers to ‘carnal intercourse against the order of nature’ (which is widely 
understood to apply to same-sex sexual acts) and section 365a criminalises ‘any act of gross 
indecency with another person’. 
3.    With the exception of one case, where the Supreme Court upheld the conviction on the 
grounds of the law but treated the convicted person’s sentence as suspended in acknowledge-
ment of the private nature of the act. See: http://www.supremecourt.lk/images/documents/
sc_appeal_32_11.pdf 
4. ‘No person shall be arbitrarily discriminated against on any ground including race, gen-
der, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, maternity, marital status, parental status, 
caste, ethnic or social origin, age, disability, religion, conscience or belief, political or 
other opinion, culture, language, place of birth or place of residence.
on Compulsory Education (1997) was enforced to ensure that children aged 
5–14 attend school (ibid: 1). However, these provisions do not award legal 
rights or protections within the Constitution, and are therefore not enforce-
able in a court or tribunal.
In 2016 the government of Sri Lanka also adopted a National Plan of 
Action (NPA) for the socio-economic development of the upcountry Tam-
il/Malaiyaha Makkal community for 2016–2020, particularly addressing 
housing, including establishing 56,0000 individual houses with land own-
ership; water supply and sanitation; health and nutrition; primary and 
secondary education; skills development and vocational training; and im-
proving the governance systems around this community. The Estate Health 
Infrastructure Project 2015–2017 also made budgetary allocations to im-
prove hospitals in areas predominantly populated by the upcountry Tamil 
community.
The criminalisation of same-sex sexual relationships between con-
senting adults under sections 365 and 365a of the Sri Lanka Penal Code2 
remains the foremost discrimination affecting LGBT+ persons in Sri Lanka. 
While there have been no convictions under this section since 1948,3  it has 
the effect of perpetuating harassment, violence and discrimination towards 
LGBT+ individuals.
Article 12 (2) of the present Constitution stipulates that ‘no citizen shall 
be discriminated against on the grounds of race, religion, language, caste, 
sex, political opinion, place of birth or any such grounds’. This list is clearly 
not exhaustive and could include sexual orientation as a ground for non-dis-
crimination. Additionally, the sub-committee on Fundamental Rights of the 
Constitutional Assembly suggested a formulation including ‘sexual orienta-
tion’ as a ground on which arbitrary discrimination cannot occur.4Moreover, 
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the abovementioned NHRAP 2017–2021, adopted by the GoSL in January 
2017, also recommended that the Penal Offences be reviewed to ‘ensure that 
they are in compliance with international human rights standards and bring 
legislation where necessary’.
‘Gross indecency’ in section 365a is not defined by the law or in common 
law but is understood to target acts of affection or sexual acts between two 
individuals of the same sex. The term being open to interpretation by police 
officers, judges and prosecutors has allowed abuse of this section (Equal 
Ground and Center for International Human Rights (CIHR) of Northwest-
ern Pritzker School of Law 2017), extending to incidents of sexual abuse 
being committed by police officers themselves (ibid: 4). 
Section 399 of the Penal Code, which makes it a criminal offence to ‘cheat 
by personation’, is often used by the police to harass LGBTIQ persons, es-
pecially transgender individuals (Human Rights Watch 2016: 16). Further, 
the Vagrants Ordinance, which prohibits soliciting or committing acts of 
‘gross indecency,’ or being ‘incorrigible rogues’ gaining ‘illicit or unnatu-
ral intercourse,’ while mostly used to arrest and harass women engaging in 
sex work, is also engaged to target LGBTIQ individuals (Equal Ground and 
Center for International Human Rights (CIHR) of Northwestern Pritzker 
School of Law 2017: 3).
Sri Lanka’s Performance on Socio-economic 
Rights with Respect to Minorities 
Assessing Efforts Using Data – a Difficulty
The domination of a political and civil rights narrative has effectively left out 
socio-economic rights-based assessment of statistics. The non-existence of 
this data hides existing violations of socio-economic rights along ethno-re-
ligious lines, which in turn has limited the understanding of the ethno-reli-
gious tensions that emerge from time to time, causing them to be attributed 
solely to ethnicity and religion. 
Health
Health statistics with regard to ethnic minorities are not available in Sri 
Lanka. Deductions must be made through general health indicators, includ-
ing the availability of health personnel and infrastructure at the district lev-
el. The districts specifically identified in this chapter are those with a higher 
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density of minorities. These same districts were also most significantly af-
fected by the civil war. 
Maternal and Infant Mortality and Health
The topics of maternal and infant health and of nutrition offer particular-
ly insightful perspectives on the health status of minorities, especially giv-
en that national indices in this area are a great source of pride to the Sri 
Lankan state. 
Although Sri Lanka’s overall health indices have improved, districts with 
high numbers of minorities demonstrated the highest infant, maternal, and 
related mortality rates in 2016.
The Sri Lanka Demographic and Health Survey of 2016 (SLDHS) re-
ported the highest rate of under-five mortality in the Kilinochchi district 
at 44 per 1000 live births in the ten years prior to SLDHS 2016, followed 
by Trincomalee, Mullativu, and Puttlam at a mortality rate of 26, 22, and 
22 per 1000 live births respectively (Department of Census and Statistics 
2016). The highest infant mortality rates were reported in same districts: 
Kilinochchi (28 per 1000 live births), Trincomalee (25), Mullaitivu (22) 
and Puttlam (19) (Figure 1).
Statistics considered by sector of residence reflect that the estates, 
where a majority of the population are Tamils of Indian origin/Malaiyaha 
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Figure 1: Infant mortality rate and under-five 
mortality rate by district
(Data source: Demographic and Health Survey of 2016)
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Malkal origin, have a higher under-five mortality rate (15 per 1000 live 
births) than urban or rural areas (11 and 12 respectively) (Figure 2). How-
ever, these rates have declined by nearly half in the estate and rural sectors 
since the SLDHS in 2006/2007.5 
Additionally, the level of education of the mother also demonstrated an 
effect on these indices (Figure 3).
The under-five mortality rate is higher for mothers with education only 
up to Grade 5 (14 per 1000 births) than mothers with higher education (6 
per 1000 births). The poorest households reported a higher rate of mortali-
ty than the richest households (17 and 9 per 1000 births). 
Disparities in Resource and Health Personnel Allocation
These indices may be explained by the distribution of health personnel in 
these districts, particularly with respect to preventive services concerning 
maternal care. The highest number of medical officers per 100,000 popu-
lation is in the Colombo district (Figure 4) (Ministry of Health 2015: 6–7).
Medical officers appointed centrally through the ‘Line Ministry’ are not 
present in Vavunia, Mannar, Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu, and these districts 
consequently report the lowest district-wise presence of medical officers: 
130 officers in Vavunia, 83 in Mannar, 88 in Kilinochchi and only 64 in 
Mullaitivu (ibid: 6). A similar trend is demonstrated in the distribution of 
nursing staff as well, with the same districts also having the lowest numbers 
of provincial nursing staff – 188 in Vavunia, 150 in Mannar, 65 in Killinoch-
chi, and 44 in Mullativu (Figure 5) (ibid: 9)
Medical officers appointed centrally through the ‘Line Ministry’ are not 
present in Vavunia, Mannar, Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu, and these districts 
consequently report the lowest district-wise presence of medical officers: 
130 officers in Vavunia, 83 in Mannar, 88 in Kilinochchi and only 64 in 
Mullaitivu (ibid: 6). A similar trend is demonstrated in the distribution of 
nursing staff as well, with the same districts also having the lowest numbers 
of provincial nursing staff – 188 in Vavunia, 150 in Mannar, 65 in Killinoch-
chi, and 44 in Mullativu (Figure 5) (ibid: 9)
5. The SLDHS reported an under-five mortality rate of 33 per 1000 live births in the estate sec-
tor and 23 per 1000 in the rural sector in 2006/2007 (Department of Census and Statistics 
2007: 106).
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Figure 2: Infant mortality rate and under-five 
mortality rate by sector of residence
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Figure 3: Infant mortality rate and under-five 
mortality rate by mother’s education level 
The lowest numbers of public health midwives are documented in Mul-
laitivu (51), Kilinochchi (60), Vavunia (90) and Mannar (108). The lowest 
numbers of public health inspectors are documented in Nuwara Eliya (28), 
Killinochchi (17), Mullativu (18), Mannar (21), Vavunia (22) (Figure 6). 
A case study: Health in situations of 
direct exposure to the civil war
A study by the Family Health Bureau and the Ministry of Health (2009) on 
the health conditions of people internally displaced by the civil war is able 
to offer data on a particular ethnic minority, and on a population of people 
Sri Lanka 
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directly exposed to the civil war. The families studied were originally from 
Mullaitivu and Killinochchi districts, and then resettled in Trincomalee and 
Vavuniya districts (ibid: 9). In the early phases of evacuation in May 2009 
the level of mortality was 0.7 per 10,000 persons per day; by June 2009 this 
reduced to 0.5 per 10,000. For reference, according to Sphere Project guide-
lines, the baseline for mortality in emergency situations in South East Asia 
is 0.25 per 10,000 per day, and the emergency threshold is 0.5 per 10,000 
per day (ibid: 7). 
An interesting pattern was found when analysing the ages of children 
against a monthly age distribution between March and December 2009: 
there was an increase in infants conceived during the August to September 
period, which was the most peaceful time in the nine month period (March 
to July was the most volatile due to evacuation, and resettlement began in 
October, unsettling the population for a second time during this period). 
This data suggests that people are more likely to reproduce when they are 
settled (ibid: 31).
The study also found that the overall dependency ratio of 65.2% among 
the war-affected sample population was much higher than the national av-
erage of 55.1% (ibid: 19).6 The ratio reflects the burden that has to be as-
sumed by the working population to provide for the needs of the dependent 
population. Sri Lanka is enjoying a demographic window in which it is expe-
riencing the lowest dependency ratio in its history; however, the study pop-
ulation demonstrated a relatively high ratio, explained by the loss of lives in 
the productive population as a result of the war.
An alarming one fifth of infants (19%) in the study population were born 
underweight, out of which 4% were severely underweight (ibid: 32). Low 
birth weight poses a critical risk to child survival and development. Further-
more, 48.9% of infants studied were found to be anaemic (ibid: 34). An un-
controlled flow of formula feeds distributed to welfare villages was a major 
concern among healthcare workers due to the health risks it poses during 
infancy. Despite a special campaign to discourage the use of formula feeds, 
33.9% of infants were formula fed in the early months of infancy. The prev-
alence of malnutrition in children was 35.6% in May 2009; this was brought 
down to 23.9% by August 2009 through the joint nutrition rehabilitation 
interventions of the Ministry of Health and UNICEF. 
6. The dependency ratio is the ratio of dependent population (0–14 years and 65 years and 
over) to working (productive) age population (15–65 years).
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Figure 4: Distribution of Medical 
Officers by District
(Data source: Human Resource Profile – Ministry of Health 2015)
Food Security and Nutrition
Sri Lanka demonstrates alarming statistics in food security and nu-
trition, with an estimated 5.2 million people considered undernourished 
(World Food Programme, GoSL and SAPRI 2017: 2). Ethnic minorities liv-
ing in the estate sector, districts affected by the war, and farming areas such 
as the northern mixed and south-eastern rain-fed areas demonstrate the 
worst levels of under-nutrition. Rural and low-income households are also 
at risk, demonstrating a predictable link between poverty, food security and 
nutrition. 
Sri Lanka was ranked 85 out of 118 countries in the Global Hunger Index 
(GHI) and 65 out of 113 countries in the Global Food Security Index (GFSI). 
The Global Nutrition Report also places Sri Lanka as a country with one of 
‘the highest “wasting” prevalence in the world’ with a ranking of 128 out of 
130 countries (World Food Programme 2017, as cited in World Food Pro-
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gramme, GoSL and SAPRI 2017: 2). A national nutrition and micronutrient 
survey by the Medical Research Institute reports that wasting has increased 
to 19.6% in 2012 from 11.7% in 2009, revealing a serious concern regarding 
public nutrition (World Food Programme, GoSL and SAPRI 2017: x). Kill-
inochchi and Monaragala districts reported the highest rates of wasting at 
34.9% and 28.8% respectively (ibid: 12).
A survey of 25 districts in 2012 showed high levels of acute malnutrition, 
ranging from 14–35%, with huge regional disparities. Low Birth Weight 
rates are reported to have remained ‘stagnant over the last decade, with al-
most 1 in 5 (18%) newborns in Sri Lanka having a low birth weight, indicat-
ing a vicious cycle of malnutrition and the need for improved maternal nu-
trition’ (ibid: 12). The level of stunting was reported to be three times higher 
in estate sector children than in children in urban areas (23.8% in Nuwara 
Eliya and 22.3% in Badulla versus 8% in Colombo), and two times higher 
in the poorest quintile than the wealthiest quintile (18% versus 9%) (ibid: 
12). Data from the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) re-
ports that households headed by ‘agricultural or non-agricultural labour-
ers’, ‘skilled agriculture workers’, and ‘persons who are disabled or too old 
to work’ are the poorest in Sri Lanka (ibid: 16).
The lack of organisation and the political environment in national food 
production has caused instability in food production and prices (IPS 2008, 
as cited in World Food Programme, GoSL and SAPRI 2017: 18). Intra-dis-
trict distribution of food stocks and patronage networks extending from ad-
ministrative centres may also be a factor affecting access to food, despite 
food being available at a National level. Additionally, poor infrastructure 
for distribution including the lack of storage, and refrigeration facilities also 
hinder the distribution of food produced rurally by farmers, contributing to 
low productivity, income, poverty, and further food insecurity. 
Samurdhi Welfare programmes launched in 1995 by the state sought to 
improve the socio-economic conditions of those living under impoverished 
conditions but has been criticised for the misallocation of resources, and 
failure to identify sectors of the population in need of support. The Samur-
dhi dry ration programme benefited 105 families in 2007 by distributing 
Rs. 1.2 billion; in 2012 this funding was reduced to Rs. 54 million (Cen-
tral Bank of Sri Lanka 2012: 93). The nutrition programme which benefited 
102,020 families through the distribution of Rs.594 million in 2007 was cut 
down to Rs. 250 million being distributed among 55,299 families. While 
funding is supposed to have shifted to livelihoods programmes supporting 
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Figure 5: Distribution of Nursing Staff 
by District
Figure 6: Distribution of Public Health 
Midwives by District
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home gardening, animal husbandry, and cottage industries, the cut back 
in welfare payments towards nutrition and dry rations to already impov-
erished households is likely to have had a significant negative effect in the 
nutrition levels in the population depending on the Samurdhi welfare pro-
grammes (Glinskaya and The World Bank 2003).
Physical access to food and markets due to poor condition of roads and 
infrastructure is also a challenge. The Northern and Eastern provinces face 
road accessibility issues, and the quality and width of roads affect physi-
cal access to food markets especially in the Estate sector (World Food Pro-
gramme, GoSL and SAPRI 2017: x). An important observation from the 
2017 report is that areas with the highest rates of poverty also demonstrated 
poor road access. 
Moreover, only 50% of the landmass in Sri Lanka is considered arable 
due to forest conservations, inland water bodies, and unsuitable terrain. Is-
sues with policy concerning land, the market for land, and competition for 
limited arable land further affect food production. Moreover, the competi-
tion for arable land also appears to be an underlying insecurity in racially 
charged controversies and violence. 
The Sri Lankan Military has been using the Land Acquisition Act of 1950 
and the Strategic Development Act of 2008 to bring land under their control 
(MRG, IMADR and WDI 2017: paragraph 6). The former allows for the sei-
zure of land for undefined and ambiguous ‘public purposes’. Vast amounts 
of land in the north and east are occupied as military camps, dispossessing 
local Tamil communities. The land is also used for commercial purposes by 
the military, including the practice of selling such land for the building of 
hotels (Human Rights Watch 2018 and Sri Lanka Brief 2018), which has 
been particularly harmful to local fishing communities losing access to the 
sea. The militarization of land in the North and East, despite some efforts 
by the present ‘Yahapalayana’ government to return such land, continues 
to be a source of displacement, loss of livelihoods and poverty, and tensions 
affecting minority communities. The continued displacement of these mi-
nority communities is a violation of Article 11 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR 2009).
Education 
There are no statistics analysing secondary education from the perspec-
tive of ethnicity to ascertain any disparities affecting minorities, and the 
247
7. The study stipulates an exception: ‘other than re-construction of schools destroyed in war 
affected districts and those due to natural disasters’ (ibid: 22).
additional lack of district level statistics on schools also makes it difficult 
to make deductions regarding minorities based on regional demographics.
A study commissioned by the National Education Commission (Ranas-
inghe et al 2016) identified that the demand for general education will re-
main constant with no increase or decrease in social demand in the next de-
cade. These findings confirmed that the new education sector development 
plan should focus on improving the quality of existing schools rather than 
increasing the number of schools (ibid: 21–22).7   
Regional disparities in the availability of schools, trained personnel, and 
resources are a main drawback in Sri Lanka’s secondary education system. 
This is evident in the statistics concerning schools where both the highest 
number of AB1 schools and overall number of schools in the island are con-
centrated in the Western Province (Ministry of Education 2016). 
According to the available population statistics, Sri Lankan Tamils 
are a majority in northern and eastern Provinces (Sri Lanka Department 
of Census and Statistics 2012). The highest numbers of Sri Lankan Moors 
live in eastern and north western Provinces, though they are still a minority 
in these districts (ibid). Schools in Mullativu, Mannar and Killinochchi (in 
northern provinces) suffer from a lack of electricity, water, and sanitary fa-
cilities (Ranasinghe et al 2014: 23–24). In 2012, 80% of schools in Mannar 
district, 75% of schools in Killinochchi district and 53% of schools in Mul-
lativu district had no electricity and Mullativu reported the highest number 
of schools with ‘unacceptable sanitary facilities’ (11.7% in 2012 and 37% in 
2005 (ibid: 24)) (Figure 7).
These same districts also have the lowest numbers of English, IT and 
science teachers (ibid: 29–31) (Figure 8). The continued effects of these dis-
parities at the tertiary level is evident in Mullativu, Mannar and Killinoch-
chi admitting the least number of students to state universities despite the 
z-score system being in place for the purpose of mitigating the regional dis-
parities (ibid: 30).
The highest numbers of upcountry Tamils/Malaiyaha Makkal live in 
the Central and Uva Provinces, with greater concentrations in Nuwara Eli-
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ya and Matale districts in the Central Province (Sri Lanka Department of 
Census and Statistics 2012). Although the Central province is among the 
provinces with highest number of type AB1 schools (Ministry of Education 
2016), these are concentrated in the Kandy district, and these facilities may 
not be accessible to the upcountry Tamils/Malaiyaha Makkal population, 
who mainly live in the estate sectors in the Nuwara Eliya district. A break-
down of statistics according to schools in the estate sector and other govern-
ment schools demonstrates a significant disparity in the quality of resources 
available to schools in the estate sector. In 2012, 27.16% of schools in the es-
tate sector did not have electricity, in contrast to 13.91% of the other schools 
on the island. 89.2% did not have a telephone (versus 67.14%), and 20.71% 
did not have water (versus 15.48%).
Nuwara Eliya district has 22.91% schools without provision of water, 
23.09% schools without electricity, and 86.78% without telephones, accord-
ing to 2012 school statistics (Ranasinghe 2016: 23) (Figure 7). Nuwara Eliya 
district also suffers from a lack of English, IT, and A/level science teachers 
while also being burdened with a high number of teachers who are not pro-
fessionally trained (26.25%) in 2012 (ibid: 27). Uva Province, which reports 
the second highest presence of up-country Tamils/Malaiyaha Makkal, has 
the lowest number of Type AB1 schools (Ministry of Education 2016). 
While degree of disparity between districts in the availability of facili-
ties is significantly high, however, there is also an appreciable progress over 
time. Districts with the highest percentage of schools with no electricity in 
2005 also demonstrated a significant reduction in this percentage by 2012: 
Mannar (95.79% to 80.21%), Kilinochchi (99.03% to 74.51%), Vavuniya 
(65.9% to 39.5%), and Trincomalee (65.52% to 17.97%) (Ranasinghe et al: 
23). Mannar (8.3%), Kilinochchi (10.78%) and Mullaitivu (19.68%) report-
ed the lowest percentage of schools with computer labs in the island, howev-
er, these are still an encouraging increase from the statistics in 2005, when 
the percentages were 0%, 4.85% and 6.45%, respectively. 
Funding Towards Education – Structural Problems
Structural problems in resource allocation and funding can be seen in the 
distribution of teachers across districts. While the national students to 
teacher ratio was 19 in 2012 and student-teacher distributions have re-
mained consistent across the country, there are pockets of excess teachers, 
notably in Matara and Kandy in 2005, and Jaffna and Mullaitivu in 2012 
(ibid: 27). The report also notes the lack of professionally trained teachers, 
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Figure 7: Lack of Facilities in 
Schools by District
% of Schools with no Electricity
% of Schools with no Water
% of Schools with no Telephone
% of Schools with Unacceptable Sanitary Fecilities
(Data source: School Census – 2012)
(Data source: School Census – 2012)
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Advanced Level Science Teachers
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and in particular subject specific teachers for English, A/L Science, and IT. 
In 2012, there were 217 pupils per English Teacher in Colombo, and 375 
pupils per English teacher in both Mannar and Kilinochchi.
Funding for schools is secured through a centralised school level com-
mittee as directed by a national circular (ibid: 41) from the government; 
NGOs and other organisations; and funds raised by the school itself. Na-
tional schools receive all funding directly from the Ministry of Education. 
Provincial schools, however, receive funds through provincial education 
offices in the form of a Block Grant, a major portion of which is used to pay 
salaries, wages, and other recurring expenses.
Capital expenses to schools are provided through Provincial Specific De-
velopment Grants (PSDP), Criteria Based Grants (CBG), and the Education 
Quality Inputs (EQI) programme, according to a centrally determined for-
mula in order to ensure equity in the distribution of funds. However, while 
the purpose of these grants is to improve the socio-economic status of the 
province, the inequities created by unequal resource allocation and funding 
actually originate here because the provinces themselves are left to decide 
how these funds can be allocated towards various development activities 
(ibid: 42). 
EQI is often the only regular source of funding received by schools an-
nually, however, these funds are reportedly not received on time or at all. 
The latter was the case in 2012 when the north western province was not 
given funds through EQI (ibid: 44). When the province receives insufficient 
funds for development under the EQI programme, funds allocated to edu-
cation are used for other projects. This disrupts planned activities in schools 
and compromises quality of education schools are able to offer, and creates 
inequity in the quality of schools across provinces, even if they were techni-
cally allocated an equal amount of funding.
The PSDP is primarily designed to fund sector and subject specific infra-
structure projects in-line with the National Development Policy Framework 
of the Government, and once received by the province is distributed across 
various sectors including education. Additionally, Parliamentarians also re-
ceive block grants through de-centralised funds such as the manthri prathi-
padana (facilitations granted for parliamentarians), which are distributed 
at the discretion of parliamentarians according to the needs of local schools. 
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Profile of a vulnerable minority
Gender and Sexual Minorities
The discrimination and disregard of LGBTQI+ persons through legislation, 
administrative infrastructure, and limitations in accessing socio-economic 
rights due to a lack of resources and poor policy consideration, have effec-
tively minoritised these communities in Sri Lanka. The main contribution 
to the issues faced by the LGBTQI+ community in Sri Lanka is the exis-
tence (and lack of) legal instruments, which are used to further discriminate 
against the community. 
There is no specific data on their numbers in the country. Mapping studies 
such as one by Equal Ground reported that 19.6% of people over 18 living 
in Colombo, Matara, Nuwara Eliya and Galle identify as LGBT. This figure 
could be skewed, however, as enumerators conducting the study may have 
approached more LGBTQI persons for the study.1  Nonetheless, the commu-
nity exists in the sidelines, victim to a hostile state and society.
Criminalising same-sex sexual acts
As mentioned earlier, Sri Lanka criminalises consensual same-sex sexual 
relationships between adults under sections 365 and section 365A2 of the 
Penal Code.3 Section 399 of the Penal Code,4 which makes it a criminal of-
fence to ‘cheat by personation,’ is often used by the police to harass LGBTQI 
persons, especially transgender individuals (Human Rights Watch 2016: 
16). Further, the Vagrants Ordinance, which ‘prohibits soliciting or commit-
ting acts of “gross indecency,”’ or being ‘incorrigible rogues’ gaining ‘illicit or 
unnatural intercourse,’ is also engaged to target LGBTQI individuals (Equal 
Ground and CIHR of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law 2017: 3).
These laws allow for a range of rights of LGBTQI individuals to be violat-
ed, while legalising their discrimination in society. Police officers have used 
these laws to threaten, harass, and extort LGBTQI individuals, and the ex-
istence of the laws prevents victims of crime from reporting to the police for 
fear of additional abuse or retribution. Abuse by the police is not uncom-
mon, with a report by Human Rights Watch (2016) reporting that 24 out of 
Contd...
1. ‘Counting in LGBT’, 22 January 2018. http://www.dailymirror.lk/article/Counting-in-
LGBT-144350.html
2. S365 refers to ‘carnal intercourse against the order of nature’ (which is widely understood 
to apply to same-sex sexual acts) and s365a criminalises ‘any act of gross indecency with 
another person’. ‘Gross indecency’ is not defined by the law or in the common law, but is 
understood to target acts of affection or sexual acts between two individuals of the same 
sex.
3. Sri Lanka Penal Code S356 and S365a
4 Sri Lanka Penal Code S399
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Dependency on funds allocated through the province faces the addition-
al burden of being affected by patronage networks. Members of Parliament 
and local government authorities offer preference and ensure funding to 
their own voter area, leaving areas with weaker representation with less 
funding.
Access to Higher Education – Controversy on District 
Quotas for University Admission8
In the early 1970s a district quota system for admission to state universi-
ties was introduced, which allowed 55% of the placements to be distributed 
on the basis of the population ratio in the district, guaranteeing a precise 
number of seats for each district. As the proportion of the students to be 
admitted on merit was reduced to a mere 30%, the students who depended 
on their merit results, specifically the students from Colombo and Jaffna 
who entered the university in large numbers before 1970s, were deprived of 
university admission. This had the effect of aggravating the discrimination 
Tamil persons were subject to during the period, and in turn further inten-
sified resentment between the communities (Devanesan 2012). In spite of 
this, the GoSL continued to hold their stance that the introduction of dis-
trict quota was for the less privileged to access tertiary education, and it was 
necessary in order to encourage and uplift the education in the provinces 
where there was a lack of resources for education. 
Judicial take on Socio-economic 
Entitlements of Minorities
In this context, in Seneviratne v The University Grants Commission,9 
a group of students who were denied the opportunity to be admitted to state 
universities as a result of the new quota system challenged the measure on 
grounds of equality. They argued that distributing university placements 
according to a population ratio had no rational nexus to the government’s 
objectives. The court went beyond analysing it as affirming action to tak-
ing the stance that the new system in fact promoted equality and dismissed 
8.   This section has been written by Azra J
9. Seneviratne and Another v University Grants Commission and Another (1980) 1 Sri L.R. 170, 
211. Available at: http://www.hrcsl.lk/PFF/Right_to_Equality/Seneviratne%20And%20
Another%20V.%20...pdf
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61 respondents in interviews carried out with LGBTQI Sri Lankans ‘had suf-
fered sexual, physical, or severe verbal abuse by the Sri Lankan police’, 16 
respondents report having suffered sexual or physical abuse by the police, 
and over half the respondents were detained by the police without cause.
Lack of Legal Protection fromDiscrimination 
Sri Lanka’s Constitution and laws do not prohibit discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. Although Article 12(1) 
of the Constitution states that ‘all persons are equal before the law and are 
entitled to the equal protection of the law’, the list of various grounds in 
Article 12(2) under which discrimination is prohibited does not include sex-
ual orientation or gender identity. However, in 2014 the Sri Lankan gov-
ernment made a statement to the Human Rights Committee that Article 
12 of Sri Lanka’s Constitution does protect persons from discrimination on 
the grounds of gender identity and sexual orientation. While this statement 
was welcome, it must be viewed against a backdrop of a legal system that 
continues to retain laws criminalising same-sex conduct and a deep-root-
ed hostility in society towards gender and sexual minorities. As such, any 
prohibition on discrimination must be explicitly stated in a constitution if 
it is to effectively guarantee the protection of gender and sexual minorities 
in Sri Lanka.
The report by Equal Ground and CIHR (2017: 6) makes the additional ar-
gument that even such an amendment to Article 12 may be compromised by 
Article 15(7), which allows for the restriction of fundamental rights on the 
grounds of ‘morality’, and Article 16(1), which provides a judicial challenge 
to the constitutionality of preceding laws (such as the Penal Code) which 
cannot be considered to violate Article 12 Right to Equality.
This lack of legal protection has resulted in the violation of the socio-eco-
nomic rights of LGBTQI persons in Sri Lanka, compromising access to 
healthcare, education, employment, housing, and legal protection. In a 
2012 study (Equal Ground 2016: 4), 35.22% of respondents believed they 
had been refused employment, 12% reported they had been denied a pro-
motion or experienced an adverse change in their role, and 24% of respon-
dents reported the loss of a job in the previous two years because of their 
sexual orientation or gender identity. 24% of respondents reported that 
they had been unable to rent housing or were forced to change residence in 
the last two years because of their sexual orientation and gender identity.
With respect to education, of the 20 respondents who had attended school 
in the past two years, 70% had been dismissed, suspended, or prevented 
from attending school on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender 
... Profile of a vulnerable minority continued ....
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the application.10 The court ruled that the policy has a rational nexus to the 
objective of the state. In order to serve the objective, which was to ‘pro-
vide equitable access to education’11  55% of seats were allocated based on 
population ratio, because it would ensure ‘that districts having larger pop-
ulations and consequently a greater number of school-going children will 
obtain a larger number of places within the 55%.’ As a result of the effect 
of the standardisation policy and the fact that the scheme’s distribution se-
verely limited the seats received by Tamil students in Jaffna on previous 
occasions, the Tamil community received its imposition with antagonism. 
The court, however, made no reference to the population that was affected 
by said scheme, reflecting an insensitivity to the intersections of class and 
race affected by the issue. 
However, during a period of intense tension and mistrust between com-
munities, the context in which said policy of equality applied became im-
portant. Even after witnessing the consequences of the Sinhala Only Act and 
the standardisation policy, the government failed to bring in any sustain-
able policy to reverse the outright discrimination promoted through said 
laws and policies. Therefore the district quota scheme further entrenched 
the systemic discrimination towards the ethnic Tamils of the island.12  Fur-
ther, Justice Wanasundera’s holistic approach towards equality – ‘…every 
class of citizens must have a sense of equal participation...’ – did not hold 
true in this instance, because one cannot discount the systemic violation of 
Tamils to view the policy as a standalone measure of access to education – 
especially in the context of mistrust and insecurity between communities. 
It is worth noting that although the facts of the case did not concern 
minority rights, the issue is of importance because of the impact it had on 
10.   Substantiating the claims of equality, Justice Wanasundera cited the following from the 
Indian case of Pathumma And Others v State Of Kerala And Others (1978): ‘…equality means 
equality to all and not merely to the advanced and educated sections of the society. It follows, 
therefore, … every class of citizens must have a sense of equal participation in building up 
an egalitarian society, where there is peace and plenty, where there is complete economic 
freedom, where there is equal opportunity to education, to work… so that the goal of social 
justice is achieved.’ See: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1959928/.
11. Imposed ‘to make available the limited number of places to as wide a number of qualify-
ing candidates as possible from various parts of the country, so that access to high edu-
cation provided by the State will be equitably distributed and also subserve the objectives 
of the national interest and policies.’ See: http://www.hrcsl.lk/PFF/Right_to_Equality/
Seneviratne%20And%20Another%20V.%20...pdf
12. Only to be rectified in 1993 by the identification of Jaffna as one of the qualifying districts 
for special quota.
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identity. In a subsequent study conducted in 2016, it was reported that bul-
lying and marginalization had forced many LGBTQI students to drop out of 
school (ibid, as cited in Equal Ground and CIHR 2017: 7). 
Administrative and policy making issues
Sri Lanka does not have an administrative procedure whereby a transgender 
person, simply on request, may apply to obtain legal identity documents that 
reflect their name and gender identity (Equal Ground and CIHR 2017: 7). A 
new policy introduced in June 2016 to obtain a ‘gender recognition certifi-
cate’ could be used to obtain an amended birth certificate, which can then 
be used to obtain an identity card and other legal documents conforming to 
a person’s gender identity. This new policy presents serious concerns with 
its requirement for evaluation from a psychiatrist who is required to refer 
individuals to ‘hormone and necessary surgical treatment’ and certify that a 
‘transformation process’ must be completed (ibid: 10). This policy effective-
ly implies that only those who have undergone full treatment, which many 
individuals may either not want or are unable to access or afford, may be 
granted their chosen legal identity.  
The ability to choose one’s name and identity is a key aspect of self-deter-
mination and freedom.5 Identity documents are especially important in Sri 
Lanka as their absence hinders the carrying out of day-to-day activities, in-
cluding maintaining a bank account, seeking public healthcare, interacting 
with the police, or applying for a job. In these situations, a transgender or 
gender fluid person whose identity documents do not match their chosen 
name and gender identity are subject to humiliation, discrimination, and the 
possibility of violence. This disparity in a person’s documented and chosen 
identity is the root cause of much of the discrimination and abuse that trans-
gender persons are subject to.
Activism or advocacy for LGBTQI issues and attempts to engage state par-
ties by organisations that are involved in this work (such as Equal Ground) 
are also viewed with scepticism, or are ignored at policy-making levels. This 
issue of ‘non-recognition’ (Equal Ground and CIHR 2017: 8) demonstrates 
how LGBTQI persons are neither recognised as a minority in Sri Lanka, nor 
are their issues viewed as legitimate. Without a legitimate identity in front 
of the state or society, they continue to be marginalised and disempowered, 
relegated into a life of social and economic deprivation.
5. Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation 
to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, Principle 3 (2007), available at http://www.
yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.htm, as cited in Equal Ground and CIHR 2017: 7
... Profile of a vulnerable minority continued ....
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society. In this instance, barring access for a large number of Tamil students 
to state university education and depriving them of their right to education 
jeopardised the students’ access to employment and an adequate standard 
of living. The judiciary in this instance did not appreciate the context in 
which the state policy was formulated, which resulted in effective discrimi-
nation against an ethnic minority.
The ability to relate and therefore express sensitivity in legal reasoning 
is distinctly felt where Justice Sharvananda, in his eminent work Funda-
mental Rights of Sri Lanka: a Commentary (1993), disagrees with the de-
cision of the case on the ground that the fundamental rights chapter of the 
Constitution only provides for individual rights and not community rights. 
He further criticises the decision, stating that the objective of the state is to 
admit the best students on individual merit instead of enforcing the unen-
forceable Directive Principles of State Policy. However, a categorical stance 
on community rights as such can also be precarious because it defeats the 
claims of economic social and cultural entitlements of the people. The dif-
ferent ways of approaching the case by both judges, despite their sound 
stare decisis and reasoning, speak to the inevitable flavour of personal be-
liefs and values involved in judicial decision-making. It also indicates that 
having a more diverse judiciary would ensure sensitivity to the diverse views 
of society in the judicial decision-making process and thereby enrich the 
decisions (Hunter 2015).
Housing and Land
Eviction and Alternative Accommodation 
Land remains a contentious and largely politicised issue among the differ-
ent ethnicities of Sri Lanka, which is attributed to the fact that 82% of land 
in Sri Lanka is vested with the State (GoSL et al 2018: viii). The ad hoc 
administrative and executive actions pertaining to state land distribution 
are often not transparent, and some of the laws are outdated – or, at least, 
not relevant in our ‘post-conflict’ society.13 Further, the state acquisition of 
private lands for ‘development purposes’ has intensified tensions among the 
people. However, because minority communities often live together, con-
centrated in particular parts of each district, any state action affecting the 
land rights of the people residing in the region may be deemed to be a sys-
tematic violation of the economic rights of the ethnic minorities residing in 
13.  Ibid.
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the region. In the North and Eastern provinces of the country, this issue is 
further complicated due to the demographics of the regions. 
The case Mowjood v. Pussadeniya14 concerned alternative accommoda-
tion. The Rent (Amendment) Act No. 26 of 2002,15  which was the related 
legislation in the case, required landlords to provide the tenants with al-
ternative accommodation before obtaining a decree against them. In this 
case, the tenants contended that the alternative accommodation provided 
to them was not proper as their circumstances were not taken into consid-
eration when providing the accommodation, and they therefore sought to 
obtain a writ of certiorari. The court analysed the purpose of the provision 
for alternative accommodation and observed, 
‘In view of this social objective, the needs and circumstances of the 
tenant ought to have some relevance if the offer of alternative ac-
commodation is to be meaningful and not be illusory.’ 
This bears relevance to the evictions that take place for beautification 
and development plans undertaken by the state. Those who are evicted from 
their houses are in a vulnerable state and many of their intersecting rights 
are violated, namely the right to food and the right to education. As far as 
ethnic minority groups are concerned, forcible eviction increases their vul-
nerability or results in an ‘aggravated violation’ of their rights.16  The neces-
sity of offering the most conducive alternative accommodation is felt in this 
instance because minorities tend to live in communities that are concen-
trated in a given locality and, therefore, uprooting them from that place and 
placing them in a completely new environment severely jeopardises their 
belonging to a given community and risks several of their social and cultural 
rights.17 
Further, setting out the standards of an alternative accommodation that 
should be provided upon the ejectment of a tenant, Sharvananda CJ stated 
14.  Available at: https://www.lawnet.gov.lk/1987/12/31/mowjood-v-pussadeniya-and-another/
15. Available at: http://www.commonlii.org/lk/legis/num_act/ra26o2002200/
16. See Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Italy (2010): ‘The Committee 
considers that an aggravated violation is constituted when the following criteria are met: on 
the one hand, measures violating human rights specifically targeting and affecting vulnerable 
groups are taken; on the other, public authorities not only are passive and do not take ap-
propriate action against the perpetrators of these violations, but they also contribute to such 
violence.’ Available at: https://www.escr-net.org/caselaw/2011/centre-housing-rights-and-
evictions-cohre-v-italy-collective-complaint-no-582009
17. Judicial Mind p 86; no access to sunlight etc.
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that the accommodation had to be habitable and appropriate to the affected 
individual and the family members, and that it must have the elementary 
amenities. The court also made an important observation on the alternative 
accommodation with regard to the lifestyle of ethnic minorities who will 
not be able to thrive in an entirely unfamiliar environment because of their 
tendency to dwell among their own community:
‘It must not be located in a far-off area with which he has no local 
connection, an area where, because of his religion, race or caste etc, 
it is unsafe for him to dwell. The nature of the environment where 
the proposed accommodation is located is a relevant consideration 
in determining whether the new accommodation can fairly be de-
scribed as ‘alternative’.’
As far as the cases during the latter stages of the war are concerned, 
the observation holds relevance in respect of the acquisition of lands by the 
military in the north and the east, affecting people’s lifestyles and the demo-
graphics. However, in the cases filed regarding eviction and displacement 
during the latter stages of the war, and inability to return to homeland af-
ter the war, the court failed to give weight to the concept of ‘demographic 
choice and behaviour’ of ethnic minorities.18  Due considerations to ‘choice 
and behaviour’ call for a sensitive approach from the court to the require-
ments of minorities. Erratic stances from the Supreme Court have, however, 
resulted in court orders ranging from the upholding of violation of the rights 
of the people who were evicted, to an instance in which the court accused 
the petitioner of merely ‘creating news for international consumption’ and 
dismissed the petition. Such instances portray the frail and unsettled juris-
prudence on the land and housing rights of the ethnic minorities who were 
subject to aggravated violation of rights. 
State’s Acquisition of Lands and Discrimination 
Against the Vulnerable
In another case, Manel Fernando v. Minister of Land, the petitioners chal-
lenged the state acquisition of their land, which was mala fide and in vi-
olation of the equal protection of the law guaranteed by Article 12 of the 
Constitution. The Garama Sevaka had harassed the petitioners, calling 
them ‘terrorists’ on account of the fact that one of them was a Tamil, and 
forcibly removed them from their premises. The decision upheld discrimi-
18.    Manivannan case.
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Contd...
During the period under review there have been a number of civil society-led 
efforts to protect rights of the Muslim minority in the country. These include 
protests against attacks on Muslims, various expressions of solidarity, as 
well as supportive participation in the campaigns demanding for reforms 
to the law governing Muslim marriages that discriminate against Muslim 
women.
One of the more recent outbreaks of anti-Muslim violence occurred in the 
Kandy District in early March 2018, leading to the declaration of a state of 
emergency in the country. The violence raged on for nearly a week, with 
scattered attacks in other parts of the island as well. During this time three 
Muslims were reported killed, several were injured and millions worth of 
damage to homes, shops and livelihoods has been recorded to date.
While the fires burned in Kandy, some monks and young Buddhists set out 
to protect mosques in Colombo, even overnight. Monks in charge of five 
temples in the capital visited four Jumma Mosques in Colombo’s Ratmala-
na and Mount Lavinia boroughs to express solidarity with the Mosques.1 In 
some areas Buddhist Monks stood in solidarity with the Sri Lankan Muslims 
during Friday prayers. 
The support of civil society in times of ethnic violence is not unheard of in 
the melting pot that is Sri Lanka. In May 2017 a chilling image of a young 
woman bandaged from head to toe in Puttalam District after being set on fire 
by her husband went viral on Sri Lanka’s social media networks. The young 
mother of two, who eventually succumbed to her injuries, was married while 
she was still a child. Under Sri Lanka’s law governing Muslim marriages – 
the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act (MMDA) – child marriages are per-
mitted, and a campaign to abolish or amend the Act was already afoot, as 
grassroots level activists have been working on the issues for the past few 
decades. 
On 29 May 2017, Muslim women from Puttalam, along with civil society 
from across the island, marched to demand justice for the young woman 
torched by her husband. In early 2018 a protest was staged near the Justice 
Ministry highlighting Muslim women’s call for justice and equality in Sri 
Good practice case study
The movement calling for the release of the Justice 
Saleem Marsoof Committee report on the 
Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act
1. ‘In Colombo Buddhist monks express solidarity with Muslims victims of attacks’, 3 Octo-
ber 2018. http://www.asianews.it/news-en/In-Colombo-Buddhist-monks-express-solidar-
ity-with-Muslims-victims-of-attacks-43317.html
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nation against the petitioners, in addition to the authority’s abuse of power 
to forcibly evict the owners. 
Mark Fernando J stated the following on the unlawful state acquisition: 
‘The statutory power given in order to enable the State to acquire land 
needed for a public purpose cannot be used for any other purpose. That 
would be a gross abuse of power, particularly in this case, where the 
owner’s wish to dispose of his land had been brought about by unlawful 
and improper harassment on account of race.’
The case law on state acquisition of land provides some guidance on 
the scope of ‘public purpose’, which has not been defined under the Land 
Acquisition Act of 1950. In the Manel Fernando case, the judiciary refers to 
a ‘truthful public purpose’ and the need for a statutorily required ‘Section 2 
notice’ stating the public purpose.19 However, in said case, the officials had 
harassed the petitioners on a number of occasions, had deliberately made 
their lives difficult in the said premises and had requested the government 
to acquire the property although there was no prior plan for such acquisi-
tion, invalidating the claim for any truthful public purpose.  
The judgment of Manel Fernando acknowledged the explicit discrim-
ination the petitioners were subject to by the state officials in the context 
of the war that was ongoing at the time, and was ground-breaking, hence, 
because an established precedent of upholding discrimination against mi-
norities is unknown to Sri Lankan fundamental rights jurisprudence.
The decision is of relevance in the post-war context because the war-af-
fected communities had been left vulnerable and prone to exploitation by 
public officials, specifically in relation to acquisition of private lands. Three 
important instances post-war must be highlighted in the state’s acquisition 
of private lands for disguised ‘public purposes’, namely, the forced eviction 
of Manal Aru residents upon the acquisition of Mahaweli Economic Agency 
in 1988, the acquisition of 6380 acres of land in Jaffna for purposes of mil-
itary cantonment, and land in Sampur for industrial development (Fonseka 
and Jegatheeswaran 2013). The three situations put forward a strong case 
for ‘aggravated violation’ of the rights of victims who constitute the ethnic 
19. ‘Public purpose’ was further crystallised in the Water’s Edge case (see: http://www.island.
lk/2008/10/12/features16.html.) ‘Public purpose’ should not be construed broadly but for 
public utility and should be directly attributable to the benefit of the community as a whole.
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Lanka. The silent protest was for the release of the Marsoof report. In 2009 
a 17-member Committee, led by Justice Saleem Marsoof, was appointed by 
the then Justice Minister to review the discriminatory provisions and rec-
ommend amendments to the MMDA.  The committee was unable to reach 
a consensus and the report was put on hold for seven years, until it was 
revitalised in 2016, as grass roots level activists created a public campaign 
on their work, drawing attention to the burning need to amend the MMDA.
As anti-Muslim attacks have grown in frequency and intensity, this small 
and dispersed population in Sri Lanka find themselves in a precarious place. 
Support from other communities – especially the majority Sinhalese com-
munity – while they demand for justice provides them with a certain degree 
of protection; it (unjustifiably) legitimises their demands, and it amplifies 
their voices. Where Sri Lanka is concerned it is important to note that those 
from other communities who have joined the protests, campaigns and the 
fight for justice have done so only in a respectful supportive role. Taking 
the lead on such matters can detract from the issue at hand; it can result 
in the issue being hijacked for other agendas ; the Muslims can lose their 
voice; and, in the case of the MMDA, it can easily turn into an anti-Mus-
lim campaign or be perceived as such. By assuming a more supportive role, 
members of the Sinhalese community, among others, show that they are not 
against Islam, but against the discrimination and grave abuse of Muslim 
women that is permitted under a faulty law.
The Sinhalese as a majority community use their place of privilege to ensure 
the Muslim women leading the campaign and the victims who have cho-
sen to go public remain unharmed. As Professor Gayathri Spivak argues in 
her essay ‘Can the Subaltern Speak’, given their position in society, women 
within a minority group are often not allowed to speak or be heard. There-
fore, while it is not ideal, in a space where minority communities lack the 
means or freedom to do speak, support from the majority community can 
enable them to achieve their demands. This applies to ethnic violence as 
well. The monks who chose to be at the mosques that day provided protec-
tion with merely their presence. 
The Marsoof report was released in July 2018, and the support of the Sinha-
lese community does not in any circumstance overshadow the work done by 
Muslim grass root level activists. Having worked on the issue for the past 20 
to 30 years, first educating and empowering Muslim women to seek justice, 
only then were they able to compile case studies and pursue justice for all 
Muslim women in Sri Lanka. 
... Good practice case study continued ....
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minorities who were affected by the war and were further targeted by the 
state for their land and property. Quite contrary to the Manel Fernando 
case, when a fundamental rights case was filed on behalf of the residents 
against the eviction of Sampur residents (ibid: 50), the then Chief Justice 
dismissed the petition remarking that the petitioner was merely ‘creating 
news’ for ‘international consumption’ and that the government should be 
given ample time to complete the security measures in the area. The state-
ment indicates the judiciary’s pro-government stance and complete disre-
gard for the victims in the immediate postwar context, despite the visible 
violation of right to equal protection of law. While the controversial Sampur 
project was abandoned with the President’s intervention in 2016, more than 
4000 acres of land acquired in Jaffna have not been released to date. 
The History of Violence and its Economic 
Consequences on Minorities 
Much of the violence towards minorities viewed as post-war phenomena 
are in fact, historical and longer standing tensions that date back to 1915 
(Haniffa and Nagaraj 2017: 2). Many of the incidents of violence towards 
Muslims in particular and the anti-Muslim rhetoric following the 1970’s 
were overshadowed by the tensions between the state and armed Tamil 
groups, the JVP insurrection, and the ethnic conflict. These incidents, which 
are widely viewed as communal in nature and are often initiated as minor 
disputes between individuals within a background of general tensions be-
tween two ethnic groups in a local community, in fact always have an eco-
nomic and political background. 
The anti-Muslim violence of 1915 must be considered in context of a 
number of economic and political factors, including the end of an ex-
port-oriented boom of the late 19th century, and the fact that resentment 
towards increasing prices and high inflation was taken out on Muslim trad-
ers (Jayawardena 1970). The ‘revival’ of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism that 
integrated a prejudiced view of Muslims by Anagarika Dharmapala, a cham-
pion of this cause, is also central (Roberts 2013). The ‘othering’ of Mus-
lims, and the propagation of the idea of Muslim prosperity (versus Sinhala 
weakness and poverty) through ‘Shylockian methods’ – appealed to later by 
multiple others, including religious leaders seeking to justify the removal of 
or violence towards Muslims in their local areas – appears here:
‘The Muhammedans, an alien people, who in the early part of the 
19th century were common traders, by Shylockian methods became 
prosperous like the Jews. […] The Muhammedan […] is an alien to 
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the Sinhalese by religion, race and language […] The whole nation 
in one day have risen against the Moor people. The causes are eco-
nomic and spiritual…’ (Dharmapala 1915)
The episodes of violence in Puttalam in 1976 are attributed to a series of 
incidents when the newly settled and increasing20 Sinhalese population was 
viewed to be receiving favourable treatment from the State, including when 
land belonging to Muslims was taken and redistributed through the Land 
Reform Act, and when a newly established Cement Corporation factory in 
Puttalam hired Sinhalese workers who had migrated to the area for this pur-
pose, despite Puttalam having a significant population (largely Muslim) of 
its own. 
Incidents of violence in Galle in 1982, Mawanella in 2001, and Aluth-
gama in 2006 also demonstrate how the anxieties surrounding apparent 
economic weakness and prosperity, in the Sinhalese and Muslims respec-
tively, also manifested themselves in the way violence was used to re-orga-
nise economic capital, with many cases in which businesses or the contents 
of shops were completely burnt, thereby completely destroying the capital.
Six days of violence in Galle in 1982 resulted in two deaths and mil-
lions of rupees worth of property damage, when 27 businesses in Galle alone 
were attacked, and some of the larger shops and lorries belonging to Muslim 
businesses were completely destroyed (Haniffa and Nagaraj 2017: 20, 26). 
Two separate narratives regarding the initial trigger both involve an alterca-
tion between a Sinhalese and a Muslim: one with a Muslim landowner and a 
Sinhalese tenant who had refused to move despite not paying rent, and the 
other involving a Sinhalese fruit vendor and a Muslim neighbour. The gov-
ernment had declared an island-wide emergency and curfew within Galle 
city limits, and the riots eventually required the intervention of the military.
An incident involving the extortion of money from a Muslim business 
in Mawanella in 2001 eventually escalated to a full-scale riot that extended 
over a few days. The inaction of the police in Mawanella and surrounding 
areas sparked off protests and further clashes in Colombo and Maradana. 
Tensions boiled over when Muslim shops were attacked, and the largest 
20. The influx in the 1970s was a continuation of the Sinhalisation of Puttlam. Calculations by 
Catherine Brun report that the Sinhalese made up approximately 39.2% of the population in 
1901, and that the district was 82.6% Sinhalese by 1981. See Haniffa and Nagaraj (2017: 2).
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21. See ‘A tiring battle’, Frontline, 26 March 2004, available at  http://www.frontline.in/
static/html/fl2106/stories/20040326004211600.htm; ‘SLMC: Liability on the Muslim 
community’, Latheef Farook, The Daily FT, 23 December 2014, available at  http://www.
ft.lk/2014/12/23/slmc-liability-on-the-muslim-community/; and ‘Rendering the SLMC 
inconsequential’, The Sunday Observer, 30 August 2015, available at  http://www.sundayob-
server.lk/2015/08/30/pol06.asp 
22. See ‘SLMC: Liability on the Muslim community’, Latheef Farook, The Daily FT, 23 December 
2014, available at http://www.ft.lk/2014/12/23/slmc-liability-on-the-muslim-community/.
businesses that were destroyed belonged to Muslims. What is also concern-
ing regarding Mawanella are reports that the Police were complicit in the 
attacks (ibid: 33). 
In 2006 an altercation between a Muslim shop-owner and three Sinha-
lese youth over the alleged theft of a mobile phone sparked large-scale vio-
lence in Aluthgama, mostly targeting Muslim businesses and homes. Min-
ister Rauf Hakeem, the leader of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), 
noted that much of this occurred during ‘curfew hours in the presence of the 
police and the armed forces, before their very eyes; while some of the shop-
keepers were pleading for the police to intervene they did nothing to stop 
the mobs from setting fire to these shops.’ He went on to suggest that the 
violence was systematic: ‘the shops owned by Muslims… [have] been set on 
fire’ but where ‘Muslims have been carrying on business as tenants, things 
have been taken out of the building and set on fire without damaging the 
building since that building did not belong to Muslims’ (Hansard). While 
the incidents in Puttalam involved the police opening fire at those running 
towards a Mosque for refuge, Mawanella and Aluthgama involved prejudi-
cial and complicit behaviour by the police, which has led to a loss of confi-
dence in the police among locals. Minister Hakeem called for a commission 
to investigate the conduct of the police.
While Silva et al (2001) suggest that tensions in Mawanella emerged out 
of resentment felt towards Muslims dominating the Mawanella bazaar by 
local Sinhalese entrepreneurs, and Nagaraj and Haniffa (2017: 37) demon-
strated a shift in economic, political power and resources away from the 
Muslims in Mawanella as context for the background of tensions,  the vio-
lence in Mawanella can also be considered as the peak point in a series of 
anti-Muslim rhetoric and violence, influenced by proceedings on the na-
tional political stage.
The emergence of the SLMC as a key player21 in 1994 in a fractured elec-
toral mandate gave the SLMC and other minority parties ‘unprecedented 
bargaining power and influence’.22 The SLMC thus represented political 
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power in the east, while the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was 
holding military power in the North. Haniffa and Nagaraj (2017) argue that 
this led to further insecurities and anxieties in the Sinhalese regarding mi-
norities yielding power, which is demonstrated in the dominant theme it 
took at a meeting to mark the first anniversary of the bombing of the temple 
of the Tooth Relic by the LTTE (with the bombing in itself viewed as a mark 
of cultural vulnerability of the Sinhalese) by a ‘lament that the Sinhala ma-
jority was being held hostage politically by the Muslims and militarily by 
the LTTE’.23 
Against a backdrop of peace talks with the LTTE and opposition to devo-
lution of power in the late 1990s, there was also a growth in Sinhala–Bud-
dhist nationalist organisations.24 Among these the Sinhala Veera Vidana 
(Sinhala Heroes Forum, SVV) and the United Sinhala Traders Association 
(UST) in particular represented the economic interests of the Sinhalese, 
with the SVV attempting to arrange for Sinhalese paddy farmers to sell 
rice to Sinhala traders at more favourable rates than the government-de-
termined price, provided they joined the SVV and endorsed its policies on 
racial exclusion. This must also be viewed against the setting of widening 
inequalities and a decrease in government funding towards agriculture and 
the open-economy reforms initiated in 1977. The latter gave an extra edge 
to competition among the Tamil, Muslim and Sinhalese business interests, 
which invariably took on racial character in an already ethnicised political 
environment.
Propagating the idea of ‘Muslim prosperity’ and ‘Sinhalese weakness’
The economic interests these organisations sought to mobilise targeted 
and involved a largely working- and middle-class Sinhala population. An 
old narrative of Muslim traders being ‘Shylockian’ and more economically 
prosperous, against the Sinhalese being economically vulnerable in this en-
vironment, reappeared again in a series of post-war attacks directed at Mus-
lim businesses or economic elements that concerned the Muslims (such as 
the controversy surrounding an apparent cost to a general consumer when 
buying halal certified products).
23.  Buddhist clergy lament, ‘Sinhala community faces annihilation due to power crazy leaders’, 
The Island, 28 January 1999. 
24. Organisations such as the National Movement Against Terrorism (NMAT), Sinhala Uru-
maya, Sinhala Veera Vidhanya (Sinhala Heroes’ Forum, SVV, a predecessor of the Jathika 
Hela Urumaya (JHU) a Sinhala-Buddhist right-wing political party) and the United Sinhala 
Traders Association (USTA).
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25. See http://coyle.lk/.
26. ‘COYLE is a chamber that always renders its untiring efforts and support in resolving nation-
al issues. It also possesses a remarkable position in the Sri Lankan economic and financial 
arena due to the significant contribution made to the GDP and GNP of Sri Lanka’ – at http://
coyle.lk/coyle under ‘About COYLE’. The section goes on to state that organisation’s vision is 
to be the ‘most influential and vibrant chamber of young business leaders whose views on the 
matters of national importance are sought by the government’ (accessed online: 4/08/2017).
27. http://coyle.lk/coyle-member-company/
The same narrative is now commonly used in other ways within wider 
political controversies, but the contemporary reincarnation of the SVV, with 
the economic interests of the Sinhalese at heart, appears in the more sophis-
ticated form of The Chamber of Young Lankan Entrepreneurs (COYLE). 
COYLE’s membership is (demonstrated to be) exclusively Sinhalese, howev-
er, unlike SVV or UST, COYLE is distinctly more elite, with its membership 
reportedly contributing 600 billion per annum to the Sri Lankan economy 
and its meetings bringing together 116 chairmen and key shareholders of 
some of the largest companies in Sri Lanka.25 The dangers of such an organ-
isation are threefold: firstly, it demonstrates how the narrative of needing 
to secure the economic interests of the Sinhalese has permeated across all 
classes of society; secondly, it yields so much power and benefit within the 
business community at the point of joining that its membership is now at-
tractive, especially to young businesspeople; and thirdly, its economic inter-
ests are now much wider, with the organisation commanding meetings with 
key ministers and executives to influence national policy26; and its market 
presence across its membership, many of which are conglomerates,  con-
trolling a significant portion of Sri Lanka’s economy. 
The anxieties are also further affected by class dynamics, with the Sin-
halese-Buddhist extremist movements primarily gaining traction and pop-
ularity among young working-class Sinhalese men operating within an en-
vironment of aspiration, who are affected by economic anxieties worsened 
by inflation, increased cost of living and unemployment, and are therefore 
most prone to accepting the narratives around an apparent Sinhalese eco-
nomic weakness. The flow of capital and internet penetration has further 
intensified the sharing of this narrative, as was demonstrated in the recent 
riots in Digana, where calls to join the riots were most widely perpetuated 
through a series of viral videos shared on social media.
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Conclusion and Recommendations
Sri Lanka’s overall outcomes with respect to the socio-economic indices 
concerning minorities have seen positive improvement; however, these 
generalised patterns have also not always been able to capture the pockets 
within communities – particularly minorities within traditional ethnic mi-
nority regions who sit at the intersections of class, gender, caste, and popu-
lation, who are most affected by issues pertaining to the violation and lack 
of protection of their socio-economic rights. The chapter has also sought to 
note how the framework of minorities is contested and mobilised in differ-
ent ways in Sri Lanka, particularly in the way minority and majority identi-
ties are shifted based on economic and political dynamics, further blurring 
the situations in which socio-economic rights are compromised.
Gender and caste in particular are important axes by which such consid-
eration and analysis must occur. The report was not able to draw these out 
due to constraints on time, however, a snapshot perspective of the former 
is attempted in our case study on war-affected women with disabilities and 
our good practice case study on civil society’s advocacy with respect to the 
Muslim community in Sri Lanka. 
The chapter highlights the reductive manner in which minority rights 
are approached in Sri Lanka and the resulting discursivities in guarantee-
ing human rights for all. If Sri Lanka is to move forward on guaranteeing 
economic, social and cultural rights to all its citizens along with civil and 
political rights, one of the first steps required is to resolve the ambiguities, 
contradictions and regressions within the constitutional and legislative 
framework in the country. An imperative first step is to recognise econom-
ic and social rights as justiciable rights in the constitution. This has been 
recommended by the consultative process on constitutional reform, which 
consulted across the island in formulating its recommendations. Other 
laws that discriminate against minority groups must also be amended or 
repealed; these include sections 365 and 365a of the Penal Code and the 
Vagrants Ordinance. 
Secondly, inequalities in resource allocation for the health and educa-
tion sectors must be addressed. The data reviewed in this chapter highlight 
the manner in which discretionary funding for local schools and cut backs 
on social welfare schemes directly affect the most marginalised in the coun-
try. National budget allocations should continue to sustain or increase allo-
cations to basic economic and social indicators, including health and edu-
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cation, in keeping with Sri Lanka’s international obligation to progressively 
realise economic, social and cultural rights. 
Thirdly, the policy decisions that discriminate against minority groups 
must be addressed. Addressing the competition for resource allocations 
would allow for the reversing of discriminatory quota changes in universi-
ty admissions; the increased allocation of resources to the poorest regions 
with the lowest social indicators; and increased diversity of representation 
in the public sector, including the judiciary. Some of the ethnic and religious 
based groupings, whether historical or presently forming, would lose their 
divisive powers if inclusive language policies, university and school admis-
sion policies, resource allocations and economic opportunities becomes a 
part of state policy in Sri Lanka.  State policy, if implemented effectively, will 
permeate every rung of state service, and will challenge divisive narratives 
along ethnic and religious lines that may be pushed by extremist groups 
belonging to any ethnic or religious affiliation.
It is our view that if these three major plans are addressed by the govern-
ment in the short term, medium term and long term, as a part of a national 
trajectory, guarantee of economic, social and cultural rights to all persons in 
Sri Lanka will become an increasingly achievable goal.
The State of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in Sri Lanka: 
A Joint Civil Society Shadow Report to the United Nations 
Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights; 
Introduction Chapter (Law & Society Trust, April 2017)
Context
1. Coming two years after a political transition from post-war authoritar-
ianism, this Shadow Report to the United Nations Committee on Eco-
nomic Social and Cultural Rights is framed in the backdrop of two con-
current processes of ‘transformation’ currently underway in Sri Lanka. 
The first is the process of constitutional reform initiated by the Govern-
ment that was elected on the platform of restoring democratic, inclusive 
and accountable governance. The second is the transitional justice pro-
cess whose contours continue to be shaped by the interplay of domestic 
and international political dynamics. 
2. This year also marks forty years since President J.R. Jayawardene ini-
tiated the open economy reforms, almost twinned to which was the 
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second republican constitution that also firmly entrenched the execu-
tive presidency as well as the majoritarian character of the State. Soon 
thereafter, in 1980, came the massive crackdown on trade unions and, 
in July 1983, the pogrom against Tamils. If the former forced a violent 
repudiation and redrawing of the social contract between state and so-
ciety, especially organised labour, the latter firmly entrenched violence 
as a defining feature of the new social contract, especially between the 
State and minority communities. 
Sri Lanka’s political economic landscape 
3. Sri Lanka’s economic geography, a legacy of post-1977 liberalisation 
policies and the war, has its epicenter in the Western Province and was 
bolstered by extraction from the inner peripheries, such as the planta-
tions. With the exception of the two-year (1988–90) Southern Insurrec-
tion and periodic suicide bomb attacks, the war was contained largely 
in the Northern and Eastern outer peripheries. Almost throughout all 
of the war years, the Sri Lankan economy continued to grow steadily, 
remittances from migrants escaped the war and rural joblessness added 
to the economy. 
4. The legacy of decades of economic liberalisation and the war has shaped 
a state-society contract characterised by serious deficits in political and 
economic democratisation, power sharing, inclusion, and accountabil-
ity. Alongside the political marginalisation and exclusion of minori-
ties, and ethnicisation of political economic relations, also entrenched 
is economic precariousness due to inadequate levels of investment in 
health, education and social protection, attacks on permanent jobs and 
burgeoning informalisation. In the North and East especially these add 
to many harms from the war that are yet to addressed, including killings, 
disappearances, displacement, sexual violence and post-war militarisa-
tion. 
Constitutional Reforms and Transitional Justice 
5.   Hundreds of submissions to the Public Representations Committee on 
Constitutional Reforms (PRC) on the one hand and thousands of sub-
missions to the Consultation Task Force on Reconciliation Mechanisms 
(CTF) on the other, sought a fundamental redrawing of the social con-
tract between the State and its citizens. Taken together and read ex-
pansively, the reports of the PRC and the CTF reflect an aspiration for 
political, civil, social and economic justice. Both reports also stress the 
importance of a state that is committed to equality, equity, inclusion, 
democratic participation and accountability. Yet, it is the Government’s 
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near identical response to both reports—consigning them to a ‘display 
only’ shelf or in the case of the CTF virtually disowning it domestical-
ly—that defines this moment and sets the stage for the critique offered 
in this report. 
6. The far-reaching proposals of the PRC call for the recognition of a raft 
of economic and social rights—especially with regard to education, food, 
health, housing, social security, labour—coupled with protection from 
forced evictions as well as an expansive equality and non-discrimina-
tion clause, which are also reflected in the report of the Fundamental 
Rights Sub-Committee of the Constitutional Assembly. This assumes 
great significance in the context of the major concerns raised in this 
report: Entrenched poverty and widening inequality; weakening social 
protection; precarious wages and employment; union busting; declin-
ing investment in education and health; worsening food insecurity and 
malnutrition; large-scale evictions and land grabs, and exclusion or 
discrimination on grounds of disability, gender and sexual orientation, 
economic status, ethnicity, caste, etc. 
7. The transitional justice agenda has all but sidelined the question of 
economic or distributive justice and the structural as well as gendered 
violence inherent in economic relations—be it before, during or af-
ter the war. The critique from the Malaiyaha Makkal or Up-Country 
People regarding the exclusion of their experiences from the scope of 
transitional justice hinges preciselyon this point1. As discussed in this 
report, the high levels of economic insecurity and precariousness in 
the post-war North and East also stem from post-war policies that fo-
cused on debt-driven physical infrastructure, and the militarisation and 
financialisation of development through the aggressive pursuit of mi-
cro-credit measures. The result has been indebtedness2, lack of decent 
work, poor social security, and militarisation of land and economic rela-
tions—all of which affect women in very particular ways and cannot be 
divorced from questions of post-war justice and accountability. 
Current economic and social policy—Key concerns 
8.     There are serious concerns about the current Government’s moves to 
slash public  expenditure, especially on health and education in 2017. 
Moreover, the push for privatization and the plans to initiate sweeping 
reforms in critical areas, such as social security, land and labour guid-
ed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund’s austerity 
mind-set, raises many serious concerns. Whilst food producers—farm-
ers and fishers—battle dispossession, massive tax concessions and hol-
idays are being given to foreign investors for large and medium-scale 
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projects; for example, to build the Colombo Port City or establish com-
mercial farms for export. Even as a highly regressive tax system and spi-
ralling cost of living squeezes the poor and near poor, the Government 
is prioritising ‘reforms’ of the Samurdhi programme that will almost 
certainly see reduced net transfers and more debt- oriented schemes.
9.   Sri Lanka’s much vaunted middle-income status and impressive aggre-
gates of human development, in areas such as health and education, in 
fact hide much more than they reveal. About 40 percent of the popula-
tion lives on less than 225 rupees per person per day,3 multidimensional 
poverty measures classify an additional 1.9 million people as poor4 and 
almost 70% of the labour force is in the informal sector, with low wages 
and no social security.5 Add to this a crisis in nutrition in many parts of 
the country, very low levels of investment (relative to GDP) in public 
health and education, and a weakened social protection system—all of 
which are exacerbated by gendered, ethnicised, caste and class-based 
deprivation as well as exclusions. 
10. Decades of inequitable political economic development have generated a 
landscape with many and expanding pockets of marginality and precar-
iousness. This is evident in places as far apart and diverse as Monaraga-
la, Batticaloa, Puttalam and Mullaitivu, which have entrenched pockets 
of poverty. Moreover, as discussed in this report, communities ranging 
from Colombo’s urban poor and the Up-Country plantation communi-
ty to the Veddas and manpower (contract) workers in manufacturing, 
services and agriculture, as well as fishers and/or farmers fighting for 
their land in Panama, Kepapulau, Mullikulam, Vallikamam, Kalpitiya 
and Uma Oya, all suffer forms multiple and shared forms of deprivation 
and exclusion. All of the above underlines that Sri Lanka’s commitments 
under the ICESCR assume an urgency and significance today that they 
have perhaps never had before. 
Enforcing economic and social rights in Sri Lanka 
11. Sri Lanka’s Constitution includes a chapter spelling out the directive 
principles of state policy, which call, amongst others, for the: 
•  Pursuit of a social order with social, economic and political justice (art. 27 
2 [b] and [f]) 
•  Realisation ‘by all citizens of an adequate standard of living for themselves 
and their families, including adequate food, clothing and housing, the 
continuous improvement of living conditions and the full enjoyment of 
leisure and social and cultural opportunities’ (art. 27 2 [c]) 
•  ’Equitable distribution among all citizens of the material resources of the 
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community and the social product, so as best to subserve the common 
good’ (art. 27 2 [e]) 
  12. The directive principles however ‘do not confer or impose legal rights 
or obligations and are not enforceable in any court or tribunal’ (art. 29). The 
fundamental rights chapter of the Constitution does not recognise economic 
and social rights. However, the Court has considered several cases pertain-
ing to economic and social rights concerns in the light of the general equality 
and non-discrimination provisions in the Constitution. 
13. The mandate of the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka 
(HRCSL), in terms of its ability to investigate complaints of rights viola-
tions, is restricted to the rights spelt out in the fundamental rights chapter 
of the Constitution. The HRCSL cannot therefore investigate complaints of 
economic and social rights violations. 
14. Redress for economic and social rights violations is limited but has 
to be seen in the context of the significant weaknesses in the enforcement 
of the rule of law and accountability for human rights violations. Whilst 
the change of Presidency in January 2015 did result in a drawdown in the 
generalised atmosphere of threats and intimidation faced by human rights 
defenders, significant challenges still remain. As outlined in the report, ac-
tivists working on labour and land issues, especially in the context of mili-
tary occupation, face surveillance, intimidation or threats, including arrest/
detention for or restrictions on their activities. 
----------
1  Submission by the Malaiyaha Makkal (Up-Country People) to the Con-
sultation Task Force on Reconciliation Mechanisms (2016).
2 In reality, almost seven years after the war, there have not been sub-
stantial levels of private sector investments in the North and East, at 
least not at levels enough to provide decent jobs and secure livelihoods 
for people struggling to survive. Parallel to that, the State pushed the 
people to take up micro-credit and self-employment schemes for day-
to-day survival. However, a large population in the North and the East 
are mired in indebtedness and other forms of dispossession due to their 
severe exposure to credit, and are struggling to survive. Women were 
the main targets of such microcredit schemes, underlining gendered 
patterns of suffering central to such political economic arrangements.  
3 The World Bank (2016, February 16), Poverty has Fallen in Sri Lanka 
but Fiscal, Growth, and Inclusion Challenges Need to Be Tackled to Sus-
tain Progress. Retrieved from The World Bank: http://www.worldbank.
org/en/news/press- release/2016/02/16/poverty-has-fallen-sri-lanka-
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but-fiscal-growth-and-inclusion-challenges-need-to-be-
tackled-to-sustain- progress 
4  The Centre for Poverty Analysis (2017, January 08), Mag-
ic ‘line’ that makes us rich or poor. Retrieved from The 
Sunday Times: http://www.sundaytimes.lk/170108/
business-times/magic-line-that-makes-us-rich-or-
poor-222743.html.
5  Gunasekara, V. (2015), Unpacking the Middle: A Class-
based Analysis of the Labour Market in Sri Lanka, Southern 
Voices Post-MDG International Development Goals, Occa-
sional Paper Series, Vol. 22, Dhaka: Southern Voices. 
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Introduction
Afghanistan is a unique case when it comes to minority rights, mainly because no ethnicity is a 
majority in the country, and most ethnicities have tried to inflate their numbers so as to seem 
more powerful. The constitution identifies no minorities, and thus no minority rights. Doing 
a survey of minority rights is therefore essentially an attempt to make a case for them to exist 
in the first place. It entails outlining who the minorities are, what their status is, whether they 
have rights, and why they need minority rights and protection. This is how this summary is 
structured.
Who are Afghanistan’s minorities?
Afghanistan has minorities based on religion, ethnicities and language. While it is an Islamic 
State, as per its constitution, people of other faiths are allowed to practise them in private 
according to the law. 84.7¬–89.7% of the population is Sunni Muslim, while 10%–15% is Shia 
(Central Intelligence Agency 2018). Other minorities, mainly Hindus and Sikhs, make for 
roughly 1% of the population. Persecution of Hindus and Sikhs has increased drastically in 
recent years, forcing most of them out of the country. Thus, their numbers have dwindled down 
to a mere 220 families.
On ethnic grounds, there is no single group that represents more than 50% of the popula-
tion, even though the largest group, the Pashtuns (40%), has tended to play a dominant role. 
The Tajiks (33%) come second. There also exist  the Hazaras (11%), Uzbeks (8%), and Turk-
mens (2%). The Kyrgyzs, Balochs, Aimaqs, Ismailis, Brahuis, and Nuristanis etc comprise 1% or 
less each (The Asia Foundation 2014). The Pashtuns mainly occupied a belt of mountains that 
extend along much of the border with Pakistan, but they presently live in pockets across the 
country. The Shia Hazaras occupy the east and the Tajiks largely occupy the western half of the 
central Hindu Kush range. The conditions for growing crops are extremely difficult throughout 
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the Hindu Kush, rendering both the Hazaras and the Tajiks relatively poor, although the Tajiks 
have had access to important areas of fertile land in the Shomali valley to the north of Kabul 
and in the adjacent Panjshir valley. The Aimaqs are Turkic in origin and are to be found in the 
westernmost part of the Hindu Kush, to the west of the Hazarajat. The Turkmenis occupy the 
hills on the northwest of the Hindu Kush, and the Uzbeks the desert of Faryab and the flat plain 
that extends northwards into Central Asia, which permitted an important agricultural and trad-
ing economy to develop, until occupied by Taliban. The Shia Ismaili community has its base to 
the immediate north and northwest of the Salang Pass, which was also controlled by opposition 
forces and the Taliban intermittently. The Baluchis occupy the inhospitable no-man’s land of 
high sand dunes and a black stony desert near the borders of Iran and Pakistan in the extreme 
southeast of the country, and are too dispersed to correctly take account of. The Nuristanis 
exist in particular isolated valleys to the south of Badakshan in eastern Afghanistan (Marsden 
2001: 6). They survive primarily on goat herding. 
From a linguistic perspective, Persian (Dari) is a widely spoken language, spoken by 
around 50–55% of the population. It has not only been the native language of many ethnic 
groups such as Tajiks, Hazaras and Qizilbashs, but it has also been the day-to-day administra-
tive language of the country for many centuries. The World Factbook indicates that Persian is 
the most widely spoken (50%), followed by Pashto (35%), Turk (Uzbeki and Turkmeni) (11%), 
and 30 minor languages (Balochi and Pashai) (4%) (CIA 2018). 
The history of inter-ethnic relations in Afghanistan is one of coexistence, tolerance and 
pride in diversity, but also of unequal opportunities and conflict. Afghans are reluctant to de-
fine the conflicts that have rived their country in recent years in ethnic terms (Simonsen 2004). 
At first, the government of Afghanistan did not indicate tribe or ethnicity on ID cards so as to 
homogenise an Afghan identity, but it still continues the practice so as to not gaslight ethnic 
tensions. It also does not record any such data. 
Minority rights in Afghanistan have improved since the 2001 Bonn agreement, but not by 
much. Historically, Hazaras have often been victims of discrimination and persecution by other 
ethnic groups for religious and racial reasons. They have been systematically excluded from 
government positions and education and have struggled to achieve social mobility. The Tali-
ban regime was particularly brutal in its persecution of Hazaras. However, in the constitution 
ratified in 2004, Hazaras were given equal rights to other ethnic groups. Most religions, apart 
from Sunni Islam, have been discriminated against in one time or another. Apart from discrim-
ination against minority ethnicities like the Hazaras or Kyrgyzs (during the Soviet invasion), 
discrimination against other religions such as Hinduism and Sikhism arose in the Taliban pe-
riod, and is especially rife now. 
The data challenge in Afghanistan
It is only right to acknowledge in the beginning that there is no comprehensive report on the 
status of minorities in Afghanistan. Finding data on different political, social and economic 
indicators related to minorities in Afghanistan is a challenging task. The government and inter-
national agencies’ data, statistics and reports are not disaggregated in terms of ethnic and re-
ligious groups. This makes the task of analysing the conditions and status of minorities tough. 
The task is made even more difficult by the fact that most reports are slightly outdated and may 
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not reflect the true demographics of the current day. Heavy internal displacement and forced 
migration are also contributing factors. The current chapter relies on reports by governmental 
and international organisations whenever available; it also draws on media reports and news-
letters, and secondary sources to fill the gaps in primary documents. 
How do minorities perform on 
socio-economic rights? 
It needs to be understood that specific figures are not available for most parameters that are 
used to check socio-economic performance. General assessments have been compiled through 
secondary reports about specific communities and policies.
According to the 2017 estimates of The World Factbook, 54.5% of Afghanistan’s popula-
tion lives below the poverty line (CIA 2018). Urban Afghans are safer and have better access to 
services and economic opportunities than those living in rural areas. Inequalities also persist 
between Afghan men and women, who increasingly find it difficult to access education and 
health services (World Bank 2017). Higher than 54% poverty incidences are found amongst 
the Kuchi population, a Pashtun Nomadic Social Group that has been forced to settle, creating 
disputes between existing settlers and the Kuchis.
Province-level poverty rates
Poverty Rates (%)
Less than 20
(20 – 30)
(30 – 42)
(42 – 58)
Greater than 58
Source: NRVA 2007/08
As seen above, poverty is most rampant in the northern parts, occupied by the Aimaqs, 
Turkmenis, Uzbeks, and Ismailis etc. Parts of central Afghanistan, like Bamiyan, the unofficial 
Hazara capital, are amongst Afghanistan’s poorest, often lacking basic facilities and electricity 
(Hucal 2016). Many reports indicate that the poorest developed areas are ones occupies by 
Shiite minorities like the Ismailis and Hazaras (Chiovenda 2014). Government facilities like 
healthcare centers, schools, roads etc are fewest in such areas. This is a continuation from the 
Taliban regime, where these minorities were persecuted and their lands and belongings force-
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fully grabbed. In trying to maintain peace after the 2001 intervention, the government never 
punished anyone for war crimes and the groups of people that were left without resources were 
never repaid. Thus, their conditions worsened. According to the diet diversity data, the most 
food insecure provinces are the central highlands, and the Nuristan province (Economic and 
Social Council 2009). Regions that are occupied largely by minority groups are very underde-
veloped and see little opportunity for economic progress.
Commitment 
After 11 September 2001, when international forces invaded Afghanistan, which led to the 
Bonn Agreement, the Government of Afghanistan agreed to support human rights and the ini-
tiation of a commission to prepare the first preliminary draft of a revised Constitution, which 
was later discussed, amended and adapted at the 2003 Constitutional Loya Jirga. 
Since the adoption of the new constitution there have been consistent promises made by 
Afghan politicians, including former president Hamid Karzai and President Ashraf Ghani, to 
address the concerns of Afghanistan’s Sikh and Hindu communities and ensure that they, like 
all Afghans, are equally protected by the law. 
Constitutional provisions
The Constitution of Afghanistan has been made more inclusive since the Bonn Agreement but 
contradicts itself in various places.
The constitution includes a mandate to abide by the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) to create a prosperous and progressive society based on social justice, protec-
tion of human dignity, protection of human rights, and the realisation of democracy to ensure 
national unity and equality among all ethnic groups and tribes (Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights and Labor 2013). 
While the constitution declares Islam to be the religion of the State, other religions can 
be freely practised, according to the law. While there is personal freedom, however, this does 
not extend to lawmaking itself. The constitution states that no law can go against the tenets of 
Islam, and in cases where the law is unclear, the Hanafi law1  can be applied. Thus, religious 
freedom is limited. Also, while local representatives can follow any religion, the President has 
to be a Muslim. Thus, non-Muslim minorities like Hindus and Sikhs have little to no political 
or electoral power. Even among Muslims, Sunni Muslims are dominant over Shia Muslims. Te-
nets of Islam must also be followed in the field of education, thus limiting access to education 
for Hindus and Sikhs, who reportedly face severe discrimination from staff and peers; although 
non-Muslims are not constitutionally required to study Islam in public schools (Bureau of De-
mocracy, Human Rights and Labor 2017). 
1. Hanafi is one of the four schools of jurisprudence that Sunni Muslims follow. Where laws 
are unclear, it is applied to everyone in Afghanistan, regardless of whether they are Sunni 
Muslims or not.
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Although the constitution does not define the minorities in Afghanistan, it does refer to 
14 ethnic groups that it says constitute the nation of Afghanistan: Balochs, Tajiks, Hazaras, 
Uzbeks, Pashtuns, Turkmens, Pachais, Nuristanis, Aimaqs, Arabs, Qirgizs, Qizilbashs, Gujurs 
and Brahwuis (Article 6). The constitution grants rights based on a liberal principle of citizen-
ship. It considers all those who have citizenship of Afghanistan to be nationals of Afghanistan. 
It further stipulates that no member of the nation will be deprived of citizenship (Article 4), 
all the citizens have equal rights and duties, and discrimination is prohibited under the law 
(Article 22). The fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution include, amongst oth-
ers: non-discrimination and equality before the law; freedom of expression; and freedom of 
association. 
While these articles ensure individual freedom, however, the exclusion of the term minori-
ty, and the non-existence of any article explicitly acknowledging such groups, puts minorities 
in a position of vulnerability. They have little legal reprise when discriminated against because 
of their ethnicity or religion.
International obligations
While Afghanistan is party to most international covenants, much of its constitution and many 
of its laws do not comply with them. The constitution and penal code are silent on apostasy 
and blasphemy, which gives a free hand to the courts, relying on their interpretation of Sharia 
Law, to punish alleged offences, even where this violates the country’s international commit-
ments to the UDHR and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Shayegan & 
Ammaar 2016).
Recently, though, efforts have been taken by the Government of Afghanistan to build its 
capacity to meet its obligations under the Rome Statute and to facilitate national investigations 
Conventions
Year acceded/ ratified 
by Afghanistan
International Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (1948) 
1956
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (1965) 
1983
International Convention on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
(1966) 
1983
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (1979)
2003
International Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) 1994
ILO 111 - Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
Convention (1958)
1969
ILO 169 – Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (1989) Not ratified
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 1983
Table 1. International Obligations of Afghanistan on Minority Rights 
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and prosecutions of ICC crimes. The Government of Afghanistan has promulgated a new Penal 
Code that now explicitly incorporates Rome Statute crimes and specifies superior responsibil-
ity as an available mode of liability. The Penal Code Bill was adopted by Afghanistan’s parlia-
ment in May 2017 (International Criminal Court 2017). 
Laws on non-discrimination and affirmative 
action for minorities 
The criminal code states that persons who forcibly stop the conduct of rituals of any religion, 
those who destroy or damage ‘permitted places of worship’ (a term not defined by the code) 
where religious rituals are conducted, and those who destroy or damage any sign or symbol 
of any religion are subject to imprisonment for six months to one year or a fine starting from 
30,000 afghanis. 
The law, pursuant to a 2016 presidential decree, mandates that an added seat in parlia-
ment’s lower house be reserved for a member of the Hindu and Sikh community. Four seats in 
parliament are also reserved for Ismailis. 
Apart from this, there is little legal reprieve for a member of a minority. They can at most 
be protected under personal rights. In practice, however, they do not seek justice in court out of 
fear of being discriminated against. The International Religious Freedom Report 2017 (Bureau 
of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 2017) stated that Hindus, Sikhs and Shia minorities 
felt unsafe seeking justice from courts, as they would be treated unfairly.
The effort on minority rights
The Afghan Professional Alliance for Minority Rights (APAMR) is a civil society organisation 
that has consistently worked towards minority rights, but there is little effort on the govern-
ment’s part. 
Programmes and schemes
No specific schemes and programmes have been launched for minorities, mainly because eth-
nicities and religions have not been categorised as minorities. 
Structures: commissions, ministries, and departments.   
The government established the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission 
(AIHRC) as part of the Bonn Agreement. The commission is composed of nine commissioners, 
each of whom covers a particular human rights area. The commission has distinct units for 
women’s rights, children’s rights and the rights of persons with disabilities, but it does not have 
a particular unit or commissioner on minority rights. The government also did not publish the 
commission’s 800-page report on the status of minorities in 2012, fearing severe backlash.
Amongst government ministries, the Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs aims to ensure 
and promote harmony amongst all sects of Islam and also arranges for pilgrimages of Hindus 
and Sikhs. 
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Conclusion and Recommendations
As can be seen from the above summary, there is a need for the government of Afghanistan to 
define a set of minority rights to protect minority groups from discrimination and harassment.
On the commitment front, Afghanistan must ratify all relevant international obligations 
on socio-economic rights and align its national laws to international covenants. Internal dis-
crepancies in the constitution and laws of Afghanistan need to be resolved so as to not contra-
dict or supersede other rights and laws. 
The government must also make an effort to identify minorities for special attention. It 
should collect data, and track and publish reports on these identified minority groups. Tar-
geted programmes and policies with adequate budgets and resources allotted to them would 
help to economically uplift such groups. Special vehicles to implement such plans would be 
desirable.
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Introduction
Nepali society is characterised by religious as well as caste and ethnic diversity, which man-
ifests itself in differing sociocultural practices and socioeconomic disparity. There are 125 
caste/ethnic groups in Nepal that speak 123 languages and follow 10 different religions (CBS 
2012). Geographically there is great variation in terrain with mountains in the north, hills in 
the centre, and Tarai plains in the south. The country’s population is equally divided between 
the hill and mountain regions and the southern Tarai plains. While the Tarai has always been 
home to indigenous peoples (namely Tharu and a few other small minorities), others also live 
there, such as Madhesis, including both Hindu caste groups and Muslims, and people from 
the hill and mountain areas.
In terms of population, no caste/ethnic group is in the majority in Nepal. The hill-origin 
people – specifically the Khas Aryas, who have roots in and practice Hinduism – are the dom-
inant minority (28.8%), followed by the Madhesis, and Janajatis (CBS 2012) (see Table 1 for 
disaggregation and explanation). Adivasi Janajatis fall outside the Hindu classificatory system 
and claim to be indigenous to the land.
The diversity of people in terms of religion, geography, caste and ethnicity has given rise 
to huge variations between and within these groups. In a country of 26,494,504 people, Hin-
duism is followed by majority of the population (81.3%), from all ethnicities and regions (CBS 
2012). Even within Hinduism, there is a great divide based on a social hierarchy defined by 
caste rules and practices that have trickled down to socioeconomic standing. Buddhism is the 
dominant minority religion (9%), followed by Islam (4.4%), Kirant (3.1%), and Christianity 
(1.4%). Prakrit is practised by slightly more than 100,000 people, Bon by 13,000, Jainism by 
3000, Bahai by 1000, and Sikhism by 600 (CBS 2012). Among the minority religions, Muslims 
and Christians are often discriminated against in the mainly Hindu milieu.
While peoples of Nepal speak more than 123 languages, Nepali is the official language of 
Nepal, as well as the lingua franca. Other languages have been discouraged in the past, when 
the state was trying to establish the idea of a unified and uniform Nepal, a defining feature of 
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Groups Population 
Adivasi Janajatis (Mountain, 
Hill, and Tarai)
35.8% (26.1% Hill-Mountain Janajatis and 9.7% Tarai Janajatis)
Madhesis 14.8% (including the Tarai Dalits in this category would take this num-
ber to 19.3% of the total population of Nepal;  if Tarai Janajatis are also 
included, it would be 29.0%) 
Dalits (Madhesi Dalits and 
Hill Dalits)
12.6% (8.1% Hill Dalits and 4.5% Tarai Dalits)
Muslims1 4.4%
Christians 1.4%
 
1. Muslims are the only religious group considered an ethnicity in Nepal.
Table 1. Groups Identified as Minorities 
Source: Adapted from Sharma (2014) and CBS (2012)
which was a common language.
Recognising the multi-religious, multi-lingual, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural character of 
Nepal, Article 18 of the 2015 Constitution guarantees the right to equality for all citizens. The 
state cannot discriminate against citizens on the grounds of religion, race, sex, caste, tribe or 
ideological conviction. No person can be discriminated against as untouchable on the basis 
of their caste, be denied access to any public places, or be deprived of the use of public utili-
ties. However, historical and cultural practices of discrimination remain and constitutional 
principles and provisions have not been implemented fully in practice. This failure has wider 
repercussions, both for affected communities and for society as a whole.
The main brunt of discrimination is borne by women. Their access to education and health-
care services and their presence in socioeconomic and political arenas is minimal compared to 
men’s (NWC and Shantimalika 2013), but this also varies based on caste, ethnicity, geography, 
and religion (DfID and World Bank 2006). Many women from the ‘lower castes’ fare worse 
than their ‘upper-caste’ counterparts. While women’s representation in elected governments 
at the federal, state and parliamentary levels has increased considerably since elections were 
held in 2017 under the 2015 Constitution, there are great internal variations amongst different 
castes/ethnicities and religions.
There is no official census on the LGBT+ community. Nepal’s Supreme Court had mandat-
ed in 2007 that the government include a third gender option in all its documents, but this has 
not yet been executed completely. There have been some advances, however, such as passports 
providing the option to identify oneself as belonging to a third gender. Activists have remained 
frustrated with the lack of implementation of a recommendation – made by a committee man-
dated by the Supreme Court in the same 2007 ruling – that the government should recognise 
same-sex relationships (Human Rights Watch 2017 and UNDP and USAID, 2014). The new 
civil code that went into effect in August 2018 has once again remained silent on the question 
of same-sex marriage.
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Table 2. Language Domain Index 
Caste/Ethnicity Mother Tongue Education Linguistic Access Language 
Domain
Mean (%) Index Mean (%) Index Index
Bahun 97.1 .9710 100.0 1.0000 0.9855
Chhetri 96.5 .9651 99.8 .9978 0.9814
Tarai Brahman/
Rajput
2.5 .0255 89.2 .8916 0.4586
Tarai Other Caste 3.2 .0323 92.8 .9280 0.4802
Hill Dalit 97.0 .9704 99.8 .9978 0.9841
Tarai Dalit 1.2 .0122 94.5 .9451 0.4787
Newar 0.0 .0000 28.5 .2848 0.1424
Mountain/Hill 
Janajati
10.2 .1018 32.9 .3287 0.2152
Tarai Janajati 3.3 .0334 74.6 .7456 0.3895
Muslim 52.9 .5290 71.7 .7171 0.6230
Others 5.1 .0509 4.6 .0459 0.0484
Total 45.4 0.4537 75.4 .7543 0.6040
This summary seeks to explore the state of minorities in a country where, while there is 
no explicit majority, the dominant minorities in terms of caste/ethnicity, religion, and region 
continue to have power. Two developments between the Interim Constitution of 2007 and the 
Constitution of 2015, which have a direct bearing on minorities, need to be highlighted. The 
first is the electoral system. The 2007 Interim Constitution was the first to introduce propor-
tional representation (PR), along with the plurality voting system, in a bid to increase repre-
sentation from marginalised groups. While the 2015 Constitution retained PR in the parlia-
mentary elections, the proportion of PR seats decreased from the 56% in the 2007 constitution 
to 40%. The same formula was applied for the newly formed provincial assemblies as well, 
while specific quotas were set aside for women, Dalit women, and specified minority groups in 
the local bodies. Secondly, Nepal was declared a secular state through a parliamentary declara-
tion in May 2006, and that status was reaffirmed in the 2007 Interim Constitution. While the 
2015 Constitution did not change the country’s secular status, it watered it down somewhat by 
defining secularism as ‘religious, cultural freedom including protection of religion and culture 
handed down from time immemorial’ (Constitution of Nepal 2015). The Sanskrit term sanatan 
is used to convey the meaning of ‘time immemorial’, but is generally understood to be related 
to Hinduism.
Socio-economic Status
In 2014 a pioneering study on the status of social inclusion in Nepal was undertaken by the 
Central Department of Sociology/Anthropology (CDSA), Tribhuvan University, which showed 
widespread disparity between and within caste/ethnic groups. The following tables, taken 
from the Nepal Multidimensional Social Inclusion Index (CDSA 2014) and supported by data 
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from the 2011 Census, underscore the poor performances of minorities along various socio-
economic indices.
Language
The 2015 Constitution recognises that ‘all languages spoken as the mother tongues in Nepal 
are the languages of the nation’. Constitutional recognition of the country’s languages grants 
them greater importance, since language is not only a ‘key element of culture and a marker of 
identity’ but it also provides a ‘structured set of social conditions for living’, with education in 
the mother tongue bolstering access to education and employment (CDSA 2014).
The language index shows that the Hindu caste groups of Bahun/Chhetri and Hill Dalits 
record the highest scores, since Nepali is their mother tongue. Interestingly, although Muslims 
have their own mother tongue, Urdu, they score highly in this index because of their access 
to mother-tongue education (in madrasas) and linguistic access. Mountain/Hill Janajati and 
Newars, who have their own mother tongues, score the lowest in language index. Tarai Brah-
mans/Rajputs, despite their high socioeconomic status, score quite low in the language index, 
as their languages are not recognised in terms of mother-tongue education. Thus, despite the 
provision of mother-tongue education being a crucial element of the government’s 2003 ‘Ed-
ucation for All: National Plan of Action’, mother-tongue teaching is not seen in practice. Thus, 
mother-tongue education is not only a reflection of the ‘classroom learning situation’ but also 
‘represents power relations between the social groups…, placing the dominant language group 
at the top’ (L. Ghimire n.d.)
Religion
Despite more than 10 religions being practised in Nepal, the 2015 Constitution did not fully 
commit to secularisation in the real sense, as demonstrated by its definition of secularism. 
In a country like Nepal with diverse religious groups, it is important for the state to provide 
equal treatment to each religion. The religion index ‘measures the extent to which religions are 
treated equally, and the recognition of religions by the state’ (CDSA 2014). As the table below 
shows, there is religious discrimination of varying degrees against all groups except for Ba-
huns. However, it also shows that there is a great variety of religious followings and practices, 
even among those groups falling within the caste hierarchy. Discrimination in these cases is 
intersectional; for example, Chhetri and Hill Dalits also face religious discrimination. Surpris-
ingly, despite the fact that they are Hindus, Tarai Brahmans/Rajputs also score very low in the 
index, which probably reflects the fact that their religious festivals are provided less state rec-
ognition than the Hindu practices of the hills. That Dalits and the Muslims are discriminated 
against is a reflection of their ‘low’ caste status for the former and prejudice against the latter. 
Though there is no data on Christians, as a community that believes in and often practises 
proselytisation, they fall foul of the 2015 Constitution, which criminalises any act to ‘convert 
another person from one religion to another or any act or conduct that may jeopardise other’s 
religion’ (Constitution of Nepal 2015). Since the promulgation of the 2015 Constitution, there 
have been reports of Christians being harassed, arrested, and jailed, and rising anti-Christian 
sentiments (USCIRF 2017).
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Social Categories Religion 
recognized
Absence of religious 
discrimination
Recognition 
of religion
Mean (%) Index Mean (%) Index Index
Bahun 98.7 .9868 100.0 1.0000 .9934
Chhetri 97.1 .9713 98.2 .9818 .9766
Tarai Brahman/Rajput 77.1 .7712 96.3 .9633 .8673
Tarai Other Caste 77.1 .7712 96.3 .9633 .8673
Hill Dalit 97.9 .9792 92.4 .9236 .9514
Tarai Dalit 96.1 .9610 90.4 .9038 .9324
Newar 92.1 .9211 94.7 .9474 .9342
Mountain/Hill Janajati 93.3 .9331 93.5 .9350 .9340
Tarai Janajati 91.9 .9195 97.4 .9744 .9469
Muslim 90.8 .9079 92.1 .9211 .9145
Others 96.5 .9647 98.9 .9889 .9768
Total 94.4 .9443 96.0 .9600 .9521
Table 3. Recognition of Religion Index by Broader Social Group
Education
Educational attainment is an outcome of and predictor for higher socioeconomic status. Higher 
educational attainment results in increased economic access, such as gainful employment and 
opportunities other than subsistence agriculture, which is the main occupation of marginalised 
caste/ethnic groups. Educational attainment seems to be a factor of sociocultural status. Tarai 
Dalits and Muslims, who are at the bottom of the social hierarchy, score the lowest education 
domain while caste/ethnic groups such as Bahuns and Chhetris score the highest. Janajati and 
Tarai caste/ethnic groups also score low on this index, indicating that a mother tongue other 
than Nepali is connected to a low score on this index.
Poverty
The CDSA study (2014) uses three indicators of food consumption, food sufficiency, and ele-
mentary occupations to calculate the non-poverty index, with higher values implying a more 
favourable situation. While there is great variation among the caste/ethnic groups, the table 
below clearly shows that Bahuns have the highest index score and Tarai Dalits have the lowest. 
Poverty results in other long-term, adverse life outcomes, as will be shown later.
Standard of Living
The CDSA (2014) study calculates the standard of living index based on housing conditions, 
living conditions, use of cooking fuel, and access to electricity. The standard of living index 
shows that the Bahun have the highest living standards and the Dalits have the lowest living 
standards. It is interesting to note that the standard of living of Chhetris, a Hindu caste group, 
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Caste/ 
Ethnicity
Food 
expenditure
Food 
sufficiency
Elementary 
occupations
Non- 
poverty
Mean Index Mean Index Mean Index Index
Bahun 35.5 0.9204 89.5 0.8947 4.9 0.9553 0.9235
Chhetri 36.4 0.8987 68.1 0.6815 5.9 0.9389 0.8397
Tarai Brahman/Rajput 46.4 0.6607 89.3 0.8934 10.5 0.8675 0.8072
Tarai Other Caste 54.4 0.4689 81.7 0.8168 14.5 0.8052 0.6970
Hill Dalit 53.3 0.4956 56.0 0.5598 11.9 0.8457 0.6337
Tarai Dalit 64.2 0.2357 53.7 0.5369 42.5 0.3683 0.3803
Newar 44.7 0.7000 90.8 0.9079 6.3 0.9335 0.8471
Mountain/Hill Janajati 45.3 0.6857 79.4 0.7938 4.1 0.9682 0.8159
Tarai Janajati 51.9 0.5296 84.4 0.8441 16.1 0.7797 0.7178
Muslim 53.7 0.4863 72.4 0.7237 18.4 0.7450 0.6517
Others 42.7 0.7475 96.7 0.9668 12.0 0.8444 0.8529
Total 44.5 0.7059 77.1 0.7706 10.5 0.8674 0.7813
Table 5. The Non-Poverty Index 
Source: CDSA 2014
is comparable to that of Tarai Janajati and Muslims, perhaps due to the Chhetris’ lack of access 
to commercial cooking fuel and electricity. This shows that there is great disparity even among 
the Hindu ‘upper caste’ groups.
Economic Access 
The economic access index calculates the average of the sum of average landholdings and 
non-agricultural employment. Thus, this index measures access to land, non-agricultural em-
ployment, productive resources and non-economic activity. The table below shows that caste/
ethnic groups from the Tarai have a higher economic access index, which is mainly due to their 
landholdings but is also indicative of their access to non-agricultural economic activities. Hill 
and Tarai Dalits have the lowest economic access index, suggesting a lack of land ownership 
and a lack of access to other economic activities, resources and means.
Women bear the largest burden of work in Nepal. Their contribution to the agricultural 
sector is 44.8% and their total labour participation is 54.3% (CBS 2012). Additionally, women 
provide about 64% of unpaid family labour (CBS 2014). Women’s access to economic means 
in terms of land ownership is limited, with only 19.71% of women owning land (CBS 2012), 
even though 76.61% of women are involved in agriculture-related occupations (CBS 2014a), 
with a rising trend of the ‘feminisation of agriculture’ (CBS 2014b). This also varies by location, 
however, in that women in the mountains have the lowest ownership of land and those in the 
Tarai have the highest (CBS 2012). This underscores significant cultural and social barriers to 
women’s land ownership (Dhakal et al, 2016). In addition, ‘women’s economic activity is still 
low in non-agriculture sectors, possibly due to a lack of education and a tradition of working 
in agriculture’ (CBS 2014b).
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Caste/Ethnicity Average landholding Non-agricultural 
employment
Economic Access
Mean (ha.) Index Mean (%) Index Index
Bahun 0.3290 0.3173 41.7 0.4169 0.3671
Chhetri 0.3517 0.3434 28.5 0.2848 0.3141
Tarai Brahman/
Rajput
0.5799 0.6056 60.4 0.6039 0.6048
Tarai Other Caste 0.6317 0.6651 33.0 0.3304 0.4977
Hill Dalit 0.2153 0.1866 30.7 0.3073 0.2469
Tarai Dalit 0.1895 0.1569 30.5 0.3051 0.2310
Newar 0.1822 0.1486 61.2 0.6121 0.3803
Mountain/Hill 
Janajati
0.3554 0.3476 27.2 0.2719 0.3098
Tarai Janajati 0.5800 0.6057 30.3 0.3033 0.4545
Muslim 0.4110 0.4115 42.2 0.4223 0.4169
Others 0.2226 0.1951 74.4 0.7440 0.4695
Total 0.3750 0.3702 33.4 0.3337 0.3519
Table 7. Economic Access Index 
According to the 2011 Census, Chhetris, with one of the lowest landholdings, are mostly 
engaged in agriculture-related employment (68.59%); for Janajatis, it is 70%; for Hill Dalits, 
62%; for Newars, 35.21%; and for Tarai Brahmans, 34.42% (CBS 2014b). This indicates that, 
while geography is a factor in determining who is engaged in agriculture, it is also a case of 
‘traditional’ economic roles and opportunities for employment in other fields.
Economic Status
The economic status of caste/ethnic groups is a composite index derived from non-poverty, 
standard of living, and economic access. There is great variation in economic wellbeing among 
caste/ethnic groups, even within the same geography. While Tarai Brahmans/Rajputs have the 
highest economic status, Tarai Dalit have the lowest. 
Women bear the largest burden of work in Nepal. Their contribution to the agricultural 
sector is 44.8% and their total labour participation is 54.3% (CBS 2012). Additionally, women 
provide about 64% of unpaid family labour (CBS 2014). Women’s access to economic means 
in terms of land ownership is limited, with only 19.71% of women owning land (CBS 2012), 
even though 76.61% of women are involved in agriculture-related occupations (CBS 2014a), 
with a rising trend of the ‘feminisation of agriculture’ (CBS 2014b). This also varies by location, 
however, in that women in the mountains have the lowest ownership of land and those in the 
Tarai have the highest (CBS 2012). This underscores significant cultural and social barriers to 
women’s land ownership (Dhakal et al, 2016). In addition, ‘women’s economic activity is still 
low in non-agriculture sectors, possibly due to a lack of education and a tradition of working 
in agriculture’ (CBS 2014b).
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Health and Nutrition
Health and nutrition are taken as both indicators and outcomes of socioeconomic access and 
status. As seen in the table below, the ‘upper castes’ can better afford health services and safe 
water, and thus have higher child survival rates and can be inferred to be generally healthier. 
Tarai Dalits, on the other hand, score the lowest on access to drinking water and modern toilet 
facilities. Tarai Janajatis and Muslims also score low in this domain.
According to the 2011 Census, Chhetris, with one of the lowest landholdings, are mostly 
engaged in agriculture-related employment (68.59%); for Janajatis, it is 70%; for Hill Dalits, 
62%; for Newars, 35.21%; and for Tarai Brahmans, 34.42% (CBS 2014b). This indicates that, 
while geography is a factor in determining who is engaged in agriculture, it is also a case of 
‘traditional’ economic roles and opportunities for employment in other fields.
Economic Status
The economic status of caste/ethnic groups is a composite index derived from non-poverty, 
standard of living, and economic access. There is great variation in economic wellbeing among 
caste/ethnic groups, even within the same geography. While Tarai Brahmans/Rajputs have 
the highest economic status, Tarai Dalit have the lowest.
Health and nutrition
Health and nutrition are taken as both indicators and outcomes of socioeconomic access and 
status. As seen in the table below, the ‘upper castes’ can better afford health services and safe 
Caste/Ethnicity Economic 
Access Index
Non-poverty 
Index
Standard of 
Living Index
Economic 
Dimension Index
Bahun 0.3671 0.9235 0.5237 0.6048
Chhetri 0.3141 0.8397 0.3930 0.5156
Tarai Brahman/
Rajput
0.6048 0.8072 0.4818 0.6313
Tarai Other Caste 0.4977 0.6970 0.3944 0.5297
Hill Dalit 0.2469 0.6337 0.2895 0.3900
Tarai Dalit 0.2310 0.3803 0.2802 0.2972
Newar 0.3803 0.8471 0.6138 0.6137
Mountain/Hill 
Janajati
0.3098 0.8159 0.4071 0.5109
Tarai Janajati 0.4545 0.7178 0.3826 0.5183
Muslim 0.4169 0.6517 0.3928 0.4871
Others 0.4695 0.8529 0.5666 0.6297
Total 0.3519 0.7813 0.4131 0.5155
Table 8. The Economic Dimension Index
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water, and thus have higher child survival rates and can be inferred to be generally healthier. 
Tarai Dalits, on the other hand, score the lowest on access to drinking water and modern toilet 
facilities. Tarai Janajatis and Muslims also score low in this domain.
Efforts and Results
Nepal has taken various steps to ensure equality and non-discrimination. Along with constitu-
tional provisions, Nepal is also a party to several international conventions to ensure non-dis-
crimination.
While Nepal sends periodic reports on the status of these conventions, it has been widely 
recognised that implementation is lacking. For instance, an alternative report submitted to 
the United Nations shows that observance of these conventions is especially inadequate and 
flawed when it comes to minorities, and that the police force often uses certain laws to harass 
minorities (LAHURNIP et al, 2018).
The government has enacted several laws and policies against discrimination, as well as 
for affirmative action for minorities, including the following:
• While Nepal’s Supreme Court has mandated that the government have the third gender 
option on all its forms, this has not yet been completely executed. There has also been no 
implementation of the 2007 Supreme Court-mandated committee recommendation that 
the government recognise same-sex relationships.
• With a view to accelerating compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights (ICCPR), the Government of Nepal has many legal and constitutional mea-
sures in place, including the 2015 Constitution, the Act Relating to Children 1992, the 
Organisations Registration Act 1978, the Civil Liberties Act 1954, the Local Self- Gover-
nance Act 1999, the Torture Related Compensation Act 1996, the Legal Aid Act 1998, the 
Nepal Treaties Act 1990, the Prisons Act 1962 and Prisons Rules 1963, the Human Rights 
Commission Act 1997, and the Kamaiya Labour (Prohibition) Act 2002. However, Nepal 
still faces growing expectations among the people for the effective implementation of the 
ICCPR (NHRC 2007). 
Conventions Year ratified
Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) 1969
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1966) 1971
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) 1991
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) 1991
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) 1990
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (1958) (ILO 111) 1974
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (1989) (ILO 169) 2007
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966) 1991
Table 10. International Conventions Ratified by Nepal Government
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• The Child Labour (Regulation and Prohibition) Act 2000 recognises the rights of children 
to identity and non-exploitation, regardless of their background. There have also been 
significant efforts to promote minority rights through programmes and schemes. 
• The Government of Nepal endorsed the National Employment Policy in March 2015 to 
promote equal access to employment opportunities and inclusive workspaces. 
• The 5th Human Rights National Action Plan 2015–2020 is being implemented to ensure 
that the ICCPR is executed at the ground level, but the implementation aspect of this action 
plan has been very weak and most district administrators and relevant agencies are found to 
be unaware of issues relating to the action plan and its implementation (INSEC 2017). 
• The national campaign Education for All (EFA) began in 2004 with three primary ob-
jectives: building institutional capacity in education at all levels of decision-making (e.g., 
central, district, and school); improving the efficiency and quality of education services; 
and improving equity in access to education, especially for girls and students from disad-
vantaged communities. It is a fairly successful programme, which has helped reduce un-
equal access to education to some extent. One of the goals of School Sector Development 
Plan (SSDP) 2016–2023 is to ‘ensure that the education system is inclusive and equitable 
in terms of access, participation and learning outcomes, with a special focus on reducing 
disparities among and between groups having the lowest levels of access, participation and 
learning outcomes’ (MoE 2016). However, it remains to be seen whether resources will be 
provided for the effective implementation of this goal.
• Gender Equality and Social Inclusion (GESI) units have been established in a number of 
key ministries to address the issue of marginalisation of different social groups, but they 
have neither clear, separate funding nor actual executive power.
From an institutional point of view, the government has established regular courts, human 
rights committees and human rights cells within the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Nepal Army 
and the Nepal Police, while the National Human Rights Commission, the National Women’s 
Commission, and the National Dalit Commission are other constitutional bodies that ensure 
access to justice.
While there have been various efforts, a major problem is that the executive wing of the 
government and the police forces do not always comply with the Supreme Court’s judgments. 
Most of the police force are from the upper castes and often refuse to file reports of discrimina-
tion in order to ‘maintain social order’. Minorities are also constantly under threat due to the 
frequent misuse of laws for the gain of the dominating castes. Dalits, women, and other minori-
ties are highly underrepresented in the police force, and the system is quite exclusionary (Sob, 
2007). Apart from this, lack of proper funding and clear executional power to the commissions 
and units that have been formed is also a major problem. Often, key stakeholders have also not 
been consulted when forming policies. An example would be the Education for All Campaign, 
where due to a lack of funding, most of it was centralised, rendering the campaign unable to 
focus on key issues local to particular regions. There was little real consultation with represen-
tative groups, notably teachers, communities, and organisations concerned with the rights of 
minorities (Vaux et al, 2006). Similar concerns plague other programmes and committees.
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Conclusion and Recommendations
In recent years, especially since the promulgation of the 2015 Constitution, the Hindutva 
movement has gained a lot of following, and extreme right-wing and left-wing ideologies have 
been taking centre stage in Nepal. The USCIRF Report (2017) lists this as one of the reasons 
why religious freedom is under threat. Muslims and Christians have already been experiencing 
the effects of this. According to the report, they feel less safe in recent years than in the previous 
decade. 
Madhesis have sought greater participation since 2007, setting the foundation for feder-
alism. While their agitations were initially started to gain greater political representation and 
power, it has turned into a broader social movement about their unequal standing compared to 
hill-origin populations and the need for economic and social inclusion and support. However, 
the movement itself has since seen ruptures, mainly because of the unclear composition of 
the Madhesis (Y. Ghimire, 2015). The Madhesis consist of different castes from diverse so-
cioeconomic, ethnic and religious backgrounds – a situation that has contributed to multiple 
factions and regional parties wanting to gain dominance. However, while the increasing power 
of regional parties may contribute to higher representation of the dominant population of that 
particular region, the lowest of the low castes are still under threat. In addition, the current 
factionalism in the movement may lead to stronger nationalist and homogenising ideologies 
taking the forefront. This will only further hurt the cause of minority rights and socioeconomic 
access in the country.
It becomes apparent that, while there is a significant movement towards social and civil 
rights in Nepal, the execution of such laws and schemes has been severely lacking. Hopefully, 
with reserved quotas guaranteeing greater representation, the power of such groups will in-
crease, enabling them to implement adequate policies.
In the case of religious freedom, laws that prohibit religious freedom need to be revoked, 
but more importantly, the government’s security organs have to be checked in order to prevent 
minority religions and castes from being harassed. Policies that ensure equal economic and 
social access, such as the Human Rights Action Plan and the Education for All Scheme, need 
to be revised, taking into account the experience and needs of minorities. They also need to be 
funded properly and proportionately.
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Status of Ratification of 
Treaties in South Asia
Annexure III A
International treaties ratified by each country1
Afghanistan
Treaty Signature Date Ratification Date, 
Accession Date (a), 
Succession Date (d) 
CAT- Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
04 Feb 1985 01 April 1987
CAT-OP- Optional Protocol of the CAT 17 April 2018 (a)
CCPR- International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights
24th Jan 1983 (a)
CCPR-OP2-DP- Second Optional Protocol to the 
CCPR aiming at the abolition of the death penalty
CED- Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance
CEDAW- Convention on the Elimination of All  
Forms of Discrimination against Women
14 August 1980 05 Mar 2003
CERD- International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
06 July 1983 (a)
CESCR- International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 
24 Jan 1983
CMW- International Convention on the Protection 
of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families
CRC- Convention on the Rights of the Child 27 Sep 1990 26 Mar 1994
CRC-OP-AC- Optional Protocol to the CRC on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict
24 Sep 2003 (a)
CRC-OP-SC- Optional Protocol to the CRC on 
the sale of children, child prostitution and child 
pornography
19 Sep 2002 (a)
CRPD- Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities
18 Sep 2012 (a)
1. Source: OHCHR Interactive Dashboard. http://indicators.ohchr.org/
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Bangladesh
Treaty Signature Date Ratification Date, 
Accession (a), 
Succession (d) Date
CAT- Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
05 Oct 1998 (a)
CAT-OP- Optional Protocol of the CAT
CCPR- International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights
06 Sep 2000 (a)
CCPR-OP2-DP- Second Optional Protocol to the 
CCPR aiming at the abolition of the death penalty
CED- Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance
CEDAW- Convention on the Elimination of All  
Forms of Discrimination against Women
06 Nov 1984 (a)
CERD- International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
11 June 1979 (a)
CESCR- International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 
05 October 1998 (a)
CMW- International Convention on the Protection 
of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families
7 Oct 1998 24 Aug 2011
CRC- Convention on the Rights of the Child 26 Jan 1990 03 Aug 1990
CRC-OP-AC- Optional Protocol to the CRC on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict
06 Sep 2000 06 Sep 2000
CRC-OP-SC- Optional Protocol to the CRC on 
the sale of children, child prostitution and child 
pornography
06 Sep 2000 06 Sep 2000
CRPD- Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities
09 May 2007 30 Nov 2007
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Treaty Signature Date Ratification Date, 
Accession (a), 
Succession (d) Date
CAT- Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
CAT-OP- Optional Protocol of the CAT
CCPR- International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights
CCPR-OP2-DP- Second Optional Protocol to the 
CCPR aiming at the abolition of the death penalty
CED- Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance
CEDAW- Convention on the Elimination of All  
Forms of Discrimination against Women
07 Jul 1980 31 Aug 1981
CERD- International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
CESCR- International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 
CMW- International Convention on the Protection 
of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families
CRC- Convention on the Rights of the Child 04 Jun 1990 01 Aug 1990
CRC-OP-AC- Optional Protocol to the CRC on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict
15 Sep 2005 09 Dec 2009
CRC-OP-SC- Optional Protocol to the CRC on 
the sale of children, child prostitution and child 
pornography
15 Sep 2005 26 Oct 2009
CRPD- Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities
21 Sep 2010
Bhutan
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Treaty Signature Date Ratification Date, 
Accession (a), 
Succession (d) Date
CAT- Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
CAT-OP- Optional Protocol of the CAT
CCPR- International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights
CCPR-OP2-DP- Second Optional Protocol to the 
CCPR aiming at the abolition of the death penalty
CED- Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance
CEDAW- Convention on the Elimination of All  
Forms of Discrimination against Women
07 Jul 1980 31 Aug 1981
CERD- International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
CESCR- International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 
CMW- International Convention on the Protection 
of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families
CRC- Convention on the Rights of the Child 04 Jun 1990 01 Aug 1990
CRC-OP-AC- Optional Protocol to the CRC on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict
15 Sep 2005 09 Dec 2009
CRC-OP-SC- Optional Protocol to the CRC on 
the sale of children, child prostitution and child 
pornography
15 Sep 2005 26 Oct 2009
CRPD- Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities
21 Sep 2010
India
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Maldives
Treaty Signature Date Ratification Date, 
Accession (a), 
Succession (d) Date
CAT- Convention against Torture and Other Crel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
20 Apr 2004 (a)
CAT-OP- Optional Protocol of the CAT 14 Sep 2005 15 Feb 2006
CCPR- International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights
16 Sep 2006 (a)
CCPR-OP2-DP- Second Optional Protocol to the 
CCPR aiming at the abolition of the death penalty
CED- Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance
06 Feb 2007
CEDAW- Convention on the Elimination of All  
Forms of Discrimination against Women
01 Jul 1993 (a)
CERD- International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
24 Apr 1984 (a)
CESCR- International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 
19 Sep 2006 (a)
CMW- International Convention on the Protection 
of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families
CRC- Convention on the Rights of the Child 21 Aug 1990 11 Feb 1991
CRC-OP-AC- Optional Protocol to the CRC on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict
10 May 2002 29 Dec 2004
CRC-OP-SC- Optional Protocol to the CRC on 
the sale of children, child prostitution and child 
pornography
10 May 2002  10 May 2002
CRPD- Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities
02 Oct 2007 05 Apr 2010
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Treaty Signature Date Ratification Date, 
Accession (a), 
Succession (d) Date
CAT- Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
14 May 1991 (a)
CAT-OP- Optional Protocol of the CAT
CCPR- International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights
14 May 1991 (a)
CCPR-OP2-DP- Second Optional Protocol to the 
CCPR aiming at the abolition of the death penalty
04 Mar 1998 (a)
CED- Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance
CEDAW- Convention on the Elimination of All  
Forms of Discrimination against Women
05 Feb 1991 22 Apr 1991
CERD- International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
30 Jan 1971 (a)
CESCR- International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 
14 May 1991 (a)
CMW- International Convention on the Protection 
of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families
CRC- Convention on the Rights of the Child 26 Jan 1990 14 Sep 1990
CRC-OP-AC- Optional Protocol to the CRC on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict
08 Sep 2000 03 Jan 2007
CRC-OP-SC- Optional Protocol to the CRC on 
the sale of children, child prostitution and child 
pornography
08 Sep 2000  20 Jan 2008
CRPD- Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities
03 Jan 2008 07 May 2010
Nepal
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Pakistan
Treaty Signature Date Ratification Date, 
Accession (a), 
Succession (d) Date
CAT- Convention against Torture and Other Crulel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
17 Apr 2008 23 Jun 2010
CAT-OP- Optional Protocol of the CAT
CCPR- International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights
17 Apr 2008 23 Jun 2010
CCPR-OP2-DP- Second Optional Protocol to the 
CCPR aiming at the abolition of the death penalty
CED- Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance
CEDAW- Convention on the Elimination of All  
Forms of Discrimination against Women
12 Mar 1996 (a)
CERD- International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
19 Sep 1966 21 Sep 1966
CESCR- International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 
03 Nov 2004 17 Apr 2008
CMW- International Convention on the Protection 
of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families
CRC- Convention on the Rights of the Child 20 Sep 1990 12 Nov 1990
CRC-OP-AC- Optional Protocol to the CRC on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict
26 Sep 2001 17 Nov 2016
CRC-OP-SC- Optional Protocol to the CRC on 
the sale of children, child prostitution and child 
pornography
26 Sep 2001  05 Jul 2011
CRPD- Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities
25 Sep 2008 05 Jul 2011
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Treaty Signature Date Ratification Date, 
Accession (a), 
Succession (d) Date
CAT- Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
03 Jan 1994 (a)
CAT-OP- Optional Protocol of the CAT 05 Dec 2017 (a)
CCPR- International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights
11 Jun 1980 (a)
CCPR-OP2-DP- Second Optional Protocol to the 
CCPR aiming at the abolition of the death penalty
CED- Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance
10 Dec 2015 25 May 2016
CEDAW- Convention on the Elimination of All  
Forms of Discrimination against Women
17 Jul 1980 05 Oct 1981
CERD- International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
18 Feb 1982 (a)
CESCR- International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 
11 Jun 1980 (a)
CMW- International Convention on the Protection 
of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families
11 Mar 1996 (a)
CRC- Convention on the Rights of the Child 26 Jan 1990 12 Jul 1991
CRC-OP-AC- Optional Protocol to the CRC on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict
21 Aug 2000 08 Sep 2000
CRC-OP-SC- Optional Protocol to the CRC on 
the sale of children, child prostitution and child 
pornography
08 May 2002  22 Sep 2006
CRPD- Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities
30 Mar 2007 08 Feb 2016
Sri Lanka
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Women’s Status in 
South Asia
Annexure III B 
Nepal
Table 1: Female Population Status in South Asian Countries
Country Female Population 
(% of total) 2015
Sex Ratio (male:female) 
2015
Sex Ratio at Birth  
(2010–2015) male:female
Afghanistan 48.4 1.07 1.06
Bangladesh 49.5 1.02 1.05
Bhutan 46.3 1.16 1.04
India 48.2 1.07 1.11
Maldives 49.9 1.00 1.10
Nepal 51.5 0.94 1.06
Pakistan 48.6 1.06 1.09
Sri Lanka 51.8 0.93 1.04
Source: South Asia and the Future of Pro-People Development Poverty Report 2016.
Source: Human Development in South Asia Report 2015.
Figure 1: Life Expectancy at Birth in South Asia
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Table 2: Comparison of women’s literacy and share in parliaments
Country Share of seats in 
parliament (% held 
by women) 2014
Adult literacy rate 
(% of population aged 
15 and above)
Adult female literacy rate 
(% of females aged 
15 and above
Afghanistan 27.6 31.7 (2011) 17.6 (2011)
Bangladesh 20 59.7 (2013) 56.2 (2013)
Bhutan 8.3 52.8 (2005) 38.7 (2005)
India 12.2 69.3 (2011) 59.3 (2011)
Maldives 5.9 98.4 (2006) 98.4 (2006)
Nepal 29.5 59.6 (2011) 48.8 (2011)
Pakistan 19.7 56.8 (2012) 43.1 (2012)
Sri Lanka 5.8 91.2 (2010) 89.9 (2010)
Source: South Asia and the Future of Pro-People Development Poverty Report 2016.
Figure 2: The share of men and women in paid, unpaid and 
total work in South Asia
Source: Human Development in South Asia Report 2015.
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Figure 3: Secondary education gross enrolment rate in 
South Asia 1980-2010
Source: Human Development in South Asia Report 2015.
Source: Human Development in South Asia Report 2015.
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Table 4: Estimated female-to-male earned income 2004-2006
Country 2004 2006
Pakistan 0.33 0.29
Bangladesh 0.56 0.46
Nepal 0.50 0.50
Sri Lanka 0.57 0.42
313
Source: South Asia and the Future of Pro-People Development Poverty Report.
Source: South Asia and the Future of Pro-People Development Poverty Report 2016.
General Socioeconomic 
Indicators
Annexure III C 
Nepal
Table 1: Social protection index scores in South Asian countries
Country SPI Score 
(2015)
SP Exp. as 
% of GDP
Social 
Insurance
Social 
Assistance
Labour Market 
Programmes
Afghanistan 0.046 2.0 0.003 0.05 0.096
Bangladesh 0.043 1.4 0.02 0.038 0.164
Bhutan 0.036 1.2 0.025 0.055 0.001
India 0.051 1.7 0.019 0.044 0.25
Maldives 0.073 3.0 0.052 0.131 0.011
Nepal 0.068 2.1 0.098 0.055 0.014
Pakistan 0.047 1.3 0.104 0.017 0.012
Sri Lanka 0.121 3.2 0.227 0.036 0.037
The higher the index, the higher the performance of the country. It has three components: 
Social Insurance, Social Assistance and Labour Market Programmes.
Figure 1: School Dropout trends by caste and ethnicity 
(Grades 1-8) in India, 2004 -10
India
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Table 2: Literacy rates in Pakistan by province and gender (%), 2013 
Rural Urban
Punjab
Male 65 80
Female 41 70
Sindh
Male 58 85
Female 23 70
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK)
Male 70 80
Female 31 51
Balochistan
Male 60 79
Female 16 44
Source: Human Development in South Asia Report 2015.
Minority Representation in Parliament
Year of Election Total members 
in parliament
Minority 
members
% of existing 
religious minorities
Remarks
1st parliament, 1973 300 + 15 12 (3.8%) 0.0000823
2nd parliament, 1979 300 + 30 8 (2.48%) 0.000055
3rd parliament, 1986 300 + 30 7 (2.18%) 0.000046
4th parliament, 1988 300 + 30 4 (1.28%) 0.000027
5th parliament, 1991 300 + 30 11 (3.38%) 0.000075
6th parliament, 1996 
(15th Feb)
300 + 30 In this election, 
no major party 
except BNP par-
ticipated
7th parliament, 1996 300 + 30 14 (4.28%) 0.000096
8th parliament, 2001 300 8 (2.67%) 0..000055
9th parliament, 2008 300 + 45 14 (4.67%) 0.000096 All (Hindu) has 
been elected 
from the AL
Table 3: Elected religious minority representatives in 
parliament, Bangladesh
Source: Religion in South Asia 2010.
Bangladesh
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India
Part III of the constitution guarantees the fundamental rights of without any discrimination, 
whereas Article 29 proclaims the rights of minorities for maintaining their distinct culture 
or language. Similarly, Article 330 and 335 Part 16 reserve seats for the disadvantaged so-
cial groups (ST, SC and OBCs) in the government jobs and the Indian parliament. Under this 
system of compensatory discrimination, a total of 49.5% of the seats are reserved in the form 
of quotas for ST, SC and OBC people of which 27% are reserved for OBC  people, 15% for ST 
people and 7.5% for SC people. However, there are no special provisions provided for securing 
minority groups because the reservation policy tends to take in its domain the marginalised 
communities in a certain social group, not the religious or linguistic minority groups, until 
they fall in the category of the ST, SC or OBCs because of their disadvantaged position (State Of 
Indian Minorities: Impact On Domestic Politics And The Country’s Standing Abroad, Muham-
mad Shabbir and Gulandam Mian, 2015). 
Source: Human Development in South Asia Report 2015.
Table 4: Muslim elected members of different Lok Sabhas
Year No. of Muslims
1952 N/A
1957 23
1962 23
1967 29
1971 27
1977 32
1980 48
1984 41
1989 29
1990 27
1996 28
1998 29
1999 32
2004 36
2009 30
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TOTAL 
SEATS 
849
National assembly, 4 provincial assemblies
New Voters in 2018: 19,77MN
TOTAL 
CANDIDATES 
11,855
POLITICAL 
PARTIES IN 
FRAY 
107
TOTAL 
VOTERS 
105,96 MN
MALE 
59.22 MN
FEMALE 
46.73MN
Majority 
172
272 seats  
directly 
elected
3,459 candidates contesting for the National Assembly
60 seats  
reserved 
for women
10 seats  
open to reli-
gious 
minorities
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY: 342 SEATS
Pakistan
Source: Times of India 2018.
Out of ten seats reserved, more are filled by Hindus than Christians despite populations being 
proportional. In 2018, for the first time, a non-Muslim won through the general/direct election 
route.
Bhutan
Under Article 15 (4) (b) of the constitution, membership of a political party may not be based 
on “region, sex, language, religion or social origin.” (BTI Report, 2012). The constitution de-
clares that religion is separate from politics and that religious institutions and personalities 
must remain above politics. Thus, the state is officially secular. The personnel of religious 
institutions are prohibited from standing in elections or voting (BTI Report, 2018). Parties 
set up by ethnic-Nepali refugees are regarded as illegal and operate only outside the country 
(ibid). Neither national nor local elections have produced candidates willing to take up the Ne-
pali-Bhutanese issue (despite the election of some Nepali-Bhutanese people), and it is a taboo 
topic in the public domain. 
Source: Susan Banki, 2014  http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/05/29/finding-a-future-for-minori-
ties-in-bhutans-emerging-democracy/)
Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI)  https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/
country-reports/detail/itc/BTN/
Pakistan election in numbers
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Research Methodology
and Data Collection Plan
Mostly desk research, using a variety of public sources, with the possibility also to admin-
ister light surveys to document minority voices. As helpful tool for evidence gathering, be-
low, longlist of indicators, grouped in ‘outcome’, ‘commitment’ and ‘effort’, by the principal 
socio-economic rights, and corresponding sources of data as well as methods, drawing exten-
sively from UN’s Human Rights Indicators framework. 
Annexure IV A
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UN Mechanisms
Below is a summary of international treaties and links to corresponding treaty bodies and doc-
umentations of their reporting cycles:
Data collection, Methods 
and Sources
Annexure IV B 
Nepal
Treaty Treaty body Weblink* 
International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), 1966
UN Committee on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR)
http://ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cescr/
pages/cescrindex.aspx
International Convention on 
Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (ICERD), 
1965
UN Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination. (CERD)
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
bodies/cerd/
Convention on Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDW), 1979
UN Committee on the Elim-
ination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW)
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/
daw/cedaw/committee.htm
Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC), 1989
UN Committee on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC)
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/
CRC/Pages/CRCIndex.aspx
Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD), 2006
UN Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD)
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/
CRPD/Pages/CRPDIndex.aspx
The International Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Mem-
bers of their Families, 1990
UN Committee on Migrant 
Workers (CMW)
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/
CMW/Pages/CMWIndex.aspx
ILO 111 Discrimination 
Convention
ILO http://www.ilo.org/dyn/
normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEX-
PUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_
CODE:C111
ILO 169 Convention Con-
cerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples, 1989. 
ILO http://www.ilo.org/dyn/
normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEX-
PUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_
CODE:C169
* Each site has an archive of useful documents related to reporting cycle, mostly under ‘The 
Work of the Committee’ section, categorised by: ‘State party reports’, ‘List of Issues’, ‘Replies 
to List of Issues (LoIs)’, and ‘Concluding Observations’, or, in case of ILO, under ‘Key Docu-
ments’, as ‘Country profiles’. 
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The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) reviews the human rights record of UN member coun-
tries, providing states the opportunity to declare what actions they have taken to improve the 
human rights situation in their country, and to fulfil their human rights obligations. There have 
been two cycles of UPRs, the 2nd having just concluded. This is the most relevant for us. 
All UPR related documents are available at the link below, arranged by country: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/Documentation.aspx
Minority Voices 
Foreground minority voices – experiences, opinions, and thoughts – to fill the large gap in dis-
aggregated statistical data, and to contribute to bolstering minorities’ autonomy and agency. 
This mostly relates to the ‘outcome’ part of evidence, although some also relate to ‘process’. 
Hear minorities on:
- The status of minorities as they see it, especially on socio-economic rights
- How minorities themselves differ, in their situation and access to rights 
- Why minorities do poorly (across the 3 rights clusters – income and health, education)?
- What and who is to blame, according to them? 
- The role of discrimination in undermining minorities’ access to rights
- How discrimination plays out in different contexts: different minorities/rights arenas
- Their hopes and expectations for change
- What community/civil society efforts are underway/needed  
Use a combination of tools:
a. Organise focus group discussion, with a cross section of respondents, to understand 
 minorities’ opinions about discrimination, its drivers and processes, and ways to 
 challenge it. 
- Organise at least one FGD, towards the end of the data collection process
- 10-15 respondents; mix of minority communities; mix of female and male; mix of old 
and young; from different walks of life and different socio-economic strata.
  (Alternatively, and preferably, organise multiple FGDs with different mixes of audiences 
– for example, one for women only from all minorities; another, youth; another only the 
most marginalised minority group,etc.)  
- Moderator to facilitate discussions, by introducing the topic, prompting questions, 
facilitating the discussion, and encouraging debate, all to elicit opinions and view-
points.  
b. Preferably, and if resources allow, also a light perception survey 
- to complement FGDs (the qualitative understanding of the phenomenon of discrim-
ination that the FGD would enable, with quantitative insights on incidence, helping 
generalise findings for the entire population) 
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- Method: For ease, ideally online/web-survey, but where there is a large set of poten-
tial respondents without access to Internet, also face-to-face survey. Whether it would 
have to be one or the other, or can be both, needs to be confirmed. 
- Sample size: small (250-400), representative of the population, both minorities (and 
the different groups within that) and the population as a whole, suitably weighted.  
- Sampling: (i) mix of minority and non-minority: to get a handle on varying percep-
tions about discrimination (existence, drivers and processes); and (ii) mix of minori-
ty groups: to understand intra-minority experiences of discrimination (in specific 
instances such as – work, housing, basic services, education and health care), and 
opinions about challenging discrimination. 
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South Asia’s minorities - religious and linguistic groups, especially 
women and those from Dalit backgrounds amongst them, and the many 
indigenous/adivasi communities, besides sexual minorities - make up 
disproportionate numbers of the poor and excluded in each country, 
suffering discrimination in the socio-economic sphere and denial of the 
most basic human rights.
South Asia State of Minorities Report 2018: Exploring the Roots seeks 
to examine the reasons for the poor outcomes for minorities in South 
Asia, shining a light specifically on their socio-economic situation and 
their access to rights and opportunities. South Asia demonstrates amply 
how failures to prevent exclusion and discrimination against specific 
minorities have opened the way for graver abuse of human rights and 
violence against those groups.
The South Asia State of Minorities Report is planned as a tool for 
advocacy. It is hoped that the periodic reports on outcomes for minorities 
and the quality of state provisioning for them, will spur public debate on 
the subject in the region and create the conditions for state parties and 
the SAARC to agree to give serious consideration to issues of minorities 
and how to deliver for them. The purpose of the project is about promoting 
citizenship, a central challenge of the ‘deepening democracy’ agenda 
in the region. This publication is the second in the series following the 
publication of South Asia State of Minorities Report 2016: Mapping the 
Terrain.
The South Asia Collective is a group of human rights activists and 
organisations that dream of a just, caring and peaceful South Asia, that 
came together in December 2015 to document the condition of the 
region’s minorities – religious, linguistic, ethnic, caste and gender, among 
others – hoping this would help in better outcomes for South Asia’s many 
marginalised groups.
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